When did the Red Army become the qualitative equal of the Heer?

Doom Head

Banned
When did the Red Army become the qualitative equal (in terms of skill and equipment) of the Heer during WW2?

Around Stalingrad? Kursk?
 
Are you talking on a man-to-man or leadership basis? Because I don’t think they ever did, as the Soviet campaigns to the end of the war still resulted in incredibly unequal loss ratios and were won in the main by larger numbers. In terms of individual equipment, it’s easy to say that the Soviets has better equipment in some cases from very early in the war (T-34, PPSH) and their aircraft quickly became equal, but poor training and skill of use still left the Germans ahead in most cases.
 

Deleted member 1487

Not sure why OP was banned. In terms of the question it depends on what you mean. In some areas they were never the equal until the Wehrmacht fell apart, in some areas they were ahead from the beginning, in some they matched or exceeded over the course of 1943-44.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Quantity has its own quality and in that context it can be difficult to determine to what degree the Red Army won its battles against the Wehrmacht, but the Red Army no doubt improved qualitatively very much from 1941 to 1945. It hardly could go the other way though. By 1941 the Red Army was not only plagued by purges and equipment being dispersed in the expansion programme, but its basic doctrines and organisation were very flawed.

In short: Too much front line and too little back up!

Even the units being close to 100% TOE in 1941 (like some of the Mechanised Corps, on paper the most powerful units on the planet) rarely lasted more than a few days of combat contact and usually didn't make much impression the enemy.

The numerous units raised in 1941 and well into 1942 were usually of extremely low quality. Hardly trained and with limited equipment and only simple doctrines. The Soviet leadership realised they didn't have the skills to lead complex units and the standard new unit was a Brigade with very little on the menu but: "Charge and die!" or "Defend and die!" but all dishes spiced generously with heroism.

A Standard Soviet Brigade size unit would have no chance vs. a Wehrmacht Brigade size unit (Regiment). But when the Wehrmacht Regiment has defeated its third Soviet Brigade it usually is down to battalion size or less, and now the fourth Soviet Brigade has its chance!

In the second half of 1942 Lend Lease items and the production from the Urals begin to show up in numbers and officers trained at the "Front Line Academy" are available. These are the forces cutting off 6th Army at Stalingrad and later giving the Wehrmacht a bloody nose at Kursk. But it is also the Red Army being surprised and outwitted at 2nd Kharkow. IMHO the Wehrmacht still unit for unit is ahead in quality, but in numbers as much behind.

In July 1944 Armygroup Mitte is practically annihilated at Bagration , that is indeed a major performance by the Red Army and one which it would not have been able to perform a year earlier. But again, it was won with overwhelming numbers and against German lines being extremely thin - much beyond what the German doctrine could accommodate.

So what is quality and what is quantity? IMHO the Wehrmacht still unit for unit was better well into 1945, but the margin was closing, and that as much applied to the Wallies.

The problem of the Wehrmacht was however that as the war progressed the opportunities for a "fair" fight became increasingly rare. But when the opportunity arose, even in 1945, they were very tough to handle for the allies - east or west - and usually was stopped as much by "standard" combat attrition and lack of supplies as from enemy "quality fighting time".

You could of course argue, that the ability to supply your units and having reserves to feed the battle with is an important part of the quality of an army - indeed it is and really what won the allies their victory. But if we shift the focus from a strategic level to a tactical and operational, then I'll claim that neither Wallies nor the Red Army ever matched the Wehrmacht, but they were close by end of war.

For example the Wallies by 1943 or at least 1944 were much superior in fire support. Not at least through the widespread use of radios the Wallies had developed very efficient use of artillery. The Red Army massed extreme numbers of guns and fired in devastating WWI like fire plans. The British/Commonwealth and US Army also could concentrate impressive firepower but also routinely could call artillery fire on individual targets as they met them (and often even hitting in first salvo, ie. without ranging the fire). The Germans were somewhere in between, but usually short on both shells and guns.
 
