When was the relative height of the United Kingdom's power?

67th Tigers

Banned
Amazing sometimes the things 67 comes up with. MILITARY historians virtually en mass agree that up to at least Gettysburgh the Army of Northern Virginia was superior to the Army of the Potomac as regards military capability. However the gap was slowly closing as the Union army got better and the Confederate army began to suffer the losses of personell and veteran commanders. It is arguable that at the time of Anteitam the Army of Northern Virginia was very close to its peak.
In numbers there was not one major battle where the Union was not
numerically superior. Lee never had more then 75,000 combat effectives at any time in the war. While the Army of the Potomac was frequently above 90,000. Now much of this advantage in power and numbers was more then nullified due to the AotP really pretty sad commanders; and more then a few bad corps commanders. For anyone to try and claim that McClellan was any where near as good as Lee is to frankly be on crack. I would ask that 67 sometime go to Carlisle, PA and speak to the Army Staff College there, where military history is studied and examined very closely. I have been there and have talked to the staff several times in the late 90's and early 00's. Since military history is my hobby I asked them to sum up the Union and Confederate commanders as regards ability and effectiveness. Needless to say they ALL would laugh in 67ths face.

Show me one occasion when the Army of the Potomac had 90,000 effectives. I won't hold my breath.

In fact, since you've mentioned Gettysburg, let us consider the "90,000" men.

Of them, over 30,000 are with the Supply Train, either as drivers or as guards. The remaining 60,000 include a small cavalry force of ca 5,000 men, a fairly large artillery arm (which requires 8,000 men to serve the guns, a figure they didn't have put took detachments of infantry to bolster the crews). After detachments for engineers etc. the 50 "brigades" that fought have 45,000 men averaging about 900 effectives each (the most extreme case, 2/1/2 Bde, mustered that morning with 532 offrs and men, and brought maybe 3-400 onto the field). However, march losses were extreme (on the order of 1/3rd of the infantry fell out of the march to Gettysburg), and Meade fights Gettysburg with maybe 30,000 effective infantry.

Lee OTOH also has about 30,000 effective infantry. It's actually a fairly evenly matched battle in terms of numbers on the field.
 
These are numbers present, not numbers effective. The generally agreed figure is that Lee had 79,000 combatants,

Generally agreed on? Where do you source your claims that the battlefield figures exclude Confederate non-combatant troops and include Union non-combatant troops?

Also, your numbers (whatever their source) claim that the CSA supply train was 14-17% of their army, while the USA supply train was 18-28% of the army at Antietam and about 40% of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. Care to explain the discrepancy?

and by calculation (105,000 present, minus 55,000 sick, minus 20-30,000 with the supply train) it can be shown McClellan had maybe 30,000 effective infantry to oppose Lee

So what your saying is every single Union combat troop at Seven Days had to fight three Confederates while protecting one non-combatant and carry two sick comrades to safety? I know the Union wore blue, but other people have neglected to mention the capes and the large letter S emblazoned across their chests.

Sounds like you’re going to have to reevaluate your claim the CSA soldier was 1.5 times as effective as his USA counterpart. If your numbers are correct than means the USA soldier is 3 times as effective as his CSA counterpart before we factor in them inflicting more casualties than they took and protecting a supply train equal in number and evacuating twice their number in troops incapactitated by sickness.

By the way, if half the Army of the Potomac really was incapacitated by an epidemic it seems odd that MccClellan never used this to try to justify his failure.

(indeed, since we have a partial account of the number of effectives per brigade, we can infer a figure of 32 brigades averaging 900 men each = 29,000 men)

That’s an average of 180 men per regiment. For comparison, the Iron Brigade, after fighting Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville had an average of 377 men per regiment. The First Minnesota took the heaviest casualties of any Union Regiment at First Bull Run and heavy casualties at Antietam, yet still started Gettysburg with 262 men.

By your numbers, Union regiments have to double in size from Seven Days to Gettysburg in spite of taking heavy casualties.

Care to explain the discrepancy?
 
Superior supply is falicious (Lee had just captured the largest Union Depot and was better supplied), numbers is also falicious (McClellan had nearly 30,000 men detached to the rear to man his supply train), firepower was also equal, and Lee was well aware of the loss of the orders, and had already altered his dispositions accordingly.

