Which is more likely: CSA Victory or Nazi Victory

[History Learner]

American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942 by Richard W. Steele:

By mid-February the shallowness of public commitment to the war had become a subject of national public discussion. To those who enthusiastically supported the administration's view of the war-and this included most of the nation's publicists and opinion leaders-America seemed indifferent.7 The consensus was that after the initial shock of Pearl Harbor had worn off, the public had lapsed into complacency. Public officials, reporters, and other "informed observers" described Americans as "smug," "slothful," and "asleep." According to Time, while people did what they were called upon to do, "they showed little excitement about the war."8 Poor morale generated the most intense public discussion early in 1942, but the problem remained a matter of official concern throughout the year.​

​

For example, in September OWI reported that "few citizens are fully supporting the war effort. Most are content with the same comfortable ruts." The report said that not many Americans were convinced the military situation was critical or doubted eventual victory. Moreover, although most expected the war to last several years, few thought the struggle would entail great sacrifices. This and other analyses of morale noted a popular disposition to concentrate on the advantages accruing to various sectors of the populace and to conclude that others were exploiting the war for selfish advantage.​

By 1945, war exhaustion had likewise set in and the JCS was getting very concerned about it. To quote from Michael D. Pearlman's "Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization and the Atomic Bomb":

"Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5"​

A Germany in control of Europe to the A-A Line or the Urals is one that has the capacity to inflict millions of casualties upon the Anglo-Americans, with its strategic position affording it the ability to last until the late 1940s at the least. In such a scenario, I find it highly likely that public support for the war will give out long before Germany is crushed under foot. Whether or not Churchill or FDR hate Hitler is irrelevant in the face of public opinion, given the former two are, after all, in charge of Democracies. Said public opinion was also not universally behind the war in the way we view today, but was in fact much more fickle and this directly shaped Allied operational planning as a result.

 

[jmc247]

Why would Britain/France ally with a nation that was nakedly racist even for its day?

Many in London in terms of power politics preferred to have two America's which they could play against each other.

The Emancipation Proclamation impacted that by making the outward appearance of the war different abroad which made the international recognition calculation harder to achieve for the South. Post January 1st 1863, Richmond needed more then a Saratoga somewhere to rope in Britain and France.

The South underachieved.
Despite their lost cause reputation, Confederate leadership was poor everywhere, and and certainly didn't do the staff work well like the Union. The costly offensives into the North, which wouldn't have been so bad, if they raided and got out, but then launching frontal offensives at Antietam and Gettysburg after met by superior Union numbers or any place really was a bad idea.

Richmond trying for a rope a dope strategy, war of attrition, and insurgency would have made for an interesting timeline. Lee didn't want it to be a war of attrition as the North had the bulk of the industry, more population, and the South wasn't totally mobilized given the four million slaves in the South.

For a grinding war of attrition he had no success getting Richmond to alter its policy in that area or to utilize the whole manpower of the region.

Spoiler

I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social institutions. I believe that with proper regulations they can be made efficient soldiers. They possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled with the moral influence which in our country the white man possesses over the black, furnish an excellent foundation for that discipline which is the best guarantee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be to secure their fidelity.

There have been formidable armies composed of men having no interest in the cause for which they fought beyond their pay or hope of plunder. But it is certain that the surest foundation upon which the fidelity of an army can rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar hardships and privations, is the personal interest of the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an interest we can give our negroes by giving immediate freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of the war to the families of those who discharge their duties faithfully (whether they survive or not), together with the privilege of residing at the South. To this might be added a bounty for faithful service.

We should not expect slaves to fight for prospective freedom when they can secure it by going to the enemy, in whose service they will incur no greater risk than in ours. The reasons that induce me to recommend the employment of negro troops at all render the effects of the measures I have suggested upon slavery immaterial, and in my opinion the best means of securing the efficiency and fidelity of this auxiliary force would be to accompany the measure with a well-digested plan of gradual and general emancipation.