I wanna know, how was quality and quantity parity between the germans and soviets like at the eve of the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943?
 
In terms of equipment: mid-1942. In terms of skill... well, as others have noted that's more complicated. Gary Grigsby's War in the East has an interesting way of judging the troop quality of formations at the tactical-operational level. Obviously there are issues with taking video game mechanics face at value, particularly ones which are relatively abstracted as is the case here, but I find it can be useful as an illustrative example.

In any case, in War in the East what would be referred to as "tactical-operational skill" tends to be divided into two numerical values: morale and experience. "Morale" in this case refers not just too what we think of when people say the words morale, but also the realism and capability of the basic training that has been received and it's impact upon discipline and cohesion. Experience refers too both more advanced training (such as exercises and wargaming) as well as combat experience. The two influence each other, in that a counter's experience cannot be higher then it's morale.

Now, in addition to each counter's individual morale each nation in WitE also has a "national morale" that changes with time. In a sense, it's a "base morale" for regular counters: A counter which winds up below national morale will slowly climb up too what the national morale is. In addition to this, counters which are considered mechanized get a +10 bonus, although the Soviets only get this bonus starting in September 1942. Axis elite counters (namely SS and a number of other select formations) get a additional +5 bonus in 1941, a +10 bonus in 1942, and a +15 bonus from 1943 onwards. Soviet guards counter get another +10 bonus. These will stack, so a Soviet Guards Tank Corps from September 1942 onwards will have a base morale of the national morale+20. A counter which is ten or more over it's base morale will start to fall back down towards it's national morale. The impact of national morale on a formations Combat Value (which is the measures the game uses to determine who wins when combat occurs) is non-linear in that there are diminishing returns on increases/decreases, so a increase from 45 to 55 has a bigger impact then the increase from 55 to 65. The general rule of thumb is that, assuming full or near-full quantitative strength, a counter below 40 morale is useless, 40-50 morale can be used for defending, and 50+ is something fit for participating in an attack.

In terms of how national morale changes over time, that is hard coded and time-based: The Soviet national morale begins the game at 45 in 1941 and stays that way until August 1942, at which point it slowly starts to rise, reaching 50 by December 1942, 55 in June 1943, and maxes out at 60 in March 1944.

German national morale starts at 75 and slowly declines over the game before bottoming out at 55 at the start of 1945.

Axis minors national morale is 45 throughout the game, with the exception of Finland who are 75.

I wanna know, how was quality and quantity parity between the germans and soviets like at the eve of the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943?

To use the numerical value of national morale in War in the East, 56 for the Soviets and 67 for the Germans. Again, consider those numbers illustrative rather then descriptive.
 
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Deleted member 1487

I wanna know, how was quality and quantity parity between the germans and soviets like at the eve of the Battle of Kursk, in July 1943?
In terms of quantity IIRC the Soviets had at least 3:1 advantages in manpower at the start of Kursk and much more in equipment categories. The Germans had an advantage in stockpiled artillery ammo IIRC, which they used in huge quantities, which is probably the reason they inflicted 3:1 casualties. In quality the edge was with the Germans still, who were probably at the peak of their abilities and equipment quality (minus the Panther) of forces used in a major battle and Kursk was the last major strategic offensive they were capable of.
 
In one sense, senior Russian leadership got better during the war, as those promoted due to the purge either learned or were removed/died. On both sides the veterans in the enlisted ranks got "better" as they survived in a hard school. The Germans did have some baked in advantages - essentially all German enlisted were literate, and had more mechanical experience than the Russians (though not anywhere near as much as the average US enlisted). Also, at least at the NCO level, German enlisted were trained and expected to change on the fly, the Russian system definitely went the other way. Adherence to a centrally directed plan no matter what unless and until changed from above is a negative quality indicator. Of course the Germans had their problems with direction from above as Grofaz would direct actions that were militarily foolish and also the whole Aryan/Slav racism thing could seriously color military decisions.

