Which army was the most qualitatively superior between the Allies and Nazi Germany?

No Soviet for urban, maneuver, or attrition combat???
Soviets got 'manuever' in '45.
I tried to imagine how the best possible division or corps-level formation would perform against their counterpart. Granted, I didn't put THAT much thought into it. How would you change that table?
 
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- assuming numerically identical forces of the highest available quality
- in case of air- and naval landings, assume a comparison of their performance against a third-party opponent that's defending

Not sure why Japan would be good at jungle warfare in the 30's. There are no jungles in Japan. America at least had Panama and a long history of intervention in Central America. I assume there's a reason US is the master of urban warfare in 1936?
 

Deleted member 1487

The Americans had a lot of them and they were more accurate than their Axis counterparts, as well as more mobile ,so the guns can keep up with the advance. Add better logistics to keep the guns fed along Superior fire control gave them the edge.
The Germans shouldn't have invested in those super heavy artilary pieces, but the Nazi ego took over.Smaller more mobile artillery pieces were more efficient in putting explosives on the enemy.
More accurate???
 

Deleted member 1487

Soviets got 'manuever' in '45.
I tried to imagine how the best possible division or corps-level formation would perform against their counterpart. Granted, I didn't put THAT much thought into it. How would you change that table?
Depends on the criteria. Soviets probably should get 1944 based on actual performance even if tactically they still had issues. In terms of urban warfare....maybe still Soviets in 1943-45? Attrition warfare was the entire Soviet model in 1941-45, wear down the invader, so from a strategic sense they were able to wear down their enemy more effectively than the inverse.
 
Not sure why Japan would be good at jungle warfare in the 30's. There are no jungles in Japan. America at least had Panama and a long history of intervention in Central America.
They had the small-unit infantry tactics that allowed them to thrive a couple of years later.

I assume there's a reason US is the master of urban warfare in 1936?
I wasn't quite sure, but I figured having Tommy Guns would help a lot vs bolt-action rifles, so, rather than leave that space blank...
 
Depends on the criteria. Soviets probably should get 1944 based on actual performance even if tactically they still had issues. In terms of urban warfare....maybe still Soviets in 1943-45? Attrition warfare was the entire Soviet model in 1941-45, wear down the invader, so from a strategic sense they were able to wear down their enemy more effectively than the inverse.
Well yes, but Soviet gear was still qualitatively inferior, so in a 1-1 situation I figured they'd more likely lose than win. Could be wrong though
 
The best-quality army is not necessarily the one with the most combat power, which is a function or quality, size, firepower, and no doubt other factors. The German army was very adaptable. For example, the Germans in Finland were clumsy in arctic conditions when compared with the Finns in 1941, but adapted very quickly until their capabilities were equal or superior. The Finns had the best defensive terrain in Europe, the best weather for conducting defensive operations, and a particularly inept opponent in 1939, so their performance probably appears cast in a somewhat rosy light. The Russians had one railway running up to Murmansk, and very poor lateral communications with the Finnish border, so their tactical problems were compounded by logistical ones. It can hardly be compared to the route from the German border to Brussels, which was over generally flat plains, and well supplied with metalled roads and railways. Also very quick to adapt were the Americans, who developed very dramatically in their capacities for armoured warfare from Kasserine Pass onwards. The much-decried Italians also performed well under Rommel's leadership, although it is hard to compare them to their German allies or British opponents because of their execrable equipment. It must however take more bravery to stand one's ground in an M13/40 than a Tiger 1, and that is what the Ariete division usually did.
 
As an army: Germans '39-'42, Soviets '43-'45.
As individual soldiers (averaged): Germans '39-'44, USA '45.

Well yes, but Soviet gear was still qualitatively inferior, so in a 1-1 situation I figured they'd more likely lose than win. Could be wrong though

Soviet gear in '44 was most certainly not inferior to German gear.
 
The best-quality army is not necessarily the one with the most combat power, which is a function or quality, size, firepower, and no doubt other factors. The German army was very adaptable. For example, the Germans in Finland were clumsy in arctic conditions when compared with the Finns in 1941, but adapted very quickly until their capabilities were equal or superior. The Finns had the best defensive terrain in Europe, the best weather for conducting defensive operations, and a particularly inept opponent in 1939, so their performance probably appears cast in a somewhat rosy light. The Russians had one railway running up to Murmansk, and very poor lateral communications with the Finnish border, so their tactical problems were compounded by logistical ones. It can hardly be compared to the route from the German border to Brussels, which was over generally flat plains, and well supplied with metalled roads and railways. Also very quick to adapt were the Americans, who developed very dramatically in their capacities for armoured warfare from Kasserine Pass onwards. The much-decried Italians also performed well under Rommel's leadership, although it is hard to compare them to their German allies or British opponents because of their execrable equipment. It must however take more bravery to stand one's ground in an M13/40 than a Tiger 1, and that is what the Ariete division usually did.

