Where do they land?

[Ian Hathaway]

As part of Germany's invasion of Britain they had available one airborne division and one air transportable division. If you were involved in the planning for the airborne assault where would you send your troops?

Your remit is to protect both the Western an Eastern flanks of the main seaborne landing (Brighton to Folkestone) and capture strategic points including airfields, crossing points on the the military canal and coastal batteries in the area of Dover.

At your disposal you have the two divisions mentioned above, 500 transport aircraft capable of carrying 10 paratroopers or 12 air transportable troops and approximately 100 gliders each capable of carrying 10 men that can be towed by either a transport aircraft or a bomber.

In past operations the typical method of attack on airfields was to fly in at 400ft and release the paras directly over the target. The size of each force was less than 100 men ... it was expected that the airfields defences would be subdued with minutes and the first Ju52 would land with reinforcements no later than 20 minutes after the first attack. During daylight hours the landings would be preceded by attacks from the air by small groups of Bf110 and in the case of Britain possibly Ju87s with the Bf110s sticking around to assist. If similar operations are anything to go on the Germans can expect to lose up to 1/3 of their transport in the first day, primarily from ground attack rather than air defence.

 

[Dable]

I think the problem with all USM is that you look at German plans and you realise that they had no idea how to plan a seaborn invasion.Normandy at 5 divisions in the first wave is 20-25 miles wide whilst Sealion with about 2 divisions is more like 50 miles wide.Brighton to Hastings is to far by sea from France to get an invasion force across in one night.Hastings to Rye is too narrow,Rye to Romney is pretty much all marsh,Dover is the most heavily defended and the terrain is against you.This leaves you Folkestone-reasonable beaches either side and a small but adequate harbour inbetween.Hawkinge and Lympne would be probably be the best places for airlanded troops and paratroopers on a line Bislington-Adlington-Smeeth.

 

[UncleDynamite]

Where do they land? At the bottom of the English Channel, in all probability. The Germans do not simply show up a mile from shore. It is impossible for an army in river boats to cross the most defended strip of sea in the world.

You'd need an incredibly different set of conditions leading up to a very different WW2. Changing that scenario would change prospective landing sites immensely depending on how it is changed.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I think the problem with all USM is that you look at German plans and you realise that they had no idea how to plan a seaborn invasion.Normandy at 5 divisions in the first wave is 20-25 miles wide whilst Sealion with about 2 divisions is more like 50 miles wide.Brighton to Hastings is to far by sea from France to get an invasion force across in one night.Hastings to Rye is too narrow,Rye to Romney is pretty much all marsh,Dover is the most heavily defended and the terrain is against you.This leaves you Folkestone-reasonable beaches either side and a small but adequate harbour inbetween.Hawkinge and Lympne would be probably be the best places for airlanded troops and paratroopers on a line Bislington-Adlington-Smeeth.

Just to split hairs ... the Normandy front was 50 miles or so ... Brighton to Folkestone is 75 miles or so.

My understanding is that the Germans were to use motor launches for the troops landed in at the western end of the invasion area with a journey time of 3 hours.

Realistically the first wave of airborne troops can't exceed 5000, more than likely landing in the hour before dawn, almost simultaneous with the beach landings. Lympney and Hawkinge would be obvious targets with Manston another possible target. All three would be hit by Paras and air transportable units. I do believe that some attempt would be made to take targets in Dover, even if it is just to put the Radar out of action. Glider troops would be used to capture crossings on the Military canal. Remaining troops landed north of Brighton.

 

[Devolved]

Maybe they could land in the Glossary of Sealion threads.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Maybe they could land in the Glossary of Sealion threads.

I asked the question ... if YOU were PLANNING the airborne operations where would you want to land your scant resources? This is a question of planning not execution, if the plan is not executed then so be it ... just interested in knowing what targets people think the Germans would consider important.

