When did Nazi Germany definitely lose WW2?

When did Nazi Germany definitely lose WW2?

  • 1. After losing Battle of Britain

    Votes: 34 15.8%
  • 2. June 22th 1941 (Barbarossa)

    Votes: 49 22.8%
  • 3. December 7th 1941 (Pearl Harbor)

    Votes: 17 7.9%
  • 4. December 11 1941 Hitler's Declaration of war against USA

    Votes: 69 32.1%
  • 5. February 2nd 1943 After Stalingrad

    Votes: 36 16.7%
  • 6. August 23rd 1943 After Kursk

    Votes: 10 4.7%

  • Total voters
    215

Deleted member 1487

And? Of course the Germans lost that many fighters over there. That's where most of their fighters were and were most active.
Sure, it wasn't the Soviets killing German aircraft, that was the wallies. Had the Allies not done it the Luftwaffe would have been slaughtering the VVS.

Instead, they get slaughtered in the East as the Soviets now have a lot more German aircraft to shoot at.
Ah no. According to "When Titans Clashed" the Soviets lost over 24k aircraft in 1944. Based on the numbers in the other link I posted, the Germans lost somewhat over 2000 in the East in 1944. Not really boding well for the Soviet air force if the bulk of German fighters were in the East in 1944.

Oh, the Soviets would still get that. The VVS would still be able to seize air superiority for several weeks by maneuvering and concentrating its forces as any competent Air Force can do. So for several weeks from the start of the offensive, the VVS will still be able to do all that. And the Soviets only need one week before they take Minsk.
Except the Luftwaffe, despite being massively outnumbered IOTL, was well able to operate and inflict damage even in 1945 in the East, while being unable to in the West. The VVS was not able to really go toe-to-toe against the Luftwaffe if the Germans massed for a main effort in a sector. Locally the VVS could get through based on sheer numbers, but that wouldn't have the total run of the field as IOTL if the Germans actually had a few hundred operational fighters. What the Soviets had for Bagration was it, the rest of the VVS was occupied in other sectors.

In Wiking's fantasy world where numbers are the only thing that matters and all you need is a certain amount of equipment with no regard for the Soviets qualitative advantages that made Bagration happen. Most of those AFVs won't even be in AGC when the offensive happens, much less appropriately emplaced or employed to stop the initial onslaught within the Army Groups sector itself.
Weren't you the one above tongue bathing the Soviets for their glorious deception efforts that drew off critical German AFV forces from AG-Center? Apparently the Soviets thought that German AFV numbers really mattered to the situation, otherwise they wouldn't have tried to ensure that German reserves were not present in Belarus. And given that Soviet AFV losses for 1944 were about 24k and they didn't have to face 1/3rd of available German AFV strength IOTL, having that addition 1/3rd of AFVs, including some of the very best remaining German armor divisions, present in the East is going to majorly raise Soviet losses and prevent them from accomplishing their missions.

I mean just going from the Normandy situation from June-August 1944 the Germans inflicted over 4000 AFV losses on the Wallies, despite the Allies having an even more crushing air superiority than the Soviets ever achieved (over 6000 tactical bombers/fighter-bombers in a far more concentrated place). 4000 AFVs were more than double what the Soviets had for Bagration, so if the Germans could inflict even half of that with half of their addition 2200 AFVs not used in Normandy the entire Soviet AFV strength for Bagration would have been wiped out.

Its interesting how you ignored the entire point that if there is a German AFV strategic reserve in June AG-Center won't be sending its armor to AG-South, AG-South would be reinforced from the 2200 AFV strategic reserve. So while yes of that pool of 2200 AFVs in the strategic reserve none would initially be with AG-Center, but then AG-Center would have at least double the initial AFVs, because in this scenario without Normandy AG-Center wouldn't be stripped of armor to send south, because the strategic reserve would be able to give those reinforcements to the Ukrainian front. So a strategic armor reserve means more AFVs for AG-Center by simple fact that Soviet deception efforts mean that the transfers of AFVs to Ukraine don't have to come from AG-Center. That alone gives AG-Center a lot of additional punching power they lacked in the critical early fighting in June. And its not like the Germans didn't know about the Soviet build up opposite Belarus, they just didn't realize the full extent because they lacked the ability to conduct aerial recon.