Like unit to like unit, on an "even" playing field I give it to the Germans. In reality, the Russians played to their strengths of a huge manpower advantage, and as the war went on a significant materiel advantage in quantity and sometimes quality. Manpower and materiel advantage will not win wars for you by themselves (see all of the Arab-Israeli Wars). In the game the way it was played, the Russians went from being a punching bag to using their advantages to win.
 
The Soviets were not perfect, no. However, the Germans were not perfect by any means either;

The men leading the panzers into the Soviet Union were a well-trained and professional cadre, but nearly one-third had little or no direct experience with tanks. Indeed, many German senior armour leaders in 1941 were still learning their trade and not completely aware of the capabilities and limitations of tanks. Half of the top thirty-one panzer leaders came from the infantry branch and one-third from the cavalry. At the most senior level, Generaloberst Ewald von Kleist of Panzergruppe 1 had more experience with commanding large panzer formations than any other officer in any army, although he had never actually served in a panzer unit. Generaloberst Heinz Guderian, commander of Panzergruppe 2, had commanded a panzer division and led his motorized corps in Poland and France, but was the only non-combat arms officer in command of panzer units in Operation Barbarossa. As a signal corps officer turned mechanization advocate, Guderian remained something of a dilettante throughout his career and had the impulsive, undisciplined nature of a military maverick – he was not a team player, but an individualist. Six of the ten commanders of motorized corps in June 1941 had previous battle command experience with a corps, but three – including General der Infanterie Erich von Manstein – had no personal experience with panzer units. Only three panzer corps commanders: General der Panzertruppen Georg-Hans Reinhardt, General der Panzertruppen Leo Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg and General der Panzertruppe Rudolf Schmidt had both extensive corps command experience and had previously led a panzer division in battle. Hitler’s creation of ten new panzer divisions in late 1940 diluted the division leadership pool somewhat and, by the start of Barbarossa, only eight of the seventeen panzer division commanders had previous division command experience and five of the seventeen were new to the Panzerwaffe. A number of the new panzer division commanders, such as Generalleutnant Walter Model, had primarily been staff officers with limited command experience. The German officers tended to be older than their Soviet counterparts due to Stalin’s purge of the Red Army, with the average age of the top thirty-one panzer commanders being fifty-three.
-Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942: Schwerpunkt [Robert Forczyk]

Any serious discussion of Soviet incompetence based on the kind of mistakes in battle command that degraded the performance of the Red Army’s tanks in 1941–42 invites a myriad of other problems as, if we were to take the case of Manstein, Soviet commanders like Vatutin and A. Vasilevsky did have varying degrees of success against this man which can be taken to mean that, no, Soviet commanders were not at least wholly inept. And I would be very interested if there were proof for the notion that they learned how to do this in a 'front line academy' rather than fundamentally prewar.

Zhukov's war strategy was in sharp contrast to the somewhat naive strategy of the Germans, which ignored Paulus' wargames. Yes, his poisoned pawn strategy failed to stop the Germans at the Stalin line ( and btw inside prewar Soviet military circles a withdrawal to 1939 borders was contemplated ) as well as lead to the complete defeat of the RKKA during the early part of the war, but he ultimately did stop the German army eventually which was not by happenstance, it was by design and making the best out of a bad situation whose architect was Stalin himself. And if you mention Mars in relation to Zhukov's quality I'd mention not only Monastery and that the Germans knew it was about to happen, but they had moved significant forces to deal with it.
 
