Which army was the most qualitatively superior between the Allies and Nazi Germany?

We're comparing quality, we're not discussing the actual situation on the ground that occurred in WW2 which was the product of strategic and material factors.

The actual situation on the ground in WW2 was not just a product of strategic-material factors, but the ability of the respective sides to leverage those factors. The ability to apply quantitative advantages or negate quantitative disadvantages by consistently arranging uneven fights when and where necessary is a function of quality. Not quality of the troops, admittedly, but quality of the leadership and their staffs.

I mean, German victories were likewise achieved not by the Germans fighting equally with their foe but by the Germans arranging the fights so they were in their favor from the start.
 
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CalBear

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Saying the Panther was some sort of trump card is like saying the T-34 meant the Soviets should have won. The reality is by late 1944 the German army was largely a shell of itself and was tossing in anything it had into combat regardless of preparedness and hoping for the best, much like the Soviets in 1941.

Last time I checked the Red Army did roll the Heer up like a used rug from a garage sale.

Just sayin...
 

Deleted member 1487

Last time I checked the Red Army did roll the Heer up like a used rug from a garage sale.

Just sayin...
In 1941? Yeah in December at the far end of their inadequate logistics, after being burned up in repeatedly attacking without sufficient replacements (manpower and equipment was held back to form new divisions and rebuild units for a 1942 campaign), and had a major part of their air support withdrawn from all over the front. They were rolled back to a point, then held the line, gave better than they got, then counterattacked in 1942 and inflicted horribly disproportionate casualties after the campaign lasted far long than had been planned on. It's a nuanced issue beyond the line moving on a map and the T-34 was not the reason for Soviet success, which was the point of the statement you quoted.
 
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Last time I checked the Red Army did roll the Heer up like a used rug from a garage sale.

Just sayin...
Would the Red Army have been able to roll the Heer up like a rug if it wasn't for massive amounts of Lend Lease, strategic bombing, and the Reich having to fight on multiple fronts against two of the most powerful nations on Earth (UK/US) all at the same time?
 

CalBear

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In 1941? Yeah in December at the far end of their inadequate logistics, after being burned up in repeatedly attacking without sufficient replacements (manpower and equipment was held back to form new divisions and rebuild units for a 1942 campaign), and had a major part of their air support withdrawn from all over the front. They were rolled back to a point, then held the line, gave better than they got, then counterattacked in 1942 and inflicted horribly disproportionate casualties after the campaign lasted far long than had been planned on. It's a nuanced issue beyond the line moving on a map and the T-34 was not the reason for Soviet success, which was the point of the statement you quoted.
Let's really run the tape shall we?

1941 - GOAL: Destroy the USSR, capture Moscow and Leningrad. Result: Failed (close but not close enough)

1942 - GOAL: Complete conquest of USSR by destroying Red Army; capture oil fields near Baku. Result: Utter failure, including the total destruction of a field army and the near destruction of Army Group B.

1943 - GOAL: Defeat Red Army's offensive potential to a degree that troops can be redeployed to face imminent WAllied offensives. Secondary goal to reassert dominance over battlefield and Eastern Front. (Operation Citadel) Result: Destruction of 9th Army and Army Group South as effective Combat formation. Effective end of Heer as an offensive force.

1944 - Goal: Hold territory gained, especially Ukraine/Crimea, Belorussia, Poland, defend Romanian oil facilities. Result: Loss of virtually all territory gained in USSR with remaining forces trapped in unsupportable pockets. Romania invaded, switches side to fight with Allies.

1945 - GOAL: Survival of 3rd Reich as political entity. Result: Red Army and WAllies meet at Oder River. Berlin captured by Red Army. Germany partitioned between four main Allied powers. Full reunification does not occur until 1991 when USSR dissolves due to internal pressures.

Find the actual strategic success. Sure the Heer gained ground, captured (and later killed through neglect and plain old brutality) millions of Red Army troops and managed to visit Hell on Earth to most of the Western USSR, but they never achieved ONE of their major operational goals in the East. Can it be argued that the goals were vastly over optimistic? Absolutely. The fact remains that the goals were set by Berlin (both by Hitler and the General Staff) and every single time the strategic goal was not achieved. EVERY SINGLE TIME.