And the Soviets tore a hole measured hundreds of kilometers wide in those first few days. That is a frontage that makes the WAllied breakout at St Louis look embarrassing.
And in those first days in this scenario AG-Center would have a greater armor reserve due to not having to rob AG-Center of armor to reinforce Ukraine due to the existence of a strategic reserve. So there is probably double the historical amounts of armor, as the reinforced Ukrainian Front instead comes from the strategic reserve. Then when the Soviet offensive begins and there is trouble getting as far as fast due to greater German armor reserves already on hand, that buys additional time beyond what was available IOTL to move in the strategic reserve and counter attack the Soviet exploitation forces moving on Minsk and other targets. Yes AG-Center will suffer quite badly initially, but not as bad as IOTL and Soviet forces will get hit harder sooner and not be allowed to exploit freely as IOTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

If anything, Meiktila-Mandalay (or the Battle of the Irrawaddy as it is known in Japanese historiography) demonstrated just what the IJA was capable of under good leadership. After Masakazu Kawabe was sacked following the disastrous invasion of India he was replaced by the far abler Lt. Gen. Heitaro Kimura, who arrived to discover that most divisions of his Burma Area Army (which had a paper strength of well over 300,000 men) were in reality little more than regimental to brigade strength skeleton units ravaged by starvation and disease that the local commanders had somehow managed to cobble together into still-viable battlegroups. Unlike von Rundstedt, who, facing similar circumstances on the west bank of the Rhine allowed his divisions to be butchered by the Western Allies, Kimura chose not to offer up his army for destruction but instead withdrew over the Irrawaddy, frustrating General Slim's plan to smash IJA resistance in that sector.
You understand the major difference there I hope, von Rundstedt was defending the industrial heart of Germany and retreating over the Rhein was not really achievable in the circumstances. Meanwhile Burma was a tertiary theater in 1944-45 for the Japanese and the local commander had total free reign over command. It was a vastly different situation, so comparing them in the same breath is beyond disingenuous.

The crux of the Japanese problem then became one of containing any river crossing. They had nowhere near enough men to hold the entire river and were up against impossible opposition in terms of numbers of men and equipment. Nevertheless when the actual landings did begin they were able to conduct very vigorous counterattacks for weeks at a time before they were finally beaten back with air power. Even after that Allied progress was slow-going and the IJA forces were able to inflict painful losses for every kilometer of ground taken; by the end of the campaign the 14th Army had taken battle casualties 50 percent greater than those of the enemy. It was only after Slim's masterpiece of deception in which he drew the bulk of Kimura's beleaguered forces into the defense of Mandalay while his mobile reserves surprised his flank at Meiktila did the Japanese commander concede defeat and withdraw, leaving the road to Rangoon wide open.
This doesn't really speak that well to the abilities of the Indians then given their obscene superiority in firepower, especially air power, and numbers as well as logistics in general.

Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma_Campaign_1944–45
The casualty numbers are actually different; the Japanese took 50% heavier losses than the British/Indian troops.

Incredibly, Burma Area Army was still attempting to consolidate its defenses at the Thai border when the war ended.
I guess the Japanese army gets a bad rap in WW2.
 
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You understand the major difference there I hope, von Rundstedt was defending the industrial heart of Germany and retreating over the Rhein was not really achievable in the circumstances. Meanwhile Burma was a tertiary theater in 1944-45 for the Japanese and the local commander had total free reign over command. It was a vastly different situation, so comparing them in the same breath is beyond disingenuous.[1]


This doesn't really speak that well to the abilities of the Indians then given their obscene superiority in firepower, especially air power, and numbers as well as logistics in general. [2]


I guess the Japanese army gets a bad rap in WW2. [3].
[1] Fair point

[2] I know you don't pay much heed to logistics but have you looked at the terrain between the India-Burma border and the Irrawaddy? Getting equipment and supplies through to assault areas was a very major task. Slim actually always intended to feint around Mandalay to suck the Japanese in and then use the flank march and crossing further down to cut them off by capturing Meiktila. As always the Japanese fought very hard in defence even when outnumbered in men and firepower. Just like on Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Tarawa. Do you criticise the U.S. Army and Marine Corps for making heavy weather of these operations?

