Which generals of the 1900 to the present were the best and worst at counterinsurgency?

Successful COIN is not and has never been about kill everyone and let God sought them out. Its about enforcing a desired political and social settlement. The Americans in Iraq and Vietnam wanted the occupied countries to be rebuilt in their image. The Pakistanis in FATA, the Nigerians in Bifaria and the Sri Lankans in Tamil areas wanted the locals to be good, loyal, peaceful tax paying citizens.
Killing every last man, woman, child and cat would not accomplish that.
 
The Serbian response to insurgency in Kosovo in 1998-99 was effective, but against the Western ideas of doing COIN - at least in Europe.

Effective at quelling immediate insurgency? Sure. Effective at obtaining the Kosovars long-term legitimacy and loyalty to the Serbian regime? Not one bit. For the Serbs, who just wanted to maintain their control over Kosovo regardless of the locals wishes this might have been fine (save for the part where NATO came down on them) but it’s completely inappropriate for a nation-building exercise, for example, Afghanistan.

I'm sure you could terrorize the Afghan’s into temporary submission with mass slaughter far short of total genocide, if you applied it efficiently, pervasively, and ruthlessly enough. The Afghans have always been willing to bow to force majeure. For a time.

The problem is this proposal has a massive logical disconnect. The US is not in Afghanistan to conquer and colonize them. The US wants the country to stabilize and settle down so the US can leave; the sooner the better. If you just bomb them until they stop resisting, that lack of resistance lasts no longer than when the last American soldier gets on the plane home. At which point, you now have a large body of bitter and twisted individuals with a ruined nation and a burning hatred of you.

Needless to say, this is not just immoral, but also counterproductive to what the US is actually trying to accomplish.
 
Ramon Magsaysay From what I understand did wonders as secretary of defense, reorganizing the military and constabulary as well as dealing with the local population.

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/772685.pdf
Any COIN is doomed to eventual failure, unless some of the basic grievances of the population are dealt with on a political level. This guy understood that and it were his landreforms that took away a major recruitment incentive of the Huk rebellion.
 
Effective at quelling immediate insurgency? Sure. Effective at obtaining the Kosovars long-term legitimacy and loyalty to the Serbian regime? Not one bit. For the Serbs, who just wanted to maintain their control over Kosovo regardless of the locals wishes this might have been fine (save for the part where NATO came down on them) but it’s completely inappropriate for a nation-building exercise, for example, Afghanistan.
The Soviets tried the method you described while also pouring in a lot of infrastructure investment funds, and in the end their client regime fell when the Scud stockpile was used up and no further support was forthcoming.

The main problem has historically been the fact that few armies are sent to invade places with a clear, well-defined postwar plan to stay as occupiers for decades, US after WW2 in Western Europe being an obvious and notable exception.
 
The US functionally conquered Western Europe and parts of E Asia post WW2. I often wonder if future historians will see post '45 as the start of US rule over Western Europe.
I mean, no one post 30BC in the real 30BC thought of the Republic of Rome having given way to Empire. We see Octavian dominance starting then, and his titles as basically politically necessary fictions.
 
Generals and armies do not defeat counter insurgency. They stabilise the situation for the politicians to come to some accommodation. The absence of this in South Vietnam and the search for a military solution instead made the UK shy off any involvement in that war.
 
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