It gets tiresome after a while to continue to point out, time and again, that the Reich hit its high water mark in late October of 1941 (Arguably as early as September by some measures). From that point forward for every "success" there was a near immediate blowback that resulted in Reich failure. The Allies didn't suddenly say a magic word in early spring 1945 or defeat the Reich because they came up with a single war winning miracle weapon. The drove the Wehrmacht back into itself in the same manner that a car crusher turns a 3 meter long car into a one square meter cube, in a constant, incredibly violent unrelenting application of pure overwhelming force.

The last real uncomplicated success for the Heer was when it reached the Channel coast in June of 1940.
 

CalBear

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Would the Red Army have been able to roll the Heer up like a rug if it wasn't for massive amounts of Lend Lease, strategic bombing, and the Reich having to fight on multiple fronts against two of the most powerful nations on Earth (UK/US) all at the same time?
Maybe. It would likely have been a case of mutual exhaustion, although the Soviets had far more of every resource (including people) so even a battle of attrition ends with the Soviets surviving (which, BTW, is a VICTORY since the Reich's goal was to literally eliminate the USSR as a political entity).
 

Deleted member 1487

We're arguing different things entirely. The point of mine you quoted was in reference to claiming that 1 piece of equipment with certain factors like armor and a long gun made it overall a better weapon system and a fight equal. My entire point with that quote was to point out that those factors didn't make the T-34 a dominant weapon and we could also add in the French and British armor from 1940. You're making a much broader point I'm not even arguing. Though even trying to talk about the outcome of the Eastern Front in isolation for all other factors and fronts is at best pointless in discussion about relative army quality.

Maybe. It would likely have been a case of mutual exhaustion, although the Soviets had far more of every resource (including people) so even a battle of attrition ends with the Soviets surviving (which, BTW, is a VICTORY since the Reich's goal was to literally eliminate the USSR as a political entity).
Again you're ignoring that in talking about relative army quality (not quantity) attrition and resources isn't the factor being discussed. Yes attrition and access to resources, industrial, manpower, and raw materials, as well as strategic depth did in the end decide the war, but that isn't what OP was asking about:
Which army was the most qualitatively superior (had the most fighting power) out of the Allies and Nazi Germany?
Certainly the Soviets were quantitatively superior (as were the Wallies in toto) and by the very end thanks to attrition the Allies on all fronts had ground down the Axis to the point that they were indisputably qualitatively superior by late 1944. You could of course argue that quantity has a quality all it's own and god is on the side of the bigger battalions, but that is a rather different and more nuancd argument than saying 'the allies won therefore better, end discussion'.
 
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- assuming numerically identical forces of the highest available quality
- in case of air- and naval landings, assume a comparison of their performance against a third-party opponent that's defending

Interesting table, but few points:
1) The 36-38 columns are hard to judge since most of the countries listed were largely idle (save Japan and Italy)
2) I think I'd replace Finland with USSR by 41 or 42
3) Not sure I'd give Germany so many Urban combat entries. USSR beat them in Stalingrad and the US chased them out of town after town.
4) I'd replace Germany in open terrain maneuver after 42 or 43. Toss up after that whether it's USSR or US -- Patton's army was pretty brilliant
5) I'd replace Germany in attrition after 42 or 43, probably then USSR and US
 
The particular engagement I am referring to in Nordwind is the battle around Herrlisheim (Jan 16-19 1945). 10.SS. Panzer divsion destroyed US 43rd Tank Battalion and 17th Armored Infantry Battalion of the US 12th Armored division. The German victory was not due to concentration of forces, but because the 10 SS Panzer was a more effective unit than equivalent Allied formations.

So roughly 40 tanks and a few Companies of Infantry in Halftracks and few Priests vs 1-300 Tanks in a SS Division?
Sounds like a fair fight :cool:
 
Surely the British/commonwealth are the most experienced / successful Jungle fighters from 44 onwards - certainly had one of the best allied commanders

Forgotten 14th indeed and I'm not sure the Japanese were particularly experienced in Jungle warfare much before 1940
 

CalBear

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Surely the British/commonwealth are the most experienced / successful Jungle fighters from 44 onwards - certainly had one of the best allied commanders

Forgotten 14th indeed and I'm not sure the Japanese were particularly experienced in Jungle warfare much before 1940
The Japanese reputation as "expert jungle fighters" is largely a result of the drubbing the British/Commonwealth forces took at the hand of the IJA in the early months of the war. It doesn't really hold up to close examination.