While I understand the historiography of McClellan, I can find very little basis for the idea of him as a bad general. The fabled "200,000" estimate for example appears to be myth, he himself in the OR's assesses Confederate Strength (including that in the Valley etc.) at 114,000, less than 5% off actual strength.

McClellan also had an entire corps (VI Corps) in reserve at Antietam which was never committed. He probably wasn't as bad as a lot of historians claim, but he was much too cautious to be an effective general on the side that had to go on the offensive to win. In a way, he would have made a much better Confederate general, while Lee, who was often too aggressive, would have been better suited as a Union general.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
McClellan also had an entire corps (VI Corps) in reserve at Antietam which was never committed. He probably wasn't as bad as a lot of historians claim, but he was much too cautious to be an effective general on the side that had to go on the offensive to win. In a way, he would have made a much better Confederate general, while Lee, who was often too aggressive, would have been better suited as a Union general.

Which is a *good thing*, in fact, from my POV, it's the DS Pink. McClellan wasn't a wargamer trying to get VPs, he was a General of a field army, and to have committed his final reserve would have risked losing the entire war for a nominal chance (by that point) of winning, and would have lost the chance to have a Corps de Chasse in hand if he did win.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Generally agreed on? Where do you source your claims that the battlefield figures exclude Confederate non-combatant troops and include Union non-combatant troops?

Also, your numbers (whatever their source) claim that the CSA supply train was 14-17% of their army, while the USA supply train was 18-28% of the army at Antietam and about 40% of the Army of the Potomac at Antietam. Care to explain the discrepancy?

What discrepancy?

So what your saying is every single Union combat troop at Seven Days had to fight three Confederates while protecting one non-combatant and carry two sick comrades to safety? I know the Union wore blue, but other people have neglected to mention the capes and the large letter S emblazoned across their chests.

I'd suggest you read up on the Seven Days. The long and the short is that Lee was simply outgeneralled by McClellan.

Sounds like you’re going to have to reevaluate your claim the CSA soldier was 1.5 times as effective as his USA counterpart. If your numbers are correct than means the USA soldier is 3 times as effective as his CSA counterpart before we factor in them inflicting more casualties than they took and protecting a supply train equal in number and evacuating twice their number in troops incapactitated by sickness.

Your not including Lee's poor command and control, his utter lack of grasp of the situation, or indeed some the the utter **** ups he had as subordinates (particularly Jackson, who single handedly lost Gaine's Mill, the largest CS attack of the war).


That’s an average of 180 men per regiment. For comparison, the Iron Brigade, after fighting Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville had an average of 377 men per regiment. The First Minnesota took the heaviest casualties of any Union Regiment at First Bull Run and heavy casualties at Antietam, yet still started Gettysburg with 262 men.

By your numbers, Union regiments have to double in size from Seven Days to Gettysburg in spite of taking heavy casualties.

Care to explain the discrepancy?

Er, no. Union brigades remain fairly constant at around 1,000 effectives for most of the war (with constant reinforcement by new units). However, remember there is no service corps, that 33% (or 50% in the AoT pre-Sherman) of the army needed to drive wagons etc. are carried on regimental rolls.

The falicy of the idea of everyone being in the line is obvious when you realise that it would require a greater troop density than at Waterloo (a very cramped battle, units had to form 4-6 deep to get on the field, and were stacked on average 3 deep). In fact, from known frontage etc. we know that it was "only" ca 11,000 men per mile, about the same as the British at the Alma, and typical for linear armies.
 
Superior supply is falicious (Lee had just captured the largest Union Depot and was better supplied), numbers is also falicious (McClellan had nearly 30,000 men detached to the rear to man his supply train),

How does brief looting by part of Lee’s Army that has to abandon Harper’s Ferry in haste to force march to battle make them better equipped? And where do you get you figures for the gigantic Union supply train?

firepower was also equal, and Lee was well aware of the loss of the orders, and had already altered his dispositions accordingly.

