When did the Red Army become the qualitative equal of the Heer?

Material factors were a function of population,

Almost even after the losses of 1941.

help from allies (material and by drawing forces off for other fronts),

Inadequate to make up for the disparity until after the decisive period had passed.

Hitler being a moron and starting a multi-front war against the strongest powers in the world,

An example of the Germans inferior strategic insight, but it says little about the Soviets.

and pre-war mass heavy industry formation for reasons other than fighting WW2 specifically.

That the Soviets deliberately prepared their industry for a extensive war of attrition and the Germans didn’t prior to the war is evidence for the formers superior strategic insight. Strategy, after all, is an all encompassing thing and does not recognize artificial divisions between war and peace. A good strategy needs to be realized before the fighting begins and is part and parcel of preparing your forces for the conflict you plan or forsee. If you're trying to establish your strategic vision of what kind of war your trying to fight after you've started fighting rather than before, then you have made a serious error. Hence the Sun Tzu quote, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war. Defeated warriors go to war and then seek to win."

And the Soviets had very much deliberately prepared their industry for the kind of war World War 2 was, even if not for WW2 specifically.
 
Last edited:
...
That the Soviets deliberately prepared their industry for a extensive war of attrition and the Germans didn’t prior to the war is evidence for the formers superior strategic insight. Strategy, after all, is an all encompassing thing and does not recognize artificial divisions between war and peace. A good strategy needs to be realized before the fighting begins, and is part and parcel of preparing your forces for the conflict you plan or forsee. If you're trying to establish your strategic vision of a war after you've started fighting rather than before, then you have made a serious error. Hence the Sun Tzu quote, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war. Defeated warriors go to war and then seek to win."

And the Soviets had very much deliberately prepared their industry for the kind of war World War 2 was, even if not for WW2 specifically.

This makes wonder what the differences would have been had the US invested a few millions in realistic and well researched plans for industrial mobilization from 1920 to 1939, as per the Marsh Plan outlined in 1919? As it was the plans were so poorly research (lack of funds) the industrial mobilization started in 1940 did not hit its stride until three and a half years later, in latter 1943.
 
IMHO the huge difference came at the operational level - ie. the intermediate level between the front (tactics) and the overall allocation of resources and goals of the warfare (Strategy). This is the level where units capable of independent combat (from Brigade/Division and up) and deployed and lead into combat, and that includes TOEs and logistics...

Very good point and I agree completely. I forgot the term "operational" and its use to describe division / regiment / battalion level operations. I include battalion in this because German battalions were significantly bigger than Soviet ones- maybe as big as Soviet regiments.
 

Deleted member 1487

Almost even after the losses of 1941.
Nowhere near. They had at least 140 million people after the highest point of German penetration in 1942, which was 60 million more than the Germans...not counting British and US siphoning off of German troops and resource.

Inadequate to make up for the disparity until after the decisive period had passed.
Nonsense. The Wallies took the critical edge of German resources off in 1941-42. Beyond that Wallied help was vital to keeping the Soviet economy from imploding and giving the resources to allow the rolling back of the Germans. Zhukov even said that the vital armaments to the reserve armies of 1942 came from the Wallies:
https://www.rbth.com/defence/2016/0...ies-aided-the-ussr-in-its-darkest-hour_575559
"Now they say that the allies never helped us, but it can't be denied that the Americans gave us so many goods without which we wouldn't have been able to form our reserves and continue the war," Soviet General Georgy Zhukov said after the end of WWII.

"We didn’t have explosives, gunpowder. We didn’t have anything to charge our rifle cartridges with. The Americans really saved us with their gunpowder and explosives. And how much sheet steel they gave us! How could we have produced our tanks without American steel? But now they make it seem as if we had an abundance of all that. Without American trucks we wouldn’t have had anything to pull our artillery with."

An example of the Germans inferior strategic insight, but it says little about the Soviets.
Hitler's poor strategic insight. But then this discussion isn't about how poor his insights were, rather how much Soviet success relied on them.

That the Soviets deliberately prepared their industry for a extensive war of attrition and the Germans didn’t prior to the war is evidence for the formers superior strategic insight. Strategy, after all, is an all encompassing thing and does not recognize artificial divisions between war and peace. A good strategy needs to be realized before the fighting begins and is part and parcel of preparing your forces for the conflict you plan or forsee. If you're trying to establish your strategic vision of what kind of war your trying to fight after you've started fighting rather than before, then you have made a serious error. Hence the Sun Tzu quote, “Victorious warriors win first and then go to war. Defeated warriors go to war and then seek to win."

And the Soviets had very much deliberately prepared their industry for the kind of war World War 2 was, even if not for WW2 specifically.
They were first of all preparing to industrialize period, which meant having the sort of heavy industry that translated into mass war materials. Still what they had wasn't enough, they needed $11 Billion in foreign aid to keep going and go on the offensive.

Also the Germans did prepare their economy for war since 1933; Hitler of course went to war before preparations were ready. Which gets us back into the strategic insights issue on the German side...which was a cause of Soviet success.

Very good point and I agree completely. I forgot the term "operational" and its use to describe division / regiment / battalion level operations. I include battalion in this because German battalions were significantly bigger than Soviet ones- maybe as big as Soviet regiments.
Rather, Soviet battalions were much smaller than everyone else's because they had to downsize for reasons Redbeard talks about.
 
S
IMHO this is the really critical time of the East Front. The Soviets won due to strategic perseverance and the Germans lost due to lack of the same - ie. the old stuff about not planning Barbarossa into 1942. With a foresighted planning, the Germans could have utilised their operational superiority to neutralise the Soviet perseverance into 1942. But they didn't - the operational superiority got blunted in the winter of 1941/42, and when it got temporarily sharpened again in mid 1942 and mid 1943 it was up against not only the Soviet perseverance but also against a Red army starting to get the grip of operations (and a Hitler replacing operational sense with a ditto neurosis).

I think this was in part due to the Soviet numerical advantage and the German way of war.

German combat units were fragile in that they needed well trained men, carefully selected NCOS and very carefully selected officers to implement their advanced tactics. It did not take much leadership losses to degrade the performance of a unit because the tactics were so advanced. This meant that German category "A' type operational level infantry and armored units needed significantly more rebuilding time than their Soviet opposites with simpler tactics and a tolerance for lower expectations. Of course this did not mean that every Soviet operational level leader was a dud, just that Germans needed more comprehensive preparation and training to get the most out of their advanced tactics.
 
Very good point and I agree completely. I forgot the term "operational" and its use to describe division / regiment / battalion level operations. I include battalion in this because German battalions were significantly bigger than Soviet ones- maybe as big as Soviet regiments.

That's not operational at all. The level of division and below is tactics. "Operational" is generally army through to the entire theater-level command.

Nowhere near. They had at least 140 million people after the highest point of German penetration in 1942, which was 60 million more than the Germans...not counting British and US siphoning off of German troops and resource.

Very much near. In fact, if we consider that Germany was sitting a top practically the whole of Europe, they were operating with a superiority in population.

Nonsense. The Wallies took the critical edge of German resources off in 1941-42.