As that will be the result of the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if the enemy succeed, it seems to me advisable to adopt it at once, and thereby secure all the benefits that will accrue to our cause. The employment of negro troops under regulations similar in principle to those above indicated would, in my opinion, greatly increase our military strength, and enable us to relieve our white population to some extent. I think we could dispense with our reserve forces except in cases of necessity.

It would disappoint the hopes which our enemies base upon our exhaustion, deprive them in a great measure of the aid they now derive from black troops, and thus throw the burden of the war upon their own people. In addition to the great political advantages that would result to our cause from the adoption of a system of emancipation, it would exercise a salutary influence upon our whole negro population, by rendering more secure the fidelity of those who become soldiers and diminishing the inducements to the rest to abscond.

I can only say, in conclusion, that whatever measures are to be adopted should be adopted at once. Every days delay increases the difficulty. Much time will be required to organize and discipline the men, and action may be deferred until it is too late.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. Lee, General.

"General Lee's Views on Enlisting the Negroes," Century Magazine (August 1888) - Encyclopedia Virginia

Century Magazine (August 1888), Page 599 General Lee’s Views on Enlisting the Negroes. [The subjoined letters, which contain their own explanation, are sent to us through the Hon. W. L. Wilson, M. C., by the Hon. Andrew Hunter, of Charlestown, West Virginia, who assures us that they have not...

www.encyclopediavirginia.org

 

[Catspoke]

A Germany in control of Europe to the A-A Line or the Urals is one that has the capacity to inflict millions of casualties upon the Anglo-Americans, with its strategic position affording it the ability to last until the late 1940s at the least. In such a scenario, I find it highly likely that public support for the war will give out long before Germany is crushed under foot. Whether or not Churchill or FDR hate Hitler is irrelevant in the face of public opinion, given the former two are, after all, in charge of Democracies. Said public opinion was also not universally behind the war in the way we view today, but was in fact much more fickle and this directly shaped Allied operational planning as a result.

Casualties may be double, 300,000 extra, not Millions, I think the Allies will adjust, Not invade Iwo Jima or Okinawa, or even the Philippines, let the bombers and submarines do their work and let Japan wither on the vine.

In Europe:
The Allies can take North Africa just the same, cutting Axis sea supply as per OTL. (might take longer though), close the ring.
The Allies could just skip Italy and Sicily if the Germans stack up divisions there.
Northern France would be a grinder in 1944, but with a huge fleet parked off shore and aircraft stacked up high, I can't see the Germans pushing the Allies back into the sea. This is where the bulk of the extra Allied casualties are. But once northern France is liberated, a huge Allied bombing campaign can launch and the Allies can avoid invading Germany until 1946 if they have too.

 

[History Learner]

Casualties may be double, 300,000 extra, not Millions, I think the Allies will adjust, Not invade Iwo Jima or Okinawa, or even the Philippines, let the bombers and submarines do their work and let Japan wither on the vine.

In Europe:
The Allies can take North Africa just the same, cutting Axis sea supply as per OTL. (might take longer though), close the ring.
The Allies could just skip Italy and Sicily if the Germans stack up divisions there.
Northern France would be a grinder in 1944, but with a huge fleet parked off shore and aircraft stacked up high, I can't see the Germans pushing the Allies back into the sea. This is where the bulk of the extra Allied casualties are. But once northern France is liberated, a huge Allied bombing campaign can launch and the Allies can avoid invading Germany until 1946 if they have too.

See the Victory Plan of 1941 for the counter-argument:

 

[Captain Homicide]

Casualties may be double, 300,000 extra, not Millions,

The Wehrmacht would have to lose all of their skill, experience and quality equipment and everything to go the WAllies’ way for any war with a Reich that controls virtually all of Europe to result in the level of casualties that you describe.

IOTL almost 4 million German soldiers died on the Eastern Front along with almost a million Axis soldiers and collaborators compared to less than 500,000 German deaths suffered in Western Europe and Italy.