Imperial Japanese kit was not particularly well designed for the rigors of tropical combat, or for fighting in monsoonal weather (if anything most of the gear was inferior to the best British kit). The Japanese had been fighting in Northern and central China for half a decade, not a lot of jungle to be found in Manchuria or on the way to Nanking (the January high average for the city is 2.7C (37F) and it snows in the city a couple times a year. Yamashita's forces didn't roll the Malay Peninsula and Singapore up because they were better "jungle fighters", they won because they were better led, used several bits of tactical innovation (including regular small scale amphibious hops to bypass British strong points and the mass use of bicycles to create a sort of "mounted infantry"), and the British 2 pdr gun (or more properly the specific AP ammunition available in the Far East) was ineffective against Japanese tankettes and light tanks.

What the Imperial troops were, without question, was highly disciplined, used to abuse from their senior NCO and officers that would have resulted in General Courts in the West, with general treatment that hardened them to lousy conditions, including those that the jungle threw at all sides; and were largely combat veterans (or at least led at the squad level and up by combat veterans). As a light infantry force the IJA had a much smaller logistical tail than most pre-war Western formations and Japanese troops were used to having to deal with relatively short rations in the field (doesn't mean they liked it any more than the British, Indians or Americans, just that they were familiar with the hardships of campaigning while their opponents were not).

The British gave the IJA the title of expert. Doesn't mean it was true. It is much easier to conceptualize that the enemy flat kicked your ass because he was specially trained to fight in the jungle than to accept that your own leadership and performance flat stank.
 
So roughly 40 tanks and a few Companies of Infantry in Halftracks and few Priests vs 1-300 Tanks in a SS Division?
Sounds like a fair fight :cool:

I don't think the Germans felt under any obligation to use the Marquess of Queensberry rules. There seems to be some sort of feeling that because the Germans concentrated their forces prior to an attack, just like any other army, they were somehow less effective because they had to do it. They had a slightly smaller force overall, but deployed it more effectively, by concentrating a large part of their force against a smaller pat of the enemy force.
 

Deleted member 1487

So roughly 40 tanks and a few Companies of Infantry in Halftracks and few Priests vs 1-300 Tanks in a SS Division?
Sounds like a fair fight :cool:
Looks like the US was on the attack in January 1945:
http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/da...nd-the-12th-armored-divisions-lost-battalion/
http://www.historynet.com/world-war-ii-american-vi-corps-fought-the-battle-for-herrelsheim.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/12th_Armored_Division_(United_States)#World_War_II
German defenders repulsed two division attacks in the most violent fighting in the history of the division, during 8 to 10 January and 16 to 17 January 1945. The division's attacks at Herrlisheim failed to use combined-arms tactics and were defeated in detail, resulting in two tank and two armored infantry battalions taking heavy losses. Poor tactics were compounded by terrain that was almost tabletop-flat, offering the German defenders excellent fields of fire. However, enemy counterattacks failed also, in part because of the firm leadership of the commander of Combat Command B, Colonel Charles Bromley, who declared his headquarters expendable and ordered all personnel in the headquarters to prepare a hasty defense.[d][19]

The division was subsequently relieved by the U.S. 36th Infantry Division. The 12th Armored Division suffered over 1,700 battle casualties during the fighting in and around Herrlisheim. As a consequence, when African-American soldiers who were in non-combat positions were able to volunteer to become combat troops, Major General Roderick R. Allen was one of only ten Division commanders who allowed them to join the combat ranks.[3]
The German counterattack suffered pretty badly too, apparently mostly due to American artillery.
 
I don't think the Germans felt under any obligation to use the Marquess of Queensberry rules. There seems to be some sort of feeling that because the Germans concentrated their forces prior to an attack, just like any other army, they were somehow less effective because they had to do it. They had a slightly smaller force overall, but deployed it more effectively, by concentrating a large part of their force against a smaller pat of the enemy force.
Looking at Operation Nordwind as a whole, the only reason the 12th Armored Division had a rough time was due to the fact that the US 7th Army was overextended to assume a significant portion of the Third Army's area of responsibility during the Battle of the Bulge.