Finnish army was more than match to Soviets not only in 1939-1940 but also in 1941, in small scale engagements in 1942-1943 and again in large scale combat operations in 1944 when Soviet forces were at their prime. In addition to stopping the Soviet offensive in Karelian Isthmus and North of Lake Ladoga Finnish army also decimated Soviet troops trying to outflank Finnish troops in Northern Karelia in 1944. Finnish army was also arguably superior in combat ability against German forces it faced in 1944 in Gulf of Finland during Tanne Ost (casualties 120 against 1387, or ratio of 1 to 11) and southern Lapland, par the patrol engagements in tundra landscape in northernmost Lapland in 1945. German units adapted to Finnish terrain but were never match to Finnish troops in capability of fighting in deep forests, especially during winter.

But yes, for example Belgium had themselves flanked with the Netherlands and France and small geographical distance. On the other hand, their army was more powerful, unit densities were larger and fortifications were of much better quality. Of course this did not ultimately matter as Belgium was outflanked. This was much of a case of many armies in Second World War. Either US, British or Soviet showing at first wasn't very good. In case of Belgium and France they did not have geographical depth which to retreat and learn. Finnish Army fought extremely well from the outset - except in 1944 when Finns had to retreat and learn and had the geographical depth to do it.
 
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Germans were qualitatively the best, if you put a fully equipped German division be it infantry, panzer or panzer grenadier against any of it's contemporaries in an equal battle, the Germans would win. However war is obviously not made up of equal battles, and the Germans made far too many strategic errors (on the part of Hitler) to take full advantage of their conventional superiority.
 
Everyone seems to be ignoring the big infantry killers mortars and artillery.
I don't see any real winner with mortars,the Americans hag fantastic light mortars,the Japanese had the one man portable 40mm knee mortar,and the Russians had their excellent120mm.
As for artillery
Numbers Russia
Doctrine British
Overall quality American
 

Deleted member 1487

Everyone seems to be ignoring the big infantry killers mortars and artillery.
I don't see any real winner with mortars,the Americans hag fantastic light mortars,the Japanese had the one man portable 40mm knee mortar,and the Russians had their excellent120mm.
As for artillery
Numbers Russia
Doctrine British
Overall quality American
As far as attrition goes sure, but in decisive maneuver battle the goal isn't casualty infliction so much as it is the paralyzing of enemy forces and destruction of enemy will to fight. You can get a lot more POWs and results with decisive maneuver than WW1 style blast your way forward methodical firepower warfare. Artillery primarily matters if things bog down and it become an infantry war, combined air/armor maneuver will achieve greater results with less killing.
 
Everyone seems to be ignoring the big infantry killers mortars and artillery.
I don't see any real winner with mortars,the Americans hag fantastic light mortars,the Japanese had the one man portable 40mm knee mortar,and the Russians had their excellent120mm.
As for artillery
Numbers Russia
Doctrine British
Overall quality American

Equipment: US for signals equipment, German and Finnish for measuring equipment (such as Vaisala stuff still used by armies all over the world), US/British for shells. For actual tubes the towed stuff was fairly similar all over, Russian perhaps was the best overall, for SP artillery US
Doctrine: Finnish or British, British abilities were almost as good as Finnish, only their forward observation officer procedures were not as well developed
Numbers: USSR
 
As far as attrition goes sure, but in decisive maneuver battle the goal isn't casualty infliction so much as it is the paralyzing of enemy forces and destruction of enemy will to fight. You can get a lot more POWs and results with decisive maneuver than WW1 style blast your way forward methodical firepower warfare. Artillery primarily matters if things bog down and it become an infantry war, combined air/armor maneuver will achieve greater results with less killing.

Indirect fire also kills in manouver battle. With well trained crews artillery was very quick into getting position and getting good enough topographic and meteorlogical data to provide timely and accurate fires. It's much nicer to assault someone when you're provided with shells raining on enemy keeping their heads down when going forward.
 