[3] I don't think anyone disses the Japanese for fighting ability and defensive tactics. Logistics and operational level command yes but not tenacity in defence.
 

Deleted member 1487

[2] I know you don't pay much heed to logistics but have you looked at the terrain between the India-Burma border and the Irrawaddy?
Yeah you weren't paying any attention to the part were I addressed that. The US tactical airlift support was the crucial element there. They flew in supplies to the tune of several thousands sorties per day in addition to airlifting entire Indian divisions forward. The logistics of that was in major part due to the US providing adequate air transports to get around the terrain on the ground. BTW I had a relative in the India theater that ended up dying flying air missions, so I am aware of what the situation was.

Getting equipment and supplies through to assault areas was a very major task. Slim actually always intended to feint around Mandalay to suck the Japanese in and then use the flank march and crossing further down to cut them off by capturing Meiktila. As always the Japanese fought very hard in defence even when outnumbered in men and firepower. Just like on Okinawa, Iwo Jima and Tarawa. Do you criticise the U.S. Army and Marine Corps for making heavy weather of these operations?
Agreed, it was tough moving forward, which is why the US provided major airlifts to keep the British military going. Of course major truck support was also part of the situation, but the Allies had an enormous mountain of material to keep them going, despite the challenges of terrain; when things got tough they simply flew over rough terrain with their hundreds of Dakotas.
As to the comparison of Okinawa and Iwo Jima, those areas were far better supplied and prepared than the fluid, tertiary front of Burma.

[3] I don't think anyone disses the Japanese for fighting ability and defensive tactics. Logistics and operational level command yes but not tenacity in defence.
I think some people do diss the Japanese for being unskilled in combat and believe in the myth of the Japanese being poor on the attack and only successful in defense when well dug into islands.
 
You understand the major difference there I hope, von Rundstedt was defending the industrial heart of Germany and retreating over the Rhein was not really achievable in the circumstances. Meanwhile Burma was a tertiary theater in 1944-45 for the Japanese and the local commander had total free reign over command. It was a vastly different situation, so comparing them in the same breath is beyond disingenuous.

The Ruhr industrial area was mostly on the east side of the Rhine. Had von Rundstedt made his stand there it would have been far more costly to the Allies to seize it than the giant encirclement it was in OTL (granted he had his hands tied by Hitler, but still). Plus, the original comparison is Slim's, not mine.

From Lt. Col. Ed Egan's study on the campaign:

"Slim credits the Japanese for being wise: 'wiser than the Germans in similar circumstances on the west of the Rhine. Kimura was showing a greater sense of realities than his predecessor, Kawabe, had at Imphal.' "

This doesn't really speak that well to the abilities of the Indians then given their obscene superiority in firepower, especially air power, and numbers as well as logistics in general.

Edit:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma_Campaign_1944–45
The casualty numbers are actually different; the Japanese took 50% heavier losses than the British/Indian troops.

Despite the losses and state of the opponent it was perhaps the single best example of Western Allied operational art against the IJA for the whole war, and against a good commander to boot.

On the casualties, those numbers in that link have no citation and in any regard allegedly refer to the campaign as a whole; the Meiktila-Mandalay battle produced a total of 2,307-2,667 killed/15,500-15,888 wounded for the Allies and 6,513 killed/6,299-6,500 wounded for the Japanese (depending on the source), a ratio of roughly 1.5 : 1 in Japan's favor.

I guess the Japanese army gets a bad rap in WW2.