What took the critical edge off of German resources in 1941-42 was the German failure to mobilize their economy for total war with the USSR. The reasons they failed to do this had to do with the expectation of a short war with the Soviets and a desire to preserve their mobilization capabilities for a long follow up war against the Anglo-Americans, but had the Germans done so they would have long pre-empted the Soviet material superiority with their own material superiority regardless of what the Western Allies did or did not do.

In other words, the reasons for Soviet material disparity by 1942-43 comes down to the strategic decisions made by the Soviets and Germans and that the decisions made by the Soviets were superior to that of the Germans. They not incidents or flukes or simple luck (unless your speaking of Napoleon's definition of luck). Of course, why those decisions were made is a different matter which was predominantly determined by how the various Soviet and German organizations made their decisions.

Beyond that Wallied help was vital to keeping the Soviet economy from imploding and giving the resources to allow the rolling back of the Germans.

Irrespective of the debate on whether lend-lease was precisely that important, basic math tells us $11 billion of foreign aid cannot make up for the loss of $143 billion worth of economic assets nor does it make up for a economic disparity of the same level (if counting just the domestic German GDP) or a disparity of $874 billion (if we include the economies of the occupied territories).

Hitler's poor strategic insight.

Distinction without difference for the period we are discussing.

But then this discussion isn't about how poor his insights were, rather how much Soviet success relied on them.

Everyone benefits from the mistakes of their opponents... assuming they have the skill to exploit them.

EDIT: And if we want to go down that rabbit hole, one could point to how much German success relied upon the mistakes both the WAllies and the Soviets made. The difference is the WAllies and Soviets mistakes lost them battles, German mistakes lost them the war.

They were first of all preparing to industrialize period, which meant having the sort of heavy industry that translated into mass war materials.

That the Soviet industrialization was from the start done with an eye for the technical-industrial productive capacities to wage a massive war of attrition is a matter of historical record. This was explicitly laid out in Soviet military thinking in the 1920s and 30s, thinking which was whole-heartedly endorsed and adopted by the CPSU.

Still what they had wasn't enough, they needed $11 Billion in foreign aid to keep going and go on the offensive.

What they had at the start of 1941 was certainly enough, foreign aid or not. What they had after the German invasion wrecked their economy was a completely different matter, of course, but it meant that even with WAllied aid they had to use their resources better then the Germans did if they wanted to prevail. In this, they succeeded and the reason for that success lay with their strategic insight.

Also the Germans did prepare their economy for war since 1933;

Not quite. Serious German preparations really begin towards the end of 1935. The main issue was they occurred within a economy confined with just the domestic German industrial base and operating at a inferiority in raw inputs. This was not the case after Barbarossa when comparing the German economy to the Soviet one. Even accounting for lend-lease, the Germans had grossly superior access to all of the various inputs for a war economy in 1942 and 1943: manpower, raw materials, refined materials, and so-on. Yet they failed to match Soviet production of war material until 1944.

Hitler of course went to war before preparations were ready.

Hitler actually went to war when Germans preparations were at their best vis-à-vis their opponents. Had he waited further, as his generals wanted him too, Germany would have failed out the gate. Spectacularly.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

I think this was in part due to the Soviet numerical advantage and the German way of war.

German combat units were fragile in that they needed well trained men, carefully selected NCOS and very carefully selected officers to implement their advanced tactics. It did not take much leadership losses to degrade the performance of a unit because the tactics were so advanced. This meant that German category "A' type operational level infantry and armored units needed significantly more rebuilding time than their Soviet opposites with simpler tactics and a tolerance for lower expectations. Of course this did not mean that every Soviet operational level leader was a dud, just that Germans needed more comprehensive preparation and training to get the most out of their advanced tactics.
Well you don't really have an option due to having a much smaller population base, especially the cohorts coming of age during WW2, as they were the 'hollow years' due to WW1 and the aftermath (birthrates in the early 1920s was lower than they are now in Germany). The Germans also had the advantage of having the highest literacy rate in Europe and a very well educated population except compared to say the US and Britain.
The thing is the German combat units retained a much higher combat effectiveness despite heavy losses than their Soviet counterparts. Part of that was a higher firepower per unit than the Soviets, particularly in their division/regiment artillery, which was extremely efficient/effective compared to the Soviets. Of course for tactical units it really helped that even though the infantry were hollowed out the most, the other arms, particularly the artillery and staff officers (aka the guys that made operations happen) were not wiped out with any regularity until 1943-45, so they built up a ton of experience and could work with even a sub-par trained infantry. Also the Germans tended to retain substantial cadres, so even a 'green' division was built up with a substantial number of experienced officers and NCOs, who, with surprising effectiveness, imparted practical combat wisdom on their recruits.
 

Deleted member 1487

Very much near. In fact, if we consider that Germany was sitting a top practically the whole of Europe, they were operating with a superiority in population.
Most of whom were conquered by the Germans and quite hostile to them, requiring occupation and draining of resources. They were a net loss of manpower to the Germans, as not only did they have to be occupied, but also defended from the Brits, which meant if anything they contributed to making the manpower disparity worse, not better. Even allowing for forced labor in Germany, the reality is that the majority of occupied Europe was a huge drain on the fighting age manpower of Germany and occupied Europe contributed far less combat manpower than it required to hold down.

Now you could make the argument of Germany's allies in Europe helping them, but you'd also have to then factor in the UK and US manpower and other nations that contributed to the overall Allied war effort.


What took the critical edge off of German resources in 1941-42 was the German failure to mobilize their economy for total war with the USSR. The reasons they failed to do this had to do with the expectation of a short war with the Soviets and a desire to preserve their mobilization capabilities for a long follow up war against the Anglo-Americans, but had the Germans done so they would have long pre-empted the Soviet material superiority with their own material superiority regardless of what the Western Allies did or did not do.
They were already mobilized for war against the UK. They couldn't fully mobilize for war against the USSR, because they were already mobilized against Britain and roughly half of their military spending in 1941 was to fight the British. I'm not sure what extra resources you think were sitting around, given that anything 'extra' was for fighting the Brits and would simply be transferred from the 'fighting the Brits' to 'fighting the Soviets' column.
There was no chance preempt Soviet material superiority given that Germany was already outnumbered before the invasion by Soviet artillery, armor, and aircraft in raw numbers, plus the Soviet reserve potential, which left the Soviets 8 million men under arms by the end of 1941 even after taking something like 4.5-5 million casualties in 1941. The Germans meanwhile ended the year with less men under arms than they started with.

In other words, the reasons for Soviet material disparity by 1942-43 comes down to the strategic decisions made by the Soviets and Germans and that the decisions made by the Soviets were superior to that of the Germans. They not incidents or flukes or simple luck (unless your speaking of Napoleon's definition of luck). Of course, why those decisions were made is a different matter which was predominantly determined by how the various Soviet and German organizations made their decisions.
In the sense that the Soviets chose to focus on a few categories of weapons and make a lot of cheap versions of them, while the Germans were fighting on multiple fronts, being forced to make equipment in categories that would not have made sense to the Soviets or they couldn't make (Uboats, variety of cruise/ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, handheld rocket launchers, APCs, massive amounts of locomotives and rolling stock, all sorts of rail equipment to rebuild Soviet rail to European standards, all sorts of advanced electronics, huge amounts of heavy AAA, etc.) .