Do you really believe that in a scenario where Germany has more resources, strategic depth, time to complete the Atlantic Wall, a better Luftwaffe, much better anti air defenses and a hardened combat force that hasn’t lost millions of their best soldiers and tens of thousands of aircraft, armored vehicles and artillery in Eastern Europe would only cause the WAllies marginally more casualties than they did IOTL?

With all the advantages no Eastern Front would give the Reich I think 2x US/UK casualties as OTL is a conservative estimate. Anything less is a gross underestimation of Nazi capability and a gross overestimation of WAllied strength. Even with atomic bombs any war against the Third Reich in its prime would be an extremely brutal and tedious slog.

 

[TxAggie]

For a grinding war of attrition he had no success getting Richmond to alter its policy in that area or to utilize the whole manpower of the region.

Spoiler

I think, therefore, we must decide whether slavery shall be extinguished by our enemies and the slaves be used against us, or use them ourselves at the risk of the effects which may be produced upon our social institutions. I believe that with proper regulations they can be made efficient soldiers. They possess the physical qualifications in an eminent degree. Long habits of obedience and subordination, coupled with the moral influence which in our country the white man possesses over the black, furnish an excellent foundation for that discipline which is the best guarantee of military efficiency. Our chief aim should be to secure their fidelity.

There have been formidable armies composed of men having no interest in the cause for which they fought beyond their pay or hope of plunder. But it is certain that the surest foundation upon which the fidelity of an army can rest, especially in a service which imposes peculiar hardships and privations, is the personal interest of the soldier in the issue of the contest. Such an interest we can give our negroes by giving immediate freedom to all who enlist, and freedom at the end of the war to the families of those who discharge their duties faithfully (whether they survive or not), together with the privilege of residing at the South. To this might be added a bounty for faithful service.

We should not expect slaves to fight for prospective freedom when they can secure it by going to the enemy, in whose service they will incur no greater risk than in ours. The reasons that induce me to recommend the employment of negro troops at all render the effects of the measures I have suggested upon slavery immaterial, and in my opinion the best means of securing the efficiency and fidelity of this auxiliary force would be to accompany the measure with a well-digested plan of gradual and general emancipation.

As that will be the result of the continuance of the war, and will certainly occur if the enemy succeed, it seems to me advisable to adopt it at once, and thereby secure all the benefits that will accrue to our cause. The employment of negro troops under regulations similar in principle to those above indicated would, in my opinion, greatly increase our military strength, and enable us to relieve our white population to some extent. I think we could dispense with our reserve forces except in cases of necessity.

It would disappoint the hopes which our enemies base upon our exhaustion, deprive them in a great measure of the aid they now derive from black troops, and thus throw the burden of the war upon their own people. In addition to the great political advantages that would result to our cause from the adoption of a system of emancipation, it would exercise a salutary influence upon our whole negro population, by rendering more secure the fidelity of those who become soldiers and diminishing the inducements to the rest to abscond.

I can only say, in conclusion, that whatever measures are to be adopted should be adopted at once. Every days delay increases the difficulty. Much time will be required to organize and discipline the men, and action may be deferred until it is too late.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. E. Lee, General.

"General Lee's Views on Enlisting the Negroes," Century Magazine (August 1888) - Encyclopedia Virginia

Century Magazine (August 1888), Page 599 General Lee’s Views on Enlisting the Negroes. [The subjoined letters, which contain their own explanation, are sent to us through the Hon. W. L. Wilson, M. C., by the Hon. Andrew Hunter, of Charlestown, West Virginia, who assures us that they have not...

www.encyclopediavirginia.org

Now THAT would be interesting.

I see where Lee's coming from in thinking as a general, but I can't imagine arming and training slaves and freeing their families would result in anything but undermining the "cause" the CSA fought for in the best case, and exploding into a very capable slave revolt in an easily-foreseeable worst case.