 

[Japhy]

Ignoring the inherent problem of the concept and going simply for the discussion:

German Airborne Doctrine was centered on small unit operations --- Eben Emael's famous battle was done by a platoon led by an NCO --- which generally consisted of attacking strategic positions like Forts (Belgium), Bridges (Holland), and Airfields (Norway). In the context of a singular division landing then, the issue becomes one of using the force as a Blocking Force akin to the landing of the 82nd and 101st in Normandy in 1944, going for Bridges and the like and working as a barrier to isolate the landing beaches which has its own obvious advantages, or being used as the Germans did IOTL attack Crete, going after an airfield to bring in that Air-Transportable division. The main issue being that going for airfields would necessitate throwing the Division into further isolation and not providing immediate support of the landings.

From the 21st Century perspective of having seen what happens to isolated airborne troops when they can't be reached quickly by regular forces, personally the decision is clear: Go for Bridges and the like, go for Artillery and protect the landing force. This seems especially useful as the German Airborne has at this time seen most of its combat experience working as regular infantry anyway.

Based though on what we know the Germans did do with their airborne forces after the Fall of France IOTL, I would imagine the move would be for the airfields so as to bring in the Air-Transportable troops.

From the perspective of a historical observer one would hope that they would follow the second option, being as it means two more Divisions to drop from the rolls when Sealion collapses on itself.

 

[oldironside]

Easy. Ibiza. Trust me. Young German soldiers love it there and it's the best outcome for everyone concerned.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Ignoring the inherent problem of the concept and going simply for the discussion:

German Airborne Doctrine was centered on small unit operations --- Eben Emael's famous battle was done by a platoon led by an NCO --- which generally consisted of attacking strategic positions like Forts (Belgium), Bridges (Holland), and Airfields (Norway). In the context of a singular division landing then, the issue becomes one of using the force as a Blocking Force akin to the landing of the 82nd and 101st in Normandy in 1944, going for Bridges and the like and working as a barrier to isolate the landing beaches which has its own obvious advantages, or being used as the Germans did IOTL attack Crete, going after an airfield to bring in that Air-Transportable division. The main issue being that going for airfields would necessitate throwing the Division into further isolation and not providing immediate support of the landings.

From the 21st Century perspective of having seen what happens to isolated airborne troops when they can't be reached quickly by regular forces, personally the decision is clear: Go for Bridges and the like, go for Artillery and protect the landing force. This seems especially useful as the German Airborne has at this time seen most of its combat experience working as regular infantry anyway.

Based though on what we know the Germans did do with their airborne forces after the Fall of France IOTL, I would imagine the move would be for the airfields so as to bring in the Air-Transportable troops.

From the perspective of a historical observer one would hope that they would follow the second option, being as it means two more Divisions to drop from the rolls when Sealion collapses on itself.

The highlighted text is a bit of an over simplification of what turned out to be a well worked out and executed plan. The gliderborne forces around Maastricht were given four specific targets ... three bridges and a fort. In total there were 41 gliders, each containing a section of men, totalling 363 paratroopers under the command of Captain Koch. The mission of those at the three bridges was to prevent their demolition and hold until relieved by ground forces. Force Granite, 11 sections totalling 85 men under the command of Lieutenant Witzig, had the task of disabling the key installations of the fort and holding until the ground forces were able to cross the bridges and complete the capture of the fort. Each of the eleven sections was led by a capable NCO and each section had its own specific targets. They could work independently of each other and had been told what to do if their neighbouring section did not arrive. Of the entire force of 41 gliders only two didn't make it on time, both of which happened to be part of force Granite, unfortunately Lieutenant Witzig was in one of those gliders, which failed to reach the target when the tow cable snapped during the flight. However the glider made a soft landing and Witzig managed to contact HQ who sent out a fresh Ju52 which landed and towed them to the target arriving 2 1/2 hours late. The Germans managed to secure two of the bridges before destruction and were joined by the ground forces on the first day but it would not be until the afternoon of the second day that the fort garrison finally surrendered after a joint assault by the combined ground troops and paratroops.

As for the attacks on British airfields both Lympney and Hawkinge would make perfect targets being just 2-3 miles inland from the proposed landing beaches.