Irrespective of the debate on whether lend-lease was precisely that important, basic math tells us $11 billion of foreign aid cannot make up for the loss of $143 billion worth of economic assets nor does it make up for a economic disparity of the same level (if counting just the domestic German GDP) or a disparity of $874 billion (if we include the economies of the occupied territories).
Depends on whether those economic assets were war material capable. And they don't need to make up all of them, especially if it is the edge to prevent collapse of the economy and specially targeted aid to help make up for what couldn't be made by the Soviets (electronics, advanced machine tools, high quality trucks and aircraft and fuel for example). The German occupied territories didn't yield the Germans value in anywhere near the realm of $874 Billion and was mostly things like property held by private citizens; those economies effectively collapsed without imports, so contributed little beyond what was taken out of the countries to ship back to Germany. Do you have the numbers about the dollar value and types of materials taken from occupied countries?

Distinction without difference for the period we are discussing.
What difference is there with that statement? As a basic fact Hitler had poor strategy, which gave the Soviets a chance to win.

Everyone benefits from the mistakes of their opponents... assuming they have the skill to exploit them.

EDIT: And if we want to go down that rabbit hole, one could point to how much German success relied upon the mistakes both the WAllies and the Soviets made. The difference is the WAllies and Soviets mistakes lost them battles, German mistakes lost them the war.
Sure, the Germans inordinately benefited from the mistakes of their enemies until late 1941 when the Allies had their chance to turn the tables given Hitler's mistakes. The structural material factors favored the 'haves' vs. the 'have nots' trying to take from the 'haves'.

That the Soviet industrialization was from the start done with an eye for the technical-industrial productive capacities to wage a massive war of attrition is a matter of historical record. This was explicitly laid out in Soviet military thinking in the 1920s and 30s, thinking which was whole-heartedly endorsed and adopted by the CPSU.
Soviet military production was one facet of building up a heavy industry. The Soviets were trying to industrialize themselves with limited help from outside the country, which mean if they were going to have an autarkic system they need to start with heavy industry and develop the rest as they went. Luckily mass heavy industry easily feeds into major weapon system production, so the Soviet military could plan on having access to mass manufactured heavy equipment, but not things like sufficient electronics.

What they had at the start of 1941 was certainly enough, foreign aid or not. What they had after the German invasion wrecked their economy was a completely different matter, of course, but it meant that even with WAllied aid they had to use their resources better then the Germans did if they wanted to prevail. In this, they succeeded and the reason for that success lay with their strategic insight.
Debatable. Even with an intact economy they lacked certain capacities to make things like sufficient quality electronics, which is why they had such a dearth of radios, not to mention radar, in 1941. They could have had a lot more manpower/labor, AFVs, and food without losing all that territory. They didn't really use their resources better than the Germans, which is the entire point I'm making, they had a one front war to fight and very powerful allies drawing off the critical edge of German resources. The Soviets were able to persevere due to having a lot of help from before the war in the East even started due to Britain fighting/having fought the Germans for 18 months already, while during the entire war in the East fighting them on multiple fronts, forcing the Germans to spend at least half their military spending on weapons to fight them, and supplying the Soviets with material aid from the beginning (as did the US). US entry was a game changer that tipped the scales heavily toward military production against the Wallies, not the Soviets. As the Soviets were then able to focus on one front, one type of war, they were able to specialize, while the Germans were forced to focus on multiple fronts, multiple types of warfare and get ground to death by multiple enemies with combine resources more than 500% greater.

Not quite. Serious German preparations really begin towards the end of 1935. The main issue was they occurred within a economy confined with just the domestic German industrial base and operating at a inferiority in raw inputs. This was not the case after Barbarossa when comparing the German economy to the Soviet one. Even accounting for lend-lease, the Germans had grossly superior access to all of the various inputs for a war economy in 1942 and 1943: manpower, raw materials, refined materials, and so-on. Yet they failed to match Soviet production of war material until 1944.
German war industry was largely destroyed by the ToV, which meant 1933-35 was spent rebuilding foundational industry to get to the point where they could focus on specific outright military production; foundational industrial work is still part of the rearmament plan, which was actually laid out pre-Hitler in 1932 by the Reichswehr. Finances, limited manpower, and limited industrial bases all played a role in limiting the rate of military recovery, but it was all ongoing from 1933 and arguably a bit before.
The problem with comparing the Soviet and German economies after the invasion began is that you're ignoring the British and US economies, which were big contributors to fighting Germany. It wasn't 100% of German production and manpower dedicated to the East, rather more like 50% dedicated to the East. In 1942-43 the Germans were fighting a naval war, a strategic air war, fighting in the Mediterranean, spending manpower to occupy and defend Europe, and fighting resistance movements all over Europe. In no way can you look at the entire German economy and compare that to the entire Soviet economy and say you're making a fair comparison; you also need to factor in the Wallied contributions and economies.

Hitler actually went to war when Germans preparations were at their best vis-à-vis their opponents. Had he waited further, as his generals wanted him too, Germany would have failed out the gate. Spectacularly.
His generals were telling him not to go to war period. They liked the bigger budgets. Hitler only went to war in 1939 because he thought the Allies wouldn't declare war on him for invading Poland. Again, great strategic genius he was. /s
 
What took the critical edge off of German resources in 1941-42 was the German failure to mobilize their economy for total war with the USSR. The reasons they failed to do this had to do with the expectation of a short war with the Soviets and a desire to preserve their mobilization capabilities for a long follow up war against the Anglo-Americans, but had the Germans done so they would have long pre-empted the Soviet material superiority with their own material superiority regardless of what the Western Allies did or did not do.

This is the only point I disagree with you on, mostly because Tooze shows pretty convincingly the German economy actually was going flat-out by 1940 and didn't really slack off in the interim. The whole notion of Germany not mobilizing their economy to keep the home front happy is mostly a myth spun up by Speer to make himself look better. To be fair there were some improvements in production processes and the like just as and after Speer took over but that was more of the nature of refining an already-existing war economy, stepping up exploitation of non-German workers and changes to production modes than anything related to an increased level of mobilization. It was also a period that saw lots of dead-ends, screwups and mistakes by people like Speer who upended previously existing systems, chased illusory production miracles and didn't fix the deeper problems in German production and logistics like, for example, the tendency for in-production tinkering and gradual improvements.
 