In some ways their criticisms are deserved (most stereotypes have at least a bit of truth to them), in others they are wildly overblown to an almost cartoonish degree. Of all the major powers only the Soviets are subject to the same level of mythmaking.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Ruhr industrial area was mostly on the east side of the Rhine. Had von Rundstedt made his stand there it would have been far more costly to the Allies to seize it than the giant encirclement it was in OTL (granted he had his hands tied by Hitler, but still). Plus, the original comparison is Slim's, not mine.

From Lt. Col. Ed Egan's study on the campaign:

"Slim credits the Japanese for being wise: 'wiser than the Germans in similar circumstances on the west of the Rhine. Kimura was showing a greater sense of realities than his predecessor, Kawabe, had at Imphal.' "
You mean a general gives credit to the enemy he was fighting and none to the enemy he wasn't to improve his reputation?
In any event the ability to actually move the German army, especially across the river, at that point in the war of complete Allied air dominance was not really possible given the circumstances and the war was lost, so it was pretty much a way of ending the war quickly without having Hitler sic his SS bloodhounds on Rundstedt. And of course if you've been to the Rhein/Ruhr area if an enemy gains the West bank they can just artillery the entire industrial area. Its basically on the river. So abandoning the West bank is totally accepting the Ruhr will cease production and if you do that the war is over, so its a no-win proposition. For the Japanese to retreat in Burma it makes nothing but sense given that there was nothing of value for them to defend that far forward, i.e. a totally different circumstance.

Despite the losses and state of the opponent it was perhaps the single best example of Western Allied operational art against the IJA for the whole war, and against a good commander to boot.

On the casualties, those numbers in that link have no citation and in any regard allegedly refer to the campaign as a whole; the Meiktila-Mandalay battle produced a total of 2,307-2,667 killed/15,500-15,888 wounded for the Allies and 6,513 killed/6,299-6,500 wounded for the Japanese (depending on the source), a ratio of roughly 1.5 : 1 in Japan's favor.
Operational art...you mean using overwhelming numerical advantage to invest and flow around the enemy. Everyone did that and would in those circumstances, especially when you're in a hurry to beat Monsoon Season.

As to losses, yeah that was one set of engagements in the entire campaign.

In some ways their criticisms are deserved (most stereotypes have at least a bit of truth to them), in others they are wildly overblown to an almost cartoonish degree. Of all the major powers only the Soviets are subject to the same level of mythmaking.
Sure, though in the case of the Soviets it goes both ways. They get painted as their 1941-42 selves in most histories prior to the 1990s, while since Glantz has been publishing the tendency is going the other way of giving them too much credit for their supposedly skills. The pendulum keeps swinging, maybe one day it will settle in the middle.
 
You mean a general gives credit to the enemy he was fighting and none to the enemy he wasn't to improve his reputation?
In any event the ability to actually move the German army, especially across the river, at that point in the war of complete Allied air dominance was not really possible given the circumstances and the war was lost, so it was pretty much a way of ending the war quickly without having Hitler sic his SS bloodhounds on Rundstedt. And of course if you've been to the Rhein/Ruhr area if an enemy gains the West bank they can just artillery the entire industrial area. Its basically on the river. So abandoning the West bank is totally accepting the Ruhr will cease production and if you do that the war is over, so its a no-win proposition. For the Japanese to retreat in Burma it makes nothing but sense given that there was nothing of value for them to defend that far forward, i.e. a totally different circumstance.

Slim was never one to boast, and in the case of the Germans (even considering the Hitler factor) failure to withdraw over the Rhine was still a serious strategic error. Any damage to the Ruhr industry (it went down anyway very rapidly following the OTL Rhineland campaign and crossing of the namesake river, plus was already being bombed on a daily basis) would be a vastly less grievous a blow to the German war effort than the collapse of an Army Group like what they got.

Rearranging the furniture on the Titanic,maybe, but still making the best of a bad situation.

Plus, Allied airpower, strong as it was, failed to prevent the Japanese from completing a similar maneuver in Burma.

Operational art...you mean using overwhelming numerical advantage to invest and flow around the enemy. Everyone did that and would in those circumstances, especially when you're in a hurry to beat Monsoon Season.