 

[hipper]

Hi Ian it depends on what date the germans plan to land

I believe the September german plan was to

1) land the paratroops available behind the beach defenses in an effort to destroy the costal artillery
2) capture bridges of the Royal military canal
3) use the troops in 1 to march to lympne airport airfield and capture it. -

in July they only have enough forces to do 1 or 2

by august both could be attempted.

attempting to suppress the Beach defenses is no doubt the most profitable use of the paratroops. With the direct fire beach defense batteries unsupressed heavy weapons could not be unloaded in quantity.

cheers

Hipper

 

[Japhy]

The highlighted text is a bit of an over simplification of what turned out to be a well worked out and executed plan.

As for the attacks on British airfields both Lympney and Hawkinge would make perfect targets being just 2-3 miles inland from the proposed landing beaches.

For the first issue, yes its a simplification but that's irrelevant. The key issue is that when seeking to engage in operations to secure major objectives in blocking / breakthrough attacks the Germans were in the vein of the 1918 Stormtroopers, still using very small unit tactics. In comparison to say entire companies, battalions, or even sometimes regiments being used by the Allies in similar goals. Any cover operation for the landing beaches would most likely depend on this sort of small force screen to cover various targets like artillery positions and bridges in the region.

Are either of the two airfields developed enough to bring an Air-Transportable Division in? Otherwise there's no point in taking them, especially as no airfield the Germans took could be useful for basing aviation units out of for considerable time. Remember the Heer is going to need to bring across their horses, that cuts in on the AvGas they'd need to bring in for the Luftwaffe, among other issues. ( )

 

[Astrodragon]

Possible targets?

Airfields. These are good, you can land support. Unfortunately the Brits has inconsiderately thought of this - the airfields were armed, supported, and would have slaughtered the Paratroops as they landed. Some of the British preparations can only be described as ingeniously paranoid. If something goes wrong, the runway is cratered and useless.

Bridges are a problem given the transport network in the area. There aren't many obvious chokepoints, they are over a wide area, and there are loads of ways around them. A small group on a bridge, with just light weapons, is going to get to play with the Home Guard (who weren't nearly as much of a joke as is often made out).

Ports? All (even the little ones) prepped for demolition. What you need is a big one like Dover. Good luck on that one, the garrison + navy outnumbers you, and they are waiting.

Behind the beach defences? First, drops at this time were terribly inaccurate, second, you are dropping into alerted troops, and in any case there wasn't much coastal artillery - the British depended on ships.

Concentrating on one target area could work, but you have now expended your airdrop on one small target (and hoping the barges heading there aren't the ones who get to play with an RN destroyer...)

 

[Ian Hathaway]

For the first issue, yes its a simplification but that's irrelevant. The key issue is that when seeking to engage in operations to secure major objectives in blocking / breakthrough attacks the Germans were in the vein of the 1918 Stormtroopers, still using very small unit tactics. In comparison to say entire companies, battalions, or even sometimes regiments being used by the Allies in similar goals. Any cover operation for the landing beaches would most likely depend on this sort of small force screen to cover various targets like artillery positions and bridges in the region.

Are either of the two airfields developed enough to bring an Air-Transportable Division in? Otherwise there's no point in taking them, especially as no airfield the Germans took could be useful for basing aviation units out of for considerable time. Remember the Heer is going to need to bring across their horses, that cuts in on the AvGas they'd need to bring in for the Luftwaffe, among other issues. ( )

A feature of Junkers designs of the period was the detached flap/aileron assembly positioned below and behind the main wing structure. The ailerons drooped at low speed to act as partial flaps which. together with the normal slotted inboard flaps. gave the type tremendous STOL capability.

So I'm assuming that the landing strips at Lympne which were sufficiently long enough for landing and take off as they were in the 1000m + range. Similarly those at Hawkinge would be suitable. Both Lympne and Hawkinge were forward bases for Fighter Command and would no doubt have adequate facilities considering the Germans used makeshift airfields regularly in France. Lympney also has the advantage of being right next to the A20, a major route from London to the South Coast and is just over 2 miles from the landing beaches West of Folketone.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

... First, drops at this time were terribly inaccurate, second, you are dropping into alerted troops, and in any case there wasn't much coastal artillery - the British depended on ships. ...