Deleted member 1487

This is the only point I disagree with you on, mostly because Tooze shows pretty convincingly the German economy actually was going flat-out by 1940 and didn't really slack off in the interim. The whole notion of Germany not mobilizing their economy to keep the home front happy is mostly a myth spun up by Speer to make himself look better. To be fair there were some improvements in production processes and the like just as and after Speer took over but that was more of the nature of refining an already-existing war economy, stepping up exploitation of non-German workers and changes to production modes than anything related to an increased level of mobilization. It was also a period that saw lots of dead-ends, screwups and mistakes by people like Speer who upended previously existing systems, chased illusory production miracles and didn't fix the deeper problems in German production and logistics like, for example, the tendency for in-production tinkering and gradual improvements.
Tooze has issues with his analysis too, as there was a ton of corruption and administrative waste that caused issues for the German war economy prior to 1942. Speer benefited from the fact that he got the sole administrative control over production, which was not the case before his rise to power. That alone, not necessarily anything he did, helped rationalize production a great deal. Also Richard Overy wrote his thesis about the German war production problems of 1939-41, but I don't know if it has been published ever; I was able to read it through interlibrary loan. He points out the specific ways that things were heavily rationalized from 1942 on once Speer took over...but weren't necessarily a function of Speer himself.

So while there was a lot of reform possible within the Nazi German economy before 1942, all resources were basically allocated, so it was only rationalization and cracking down on corruption and other issues that resulted in the rise in production.
 
Tooze has issues with his analysis too, as there was a ton of corruption and administrative waste that caused issues for the German war economy prior to 1942. Speer benefited from the fact that he got the sole administrative control over production, which was not the case before his rise to power. That alone, not necessarily anything he did, helped rationalize production a great deal. Also Richard Overy wrote his thesis about the German war production problems of 1939-41, but I don't know if it has been published ever; I was able to read it through interlibrary loan. He points out the specific ways that things were heavily rationalized from 1942 on once Speer took over...but weren't necessarily a function of Speer himself.

So while there was a lot of reform possible within the Nazi German economy before 1942, all resources were basically allocated, so it was only rationalization and cracking down on corruption and other issues that resulted in the rise in production.

There were also increases in resource production under Speer but as a consequence of squeezing occupied Europe even harder and the outright annexation of all of France. Germany was squeezing blood from stones starting in 1938 so there really wasn't much they could get out of their war economy barring a massive push starting in 1933 to dismantle the craft system and replace it with mass-based production. That, however, was never going to happen thanks to how much the Nazis depended on their alliance with big capitalists who liked that system just the way it was.
 

Deleted member 1487

There were also increases in resource production under Speer but as a consequence of squeezing occupied Europe even harder and the outright annexation of all of France. Germany was squeezing blood from stones starting in 1938 so there really wasn't much they could get out of their war economy barring a massive push starting in 1933 to dismantle the craft system and replace it with mass-based production. That, however, was never going to happen thanks to how much the Nazis depended on their alliance with big capitalists who liked that system just the way it was.
There was plenty they could have gotten out by rationalizing production; they had a horribly inefficient system (whodathunk the Nazis were bad at organizing?) which only worked out the kinks with time and Goering having his influence largely removed from the system.
 
Still working on my reply to Wiking, although this covers part of it, but I guess I’ll throw out my reply to you.

This is the only point I disagree with you on, mostly because Tooze shows pretty convincingly the German economy actually was going flat-out by 1940 and didn't really slack off in the interim.

You need to reread Tooze closer. Tooze very much states that Nazi Germany operating with perfect hindsight could have committed its limited stocks of strategic resources to maximize production in 1942/43, rather than in 1944/45 when it was too late. What Tooze really says is that the argument that the Germans failed to mobilize isn’t so much incorrect as it was incomplete. The issue was the Germans had a tightly time limited window in which they could go to maximum production due to limited stocks of resources, wear on machinery, and allocations of manpower. Had Hitler made the decision to industrially go for broke years earlier than he did, the Soviet materiel advantage in 1942/43 could have been significantly offset or pre-empted.

Of course Hitler's reason for not doing so was that it would have drained the German war economy, which as you say was already under serious pressure, and he was hoping for a quick war against Russia allowing Germany to then turn back and deal with the British Empire and America. Essentially, full commitment of resources against the Soviets would have meant a tacit admission that Germany would be unable to beat to the Western Allies, which wasn't the game Hitler wanted to play.

EDIT:

Most of whom were conquered by the Germans and quite hostile to them, requiring occupation and draining of resources.

I’m 1941, only Poland and Yugoslavia were actively hostile and even there the partisan movements were still being garrisoned. Other occupied territories were, at the least Western Europe. As far as being net drains... in the long-term, yes, what with Germany’s massively destructive looting. But in 1940-41 the occupation of Western Europe combined with the not-quite-extortion of raw materials from the USSR provided Germany with the foundation with which they would attempt, and fail, Barbarossa and then ultimately fight the entire rest of the war after that. Had Germany not acquired the resources of Western Europe, they would have lost the war by mid-1942 at the latest.

They were a net loss of manpower to the Germans, as not only did they have to be occupied, but also defended from the Brits, which meant if anything they contributed to making the manpower disparity worse, not better.

In 1941 the territories did not have to be occupied with substantial combat troops as the British lacked the forces to threaten them yet and local partisan groups were not yet organized enough to be a consideration. Most of the draining part of the drains came substantially later.

They were already mobilized for war against the UK.

Correction: they were mobilizing for the war against the UK.

I'm not sure what extra resources you think were sitting around,

The same resources that they would subsequently use over the next four years losing the war with.

And duh, this would come at the expense of the war with the British. Hence why Hitler didn’t do it.

There was no chance preempt Soviet material superiority given that Germany was already outnumbered before the invasion by Soviet artillery, armor, and aircraft in raw numbers,

Yes, there was plenty of chance. By the end of 1941, the Soviet air, artillery, and armored park were completely shattered. The German armored park, of course, was only in a somewhat better state but that means that even at worse their armored park would halve maintained parity with proper mobilization rather then falling behind like it did OTL. Their air and artillery parks, on the other hand, should have outstripped the Soviets by far. But in the end the Germans didn’t equal the crippled Soviet aircraft production until 1944 and they never matched the Soviets artillery production.

The Germans meanwhile ended the year with less men under arms than they started with.

At the start of 1942, and hence the end of 1941, the Heer had 5.2 million men with the field forces accounting for 4 million of that. At the start of 1941 those numbers were 5.2 million and 3.8 million, respectively. Not sure what mathematical system declares that 4 million is less then 3.8 million.

[quots]In the sense that the Soviets chose to focus on a few categories of weapons and make a lot of cheap versions of them, while the Germans were fighting on multiple fronts, being forced to make equipment in categories that would not have made sense to the Soviets or they couldn't make (Uboats, variety of cruise/ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, handheld rocket launchers, APCs, massive amounts of locomotives and rolling stock, all sorts of rail equipment to rebuild Soviet rail to European standards, all sorts of advanced electronics, huge amounts of heavy AAA, etc.) .[/quote]

That the Soviets chose to make a few categories of low cost but effective weapons was based on the insight that they needed to make a few categories of low cost weapons if they were to survive and they couldn’t afford to waste resources. Had they not had that insight, they would have been more like the Germans and manufactured too many different models, and variants of the same model, and wasted resources on stuff they didn’t need... and subsequently would have lost the war. Meanwhile, a few of the things you listed there (namely the cruise/ballistic missiles and strategic bombers) were precisely cases of the Germans wasting resources on things they didn’t need, sometimes at the expense of things they did. One is an example of good strategic insight, the other isn’t.