 

[Catspoke]

The Wehrmacht would have to lose all of their skill, experience and quality equipment and everything to go the WAllies’ way for any war with a Reich that controls virtually all of Europe to result in the level of casualties that you describe.

IOTL almost 4 million German soldiers died on the Eastern Front along with almost a million Axis soldiers and collaborators compared to less than 500,000 German deaths suffered in Western Europe and Italy.

Do you really believe that in a scenario where Germany has more resources, strategic depth, time to complete the Atlantic Wall, a better Luftwaffe, much better anti air defenses and a hardened combat force that hasn’t lost millions of their best soldiers and tens of thousands of aircraft, armored vehicles and artillery in Eastern Europe would only cause the WAllies marginally more casualties than they did IOTL?

With all the advantages no Eastern Front would give the Reich I think 2x US/UK casualties as OTL is a conservative estimate. Anything less is a gross underestimation of Nazi capability and a gross overestimation of WAllied strength. Even with atomic bombs any war against the Third Reich in its prime would be an extremely brutal and tedious slog.

Some assumptions about the 2X OTL casualties number.

a) The Germans have committed the bulk of their forces to the eastern front though the end of 1942
b) At the end of 1942 the Germans have seizing Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Grozny, Murmansk have eliminated Soviet ability to do major counter attacks, but the Germans would still have to keep huge armies in the east, maybe 80% of the army, 50 % of the air-power vs OTL. Attrition will still happen.
c) The Allies can clear North Africa as OTL, where the Axis is limited by supply just the same, so the Allies suffer no extra casualties vs OTL really through May 1943
d) Invading Sicily/Italy/Capturing Rome/Gothic Line is always optional, the Allies can stop at whatever point they want if they think casualties will be high.
e) Invading France is not optional however, it reduces the submarine threat, limits the V and bomber attacks on England, weakens the German early warning air defense system, and has tremendous diplomatic value. Casualties will be higher, but the front is only so big and the Germans can only supply so much in the line in western France.

 

[Captain Homicide]

the Germans would still have to keep huge armies in the east, maybe 80% of the army, 50 % of the air-power vs OTL.

It would take a much smaller combat force to occupy the USSR and fight partisans than it took to wage the actual war against the Red Army. In the fall of 1942 the Axis had 3.5 million troops fighting the USSR. With no USSR most of those could be either demobilized or stationed in Western Europe. I can’t see the Axis needing to plausibly station any more than 1.5 million troops in the East (with the number steadily decreasing as the partisans become less and less of a threat).

The Reich would have a large number of collaborators from the local population as well since more than a million Soviet citizens joined forces with Germany IOTL when they were losing. If given the choice between collaboration (especially among the Slavs deemed to have Aryan blood) and being shot, worked to death or starved a significant percentage would happily choose the former.

In late 1942 the Luftwaffe had 3,500 combat aircraft on the Eastern Front. Once the war is over and the main focus becomes fighting partisans (who would be more like rag tag bandits without outside support) there wouldn’t be a need for thousands of aircraft in the East (many of which wouldn’t be suitable for partisan warfare).

 

[Thomas1195]

If given the choice between collaboration (especially among the Slavs deemed to have Aryan blood) and being shot, worked to death or starved a

This is however borderline Notzis, because the number of Slavs who could be given a choice would be not that many. And when you give your enemy no choice other than death, watch out.

 

[Captain Homicide]

This is however borderline Notzis, because the number of Slavs who could be given a choice would be not that many. And when you give your enemy no choice other than death, watch out.

Of course once they enact Generalplan Ost they wouldn’t give every Slav the choice (since the goal was to kill most of them and enslave the rest) but even just a few million Slavic collaborators (even as Kapos like in the concentration camps) would help reduce the number of German soldiers needed to occupy the former USSR.

There’s also plenty of non Slavic groups (Cossacks, Tatars, Caucasians, Central Asians etc) in the USSR to draw manpower from as the Reich did IOTL.