Slim had both of those advantages, but he didn't use his army like a battering ram to defeat Kimura. Instead he relied on deception, mobility, and rapid force concentration to compromise the Japanese defenses and force a withdrawal using a plan improvised 'on the fly.' Speaking frankly the geography of the Pacific tended to be prohibitive to maneuver battles like those in Europe, but on landmasses in which this was possible (the Philippines, mainland Asia), only Slim was able to pull off what could be termed a "masterstroke" at the Irrawaddy and to a lesser extent Imphal. The Americans, on the other hand, performed rather poorly against the IJA on the operational level at Leyte and Luzon.

Sure, though in the case of the Soviets it goes both ways. They get painted as their 1941-42 selves in most histories prior to the 1990s, while since Glantz has been publishing the tendency is going the other way of giving them too much credit for their supposedly skills. The pendulum keeps swinging, maybe one day it will settle in the middle.

Right. I have seen plenty of it in both directions.
 

Deleted member 1487

Slim was never one to boast, and in the case of the Germans (even considering the Hitler factor) failure to withdraw over the Rhine was still a serious strategic error. Any damage to the Ruhr industry (it went down anyway very rapidly following the OTL Rhineland campaign and crossing of the namesake river, plus was already being bombed on a daily basis) would be a vastly less grievous a blow to the German war effort than the collapse of an Army Group like what they got.
I think its more an issue of Slim not really understanding the dilema/constraints that von Rundstedt had to deal with. It was a case of damned if you do, damned if you don't in terms of defending the production in the Ruhr, while IIRC there wasn't really the means to evacuate back across the Rhein. From a purely academic military perspective you're right that pulling back would have been the smart thing to do, but there were a lot of real world constraints impacting a collapsing nation and army that mean the text book answer to the situation wasn't an option.

Rearranging the furniture on the Titanic,maybe, but still making the best of a bad situation.
Not going to solve the problem of the war being lost and that's assuming there were the means to pull back at all and Rundstedt wouldn't get executed for it.

Plus, Allied airpower, strong as it was, failed to prevent the Japanese from completing a similar maneuver in Burma.
Allied air power in Burma was a tiny fraction of what was in the primary theater of action in Germany. Again comparing apples to car tires.

Slim had both of those advantages, but he didn't use his army like a battering ram to defeat Kimura. Instead he relied on deception, mobility, and rapid force concentration to compromise the Japanese defenses and force a withdrawal using a plan improvised 'on the fly.' Speaking frankly the geography of the Pacific tended to be prohibitive to maneuver battles like those in Europe, but on landmasses in which this was possible (the Philippines, mainland Asia), only Slim was able to pull off what could be termed a "masterstroke" at the Irrawaddy and to a lesser extent Imphal. The Americans, on the other hand, performed rather poorly against the IJA on the operational level at Leyte and Luzon.
You don't need to act as a battering ram when you've got too many forces to use against specific targets. They'd surround enemy positions and have the rest of the army move on, because they'd have nothing to do but sit around and wait while pockets were reduced. I'm not saying that the Allied army lacked finesse, but that was a luxury afforded by outnumbering your enemy 10:1 in combat manpower, having 60:1 more aircraft, and an infinitely better supply train. Its astonishing the Japanese fought as well as they did when the Allies were literally flying entire divisions over their head into their rear areas. As to the Philippines my Grandfather was there during the campaign and I can tell you the IJA was FAR better equipped and prepared to fight than they were in Burma. They had far more air support, combat troops, and naval support. The troops in Burma were left behind sacrificial lambs that the Japanese just left a speed bump. Slim outnumbered is opponent by far more than the Allies did the Japanese in the Philippines in 1944-45.
 
I think its more an issue of Slim not really understanding the dilema/constraints that von Rundstedt had to deal with. It was a case of damned if you do, damned if you don't in terms of defending the production in the Ruhr, while IIRC there wasn't really the means to evacuate back across the Rhein. From a purely academic military perspective you're right that pulling back would have been the smart thing to do, but there were a lot of real world constraints impacting a collapsing nation and army that mean the text book answer to the situation wasn't an option.