Lee did not find out about the Lost Orders until after they reached McClellan. McClellan spent the afternoon making plans and finally issued orders at 6:20 that night to move at daybreak. A Maryland citizen reached Lee’s army still later that night. Lee did not spend hours in planning, he issued orders as soon as Longstreet could reach his tent

McClellan reached Sharpsburg on the evening of the 15th. Then after delaying until the morning of the 17th, McClellan finally attacked. The day-and-a-half present allowed Jackson to reinforce Lee on the 16th, McLaws and Anderson to arrive shortly after the battle began and AP Hill to arrive in the early afternoon.

While I understand the historiography of McClellan, I can find very little basis for the idea of him as a bad general. The fabled "200,000" estimate for example appears to be myth, he himself in the OR's assesses Confederate Strength (including that in the Valley etc.) at 114,000, less than 5% off actual strength.

I’ve not heard of the “200,000” before. Sources generally agree that McClellan thought Lee had about 115,000 to 120,000 men, when in fact he faced about 45,000 and would have faced only 18,000 if he’d attacked on the morning of the 16th.

Show me one occasion when the Army of the Potomac had 90,000 effectives. I won't hold my breath.

In fact, since you've mentioned Gettysburg, let us consider the "90,000" men.

Of them, over 30,000 are with the Supply Train, either as drivers or as guards. The remaining 60,000 include a small cavalry force of ca 5,000 men, a fairly large artillery arm (which requires 8,000 men to serve the guns, a figure they didn't have put took detachments of infantry to bolster the crews). After detachments for engineers etc. the 50 "brigades" that fought have 45,000 men averaging about 900 effectives each (the most extreme case, 2/1/2 Bde, mustered that morning with 532 offrs and men, and brought maybe 3-400 onto the field). However, march losses were extreme (on the order of 1/3rd of the infantry fell out of the march to Gettysburg), and Meade fights Gettysburg with maybe 30,000 effective infantry.

Lee OTOH also has about 30,000 effective infantry. It's actually a fairly evenly matched battle in terms of numbers on the field.

So you’re claiming:
* 1/3 of the Union army was with the supply train
* 1/3 of the remainder didn’t make it due to straggling.
* Cavalry don’t count as ‘effectives’
* Artillery don’t count as ‘effectives’.
* The Union artillery was supplemented by a large number of amateurs.
* Average Brigade size was 900 ‘effectives’, meaning average Regiment size would be 180 men.
* Lee only had 30,000 ‘effective’ infantry.

I hate to break it to you but I don’t know of any historian that agrees with any of your claims. For example, Busey and Martin say USA "Engaged strength" at the battle was 93,921, while CSA "Engaged strength" was 71,699.

Far from averaging 180 per Regiment, some of the hardest hit units of the war, the Iron Brigade and the 1st Minnesota averaged 358 men per Regiment at the start of the battle.

And if the Union artillery was largely crewed by amateurs how did they outshoot the Confederate artillery?
 

67th Tigers

Banned
How does brief looting by part of Lee’s Army that has to abandon Harper’s Ferry in haste to force march to battle make them better equipped? And where do you get you figures for the gigantic Union supply train?

I was actually referring to taking the depot at Manassas Junction a few weeks earlier.

Lee did not find out about the Lost Orders until after they reached McClellan. McClellan spent the afternoon making plans and finally issued orders at 6:20 that night to move at daybreak. A Maryland citizen reached Lee’s army still later that night. Lee did not spend hours in planning, he issued orders as soon as Longstreet could reach his tent
If you look at the length of their OODA loops, they're actually not dissimilar. The idea that McClellan can suddenly redirect his army on a whim is rather silly. In fact, his change in direction of march is rather rapid.

McClellan reached Sharpsburg on the evening of the 15th. Then after delaying until the morning of the 17th, McClellan finally attacked. The day-and-a-half present allowed Jackson to reinforce Lee on the 16th, McLaws and Anderson to arrive shortly after the battle began and AP Hill to arrive in the early afternoon.
Again, he needs a day to reorder his army, and to get it all on the field. Or risk being defeated in detail.

I’ve not heard of the “200,000” before. Sources generally agree that McClellan thought Lee had about 115,000 to 120,000 men, when in fact he faced about 45,000 and would have faced only 18,000 if he’d attacked on the morning of the 16th.
You're confusing Antietam and the Seven Days.

