When did the Red Army become the qualitative equal of the Heer?

Deleted member 1487

I disagree that is irrelevant except in the sense that of course Cold War Soviets would be more advanced than the German army of WWII, though, search in that book for "194" and I think you will change your mind when you see all the results pop up, just like as another example, Tactics: A Soviet View by Reznichenko, V G it is seemingly replete with historical examples of what the Soviets did 'right'
I am reading through it, it is interesting, but my point still holds: the manual is using WW2 experience, culled long after there was time to digest and cherrypick the right lessons. Soviet troops during didn't have the luxury of looking back at WW2 as an example of what to do right, they were figuring things out as they went, partially based on hastily developed lessons from previous operation, hard won experience, and pre-war theory/doctrine. As it was the majority of Soviet troops during were not trained, or at least had rudimentary training compared to the pre and post war standards (especially the post-war), so weren't fighting so much based on doctrine as such, but on what they could figure out as they went. Higher level commanders could of course rely on pre-war training and doctrine, honing their methods as they went based on experience. Take Bagration for example. That was largely based on pre-war doctrine (Isserson's developments from what I gather) and experience from 1941-43...which wasn't exactly when Deep Battle was really practiced (at least well).

So my issue with using 1970s-80s refined Soviet doctrine or at least the American analysis of it, is that it highly refined and cherrypicks WW2 examples of when things were 'done right' for the modern army to emulate rather than actually detailing the reality of what the standard/average practice of WW2 were for the Soviet military. The post-war Soviet military was quite a different animal than the WW2 military, as they had the experience, time, and soon lack of Stalin to allow them to work out their wartime deficiencies and create the world's most formidable military.

Thanks for the suggestion about "Tactics" I'll check it out.
 

Redbeard

Banned
That's not operational at all. The level of division and below is tactics. "Operational" is generally army through to the entire theater-level command.

I'll first try to answer in your own spirit: No it isn't!

Then I'll try to move on into elaborating where I think the distinction between tactical and operational level ought to be, and that is at the level where units are expected of performing independent combat. In most WWII armies the Division was the smallest unit expected to perform independent combat as it had various arms to combine (inf, arty, engineers etc). In this regard the levels from Division and up had a very important common factor. In many armies the Division also was closely liked to the Army in logistic matters (actually bypassing the Corps level).

Anyway there are many overlaps, but having a tactical level going from squad to Division simply spans too much.
 
The operational level was introduced in the 20s when the Soviets formulated their Broad front/successive operations doctrine. This was conceptually similar to the final Allied offensives of WW1, in the sense that one didn't plan a single battle, but a series of intertwined battles.
it is now accepted that the allied command was "de facto" operating at the operational level in late 1918, but the idea of an "operational" level was only formulated by the soviets.
It is, therefore, not linked to a formal echelon. The Operational Maneuver Groups got their name because they were operating within the framework of the operational level plan.
In the current era of Multi-Domain Ops, the level of vertical and lateral integration is so high that the idea of separate tactical operational and strategic levels is somewhat blurred.
 
I'll first try to answer in your own spirit: No it isn't!


Anyway there are many overlaps, but having a tactical level going from squad to Division simply spans too much.

That problem is solved at War Colleges by dividing tactics btw small unit tactics (Battalion/Brigade) and large units tactics (Independent Brigade upwards)
 

Deleted member 1487

The operational level was introduced in the 20s when the Soviets formulated their Broad front/successive operations doctrine. This was conceptually similar to the final Allied offensives of WW1, in the sense that one didn't plan a single battle, but a series of intertwined battles.
it is now accepted that the allied command was "de facto" operating at the operational level in late 1918, but the idea of an "operational" level was only formulated by the soviets.
It is, therefore, not linked to a formal echelon. The Operational Maneuver Groups got their name because they were operating within the framework of the operational level plan.
In the current era of Multi-Domain Ops, the level of vertical and lateral integration is so high that the idea of separate tactical operational and strategic levels is somewhat blurred.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_level_of_war
The idea existed with a different name in the 18th-19th centuries, called 'Grand Tactics' or 'Minor Strategy'. Perhaps the Soviets introduced the terms in the 1920s, though I know the Luftwaffe were using the term/concept but it is unclear if they got it from the Russians or not. From what I've read it seems the concept was largely formalized during WW1, though both the Germans and Soviets took it to another level in the 1920s. Also as a point of order, the Operational Maneuver Group was a term that was coined after WW2 in the 1950s. During WW2 it was a Cavalry-Mechanized Group.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_manoeuvre_group
Not sure how right this is, but the above link suggests the Germans and Soviets developed operational concepts together during their cooperation period in the 1920s...
 
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_level_of_war
The idea existed with a different name in the 18th-19th centuries, called 'Grand Tactics' or 'Minor Strategy'. Perhaps the Soviets introduced the terms in the 1920s, though I know the Luftwaffe were using the term/concept but it is unclear if they got it from the Russians or not. From what I've read it seems the concept was largely formalized during WW1, though both the Germans and Soviets took it to another level in the 1920s. Also as a point of order, the Operational Maneuver Group was a term that was coined after WW2 in the 1950s. During WW2 it was a Cavalry-Mechanized Group.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_manoeuvre_group
Not sure how right this is, but the above link suggests the Germans and Soviets developed operational concepts together during their cooperation period in the 1920s...
If you read the original versions of either German (Guderian) or Soviet (Tukhachevsy) they show no influence from each other. It was only after the war, in the Lidell Hart prefaced new British version that German influence on soviet work was first discussed.
This is a often discussed topic and no two persons seem to agree but my personal take is that as far as small units tactics go, everybody who did field exercises and wargames in the 20s and 30s arrived at more or less the same conclusions, but some were more succefull than others in Implementing them. The Germans worked out small units tactics first, and the used them to bring back a new take on the strategic concepts that Moltke had developed in 1860/1870. The soviets started with successive/broad front operations and developed small units tactics to match their new operational/strategic concept and that led to deep battle which is, IMO a classic Marxist synthesis between the opposing concepts of manoeuvre and attrition in the sense that it maximises attrition through manoeuvre. In that sense the German doctrine was developed in a bottom > Up manner and the soviet one in a Top > Down manner and they sort of met at the middle.
Both drew heavily from the very public work of General Estienne after the war.