 

[marathag]

t would take a much smaller combat force to occupy the USSR and fight partisans than it took to wage the actual war against the Red Army.

Though look how many troops were needed by the USSR to keep a lid on Afghanistan.
Occupied territory is a bitch. See Iraq and Vietnam, plus later Afghanistan for US examples.

 

[marathag]

but even just a few million Slavic collaborators (even as Kapos like in the concentration camps) would help reduce the number of German soldiers needed to occupy the former USSR.

Need someone to do production, otherwise it's empty land. Really can't kill them all. Would take decades for proper Volk to replace them.

 

[Catspoke]

It would take a much smaller combat force to occupy the USSR and fight partisans than it took to wage the actual war against the Red Army. In the fall of 1942 the Axis had 3.5 million troops fighting the USSR. With no USSR most of those could be either demobilized or stationed in Western Europe. I can’t see the Axis needing to plausibly station any more than 1.5 million troops in the East (with the number steadily decreasing as the partisans become less and less of a threat).

The Reich would have a large number of collaborators from the local population as well since more than a million Soviet citizens joined forces with Germany IOTL when they were losing. If given the choice between collaboration (especially among the Slavs deemed to have Aryan blood) and being shot, worked to death or starved a significant percentage would happily choose the former.

In late 1942 the Luftwaffe had 3,500 combat aircraft on the Eastern Front. Once the war is over and the main focus becomes fighting partisans (who would be more like rag tag bandits without outside support) there wouldn’t be a need for thousands of aircraft in the East (many of which wouldn’t be suitable for partisan warfare).

If the Germans could get that kind of victory over the Soviets you are right.

I am thinking the Germans can't achieve that level of victory over the USSR, they could take Moscow, Leningrad, etc... But the industry is in the Urals, and the Baku oil is unreachable, and there is more oil east of the Caspian.

There would be huge Soviet armies in the field, maybe you can hobble their economy with the loss of Moscow, its rail net etc.. Make it hard for the Soviets to counter attack like OTL. But there would still be a huge regular Soviet army in the field that can't be ignored.

 

[History Learner]

If the Germans could get that kind of victory over the Soviets you are right.

I am thinking the Germans can't achieve that level of victory over the USSR, they could take Moscow, Leningrad, etc... But the industry is in the Urals, and the Baku oil is unreachable, and there is more oil east of the Caspian.

There would be huge Soviet armies in the field, maybe you can hobble their economy with the loss of Moscow, its rail net etc.. Make it hard for the Soviets to counter attack like OTL. But there would still be a huge regular Soviet army in the field that can't be ignored.

90% of Soviet oil is in the Caucasus, and the Germans IOTL took Maikop and came within a hair of Grozny; not sure where the idea they can't get Baku is coming from. Most Industry as also located in the Moscow-Tula-Gorki Region, with Moscow and Leningrad both having like 25% of Soviet industry alone on top of the 40-50% the Germans took IOTL.

 

[LestWeForget]

I'm inclined to think CSA, but it seems the Nazis did come closer in real life. Britain and the SU were both close to defeat at certain points.

 

[dilbert113]

I think that a Nazi victory in WW2 is vastly more likely than a CSA victory during the Civil War. Factually, Germany did win WW2. . . and then, the German Government decided to lose it. After the Fall of France, something which happened so easily and quickly that Hitler himself was surprised, the war could, and should, have been near its end, at least in Europe. One can read non-fiction books talking about the attitude in England that after France fell, the war would soon be over with a negotiated peace. If Germany had simply not attacked the USSR, it is very likely that it would have won WW2. As others on this board have pointed out, absent a big ugly war with the USSR, Germany could simply have developed its V1 and V2 weapons systems and rocketed England at will. England did not have cruise missiles (V1) or primitive versions of ICBMs (V2) and Germany did. Frankly, without a second front, Germany's V3 weapon system, a huge rocket assisted cannon that could shell England might have been successful, along with increased submarine warfare to intercept ships from the US providing Leand-Lease aid to England. Folks tend to think of the US providing lend-lease aid to the USSR when in fact, the program started with Great Britain, and absent Operation Barberossa, L-L would have remained a US-Britain program. Germany chose to lose WW2, after winning mastery of Western Europe.