Antietam is interesting, as Lee has 75,000 (PFD) a couple of days before, 70,000 a couple of days later, but only "45,000" on that day. There don't seem to be any major detachments in that period. I'd offer the explanation that the 45,000 figure often quoted (and some manage to push it down to 33,000 by excluding officers, artillery etc. in order to exaggerate Lee and/or denigrate McClellan) is probably the number of combatants it his army.

Of course, the same is not true for McClellan. The 90,000 figure includes all his baggage. It will take at least 30,000 men to man his baggage train.

So you’re claiming:
* 1/3 of the Union army was with the supply train
At least, Sherman complained that fully half the Army of the Tennessee was non-combatants when he took it over.

* 1/3 of the remainder didn’t make it due to straggling.
Gettysburg? The data seems to show that most regiments that force marched arrived on the field with less than half their strength from that morning state, but most seem to have caught up. Maybe 5-6,000 used the march as an opportunity to desert.

* Cavalry don’t count as ‘effectives’
I was talking about infantry, the cavalry are actually worse, tending towards 50% non-combatants. The logic should be obvious considering how maintenance and logistics intensive cavalry is. However, not as bad as:

* Artillery don’t count as ‘effectives’.
Again, I was talking about infantry.

* The Union artillery was supplemented by a large number of amateurs.
Well yes, obviously. It takes 250 men to run a 6 gun battery, and most Union gun batteries had 110-130 men. They had the difference up by detaching infantrymen.

* Average Brigade size was 900 ‘effectives’, meaning average Regiment size would be 180 men.
After deducting detachments and non-combatants, that's about right.

* Lee only had 30,000 ‘effective’ infantry.
Have to check that. His 36 brigades were slightly larger on average, and I'm to believe he detached a smaller proportion of them.


I hate to break it to you but I don’t know of any historian that agrees with any of your claims. For example, Busey and Martin say USA "Engaged strength" at the battle was 93,921, while CSA "Engaged strength" was 71,699.
The numbers simply being the number carried on rolls.

Far from averaging 180 per Regiment, some of the hardest hit units of the war, the Iron Brigade and the 1st Minnesota averaged 358 men per Regiment at the start of the battle.
The Iron Brigade is generally listed as including even the detached 7th Indiana - EDIT: 1st and 2nd Brigade Confusion Here. I have seen some adding an extra "437 casualties" by simply comparing the pre-Gettysburg nominal roll with the post-Gettysburg morning states.

The 1st Minnesota, that's the regiment which committed suicide by rather spectacularly by putting a volley into itself. The 1st Minnesota had detached 4 Coys (out of 12, including 2 attached SS Coys) to the baggage train. There was no standardised way of detaching service troops, some detached details, some detached companies, some brigades detached whole regiments (and occasionally a division would detach a brigade, usually when a veteran division had a new brigade which was unreliable under fire).

So while 358 were with the army, less than 2/3rds were with the Regiment. The 8 Coys with the regiment and RHQ numbered 262. RHQ included non-combatants (probably 20-30), so the loss of 215 men probably understates just how massacred they were, although the decisive moment was when the second line put a volley into the backs of the first line at 5 yards, essentially destroying it.

And if the Union artillery was largely crewed by amateurs how did they outshoot the Confederate artillery?
Well, they didn't.
 
Last edited:
Around Palmerstons time, the mid 19th Century.......ish. It was a time when we could start wars over drugs, or send a gunboat to sort out any problem we had with the rest of the world. Truly t'was a time when if you said "Out of my way, im British!", people complied. Of course nowadays if you do that you get arrested at the airport......silly me......

:D:D:D

Reminds me of Jack Dee talking about the old, larger, thick passports that could be used to beat foreigners.

"What is the purpose of your visit"?
"IMPERIALISM"! *whack*
 
Union brigades remain fairly constant at around 1,000 effectives for most of the war (with constant reinforcement by new units).

Some numbers I’ve found are:

Average regiment size
Shiloh 560
Fair Oaks 650
Chancellorsville 530
Fredericksburg 400
Gettysburg 375
Chickamauga 440
Wilderness 440

Since there were 5 regiments in a brigade, even if we assume heavy straggling that leaves total effectives of far more than your regimental average of 180 men.

However, remember there is no service corps, that 33% (or 50% in the AoT pre-Sherman) of the army needed to drive wagons etc. are carried on regimental rolls.