Not going to solve the problem of the war being lost and that's assuming there were the means to pull back at all and Rundstedt wouldn't get executed for it.

As I said, the war was lost. Ultimately it wouldn't have made a difference but strategically the situation would have been improved.

Allied air power in Burma was a tiny fraction of what was in the primary theater of action in Germany. Again comparing apples to car tires.

Compared to the opposition and the size of the theater it was proportionate; the Japanese had just 64 aircraft to the RAF's 1,200. With such a force the British could (and did) shoot up the few beaten down divisions the IJA had facing them, yet it wasn't enough to prevent them from crossing the Irrawaddy and reorganizing their defenses.

You don't need to act as a battering ram when you've got too many forces to use against specific targets. They'd surround enemy positions and have the rest of the army move on, because they'd have nothing to do but sit around and wait while pockets were reduced. I'm not saying that the Allied army lacked finesse, but that was a luxury afforded by outnumbering your enemy 10:1 in combat manpower, having 60:1 more aircraft, and an infinitely better supply train. Its astonishing the Japanese fought as well as they did when the Allies were literally flying entire divisions over their head into their rear areas. As to the Philippines my Grandfather was there during the campaign and I can tell you the IJA was FAR better equipped and prepared to fight than they were in Burma. They had far more air support, combat troops, and naval support. The troops in Burma were left behind sacrificial lambs that the Japanese just left a speed bump. Slim outnumbered is opponent by far more than the Allies did the Japanese in the Philippines in 1944-45.

The British never airlifted anything remotely on the division scale behind Japanese lines, and certainly didn't do it at Meiktila-Mandalay. While it was true that Slim possessed a large advantage over Kimura in terms of manpower and equipment the circumstances were far from unique. In the case of Leyte in particular that island was only defended by a single division when the US initially landed there in October which had to be reinforced via sea shipments over the straits between the islands. By attacking Leyte first the US forced the Japanese to accept the partial destruction of their reinforcements and loss of significant quantities of equipment en route as the price of bolstering that island. Nevertheless, despite being completely surprised by the American invasion, despite the fact that the 45,000 reinforcements shipped in from Luzon were invariably savaged by American submarines and air power, despite the fact that stocks of food and medicine were rapidly dwindling and consequently most Japanese casualties came from disease and starvation, despite everything: the IJA forced MacArthur's 6th Army to commit more that twice as many divisions as was originally expected, which then were only able to complete their assigned objectives in fully twice the time predicted. A Japanese counterattack even briefly isolated the 5th Air Force Headquarters before being beaten back into the jungle. Leyte cost the US 16,000 casualties and ruined American plans of using it to its full potential as a staging base against Luzon. In the face of massive disadvantages in men and materiel vis-a-vis the Americans, the Japanese on Leyte were able to achieve these results through dogged fanaticism and skillful delaying action, making full use of mountainous terrain very similar to that of Burma, terrain the Americans had occupied for decades prior to the fact.
 

Deleted member 1487

Compared to the opposition and the size of the theater it was proportionate; the Japanese had just 64 aircraft to the RAF's 1,200. With such a force the British could (and did) shoot up the few beaten down divisions the IJA had facing them, yet it wasn't enough to prevent them from crossing the Irrawaddy and reorganizing their defenses.
4300 in Burma actually according to "Brute Force". That included the airlift forces too, which were US.
Even with that the Wallies against the Germans in the West had something like 25k combined front line combat aircraft vs. less than a few hundred German once left by April. German transport was utterly shattered in 1945 as a result of the 'tender ministrations' of the Wallied air forces.