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One of the complications here is the Red & German armies never used a identical skill set. Core differences in doctrine & goals led to differing needs in skills. One difference is in the use and skill with large artillery formations. The ratio of German independent artillery battalions - those above the division, to division HQ was unusually low for 20th Century. Lacking masses of corps and army artillery groups the Germans never developed much acumen for using them. The ARKOS had considerable limits in equipment, manpower and skilled staff. The 18th Artillery Div & similar experiments had some technical marvels. But, in concept and doctrine the 18th AD had many failing and poorly conceived features. While the Red Army artillery was inferior to the German for most of the war at the division & in some technical matters, the ability to mass effectively corps or army level artillery groups was better than the Germans.
 
Honestly, considering what liabilities the Romanian/Hungarian components turned out to be for the Nazis in the East they might have done better to use them for garrison duties in Yugoslavia/ guarding other fronts. Though that would be interesting if it results in Romanians fighting at Normandy..
 

Deleted member 1487

One of the complications here is the Red & German armies never used a identical skill set. Core differences in doctrine & goals led to differing needs in skills. One difference is in the use and skill with large artillery formations. The ratio of German independent artillery battalions - those above the division, to division HQ was unusually low for 20th Century. Lacking masses of corps and army artillery groups the Germans never developed much acumen for using them. The ARKOS had considerable limits in equipment, manpower and skilled staff. The 18th Artillery Div & similar experiments had some technical marvels. But, in concept and doctrine the 18th AD had many failing and poorly conceived features. While the Red Army artillery was inferior to the German for most of the war at the division & in some technical matters, the ability to mass effectively corps or army level artillery groups was better than the Germans.
I'd suggest reading about the artillery used around Leningrad and Sevastopol. The major limiting factor for the German artillery arm was lack of access to ammo and concentrating their heavy artillery assets in specific siege situations; when they actually had ammo they outperformed Soviet artillery formations. The only advantage the Soviets had was far greater numbers of artillery tubes and greater access to ammo.
https://books.google.com/books?id=L...EIsgEwGQ#v=snippet&q=german artillery&f=false
 
The quality thing isn't just Soviet: postwar analysis concluded that the average US soldier had only about 75-80 percent of the fighting power of his German counterpart, removing all other factors. What the US was good at was leveraging these same other factors : overwhelming firepower and the most mechanized army and supply train of the war.
 
Bagration, Summer of 1944.
Up until then it was a case of some Soviet Formations being better than some German Formations. After that it was the other way around, some German formations could still beat their Soviet opponents reliably but the tide had turned.
By the way, in a fight between qualitative equals, 3 to 1 is usually required when attacking, and 1 to 3 when defending to ensure a fair chance of success (taking force multipliers into account).
 
Bagration, Summer of 1944.

Bagration is a pretty amazing Soviet victory.

To go one step further there are some intangibles the Soviets were always much better at than the Germans. Soviet intelligence outclassed the Germans every step of the way.
 
Bagration is a pretty amazing Soviet victory.

To go one step further there are some intangibles the Soviets were always much better at than the Germans. Soviet intelligence outclassed the Germans every step of the way.

Well... until the winter of ‘42-‘43 they tended to fall down on steps 4 and 5 of the intelligence cycle.
 

Steps 4 and 5 are Analysis and Dissemination, respectively. Until late-‘42, Soviet analysis tended to be skewed by the senior leadership’s pushing their own preferences over objectivity and dissemination was neglected due to a preference for overbearing secrecy in true Stalinist style leading to a hordeing of information and methods. These were ultimately corrected.
 
Bagration is a pretty amazing Soviet victory.

To go one step further there are some intangibles the Soviets were always much better at than the Germans. Soviet intelligence outclassed the Germans every step of the way.

If we are comparing armies intelligence should only be evaluated at army level. The soviets had a much better intelligence service, but that was run by the NKVD. The German Army intelligence service (at OKW and OKH level and even at Army Group level) was usually very bad at evaluating soviet strength and intentions, and remained so all through the war. They regarded the Soviets as basically finished before the winter 41 and winter 42 counteroffensives and totally missed the preparation for Bagration.
Intel, and specifically at army level, was arguably the area were the Soviets were most consistently better than the Germans.
 
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