If you look for complex campaigns, you can make a case that some Union campaigns in the ACW show signs of an understanding of a sort of operational level.
The soviets formulated the concept, and in academic terms they get the bragging rights, since they published first.
 
Regarding the OMG, they were a big part of the reintroduction of deep battle concepts by the soviets in the 70s, when they reduced the emphasis on nuclear weapons and went back to Bagration and August Strom for inspiration. IIRC from the good old days, they were usually centred around a reinforced tank division.
The French Magazine Guerres & Histoire, which is excellent, recently did and extensive piece on the evolution of NATO vs Warsaw Pact doctrines that resumes the evolution quite well.
they also did a special on alternate history, which is fun for AH.Com vets.
I liked their take on the Armada
 

Deleted member 1487

If you read the original versions of either German (Guderian) or Soviet (Tukhachevsy) they show no influence from each other. It was only after the war, in the Lidell Hart prefaced new British version that German influence on soviet work was first discussed.
This is a often discussed topic and no two persons seem to agree but my personal take is that as far as small units tactics go, everybody who did field exercises and wargames in the 20s and 30s arrived at more or less the same conclusions, but some were more succefull than others in Implementing them. The Germans worked out small units tactics first, and the used them to bring back a new take on the strategic concepts that Moltke had developed in 1860/1870. The soviets started with successive/broad front operations and developed small units tactics to match their new operational/strategic concept and that led to deep battle which is, IMO a classic Marxist synthesis between the opposing concepts of manoeuvre and attrition in the sense that it maximises attrition through manoeuvre. In that sense the German doctrine was developed in a bottom > Up manner and the soviet one in a Top > Down manner and they sort of met at the middle.
Both drew heavily from the very public work of General Estienne after the war.

If you look for complex campaigns, you can make a case that some Union campaigns in the ACW show signs of an understanding of a sort of operational level.
The soviets formulated the concept, and in academic terms they get the bragging rights, since they published first.
From what I've read about the Russian developments, there is a strong continuity from the 19th century into WW1 and the developments of the 1920s. Guderian was AFAIK never at Kazan and wasn't really that instrumental to the development of German armor doctrine, one voice of many; he got notoriety due to being the leader of the 1940 campaign and being a rather loud self promoter pre-WW2. Tukhachevsky was also hardly the only person theorizing in the USSR and might well not have been the major player in formulating it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Tukhachevsky#Reform_of_the_Red_Army
Tukhachevsky is often credited with the theory of deep operations in which combined arms formations strike deep behind enemy lines to destroy the enemy's rear and logistics,[17][18] but his exact role is unclear and disputed because of shortage of firsthand sources, and his published works containing only limited amounts of theory on the subject.

Other scholars recently have suggested Isserson was more important to Soviet developments of Deep Battle:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_operation#Isserson;_the_factor_of_depth
 
Commenting on something you posted earlier, if I wanted to give examples of deep battle done well, I would go for Bagration, August Storm, and Desert Storm :)
Air Land Battle is just Deep Battle with HighTech
Deep Battle was arguably to complex for 1930s/40s tech except when operations could be carefully planned.
Simultaneity, an essential principle of deep battle, is very difficult to maintain in a rapidly evolving situation without advanced C3I
 
The idea existed with a different name in the 18th-19th centuries, called 'Grand Tactics' or 'Minor Strategy'.

Those are only similar to Operational Art in a superficial way and lack the same depth and nuance. Although calling it "proto-Operational Art" probably wouldn't be too inaccurate.

Air Land Battle is just Deep Battle with HighTech

Not... quite. Deep Battle was a highly offensive doctrine designed based on an assumed superior operational method to conduct an offensive into and throughout the enemy's depth, moving at a speed and on a scale that would preclude the enemy forming an effective defense. Deep Battle had a deep theoretical base, rooted in past Soviet experience, and decades of extensive military studies and intellectual discussion.

Air/Land Battle was an essentially defensive doctrine focused on maximizing a tactical advantage to gain an operational edge, by striking the enemy in depth while fighting his forward forces to a standstill. Unlike Deep Battle which was a general operation doctrine, Air/Land battle was specifically designed to counter a particular methodology... that is, Soviet Deep Battle. It was based on short-term technological advantages without much in the way of deep theory.

The analogy given to me is that Deep Battle was the full, dry class on war and Air/Land Battle was the witty, well timed aphorism.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Those are only similar to Operational Art in a superficial way and lack the same depth and nuance. Although calling it "proto-Operational Art" probably wouldn't be too inaccurate.
Given that that was before aircraft, radio communication, and the motor engine the concepts of depth were not exactly as refined as it would by in the 1940s. The 'level' of warfare within the technological constraints was still there, it just wasn't something based on the depth and tempo of WW2; even WW1 wasn't even to the depth of WW2 operational level of war due to the technological constraints; it too was 'proto'.
 
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