The British never airlifted anything remotely on the division scale behind Japanese lines, and certainly didn't do it at Meiktila-Mandalay. While it was true that Slim possessed a large advantage over Kimura in terms of manpower and equipment the circumstances were far from unique. In the case of Leyte in particular that island was only defended by a single division when the US initially landed there in October which had to be reinforced via sea shipments over the straits between the islands. By attacking Leyte first the US forced the Japanese to accept the partial destruction of their reinforcements and loss of significant quantities of equipment en route as the price of bolstering that island. Nevertheless, despite being completely surprised by the American invasion, despite the fact that the 45,000 reinforcements shipped in from Luzon were invariably savaged by American submarines and air power, despite the fact that stocks of food and medicine were rapidly dwindling and consequently most Japanese casualties came from disease and starvation, despite everything: the IJA forced MacArthur's 6th Army to commit more that twice as many divisions as was originally expected, which then were only able to complete their assigned objectives in fully twice the time predicted. A Japanese counterattack even briefly isolated the 5th Air Force Headquarters before being beaten back into the jungle. Leyte cost the US 16,000 casualties and ruined American plans of using it to its full potential as a staging base against Luzon. Despite their massive disadvantage in men and materiel vis-a-vis the Americans, the Japanese on Leyte were able to achieve these results through dogged fanaticism and skillful delaying action, making full use of mountainous terrain very similar to that of Burma, terrain the Americans had occupied for decades prior to the fact.
Pardon, it was brigades, not divisions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burma_Campaign_1944–45
Japanese reinforcements moving hastily to Meiktila arrived too late to relieve the garrison. However, they surrounded and besieged the town, and tried to recapture it and destroy Indian 17th Division. Although a total of eight Japanese regiments were eventually involved, they were mostly weak in numbers and drawn from five separate divisions, so their efforts were not coordinated. The Japanese Thirty-third Army HQ (re-titled "The Army of the Decisive Battle"[12]) was assigned to take command in this vital sector, but was unable to establish proper control. The Indian 17th Division had been reinforced by a brigade of the Indian 5th Division landed by air.

Later there was mention of an air assault involving a commando unit and a division, but the division was landed by sea, not airlifted; I misread what happened.

As to the situation with the Philippines, it is a tough place to attack against a dug in enemy and MacArthur got greedy and arrogant...not exactly something out of his character if you remember what happened in 1950. But remember despite the Japanese disadvantages they had a lot more power than the Japanese did in Burma at the time. I mean 45k reinforcements is 2.5x as many combat troops as the Japanese had in ALL of Burma.
 
Sure, it wasn't the Soviets killing German aircraft, that was the wallies. Had the Allies not done it the Luftwaffe would have been slaughtering the VVS.

More like the VVS slaughtering the Luftwaffe, given how many of those transfers would consist of pilots who barely know how to take-off and land. And in any case, "no Normandy" is not the same as "no WAllies" as I already noted.

[qupte]Ah no. According to "When Titans Clashed" the Soviets lost over 24k aircraft in 1944. Based on the numbers in the other link I posted, the Germans lost somewhat over 2000 in the East in 1944. Not really boding well for the Soviet air force if the bulk of German fighters were in the East in 1944.[/quote]

I already addressed this. The reason for the difference in kills was that the Luftwaffe was operating in a target rich environment and the VVS was operating in a target poor one. Increase the number of Luftwaffe aircraft, you increase the number of targets for the Soviets and the kill ratio will actually begin to favor the Soviets more.

Except the Luftwaffe, despite being massively outnumbered IOTL, was well able to operate and inflict damage even in 1945 in the East,

And that damage was insignificant in the overall context as the Soviets had adapted their ground techniques to decieve what Luftwaffe strikes could get through their air screen.

The VVS was not able to really go toe-to-toe against the Luftwaffe if the Germans massed for a main effort in a sector.

Except they did. Repeatedly. Multiple times in 1943 and early-44 the Luftwaffe in the East massed its fighters in an area and attempted to seize air superiority from the VVS. Each attempt would briefly give the VVS a run for its money, but then ultimately failed.

For its part, whenever the VVS wanted to seize air superiority over the front, it did. Handily and decisively. The German diversion of resources westward made this easier, but what made it possible was the recovery of the VVS in the latter half of 1942.

Locally the VVS could get through based on sheer numbers, but that wouldn't have the total run of the field as IOTL if the Germans actually had a few hundred operational fighters. What the Soviets had for Bagration was it, the rest of the VVS was occupied in other sectors.