During Nordwind, the U.S. VI Corps was under heavy pressure and the 12th Armored Division was the only reserve left in the whole US 7th Army. Thus only Combat Command B (CCB) of the 12th Armored Division was sent to aid VI Corps.

Due to bad intelligence, the forces at Herrlisheim was estimated to be 1200 when there were three regiments of the 10th SS Panzer Division along with the elements of the 553rd Infantry Regiment.

On 8th January 1945, the 56th Armored Infantry battalion and the 714th Tank battalion attacked Herrlisheim. The attack failed more due to terrain than the Germans themselves. Initially the attack went well with the 56th capturing 150 German soldiers. However the 56th Armored Infantry could not move through the waterways on their vehicles and had to dismount to attack. Meanwhile the tank battalion found itself struggling to support the attack and could only do so on January 9th and they were repelled by anti-tank guns and thus couldn't support the attack. As a result, the 56th Armored Infantry was cut off by the 10th of January. On January 10th, an attempt to support the 56th with SP-guns failed when the ice underneath the guns broke. Finally at nighttime, the remnants of the 56th Armored Infantry evacuated from the town.

Despite the casualties suffered, Combat Command B still repelled a strong attack coming from Herrlisheim on January 13th.

On January 16th, the 12th Armored Division (now with Combat Command A reattached) went on the offensive. Once again, CCB found itself struggling with the waterways and met determined resistance. CCA would find itself with the misfortune of running into the 10th SS Panzer Division resulting in the destruction of two American battalions.

Hence the 12th Armored Division was beaten more due to faulty intelligence and bad terrain than anything else.
 
I don't think the Germans felt under any obligation to use the Marquess of Queensberry rules. There seems to be some sort of feeling that because the Germans concentrated their forces prior to an attack, just like any other army, they were somehow less effective because they had to do it. They had a slightly smaller force overall, but deployed it more effectively, by concentrating a large part of their force against a smaller pat of the enemy force.


But you had said it wasn't from concentration

The particular engagement I am referring to in Nordwind is the battle around Herrlisheim (Jan 16-19 1945). 10.SS. Panzer divsion destroyed US 43rd Tank Battalion and 17th Armored Infantry Battalion of the US 12th Armored division. The German victory was not due to concentration of forces, but because the 10 SS Panzer was a more effective unit than equivalent Allied formations.
 
But you had said it wasn't from concentration

Ok. Point to you. I think however that the poster was trying to imply that German victories were only achieved by overwhelming superioritu in numbers, in other words a crude use of brute force. Creating a local superiority of force in a tactical situation where one is otherwise outnumbered is something different entirely.
 
I don't know if this counts, but one thing the US did in WWII way better than any other power was logistics. Nobody was able to move men and material to the places that they needed to go and have them arrive at a timely manner than the US.
I admit that this was my first thought too. The US might not have had the best of anything, but they had a lot of everything, and the ability to get it where they needed it. Furthermore, they were motorized to the max, and likely the most mechanically inclined of all the participants. The US and UK ended up operating in such diverse theaters as far flung Pacific islands, jungles, deserts, and mainland Europe, something no one else had to do...
 

Deleted member 1487

I admit that this was my first thought too. The US might not have had the best of anything, but they had a lot of everything, and the ability to get it where they needed it. Furthermore, they were motorized to the max, and likely the most mechanically inclined of all the participants. The US and UK ended up operating in such diverse theaters as far flung Pacific islands, jungles, deserts, and mainland Europe, something no one else had to do...
Function of a massive industrial base that largely enabled their allies' war efforts, plus having bases in allied countries, nearly unfettered access to global resources, and a small army.
 
Function of a massive industrial base that largely enabled their allies' war efforts, plus having bases in allied countries, nearly unfettered access to global resources, and a small army.
kinda my point. You cant really talk about the quality of an army without a good look at the logistics behind them.
 

Deleted member 1487

kinda my point. You cant really talk about the quality of an army without a good look at the logistics behind them.
Logistics to me is the practice of organizing the flow of supplies; for the US it wasn't necessarily that they were better than anyone else, they just had endless resources to throw at any problem and much weaker foes that were primarily engaged with American allies instead of focusing any strength on the Americans in particular (with the exception of Operation Drumbeat and Wacht am Rhein).
 
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