Deleted member 1487

Indirect fire also kills in manouver battle. With well trained crews artillery was very quick into getting position and getting good enough topographic and meteorlogical data to provide timely and accurate fires.
No doubt, but it is far less important in slower leg infantry engagements, which are less decisive and won more through attrition due to lack of speed. Remember that the speed of engagement for artillery is also impacted by motorization; the Germans were able to cut down on the time for artillery to get into the fight by having infantry guns integrated into infantry regiments to provide short ranged, quick artillery support, but even then it was about using firepower to break the enemy or at least occupy enemy infantry while the mobile divisions conducted the decisive maneuver. Even in the Soviet system artillery is about achieving the breakthrough while the armor/mobile units achieved the pockets and broke coordinated enemy resistance in coordination with air power.
 
As far as attrition goes sure, but in decisive maneuver battle the goal isn't casualty infliction so much as it is the paralyzing of enemy forces and destruction of enemy will to fight.

Artillery is as decisively important in maneuver battles as well. I should also observe that the term "decisive maneuver battle", fixating on the "decisive" part of that line for a moment, is something of a misnomer here, as there was no such thing as decisive battle as it is defined in military theory.

No doubt, but it is far less important in slower leg infantry engagements, which are less decisive and won more through attrition due to lack of speed. Remember that the speed of engagement for artillery is also impacted by motorization; the Germans were able to cut down on the time for artillery to get into the fight by having infantry guns integrated into infantry regiments to provide short ranged, quick artillery support, but even then it was about using firepower to break the enemy or at least occupy enemy infantry while the mobile divisions conducted the decisive maneuver. Even in the Soviet system artillery is about achieving the breakthrough while the armor/mobile units achieved the pockets and broke coordinated enemy resistance in coordination with air power.

No, artillery was of vital importance to the maneuver element as well. The provision of mobile guns to the panzer formations was the true innovation behind Blitzkrieg, not the tanks. Similarly, Soviet tank corps in 1942 proved horribly fragile until they were augmented with their own SPGs in 1943. Without artillery fires there simply is no exploitation. In a fight between a force with infantry and artillery vs a force with infantry and tanks, it is the former who has the decisive advantage in both maneuver and positional warfare.... assuming they properly use it, of course.

Doctrine British

Doctrine: Finnish or British, British abilities were almost as good as Finnish, only their forward observation officer procedures were not as well developed

Assuming the definition of "doctrine" is "the collection of procedures and standard practices with which military fights" (which is the definition of doctrine among western militaries). then probably the ones with the best doctrine was the late-war Soviet Union. To the end of the war, pretty much every other combatant viewed artillery in more-or-less a supportive role in the combined arms package. Only the Soviets elevated it to having an equal roll as that of the armor and aircraft.
 
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Assuming the definition of "doctrine" is "the collection of procedures and standard practices with which military fights" (which is the definition of doctrine among western militaries). then probably the ones with the best doctrine was the late-war Soviet Union. To the end of the war, pretty much every other combatant viewed artillery in more-or-less a supportive role in the combined arms package. Only the Soviets elevated it to having an equal roll as that of the armor and aircraft.

But, the Soviet artillery performance in quality although not in quantity was abysmal, so probably, say, UK and US beat them hands down in actual effectiveness. To be nationalistic, the Finnish succesful defense in 1944 was built around use of combined fires - artillery supported by air power with infantry more in supporting role. Also, the French defensive tactics were built around artillery although they did not have opportunity to use them, AFAIK.
 

Deleted member 1487

Artillery is as decisively important in maneuver battles as well. I should also observe that the term "decisive maneuver battle", fixating on the "decisive" part of that line for a moment, is something of a misnomer here, as there was no such thing as decisive battle as it is defined in military theory.
It was important for chopping a hole, not the actual maneuver part. Until 1943 the SP indirect fire role was not filled except for motorized towed guns, which are not the same thing and cannot keep up the same way, so Stukas and other bombers filled that role. The Soviets ended up using direct fire SP guns, not really indirect fire for their mobile/mechanized units. Sturmoviks were their indirect fire arm, just like the Stukas were for the Panzer divisions until 1943.