Also, Soviet rail standards never reached European level during the war, whether under German or Soviet control.

Depends on whether those economic assets were war material capable.

There is no question there. In heavy artillery ammunition alone, the losses to Soviet chemical and munition plants amounted to the equivalent of 100 million rounds annual. Similarly, the destruction of plants, loss of raw materials, and dislocation would set back the Soviet aircraft industry two-three years. In both of these cases, Soviet industry didn’t recover in these sectors until the end of 1944.

And they don't need to make up all of them,

They did if the Soviet economy was too match the German economy.

What difference is there with that statement? As a basic fact Hitler had poor strategy, which gave the Soviets a chance to win.

Poor strategy versus poor strategy means the loser is that with inferior tactical-operational capabilities, which in 1941-43 describes the Soviets more then it does the Germans. It was not enough for the Germans strategy to be poor, the Soviets also had to be good.

Sure, the Germans inordinately benefited from the mistakes of their enemies until late 1941 when the Allies had their chance to turn the tables given Hitler's mistakes. The structural material factors favored the 'haves' vs. the 'have nots' trying to take from the 'haves'.

More like “late-‘42”, but yes.

Debatable. Even with an intact economy they lacked certain capacities to make things like sufficient quality electronics, which is why they had such a dearth of radios, not to mention radar, in 1941.

There is little evidence that the pre-war lack of radios was a result of lack of pre-war productivity as opposed to lack of priority or enough personnel with adequate technical skills to use them in the field. Indeed, those units which the Soviets had authorized to have radios generally had radios.

They could have had a lot more manpower/labor, AFVs, and food without losing all that territory.

And trucks. And aircraft. And ammunition. And trains. And rolling stock. Just to name a few of many.

They didn't really use their resources better than the Germans,

Had that been the case, they wouldn’t have been able to match the German output in any category of war material, let alone surpass them.

which is the entire point I'm making, they had a one front war to fight and very powerful allies drawing off the critical edge of German resources.

Which, irrespective of the factual veracity of any of the claims (true or false), says nothing about the quality of Soviet strategic insight compared to the Germans.

The Soviets were able to persevere due to...

All of which could have been squandered had the Soviets, and the WAllies, not had a good strategic decision making process. The only power for which this wasn’t true was the United States.

German war industry was largely destroyed by the ToV, which meant 1933-35 was spent rebuilding foundational industry to get to the point where they could focus on specific outright military production;

While some of German war industry was brought down by the ToV, much of it was preserved inspite of the treaty



No, I’m very much factoring them in. In fact, factoring them in rather proves my point.

It wasn't 100% of German production and manpower dedicated to the East, rather more like 50% dedicated to the East.

Even leaving aside that you are pulling that number from thin air, that still means the Germans should have been able to at least match what the Soviets put out. They did not.

In 1942-43 the Germans were fighting a naval war, a strategic air war, fighting in the Mediterranean, spending manpower to occupy and defend Europe, and fighting resistance movements all over Europe.

None of which demanded remotely as much of Germany’s attention and resources as the war in the east until well into 1943, long after the Soviets had achieved material superiority.

In no way can you look at the entire German economy and compare that to the entire Soviet economy and say you're making a fair comparison; you also need to factor in the Wallied contributions and economies.

Sure, and even with them factored in the raw economic data suggests the Germans should have been able to at least match the Soviets, if not surpass them. Yet they did not.

His generals were telling him not to go to war period.

There is no real evidence for this. Even the likes of Beck couched his objections to Hitler (although not to others) on the basis of timing for the war instead of whether war was a good idea. And he was the exception, unable to get anyone else in the high command, or the army leadership at large, to go along with him. Most were outright unwilling to deal with such higher issues at all and supported Hitler when he drove Beck out. As Megargee notes when discussing Manstein’s letter of 1938 which basically admonishes Beck to quit trying to be obstructionist and tow the line:

"Manstein's letter underscores the futility of Beck's efforts to inspire resistance against Hitler's plans. In fact, Manstein managed to encapsulate, in just a few pages, the main problem with officers of the high command: their inclination to deal with operational and organizational details instead of broader issues of "politics"; their unwillingness to let go of personal power for the sake of unified leadership; and their complete obliviousness to the dangers of Germany's strategic position."
-Inside Hotler’s high Command, Pg 50-51

That exchange showed the fatal flaw in the thinking of most of the German officer corps: they preferred to focus on tactical and operational levels and only bothered with the strategic level in so far as it let them play power politics with other factions in the Reich's hierarchy. The Generals believed their duty was to support Hitler in his decisions as best they could and in fact to be so loyal that they won Hitler's trust and became his primary source of advice, over other factions in the Nazi hierarchy.

As for Hitler, he knew the war was a huge gamble but he was convinced this was the best and only opportunity to remake the world order in Germany's favour before an apocalyptic global conspiracy gained the power to snuff out German ambitions forever. For him the issue wasn’t so much his read of the odds as it was how his world view set his goals and, by extension, warped his decision making.

Hitler only went to war in 1939 because he thought the Allies wouldn't declare war on him for invading Poland.

There isn’t any evidence for that one way or the other outside of “he said, she said”.
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

I've going to come back and backfill this as I have time, so please have some general patience with me before replying again, but if you could give me the page number for Tooze for my comment immediately below, I'd appreciate that.

You need to reread Tooze closer. Tooze very much states that Nazi Germany operating with perfect hindsight could have committed its limited stocks of strategic resources to maximize production in 1942/43, rather than in 1944/45 when it was too late. What Tooze really says is that the argument that the Germans failed to mobilize isn’t so much incorrect as it was incomplete. The issue was the Germans had a tightly time limited window in which they could go to maximum production due to limited stocks of resources, wear on machinery, and allocations of manpower. Had Hitler made the decision to industrially go for broke years earlier than he did, the Soviet materiel advantage in 1942/43 could have been significantly offset or pre-empted.

Of course Hitler's reason for not doing so was that it would have drained the German war economy, which as you say was already under serious pressure, and he was hoping for a quick war against Russia allowing Germany to then turn back and deal with the British Empire and America. Essentially, full commitment of resources against the Soviets would have meant a tacit admission that Germany would be unable to beat to the Western Allies, which wasn't the game Hitler wanted to play.
What part of Tooze's book does he say that? I've got a copy, so if you've got page numbers I'd like to read a bit about him saying that, because that is not what I recall from his argument at all, but then haven't read the book in a while.

Edit: From what I've seen early in the Barbarossa section, it was a Speer narrative that they could have produced more earlier if they went all out.