Actually, the US Quartermaster Corps significantly predates the ACW. The first US Quartermaster General, Thomas Mifflin was appointed in 1775. Montgomery Meigs, who became the 14th Quartermaster General in 1861, replacing Joseph Johnston.

Just one supply depot, City Point, employed 10,000 men and for about a year “provided all supplies necessary to support the 125,000 men and 65,000 animals of General Ulysses S. Grant's Union Armies”

Also, for the March to the Sea, Sherman limited each regiment to one wagon and one ambulance. If your 33% number were correct, that means the average Union regiment under Sherman had 6 men.

Speaking of regimental rolls, in his autobiography Sherman includes transcripts that detailed information on the Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio. They do not match your numbers.

I was actually referring to taking the depot at Manassas Junction a few weeks earlier.

Okay, how does taking the Manassas Junction a few weeks earlier lead to Lee being better equipped than McClellan at Antietam?

If you look at the length of their OODA loops, they're actually not dissimilar.

Actually as already shown by the actual battle, McClellan is significantly slower. McClellan had about 18 hours from getting Order 191 to actually putting his troops in motion. Lee had less than half that time.

The idea that McClellan can suddenly redirect his army on a whim is rather silly. In fact, his change in direction of march is rather rapid.

Nice straw man. No one ever suggested ‘McClellan can suddenly redirect his army on a whim’.

Again, he needs a day to reorder his army, and to get it all on the field. Or risk being defeated in detail.

McClellan’s army was already on the field of battle on the evening of the 15th. He finally attacked on the morning of the 17th, after giving Lee a day-and-a-half to assemble his army.

The only one in danger of being defeated in detail was Lee, but McClellan did his best to avoid that possibility. When he finally did attack after giving Lee a huge present of time, McClellan’s attacks were “ill-coordinated and were executed poorly”

You're confusing Antietam and the Seven Days.

No, I’m not. Catton, Forschen, Foote, Johnson, McPherson, Sears, and Waugh generally agree that McClellan thought Lee had about 115,000 to 120,000 men at Antietam; while all of those sources plus Anderson and Anderson, Buell, Fair, Hattaway and Jones, and Nolan agree Lee had about 45,000 and would have had half that or less if McClellan had attacked on the morning of the 16th.

Antietam is interesting, as Lee has 75,000 (PFD) a couple of days before, 70,000 a couple of days later, but only "45,000" on that day.

I’ve named my sources, what are yours?

Of course, the same is not true for McClellan. The 90,000 figure includes all his baggage. It will take at least 30,000 men to man his baggage train.

One thing Wikipedia has right, it says extraordinary claims require extraordinary sources. You continue to make extraordinary claims, yet fail to provide any sources.

And being detailed to guard the baggage train did not mean troops were completely out of combat. Special Order No. 191 clearly puts Longstreet’s command guarding the supply and baggage trains, yet that did not prevent them from being fully involved in the Battle of Antietam.

At least, Sherman complained that fully half the Army of the Tennessee was non-combatants when he took it over.

I can’t seem to find that in Sherman’s autobiography. Could you please tell me what page it’s on?

Gettysburg? The data seems to show that most regiments that force marched arrived on the field with less than half their strength from that morning state, but most seem to have caught up. Maybe 5-6,000 used the march as an opportunity to desert.

Total Union rolls show about 5,500 missing after the battle. Your numbers only make sense if the CSA was taking no prisoners in that battle.

I was talking about infantry, the cavalry are actually worse, tending towards 50% non-combatants. The logic should be obvious considering how maintenance and logistics intensive cavalry is. However, not as bad as:

Again, I was talking about infantry.

You specifically started by talking about combat effectives and during that discussion started removing cavalry and artillery from the list (see post #42 by you).

So why when you were talking about combat effectives did you remove the cavalry and artillery from the Union numbers?

And if you were just talking about infantry, why didn’t you remove the Confederate cavalry and artillery numbers from their totals?

It takes 250 men to run a 6 gun battery, and most Union gun batteries had 110-130 men. They had the difference up by detaching infantrymen.

