Which defeat was worse for the Germans: Stalingrad or Tunisia?

Which defeat was worse for the Germans: Stalingrad or Tunisia?

  • Stalingrad was the worst defeat

    Votes: 160 87.9%
  • Tunisia 1943 was the worst defeat

    Votes: 6 3.3%
  • They were equally horrible for the Germans

    Votes: 16 8.8%

  • Total voters
    182

CalBear

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Stalingrad easily. German ground losses were substantially more severe and air losses roughly as bad. The fact that the Eastern Front was the central conflict while North Africa was a sideshow,actually diminishes the importance of losses in the latter, not enhances it.

I'm not seeing how the Germans could have won after Stalingrad, unless the Soviets abruptly and inexplicably forgotten everything they had learn prior to it.

I didn't say that they could win if viewed objectively. I am referring to the way the troops, and field grade commanders saw the situation.
 
IMO? Absolutely.

There was noting to be gained in Africa, not for the Reich.

Didn't the Nazis have some Pie in the Sky geo-engineering concept for post-war, where they'd damn the Straits of Gibraltar and use the Med to turn the Sahara into arable farmland?
 
Superficially plausible but again more beneaith the surface

Stalingrad had effects far beyond the raw numbers. The effect on morale can't be underestimated. In selling the notion these guys are our inferiors Hitler created an expectations mindset that a German Army couldn't be beaten by them in such a way. Once they were it was a devastating blow to Axis morale in Europe.

Goebbels himself, who was after all the minister in charge of morale said that Tunisia was an equal blow

The term "Tunisgrad" was coined on the streetcorners of the Reich not in Allied propaganda.
 
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Hmm

IMO? Absolutely.

There was noting to be gained in Africa, not for the Reich.
So long as the Reich holds Sicily, and the Allies are not in Tunisia, the Reich can block the Mediterranean route to Suez, messing with the Allied logistics (especially those of the UK trying to run things to/from most of the British empire and dominions) on a global scale. Africa may be a side-show as far as conquests go, whilst fighting in Russia is on the menu, but as part of a blockade to Allied maritime transport, it seems to me highly valuable.
 
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CalBear

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So long as the Reich holds Sicily, and the Allies are not in Tunisia, the Reich can block the Mediterranean route to Suez, messing with the Allied logistics (especially those of the UK trying to run things to/from most of the British empire and dominions) on a global scale. Africa may be a side-show as far as conquests go, whilst fighting in Russia is on the menu, but as part of a blockade to Allied maritime transport, it seems to me highly valuable.

It might have been, provided you had inexhaustible resources. The Reich didn't. They Germans only got involved because the Italians were getting their clocks clean bu the British. It was a reflexive reaction, not a plan.

There was no way to move sufficient force to the theater, so the Heer had to send penny packets until sufficient forces were built up. They would then attack, rapidly use up their supplies and vehicles and be forced to withdraw, even if the offensive was not actively defeated. Even if one can justify the Western Desert (and IMO, it can't be justified) the decision to try to hold French North Africa was, simply put, asinine.

Put as clearly as possible, would it have been better to have an additional 300,000 Heer troops, 4,000 additional Luftwaffe aircraft, and around 1,000 tanks/assault guns holding the Don in place of the Croats, Romanians and Italians (all of whom were ill equipped, especially in heavy weapons) when Uranus kicked off or have them in North Africa cut off for any possible evac and resupply?
 
It might have been, provided you had inexhaustible resources. The Reich didn't. They Germans only got involved because the Italians were getting their clocks clean bu the British. It was a reflexive reaction, not a plan.

There was no way to move sufficient force to the theater, so the Heer had to send penny packets until sufficient forces were built up. They would then attack, rapidly use up their supplies and vehicles and be forced to withdraw, even if the offensive was not actively defeated. Even if one can justify the Western Desert (and IMO, it can't be justified) the decision to try to hold French North Africa was, simply put, asinine.

Put as clearly as possible, would it have been better to have an additional 300,000 Heer troops, 4,000 additional Luftwaffe aircraft, and around 1,000 tanks/assault guns holding the Don in place of the Croats, Romanians and Italians (all of whom were ill equipped, especially in heavy weapons) when Uranus kicked off or have them in North Africa cut off for any possible evac and resupply?

In the very least this makes my North African campaigns in Darkest Hour feel pretty accurate.
 
Which defeat was worse and had a greater negative impact upon the German war effort?

The defeat at Stalingrad due to the encirclement and resulting surrender?

Or the defeat and subsequent capture of the Afrika Korps in May 1943?
This is very bad phrasing. The Deutsches Afrika Korps was just one element of Panzer Armee Afrika, which also included

  • Italian X Corps
  • Italian XX Motorized Corps
  • Italian XXI Corps
  • German 90th Light Afrika Division
  • Italian 136th Motorized Infantry Division Giovani Fascisti
  • Italian 17th Infantry Division Pavia
And PAA was only one element of Army Group Africa, which also included Fifth Panzer Army.

Edit: I should have been more specific. By the defeat at Stalingrad I mean from the launch of Operation Uranus in November 1942 leading to the encirclement of German forces until the surrender of the 6th Army in February 1943. All casualties taken by the Germans in the time before that should not be counted.

Defining terms is good!

Stalingrad from encirclement to surrender (November 1942 to February 1943, about a four month period)

Or

The final two months of the Tunisian campaign, including the surrender/capture of the Afrika Korps (April 1943 to May 1943, a little less than two months)

If one is going to compare, the fighting in Tunisia from mid-January should be included - four months.