German small unit drops at this time were incredibly accurate ... they dropped whilst flying at low speed and from a height of 400ft, that's just 120m. The men were in the air for less than 20 seconds. Yes airfield defences are going to be a bitch, but the defences in Norway and the Low countries were a bitch as well. The follow up troops would be landed within minutes of the paras landing and from previous experience I doubt the Germans would have considered it was going to be a walkover, most of those first aircraft would be riddled with bullets and unable to take off again. As for cratering the runways, it doesn't matter ... as everyone always points out when talking about the effectiveness of German airfield bombing during the BoB ... if you have a 1000 yard grass landing strip and an aircraft that needs nothing like that length to land you are going to find somewhere to land. The Ju52 required a very short strip ... travelled at less than 60mph when landing and had notoriously sturdy undercarriage.

 

[Shaby]

Unlike the Low Countries, the British already knew and were generally appraised of what constituted the German paradrop tactics. Also, they were alert and mobilized and expecting the Germans to try.

In an answer to the direct question of what the target would be, I'd go for the airfield and the bridge. Lack of any engineering troops for some time (provided the Germans get to land anywhere in Britain in the first place) would mean that any crossing of the river or canal would be nigh impossible.

 

[Saphroneth]

There's a difference between trying to use cratering to close off the SE of England (which the LW were trying to do - without much success precisely because the amount of effort it took to seal one runway was more than they could apply to EVERY runway in the area) and trying to use cratering to close off two or three particular runways (which the RAF and the demolition teams will be trying to do - and that's MUCH easier, since there's only two targets.) Unload everything Bomber Command can do onto those two runways and they're going to be useless for a few days... and Bomber Command don't have to try and do that to dozens of other airbases, so they can repeat the job every day or every night.

(I believe the Japanese were often quite successful in runway cratering in SE Asia - precisely because there were fewer targets and a higher ratio of force-to-space.)

 

[Ian Hathaway]

There's a difference between trying to use cratering to close off the SE of England (which the LW were trying to do - without much success precisely because the amount of effort it took to seal one runway was more than they could apply to EVERY runway in the area) and trying to use cratering to close off two or three particular runways (which the RAF and the demolition teams will be trying to do - and that's MUCH easier, since there's only two targets.) Unload everything Bomber Command can do onto those two runways and they're going to be useless for a few days... and Bomber Command don't have to try and do that to dozens of other airbases, so they can repeat the job every day or every night.

(I believe the Japanese were often quite successful in runway cratering in SE Asia - precisely because there were fewer targets and a higher ratio of force-to-space.)

I agree, if the RAF chose to crater the landing strips by targeting them day and night they will probably be able to as long as the bombers get through. It would make those airfields more or less useless for continued operations. However, my comment was about the initial landings, small detachments of paratroops followed quickly by air transportable infantry ... probably no more than 500 in total. The amount of cratering that could be achieved in this instance would be insignificant due to the surprise element. One thing to note is that in previous operations of ths type the main problem for the Germans was avoiding the Ju52's that had already been landed and damaged or destroyed on the ground.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

I also wonder if, in addition to Lympne, Hawkinge and Manston, whether Shoreham Airport, just west of Brighton, would have been a viable target?

 

[Deckhand]

Easy. Ibiza. Trust me. Young German soldiers love it there and it's the best outcome for everyone concerned.

Now i have that image from "The Eagle has Landed" where the fallschirmjager are coming down on the beach, except the theme song is now the Vengaboys.

Flying Pigs indeed.

 

[King Augeas]

How much artillery was there in positions able to interdict a captured airfield? I know a lot was lost at Dunkirk, but wasn't there a lot of heavy WW1/naval stuff in storage that was reactivated in the summer?

I'm happy that the paratroopers can take an airfield, it's the ease of interdiction by BC and especially artillery that worries me.