I’m 1941, only Poland and Yugoslavia were actively hostile and even there the partisan movements were still being garrisoned. Other occupied territories were, at the least Western Europe. As far as being net drains... in the long-term, yes, what with Germany’s massively destructive looting. But in 1940-41 the occupation of Western Europe combined with the not-quite-extortion of raw materials from the USSR provided Germany with the foundation with which they would attempt, and fail, Barbarossa and then ultimately fight the entire rest of the war after that. Had Germany not acquired the resources of Western Europe, they would have lost the war by mid-1942 at the latest.
France was heavily occupied and garrisoned to guard agains the Brits. Certainly France and Western Europe yielded quite a lot in 1940-41, but the manpower required for occupation, not to mention the basing of offensive units to fight Britain, plus the start of the Atlantic Wall and hardened subpens, plus AAA commitments and rebuilding the infrastructure damage from the fighting in 1940 were not inconsiderable burdens. That said, you're right that the resources gained from occupied Europe and the USSR were massively necessary and without which it is arguable that the 1941 invasion as we know it would have been impossible, but it is a stretch to say the war would have been lost by 1942; without those resources it would have been a different war and fought different than IOTL.


In 1941 the territories did not have to be occupied with substantial combat troops as the British lacked the forces to threaten them yet and local partisan groups were not yet organized enough to be a consideration. Most of the draining part of the drains came substantially later.
A quick search has 100,000 Germans in the non-Vichy controlled parts of France, which I'm not sure if that includes only occupation troops or all troops, including Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine personnel there for combat operations. That wasn't inconsiderable and that leaves out the Lowlands and Norway, not to mention the Balkans, which were host to a number of combat divisions in 1941, even in occupation, including quality combat formations like the 5th Mountain division.


The same resources that they would subsequently use over the next four years losing the war with.

And duh, this would come at the expense of the war with the British. Hence why Hitler didn’t do it.



Yes, there was plenty of chance. By the end of 1941, the Soviet air, artillery, and armored park were completely shattered. The German armored park, of course, was only in a somewhat better state but that means that even at worse their armored park would halve maintained parity with proper mobilization rather then falling behind like it did OTL. Their air and artillery parks, on the other hand, should have outstripped the Soviets by far. But in the end the Germans didn’t equal the crippled Soviet aircraft production until 1944 and they never matched the Soviets artillery production.


At the start of 1942, and hence the end of 1941, the Heer had 5.2 million men with the field forces accounting for 4 million of that. At the start of 1941 those numbers were 5.2 million and 3.8 million, respectively. Not sure what mathematical system declares that 4 million is less then 3.8 million.



In the sense that the Soviets chose to focus on a few categories of weapons and make a lot of cheap versions of them, while the Germans were fighting on multiple fronts, being forced to make equipment in categories that would not have made sense to the Soviets or they couldn't make (Uboats, variety of cruise/ballistic missiles, strategic bombers, handheld rocket launchers, APCs, massive amounts of locomotives and rolling stock, all sorts of rail equipment to rebuild Soviet rail to European standards, all sorts of advanced electronics, huge amounts of heavy AAA, etc.) .

That the Soviets chose to make a few categories of low cost but effective weapons was based on the insight that they needed to make a few categories of low cost weapons if they were to survive and they couldn’t afford to waste resources. Had they not had that insight, they would have been more like the Germans and manufactured too many different models, and variants of the same model, and wasted resources on stuff they didn’t need... and subsequently would have lost the war. Meanwhile, a few of the things you listed there (namely the cruise/ballistic missiles and strategic bombers) were precisely cases of the Germans wasting resources on things they didn’t need, sometimes at the expense of things they did. One is an example of good strategic insight, the other isn’t.



There is no question there. In heavy artillery ammunition alone, the losses to Soviet chemical and munition plants amounted to the equivalent of 100 million rounds annual. Similarly, the destruction of plants, loss of raw materials, and dislocation would set back the Soviet aircraft industry two-three years. In both of these cases, Soviet industry didn’t recover in these sectors until the end of 1944.


They did if the Soviet economy was too match the German economy.


Poor strategy versus poor strategy means the loser is that with inferior tactical-operational capabilities, which in 1941-43 describes the Soviets more then it does the Germans. It was not enough for the Germans strategy to be poor, the Soviets also had to be good.


More like “late-‘42”, but yes.


There is little evidence that the pre-war lack of radios was a result of lack of pre-war productivity as opposed to lack of priority or enough personnel with adequate technical skills to use them in the field. Indeed, those units which the Soviets had authorized to have radios generally had radios.


And trucks. And aircraft. And ammunition. And trains. And rolling stock. Just to name a few of many.


Had that been the case, they wouldn’t have been able to match the German output in any category of war material, let alone surpass them.


Which, irrespective of the factual veracity of any of the claims (true or false), says nothing about the quality of Soviet strategic insight compared to the Germans.


All of which could have been squandered had the Soviets, and the WAllies, not had a good strategic decision making process. The only power for which this wasn’t true was the United States.


While some of German war industry was brought down by the ToV, much of it was preserved inspite of the treaty


No, I’m very much factoring them in. In fact, factoring them in rather proves my point.


Even leaving aside that you are pulling that number from thin air, that still means the Germans should have been able to at least match what the Soviets put out. They did not.


None of which demanded remotely as much of Germany’s attention and resources as the war in the east until well into 1943, long after the Soviets had achieved material superiority.


Sure, and even with them factored in the raw economic data suggests the Germans should have been able to at least match the Soviets, if not surpass them. Yet they did not.


There is no real evidence for this. Even the likes of Beck couched his objections to Hitler (although not to others) on the basis of timing for the war instead of whether war was a good idea. And he was the exception, unable to get anyone else in the high command, or the army leadership at large, to go along with him. Most were outright unwilling to deal with such higher issues at all and supported Hitler when he drove Beck out. As Megargee notes when discussing Manstein’s letter of 1938 which basically admonishes Beck to quit trying to be obstructionist and tow the line:

"Manstein's letter underscores the futility of Beck's efforts to inspire resistance against Hitler's plans. In fact, Manstein managed to encapsulate, in just a few pages, the main problem with officers of the high command: their inclination to deal with operational and organizational details instead of broader issues of "politics"; their unwillingness to let go of personal power for the sake of unified leadership; and their complete obliviousness to the dangers of Germany's strategic position."
-Inside Hotler’s high Command, Pg 50-51

That exchange showed the fatal flaw in the thinking of most of the German officer corps: they preferred to focus on tactical and operational levels and only bothered with the strategic level in so far as it let them play power politics with other factions in the Reich's hierarchy. The Generals believed their duty was to support Hitler in his decisions as best they could and in fact to be so loyal that they won Hitler's trust and became his primary source of advice, over other factions in the Nazi hierarchy.


As for Hitler, he knew the war was a huge gamble but he was convinced this was the best and only opportunity to remake the world order in Germany's favour before an apocalyptic global conspiracy gained the power to snuff out German ambitions forever. For him the issue wasn’t so much his read of the odds as it was how his world view set his goals and, by extension, warped his decision making.



There isn’t any evidence for that one way or the other outside of “he said, she said”.
That has been talked about multiple times. Overy's "Goering" biography, Kershaw's Hitler bio too. p.204 in what he said to Ciano (Britain and France will not fight over Poland). P.208 in conference with his generals he says there is a high probability the Allies would not intervene if he attacks Poland.

That said it is arguable whether or not that was the 'only' reason he went to war (clearly he had other reasons), but he felt relatively safe to do so because of the lack of anticipated Western reaction (he said there as a risk, but he had been right since 1936 about them not intervening).

