Maybe those officers who destroyed Warsaw Uprising? They were pretty effective in murdering inhabitants and destroying buildings of the city.
See the point about Europe.Yeah, I am sure the citizens of Falluja and Raqqa will be very amused to hear that. Or the guys in Abu Gharaib.
The Serbian response to insurgency in Kosovo in 1998-99 was effective, but against the Western ideas of doing COIN - at least in Europe.
Any COIN is doomed to eventual failure, unless some of the basic grievances of the population are dealt with on a political level. This guy understood that and it were his landreforms that took away a major recruitment incentive of the Huk rebellion.Ramon Magsaysay From what I understand did wonders as secretary of defense, reorganizing the military and constabulary as well as dealing with the local population.
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/772685.pdf
The Soviets tried the method you described while also pouring in a lot of infrastructure investment funds, and in the end their client regime fell when the Scud stockpile was used up and no further support was forthcoming.Effective at quelling immediate insurgency? Sure. Effective at obtaining the Kosovars long-term legitimacy and loyalty to the Serbian regime? Not one bit. For the Serbs, who just wanted to maintain their control over Kosovo regardless of the locals wishes this might have been fine (save for the part where NATO came down on them) but it’s completely inappropriate for a nation-building exercise, for example, Afghanistan.