Numbers... Wiki sez the Tunisian campaign cost the Axis about 280,000 men (240,000 captured), plus about 1,700 aircraft, while Stalingrad cost 850,000 men and 1,000 aircraft. However, the Stalingrad figure is for the whole campaign, including the very severe fight to take the city; the manpower losses from LITTLE SATURN to the would be much less (500,000?). OTOH the Luftwaffe's heaviest losses came during the winter airlift to the pocket (650 out of 1,000?).

Thus in material losses to the Axis, Stalingrad was worse.

The strategic effects of Tunisia may have been greater - but the Axis wasn't going to hold Tunisia regardless, nor Stalingrad.

So the question is: how much did the Axis lose by trying to hold Tunisia? Compared to trying to hold Stalingrad? I.e. which error cost more...

And I think Stalingrad wins.
 
It might have been, provided you had inexhaustible resources. The Reich didn't. They Germans only got involved because the Italians were getting their clocks clean bu the British. It was a reflexive reaction, not a plan.

There was no way to move sufficient force to the theater, so the Heer had to send penny packets until sufficient forces were built up. They would then attack, rapidly use up their supplies and vehicles and be forced to withdraw, even if the offensive was not actively defeated. Even if one can justify the Western Desert (and IMO, it can't be justified) the decision to try to hold French North Africa was, simply put, asinine.

Put as clearly as possible, would it have been better to have an additional 300,000 Heer troops, 4,000 additional Luftwaffe aircraft, and around 1,000 tanks/assault guns holding the Don in place of the Croats, Romanians and Italians (all of whom were ill equipped, especially in heavy weapons) when Uranus kicked off or have them in North Africa cut off for any possible evac and resupply?

Put that like obviously the question is rhetorical but it would not have been a case of being simply able to shift those German troops to the Eastern Front. As you have pointed out their Balkan allies were largely rubbish (and the Bulgarians would likely jump ship at the first serious opportunity anyway) for modern warfare.

Yet the Balkans themselves were indispensable to the Germans, their chromium was coming from Turkey and much of their copper and I believe manganese from territories they more directly controlled. Not to mention the absolutely vital sites around Ploesti from whence came much of their oil even once synthetic production was up and running at strength.

Really one way or another the Mediterranean was going to be a sinkhole of German arms...mind you sending them across the water against the best wavy navies in the world was just a bit....daft.
 
I don't think people should be so quick to decide "Stalingrad."

Both situations were unwinnable, and both situations, if responded to properly, would have resulted in withdrawals. So, the question is which disaster (not whole campaign) was worse, letting a bunch of guys gets get stranded in Tunis or a bunch of guys get surrounded and stranded in Stalingrad. Including the beginning parts of the campaigns are not relevant, because if we include that the German tactical victory in Russia far outweighed their slowly being ground to death in North Africa.

According to wiki:
From mid-November 1942 to January 1943, 243,000 men and 856,000 long tons (870,000 t) of supplies and equipment arrived in Tunisia by sea and air.

Almost all of those men, and that equipment, was captured.

In Stalingrad, the numbers were about 300,000 men in the initial encirclement.

So, Stalingrad wins due to there being more Germans captured, even though in North Africa they lost more aircraft. However, avoiding the disaster that is North Africa might have bought the Germans time in Italy, perhaps preventing Italy's quick capitulation, which pays some dividends.
 

Deleted member 1487

IMO? Absolutely.

There was noting to be gained in Africa, not for the Reich.
Keeping the Italians in the war and the shipping route shut down for the Allies had major benefits beyond what the forces committed were. Now the crap that they pulled trying to go for Egypt and trying to hold Tunisia in 1943 was beyond stupid, but the 1941-42 commitment of troops was very helpful to the overall war effort, as it badly cut into Allied shipping due to the diversion around Africa and helped the Uboat effort in the Atlantic as a result.

Put as clearly as possible, would it have been better to have an additional 300,000 Heer troops, 4,000 additional Luftwaffe aircraft, and around 1,000 tanks/assault guns holding the Don in place of the Croats, Romanians and Italians (all of whom were ill equipped, especially in heavy weapons) when Uranus kicked off or have them in North Africa cut off for any possible evac and resupply?
There wasn't that many Germany there until 1943 by which time Stalingrad was already cut off. I agree that the Germans should have evacuated once they bogged down around El Alamein, definitely after the US landed in Algeria, but then they were needed in Sicily to hold that and keep the Mediterranean shut down and Italy in the war and not on the Allied side. Now the Panzerarmee Afrika reinforcements should have gone to the Don, that's for sure, but the Afrika Korps and Italian troops were needed in Sicily once the US shows up.
 
It's my understanding that the Axis losses in aircraft during the Tunisia battle helped to give the Soviets the air superiority that was so helpful at Kursk and that the Soviets never thereafter relinquished during their drive west.
 

Deleted member 1487

It's my understanding that the Axis losses in aircraft during the Tunisia battle helped to give the Soviets the air superiority that was so helpful at Kursk and that the Soviets never thereafter relinquished during their drive west.
Yes and no; even without those losses at Tunisia, let's say counterfactually Hitler opts to not fight at Tunisia and instead evacuates the Afrika Korps upon the landing of the Americans during Torch, then those aircraft would likely still get wrecked later defending Sicily and Italy, plus would still be needed to defend Europe against the Wallied airforces. Its the presence of the Wallies in the war that sucks in German airpower away from the East, not just the losses that early, though that certainly did not help at all.
 
That's close to over a Million Axis German and Axis Allied soldiers plus support troops, equipment and supplies that were lost at both Africa and Stalingrad...woah.:eek:
 
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