It is rather striking the comments then on page 209 how placated the generals were; apparently there was broad disagreement with Hitler about going to war, but everyone felt it was too late to speak up and they all simply hoped for the best outcome. Kershaw says even that Hitler's comments in that speech to his generals reflected his lack of trust in and contempt for his generals.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Deleted member 1487

Another good source for information bearing on this question Nathan Leites, Soviet Style in War. PDF versions of two editions (original and revised) are widely available on the internet. (I found them on the Defense Technical Information Center website, as well as the Internet Archive.) The first edition was published as a book in 1982 and is widely available from dealers in used books. (Last month I bought a copy, in good condition, for about six US dollars.)
That's 1980s or at earliest 1970s Soviet doctrine. Not particularly applicable to the state of the art in WW2. Arguably the Isserson doctrine would be more applicable, though it's not clear that his ideas had disseminated and were applicable until late in the war.
https://books.google.com/books?id=C...EIKzAA#v=onepage&q=isserson interview&f=false
 
I wanna know, how was quality and quantity parity between the germans and soviets like at the eve of the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943?

In terms of quantity IIRC the Soviets had at least 3:1 advantages in manpower at the start of Kursk and much more in equipment categories. The Germans had an advantage in stockpiled artillery ammo IIRC, which they used in huge quantities, which is probably the reason they inflicted 3:1 casualties. In quality the edge was with the Germans still, who were probably at the peak of their abilities and equipment quality (minus the Panther) of forces used in a major battle and Kursk was the last major strategic offensive they were capable of.

While I disagree about labeling the Soviets as inept, I do mostly agree with wiking.

The US military has actually modeled Kursk.

A Comparison of Wehrmacht to SS Formations
The Dupuy Institute has its own model of combat,, the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model). This model was developed by Trevor N. Dupuy from analysis of historical data and has been validated to historical data. One recent validation, done as part of a larger project looking at the capabilities of the Future Combat System (FCS) modeled the 12 days of engagements from the 4th through the 15th by the SS Panzer Corps and by the XLVIII Panzer Corps. In this case, for each day of combat, the historical data for each engagement was entered into the model and the results from the model were then compared to the historical outcome.

Any variance from the historical outcome would be due to one of two reasons, either variances or errors in the model design, or the unit performed better or worse than a unit of that capability and situation historically would. In these particular runs, we assigned all the German units a combat performance advantage of 3 over the Soviets.[15] As such, the relative performance differences between the German and Soviet units were hopefully addressed, and were addressed equally for the opponents of the two panzer corps. As such, the model could then be used to compare the relative performance of the Wehrmact (regular German armed forces) XLVIII Panzer Corps to the SS Panzer Corps. This assumes that all the Soviet units they were facing were roughly equal in competence, which can be questioned.[16]

[15] A Combat Effectiveness Value (CEV) of 3. What this does effectively multiply the combat power of one side by three, making it more able to win, advance and cause casualties.
[16] If anything, the armored units facing the XLVIII Panzer Corps (III Mechanized Corps, VI Tank Corps, X Tank Corps) were more competently handled than some of the armored units facing the SS Panzer Corps (like the V Guards Tank Corps, XVIII Tank Corps and XXIX Tank Corps).

Let's compare the outcome from this experiment. To start with, the TNDM model predicted the outcomes of the 24 days of corps engagements correctly in 21 out of the 24 cases (88% of the time). The three days it was in error were the fighting by the XLVIII Panzer Corps on the 15th and by the SS Panzer Corps on the 13th and 15th.

The summation of the difference for the 12 days from 4 to 15 July is illustrative. See Table III.76

What this means is the XLVIII Panzer Corps advanced further than the model predicted it should, while the SS Panzer Corps advanced less than the model said it should. The XLVIII Panzer Corps suffered fewer casualties than the model predicted it should, while the SS Panzer Corps suffered considerably heavier losses than the model said it should. The XLVIII Panzer Corps suffered about the same armor losses as the model predicted it should, while the SS Panzer Corps suffered more armor losses than the model said it should.

Regarding their damage done to the enemy, both corps caused more casualties to the Soviets than the model estimated they should, and by similar amounts. In the case of the armor losses, the same occurred, although it favored the SS Panzer Corps in this case.

So, basically, according the model, the XLVIII Panzer Corps was performing notably better than the SS Panzer Corps, advancing farther than expected by the model and suffering fewer casualties in the process, while causing similar damage to the enemy. As such, it would appear that the XLVIII Panzer Corps performed better than the SS Panzer Corps, if one puts any stock in the model-a combat model that has been validated on four separate occasions to four different sets of data.

A simple direct comparison of the statistics between the two still favors the XLVIII Panzer Corps:

1 Advance: 27% farther by XLVIII Panzer Corps;
2 Casualty Exchange Ratio: 1 to 4.77 for the XLVIII Panzer Corps versus 1 to 3.71 for the SS Panzer Corps, making the XLVIII Panzer Corps 29% more effective at attriting opposing armor.
3. Armor Exchange Ratio: 1 to 1.32 for the XLVIII Panzer Corps versus 1 to 2.39 for the SS Panzer Corps, making the SS Panzer Corps 81% more effective at attriting opposing armor.

Of course, the lopsided armor differences could easily be explained by the Soviet armored forces launching headlong attacks into the SS Panzer Corps, as was certainly the case with the V Guards Tank Corps, the XVIII Tank Corps and XXIX Tank Corps. In contrast, the XLVIII Panzer Corps faced hull-down tanks in defensive positions with the III Mechanized Corps and the VI Tank Corps. In the end, the difference in performance may well have been the difference of the more competent defense conducted by Katukov of the First Tank Army compared to the wild thrashings of Chistyakov and Rotmistrov. In effect, the difference in armor tactics between Katukov and the other Soviet commanders led to a difference of Soviet armor losses of almost a factor of two!

Overall, whether using raw comparative statistics or using the engagements within a combat model, it appears that the performance of the XLVIII Panzer Corps was measurably superior to that of the SS Panzer Corps. This difference appears to be at least 30%! This is not taking into account that the Soviet forces opposite the XLVIII Panzer Corps appear to have been better handled than those opposite the SS Panzer Corps.

This comparison does open the question as to whether the alleged "eliteness" of the SS units is grossly overstated in many works.

p. 1372-1374, Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka by Christopher A. Lawrence
 
Last edited:

Deleted member 1487

While I disagree about labeling the Soviets as inept, I do mostly agree with wiking.

The US military has actually modeled Kursk.
This comparison does open the question as to whether the alleged "eliteness" of the SS units is grossly overstated in many works.
Without a doubt the SS were/are grossly overrated relative to the regular army throughout the war.
 