Further research shows you are wrong again. While Union gun batteries did average have about 20 men per gun, they typically used only 8 to actually fire it and could still fire at a reduced rate with even less. For comparison, Napoleon’s army had averaged about 20 men per gun, and guns had become easier to handle in the intervening half-century.

I hate to break it to you but I don’t know of any historian that agrees with any of your claims. For example, Busey and Martin say USA "Engaged strength" at the battle was 93,921, while CSA "Engaged strength" was 71,699.
The numbers simply being the number carried on rolls.

No. There is a difference between ‘engaged strength’ and ‘total strength’. Perhaps you’re unfamiliar with the terms?

The Iron Brigade is generally listed as including even the detached 7th Indiana - EDIT: 1st and 2nd Brigade Confusion Here. I have seen some adding an extra "437 casualties" by simply comparing the pre-Gettysburg nominal roll with the post-Gettysburg morning states.

The Iron Brigade was composed of the 2nd, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, the19th Indiana, and the 24th Michigan. Veterans and recruits of the 7th Indiana weren’t merged into the 19th Indiana until September 1864, over a year after Gettysburg.

However, you are correct that there was a detached Brigade Guard. It numbered 102 out of the 1883 men, which is 5% of the total strength, nowhere near the 30+% you keep insisting on. That leaves the Iron Brigade with 1781 men, almost twice the average you claim for the whole Union Army.

The 1st Minnesota, that's the regiment which committed suicide by rather spectacularly by putting a volley into itself.

From an actual account of the battle –

"When the Confederates were only about thirty yards away, Colvill ordered his men to fire a volley into their faces, causing much confusion. Wilcox's second line returned the fire through the remnants of their own first line, and, according to Colvill, 'felling more of their own men then ours.'

The 1st Minnesota did not put a volley into itself. Their Confederate opposition put a volley into itself.

The 1st Minnesota had detached 4 Coys (out of 12, including 2 attached SS Coys) to the baggage train. So while 358 were with the army, less than 2/3rds were with the Regiment. The 8 Coys with the regiment and RHQ numbered 262. RHQ included non-combatants (probably 20-30), so the loss of 215 men probably understates just how massacred they were,

Shelby Foote covers the detached Companies, though only Company C was detached as provost-guard for the division, the others were skirmishers. Standard Regimental staff was 8 men, not 20 to 30, and such men frequently saw action in the ACW. Regardless, Foote and others make it clear that 262 men from the remaining 8 companies of the 1st Minnesota (well over your estimated average of 180) charged under Hancock’s orders.

although the decisive moment was when the second line put a volley into the backs of the first line at 5 yards, essentially destroying it.

Between your misreading the Union shooting their own men when sources show it was the Confederates and your previous misreading Hattway and Jones’ conclusion that Lee suffered average casualties to mean Lee was an average commander, I recommend you spend a bit longer looking at your sources.


And if the Union artillery was largely crewed by amateurs how did they outshoot the Confederate artillery?
Well, they didn't.

I take it you’re unfamiliar with Pickett’s charge then? Lee's artillery chief, William N. Pendleton, obstructed the effective placement of artillery from the other two corps and withdrew much of the vitally needed ammunition train. Edward Porter Alexander’s artillery inflicted relatively little damage on immediate opponents as they largely overshot their targets. Union counterfire inflicted significant casualties on the Confederate infantry before the charge even began. In addition to the Confederates taking heavy casualties from the Union artillery in front of them, they also took heavy fire flanking fire from Union batteries on Cemetery Hill
 
Nah, the USA (even split) was too industrialized at that point.


I'd agree upthread with 1840 or so…*I figure that's the last point a Realist British Empire could have screwed everybody else.

(Flood the market with cheap goods so nobody else can afford to industrialize; break up the USA; prevent Germany from forming; DO NOT sell complete manufacturing bases to everybody who wants one, and DO NOT finance them with British money.)

Now in absolute terms living standards both in the UK and worldwide would be way lower, but a Realist British Empire could maintain a relative edge for quite a lot longer than OTL if they had set out to do so.

Even in PPP terms, the American economy was considerably smaller than the British in 1861... It would be equivalent, I suppose, to the China of today. Then put the fact that the US was isolationist and demilitarised into the bargain (at least in the sense of projecting such military force) excepting the Civil War at least...