 

[dilbert113]

As to the CSA--unlike Germany during WW2, the CSA never had an opportunity to end the war on its own terms and be an independent nation. The CSA fought on the defensive from the first day of the war until the last. It never even existed as an independent nation in any meaningful sense, it was not recognized as a nation, it was an internal rebellion masquerading as a war between two nations (when only one nation involved in the conflict actually existed, and it steadily quashed the parts of itself which chose to rebel, much as a healthy body fights cancer cells.) It is vaguely possible that, if Lee's lost order had not been lost, if the CSA had managed a big victory during its first invasion of Union territory, the Battle of Antietam. . .which, IRL, led to the blo,odiest day of the Civil War. . .IF the CSA had won big at Antietam, and if the Union had therefore held off and not issued the Emancipation Proclamation, and IF Great Britain and France had recognized the CSA as an independent nation. . .which they might well have, they told the Confederates one more big victory and we will recognize you. . ..if all of those parts had fallen into place then maybe, just maybe, some sort of "peace" might have been made between the Union and the Confederacy. . .but. . .smart Union leadership would have seen this as a temporary setback, and over time re-absorbed the CSA . The comparison between Nazi Germany, a near super-power for a couple of years in the 1939-1942 time period, and the CSA, a nation that never existed or had a chance to exist, is inapposite.

 

[brunohusker]

Personally I think the Nazi's had the better chance but both were doomed from the start. The Confederacy had great leaders but was doomed. If Lincoln had wanted to commit to total war, he could have destroyed the CSA.

 

[TDM]

I think that a Nazi victory in WW2 is vastly more likely than a CSA victory during the Civil War. Factually, Germany did win WW2. . . and then, the German Government decided to lose it. After the Fall of France, something which happened so easily and quickly that Hitler himself was surprised, the war could, and should, have been near its end, at least in Europe. One can read non-fiction books talking about the attitude in England that after France fell, the war would soon be over with a negotiated peace. If Germany had simply not attacked the USSR, it is very likely that it would have won WW2.

Only attacking the USSR was always the plan, to not attack the USSR is to make them Notzis. it wasn't just the Nazis either the German army command was fine with the idea in abstract as well

Ultimately they'd just done in 1940 in 2 months what they failed to do in 4 years 1914-18, the expectation is they'll be able to do in 1941 what they did in 1914-17

As others on this board have pointed out, absent a big ugly war with the USSR, Germany could simply have developed its V1 and V2 weapons systems and rocketed England at will. England did not have cruise missiles (V1) or primitive versions of ICBMs (V2) and Germany did. Frankly, without a second front, Germany's V3 weapon system, a huge rocket assisted cannon that could shell England might have been successful, along with increased submarine warfare to intercept ships from the US providing Leand-Lease aid to England. Folks tend to think of the US providing lend-lease aid to the USSR when in fact, the program started with Great Britain, and absent Operation Barberossa, L-L would have remained a US-Britain program. Germany chose to lose WW2, after winning mastery of Western Europe.

The V1's were quickly retro engineered IRL as well as counter measures developed against them, and the V2 was a white elephant compared to the V1). and if LL just becomes a US->-Britain programme that only increases teh support for Britain. The Submarines stop being such a threat after ASW tactics were developed. Pus of course both the UK and US are working on nuclear weapons (even if the UK project got folded into the US one) I'll take a actually working nuclear bombs in 1945 vs. any of the napkinwaffe.

But don't get me wrong Germany not invading the USSR does leave Germany stronger in Europe!

 

[samcster94]

Lebensraum was never a workable plan. Hitler’s idea of Germans settling the Ukraine region was complemented unrealistic and would have killed tens of millions of people.