Please note in my previous quote where they say they upped the German performance by a factor of 3 relative to the Soviets (!). There is also the the Kursk Operation Simulation and Validation Exercise Study affiliated with the Kursk Data Base. Christopher Lawrence's book is related to the KDB. Here are some findings;

The principal findings of the KOSAVEII Study are:

(1) Soviet initial personnel in theater were 66 percent higher than German, and initial Soviet tanks in theater were double the German level. A considerably larger fraction of the German units in the Kursk campaign was engaged in combat and incurring casualties for a longer time than was the case for Soviet units. The majority of German units were continually attacking from 5 July through 12 July 1943, but all had ceased attacking by 17 July. The Soviets defended until they counterattacked on 12 July. German progress peaked on 16 July at 46 kilometers (km) northern advance from initial 4 July positions.

(2) Daily Soviet personnel casualties and casually rates were much higher than German. The Germans also consistently destroyed tanks and heavy antitank (AT) weapons in the Soviet force at a much higher rate than the Soviets achieved against them. However, for both personnel and tank/ heavy AT weapons, high fractional exchange ratios in favor of the Germans were sporadic and not sustained during the campaign.

(3) Over the entire KDB campaign, the Soviets consumed 44 percent more tank/AT ammunition that the Germans. The Germans expended three times the Soviet artillery tonnage, two times the Soviet rocket tonnage, and three times the Soviet small arms/AA tonnage expenditure.

(4) The Germans generated more tactical aircraft sorties than the Soviets. The roles with the most sorties were ground attack for the Germans and air-to-air for the Soviets.

(5) The Soviets always had unengaged reserves, while the Germans were always fully committed and engaged. Only 2/3 of Soviet personnel, tanks, and heavy AT weapons were, on average, in contact with the enemy, compared with averages of 92-97 percent for the Germans. This suggests that the German force was subjected to more wear and tear from the effects of nearly constant combat than was its opponent. Also, since rest and replenishment are minimal in a heavily committed force, the effectiveness and efficiency of German combat elements probably deteriorated over time relative to the Soviet force.

The point is abundantly clear in any case, the loss exchange ratios were not in the Soviets favor.

Bagration, Summer of 1944.
Up until then it was a case of some Soviet Formations being better than some German Formations. After that it was the other way around, some German formations could still beat their Soviet opponents reliably but the tide had turned.
By the way, in a fight between qualitative equals, 3 to 1 is usually required when attacking, and 1 to 3 when defending to ensure a fair chance of success (taking force multipliers into account).

Joshua Epstein claims to have debunked that rule with historical examination where for example the attacker can gain a local advantage in terms of force ratios, like the case with Barbarossa seen here.

UKRAINE 1941
The case of the Ukraine, June 1941, also involved the Wehrmacht; the defender in this case was the Soviet army. Dupuy focuses on Army Group South's initial breakthrough in an area due west of Rovno during the first days of Operation Barbarossa. The breakthrough occurred on a 70 km front and was made by the German 6th Army, which had the First Panzer Group subordinated to it for this operation. The break- through was made by seven infantry divisions and two Panzer divisions.13 The Soviets maintained only a handful of divisions along their border in the Ukraine, emphasizing instead a defense-in-depth in that area.14 In fact, many Soviet units were deployed a hundred or more kilometers behind the front. Along the 70 km front in question, the Soviets maintained two rifle divisions, neither of which was at war-time strength when the nine Wehrmacht divisions attacked on June 22, 1941.15 Thus, in terms of raw numbers, the Germans had approximately a 4.5:1 advantage in divisions and probably about a 6.5:1 advantage in manpower. Moreover, the Germans had about 330 tanks with their first echelon force, while the Soviets had few if any tanks in their two infantry divisions. On top of this, the Germans had air superiority, achieved almost complete surprise, and were surely qualitatively superior fighting forces at that point in the war. Thus the Germans had an overwhelming advantage in combat power at the point of attack.

With this decisive force advantage, the Wehrmacht quickly broke through Soviet forward defenses and, as John Erickson notes, "By the morning of 23 June, German penetration at the junction of the Soviet 5th and 6th Armies was an accomplished and menacing fact." Because the Soviets maintained large numbers of forces well behind those forward positions in the Ukraine, the Germans had considerable trouble exploiting their breakthrough and getting to Kiev quickly. This difficulty, however, involved the exploitation phase, not the initial breakthrough, which was accomplished with relative ease because the Germans had more than a 3:1 advantage at the point of attack.

Assessing the Conventional Balance The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics by John J. Mearsheimer

IMHO the huge difference came at the operational level - ie. the intermediate level between the front (tactics) and the overall allocation of resources and goals of the warfare (Strategy). This is the level where units capable of independent combat (from Brigade/Division and up) and deployed and lead into combat, and that includes TOEs and logistics. By 1940-41 the Wehrmacht was way ahead of any other army on the planet and in contrast the Red Army hardly had any operational level at all! The General officers had been shot, materiel dispersed to a degree where most units were critically short (de facto being static units) and the TOEs so extremely biased towards frontline strength that even the fully equipped units usually vapourised on the first combat contact. I guess this was a product of the Soviet system, where a career was made by reporting back to have fulfilled the quantitative goals in the plan. And here it was much easier to understand that a unit with 200 tanks in the inventory would be much better than one with 100 and in this context resources spent on mechanics and recovery vehicles could easily be seen as a waste of resources as would training the tank crews in locating the 100s of lubrication nipples and knowing which ones to used daily and which ones after 100 miles etc.

That's not operational at all. The level of division and below is tactics. "Operational" is generally army through to the entire theater-level command.

Okay, you are basically correct ObsessedNuker regarding the last sentence, although, I am not sure why you included theater (TVD) for the Soviets as that may be strategic level, but it also can include the Fronts and Stavka representatives on the high end of the operational spectrum. On the lower end of the operational spectrum (operational-tactical) we can allocate for example tank armies. (there are other examples of course like army OMG aside from this, as well as forward detachments which themselves can apparently be operational-tactical) Panzergruppe von Kleist, is an example, of the operational-tactical.
  1. Tank Attack by Aleksey Ivanovich Radziyevskiy
  2. Military Thought: Combat Actions of a Tank Army Seperated from other Front Forces
  3. The battle of Kursk (continued): Tank forces in defense of the Kursk Bridgehead
  4. Joint Operational Warfare: Theory and Practice
  5. Operational Pauses: Minimizing the Effects of Culmination in Joint Operations by MAJ Donald C. McGraw Jr.
  6. FM 100-61
That's 1980s or at earliest 1970s Soviet doctrine. Not particularly applicable to the state of the art in WW2. Arguably the Isserson doctrine would be more applicable, though it's not clear that his ideas had disseminated and were applicable until late in the war.
https://books.google.com/books?id=C17uxAfGKdIC&pg=PA370&lpg=PA370&dq=isserson+interview&source=bl&ots=zlGD4UlBAS&sig=qjVNf8R0u7DgndCAmbrpPjYspPw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjR7t7kyoXZAhVJzoMKHRsnDl4Q6AEIKzAA#v=onepage&q=isserson interview&f=false

I disagree that is irrelevant except in the sense that of course Cold War Soviets would be more advanced than the German army of WWII, though, search in that book for "194" and I think you will change your mind when you see all the results pop up, just like as another example, Tactics: A Soviet View by Reznichenko, V G it is seemingly replete with historical examples of what the Soviets did 'right'
 
Last edited:
Top