In relative terms, the answer must indeed be some time in the mid 19th century (just after Waterloo is often quoted, but in fact that perhaps isn't accurate; Russia had been vindicated, and the French economy was barely smaller than the British).
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Some numbers I’ve found are:

Average regiment size
Shiloh 560
Fair Oaks 650
Chancellorsville 530
Fredericksburg 400
Gettysburg 375
Chickamauga 440
Wilderness 440

Since there were 5 regiments in a brigade, even if we assume heavy straggling that leaves total effectives of far more than your regimental average of 180 men.

Straight out of Foxes Regimental Losses. He arrived at this figure by simply dividing the number of men present at the battle by the number of regiments. It is thus an overstatement.

Gettysburg for example, had only a handful of Regiments over 300 bayonets, yet the mean is somehow 375?

Just one supply depot, City Point, employed 10,000 men and for about a year “provided all supplies necessary to support the 125,000 men and 65,000 animals of General Ulysses S. Grant's Union Armies”

That's the supply base, how many men are needed to move it? Bear in mind that Wagon Trains average 8 men per wagon, and the Army of the Potomac's train is about 5,000 wagons....

Also, for the March to the Sea, Sherman limited each regiment to one wagon and one ambulance. If your 33% number were correct, that means the average Union regiment under Sherman had 6 men.

That's Regimental Baggage. What about brigade baggage? Division? Corps? The Artillery and Cavalry?

In fact, Sherman's 62,000 men had 2,500 wagons (at 8 men per wagon = 20,000 men, roughly a third of the force) and 600 ambulances. In addition, each brigade formed a 250 man foraging detachment.

Speaking of regimental rolls, in his autobiography Sherman includes transcripts that detailed information on the Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio. They do not match your numbers.

I think you'll find they do.

Much snipage.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Britain declined to enter a war on Danish side because Denmark brokje a treaty that was negotiated under British mediation and signed in London. Somehow, I fail to see how this is any argument in either direction about British power - the UK simply had good political reasons not to join the war, as the side they would have helped was the agressor.

On the way to bringing this back to the original thread I actually agree with Susano(!). A simple "we are not amused" from London probbaly would have blocked Bismarck's schemes instantly. The British abstained from intervention not because they couldn't, but because the Danes by stupid diplomacy had made the German cause appear quite just and appropriate (probably aided by Prince Albert)!

By this time the expansion of the Empire into Africa and SEA still was an undecided matter however, but in early 20th century, before the growth of the German navy made a concentration of the RN in the North Sea necessary, the British had won the colonial race in just about any place, and no likely combination of powers could seriously challenge the British. That didn't mean the British could at will invade and defeat any opponent - it never had and still doesn't for the present global power - but there wasn't any serious callenge to the British world order.

The old archenemy France had ben seriusly grinded down by centuries of wars and was fast closing to become an ally. USA, Germany and Russia clearly had potential, but I think the Russian one appeared the most serious, as the Russians were the only threat to the jewel of the Empire - India. The Japanese helped postpone that a lot however, and after that the Germans post-Bismarck pressed the Russian into the British camp - what a relief.

USA indeed had a growing industry and abundant raw materials - but factories and pits have never won any war or battle - armies and navies in the right place and time have. By early 20th century USA was very far from (even having the will to) transforming that potential into anything being a threat outside the (N)American continent. Had it wanted to, it could have utilsed the years when the RN had to focus on the German Navy in the North Sea, but it wasn't seriously considered on any side of the pond. And even though the US economy was huge by early 20th century, it was mainly limited to the American continents and still with a heavy influx of British investments.

After WWI USA quickly fell back in an isolationist role, and the parity granted the USN in 1922 did not challenge the RN/GB as the only global power.

All in all my best bid for a zenith would be 1905-06, when France and Russia are over as threats but Germany, Japan and USA still only regional powers - and the RN yet uncommitted in the North Sea. By 1918 Germany is done with for the time being, and Japan and USA not (yet) any threat, but the optimism and belief in progress lost on the battlefields of WWI IMHO was the dominant factor behind the fall of the Empire(s), and the final step was taken by Churchill sacrificing the Empire in the fight vs. the nazis. USA never was a threat to the Empire, but was so kind to take over the patrol duties when the Empire lost breath.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
Top