No, artillery was of vital importance to the maneuver element as well. The provision of mobile guns to the panzer formations was the true innovation behind Blitzkrieg, not the tanks. Similarly, Soviet tank corps in 1942 proved horribly fragile until they were augmented with their own SPGs in 1943. Without artillery fires there simply is no exploitation.
How so? Truck towed artillery was used in WW1 and the SP artillery on a tank chassis like the Wespe didn't come out until mid-1943, leaving aside attempts to make SP infantry guns. Direct fire weapons were more important for mobile divisions until then, as artillery could only really deploy after things bogged down a bit or were on the defensive or a preplanned retreat trap for the towed weapons to have a role was planned. Soviet SPGs were more assault guns/direct fire weapons than indirect artillery. Artillery helps rip the hole, but without the motorized/mechanized maneuver element you end up with WW1 slogs. Also the Soviet 1942 divisions/corps had a variety of other issues besides simply TOE composition, though that was a factor.
 
It was important for chopping a hole, not the actual maneuver part. Until 1943 the SP indirect fire role was not filled except for motorized towed guns, which are not the same thing and cannot keep up the same way, so Stukas and other bombers filled that role. The Soviets ended up using direct fire SP guns, not really indirect fire for their mobile/mechanized units. Sturmoviks were their indirect fire arm, just like the Stukas were for the Panzer divisions until 1943.

CAS, even today, has fairly long response time and before advent of precision munitions is not as precise as indirect fire in providing support. A well drilled mortar or artillery unit can be put to firing position in matter of minutes after command and deliver, even without charts and WW II technology, accurate fires within ballistic qualities of shells in minutes. Moreover, with leaping batteries etc. (ie. one battery out of battalion in position, two others on march etc.) procedures indirect fires are always on call.

CAS is not a replacement of indirect fires. It's great for some purposes and but it was not and probably even not even now is a perfect replacement for indirect fires.

How so? Truck towed artillery was used in WW1 and the SP artillery on a tank chassis like the Wespe didn't come out until mid-1943, leaving aside attempts to make SP infantry guns. Direct fire weapons were more important for mobile divisions until then, as artillery could only really deploy after things bogged down a bit or were on the defensive or a preplanned retreat trap for the towed weapons to have a role was planned. Soviet SPGs were more assault guns/direct fire weapons than indirect artillery. Artillery helps rip the hole, but without the motorized/mechanized maneuver element you end up with WW1 slogs. Also the Soviet 1942 divisions/corps had a variety of other issues besides simply TOE composition, though that was a factor.

That's because German and especially Soviet use of artillery was quite primitive and not flexible at all. Soviet doctrine, for example, did not rely on FOO's capable of calling multiple units but rather FOO's organic to firing batteries while larger fire plans required upper level co-ordination, unlike, for example, in British or Finnish systems where a single FOO could control entire army's artillery if required.
 
But, the Soviet artillery performance in quality although not in quantity was abysmal,

No, it tended to be extraordinarily effective. At it's peak, it was able to break German defenses pretty much by itself. The biggest problem was there tended to be quite a difference in the quality of the non-divisional and divisional artillery, in that the former received all the key gizmos and personnel for flexible fires while the latter didn't.

It was important for chopping a hole, not the actual maneuver part.

No, the actual maneuver part as well.

Until 1943 the SP indirect fire role was not filled except for motorized towed guns, which are not the same thing and cannot keep up the same way, so Stukas and other bombers filled that role. The Soviets ended up using direct fire SP guns, not really indirect fire for their mobile/mechanized units. Sturmoviks were their indirect fire arm, just like the Stukas were for the Panzer divisions until 1943.

Even leaving aside that direct fire artillery is still artillery, the motorized guns were actually essential in providing indirect artillery fire to the panzers. Air power could not completely replace them, as it was much more limited in a number of ways (staying power, timeliness, more weather-dependent, etc).


If nothing else, suppression of enemy artillery. In the aforementioned "tanks and infantry only vs artillery and infantry only" match-up I mentioned, if the former tried to thrust at the latter with their armor, then the latter would first pin the former's supporting forces, then hack the unsupported armor apart with infantry armed with AT weapons while it sat impotently on whatever ground it had taken waiting for fuel and ammunition supply that would never arrive because it was being interdicted by yet more artillery fire. Tanks need to be concentrated to work, but artillery can fight dispersed and concentrate fire using their range. And while tanks must still be cautious around infantry, if there's no artillery to worry own then artillery can operate largely unmolested. This isn't idle speculation either: there have been repeated military exercises where one side was denied it's use of artillery and the other it's use of armor. What happened was that the side with artillery formed up their batteries with small groups of infantry and had them run around the battlefield totally wrecking shit until the exercise refs would finally consent to lift the restriction on the other sides arty.
 
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