Which defeat was worse for the Germans: Stalingrad or Tunisia?

[Deleted member 1487]

That's close to over a Million Axis German and Axis Allied soldiers plus support troops, equipment and supplies that were lost at both Africa and Stalingrad...woah.

The Stalingrad figure was for the entire Case Blue campaign minus the Caucasus casualties.

 

[zoomar]

The only argument for considering Tunisia a worse defeat than Stalingrad is that Tunisia was (and always should have been) a marginal theatre for the survival of the 3rd Reich. Thus the losses in men and material in North Africa were a waste to the basic aims of Germany. It was a bad loss in a theatre that hardly mattered...which actually magnifies the disaster.

Stalingrad was an battle involving Germany's most dangerous enemy, the defeat of which was absolutely essential if Germany was to have a chance of surviving. The losses, even if worse than in North Africa, were in support of Germany's chief and overriding war aim...the defeat and subjugation of the Soviet Union. A bad loss, but one that had to be fought...if not at Stalingrad someplace else in the USSSR.

 

[TFSmith121]

Yeah, multi-front wars

That's close to over a Million Axis German and Axis Allied soldiers plus support troops, equipment and supplies that were lost at both Africa and Stalingrad...woah.

Yeah, multi-front wars by a weaker coalition rarely end well for said coalition.

For the Germans to go to war against the British and French was confident; against the British and Soviets was overconfident; against the British, Soviets, and Americans was suicidal.

Best,

 

[Redbeard]

Tunis never got the intended strategic impact hoped for by the Allies, not at least the British.

Had the Axis been thrown out of N.Africa three years earlier it might have had a significant impact. Not in Europe but on events in the Far East, as Singapore/The British Empire would have been much easier to hold. El Alamein probably was more significant, as it gave the Allies their first large scale victory over German ground forces.

In contrast Stalingrad was a significant strategic defeat for Germany and a similar strategic victory for the Allies.

Not so much because the Germans lost the 6th Army there (not that different from all the other German armies on the Eastern Front and was soon replaced), but mainly because they were decisively defeated at a place and time where they really wanted and neeeded to win at any cost. Had they won, they would not only have had a fair chance of gaining access to important oilfields but also of cutting off the most important supply route to USSR of Lend-Lease, that through Persia.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A lot of good points here. While Stalingrad was the larger victory the two were much closer that the argument so far suggest.

This is very bad phrasing. The Deutsches Afrika Korps was just one element of Panzer Armee Afrika, which also included

• Italian X Corps
• Italian XX Motorized Corps
• Italian XXI Corps
• German 90th Light Afrika Division
• Italian 136th Motorized Infantry Division Giovani Fascisti
• Italian 17th Infantry Division Pavia

And PAA was only one element of Army Group Africa, which also included Fifth Panzer Army.

These included a very high portion of the best the Germans and Italians had. close to half were the elite or what passed for it in early 1943. The gross losses at Stalingrad or in the larger campaign included a higher portion of average and second or third rate formations. So, of the 300,000 (+-) lost in the Stalingrad pocket perhaps 30% or 100,000 might be considered elite or at least first class & in Tunisia close to half were of similar caliber. Also note that while two mechanized or panzer corps were lost inside the Stalingrad pocket the equivalent of three were lost in Tunisia.

In the large campaign the difference widen, but that leads to the question of if the wider campaign in the Med should be included with Tunisia?

Defining terms is good!

To many posts are cryptically brief.

If one is going to compare, the fighting in Tunisia from mid-January should be included - four months.

Numbers... Wiki sez the Tunisian campaign cost the Axis about 280,000 men (240,000 captured), plus about 1,700 aircraft, while Stalingrad cost 850,000 men and 1,000 aircraft. However, the Stalingrad figure is for the whole campaign, including the very severe fight to take the city; the manpower losses from LITTLE SATURN to the would be much less (500,000?). OTOH the Luftwaffe's heaviest losses came during the winter airlift to the pocket (650 out of 1,000?).

The aircraft numbers seem to be strictly combat losses. Have to check that, but my take is the overall operational/combat losses were about 2000 German aircraft during the Stalingrad campaign, & over 3000 in the Tunisian campaign. Toss in other Axis aircraft and the gap widens. I expect a really through count from German records of combat losses, accident losses, and airframes worn out though flight hours or sortie rates would reveal the Tunisian campain loss to be more than double that of the Stalingrad campaign.

Thus in material losses to the Axis, Stalingrad was worse.

The strategic effects of Tunisia may have been greater - but the Axis wasn't going to hold Tunisia regardless, nor Stalingrad.

So the question is: how much did the Axis lose by trying to hold Tunisia? Compared to trying to hold Stalingrad? I.e. which error cost more...

And I think Stalingrad wins.

In the case of Tunisa the losses could have been mitigated by running the campaing as a delaying actions vs a holding action. By using a economy of force doctrine from the start Kesselring could have delayed the Allies nearly as long with vastly fewer losses on the ground or at sea. The air losses may have been inevitable given Allied goals.

Converesly Given the stratigic intiative of the Red Army & its intent plus the general situation, it is a lot more difficult to see the same occuring with the two German army groups or at Stalingrad itself.