And what the Soviets had for Bagration was 3,000 fighters. A few hundred German fighters just isn't going to cut it even if we assume the kill ratios remain static.

Weren't you the one above tongue bathing the Soviets for their glorious deception efforts that drew off critical German AFV forces from AG-Center?

A deception effort you are vigorously ignoring.

Apparently the Soviets thought that German AFV numbers really mattered to the situation, otherwise they wouldn't have tried to ensure that German reserves were not present in Belarus. And given that Soviet AFV losses for 1944 were about 24k and they didn't have to face 1/3rd of available German AFV strength IOTL, having that addition 1/3rd of AFVs, including some of the very best remaining German armor divisions, present in the East is going to majorly raise Soviet losses and prevent them from accomplishing their missions.

This posits some fantasy where AG Center would be able employ what armor it had effectively, something it completely failed to due OTL due to the effects of surprise upon it and Soviet tactical-operational methodology. The lone panzer division AGC had in June may have been weak, but even it's low potential was further undone by the fact the Soviets had comprehensively managed to hide the location, strength, and timing of the attack strategically, the location, strength, and objectives operationally, and the concentrations of forces tactically. This meant it's employment by AGC was confused and ineffective, which was further compounded by the extensive frontage over which the attack occurred. So it would be with any additional armor. Nor can the additional armor compensate for the fact that AGCs frontline defenses are too weak for the line to hold. As a case in point example: the southern breakthrough sector of 1st Belorussian front consisted of thirteen near-full-strength rifle divisions, a tank corps, and a cavalry-mechanized group. Opposing them were two German infantry divisions. That meant the Soviets had an entire division (or division-equivalent) per German battalion. There is no way that is lasting even a single day nor is it going to be reinforced by anything as AGC didn't have the first clue about it and didn't believe the Soviets to be capable of driving that many tanks through the Pripyet Marshes (something which they were dead wrong about).

Furthermore, if we want to keep pretending that only numbers matter, there is absolutely nothing preventing the Soviets from matching or even surpassing the German increase in AFVs with by dipping into their own, considerably larger, reserves of armor.

I mean just going from the Normandy situation from June-August 1944 the Germans inflicted over 4000 AFV losses on the Wallies, despite the Allies having an even more crushing air superiority than the Soviets ever achieved (over 6000 tactical bombers/fighter-bombers in a far more concentrated place).

That's because WW2 aircraft are shit at killing tanks, so the degree of air superiority matters rather little in that specific regard. The WAllies were also less experienced then the Soviets in the kind of massed overland operations like Normandy (post-D-Day) and Bagration entailed, with tactical tempos that were far too slow for their own good and operational art that was almost non-existent.

Its interesting how you ignored the entire point that if there is a German AFV strategic reserve in June AG-Center won't be sending its armor to AG-South, AG-South would be reinforced from the 2200 AFV strategic reserve.
So while yes of that pool of 2200 AFVs in the strategic reserve none would initially be with AG-Center, but then AG-Center would have at least double the initial AFVs, because in this scenario without Normandy AG-Center wouldn't be stripped of armor to send south, because the strategic reserve would be able to give those reinforcements to the Ukrainian front. So a strategic armor reserve means more AFVs for AG-Center by simple fact that Soviet deception efforts mean that the transfers of AFVs to Ukraine don't have to come from AG-Center. That alone gives AG-Center a lot of additional punching power they lacked in the critical early fighting in June.

And its not like the Germans didn't know about the Soviet build up opposite Belarus

The subordinate formations of AGC had some clue that a build-up was going on, but (A) they didn't have the first clue to it's significance and scale and (B) their not the ones in charge of German strategic reserves. The German High Command, for it's part, was completely blind.

they lacked the ability to conduct aerial recon.

The Germans were able to slip recon aircraft through the Soviet lines all the time because a lone aircraft flying at high altitude was difficult for the Soviets to spot and intercept, particularly given the VVS's policy of merely maintaining air parity when not conducting major operations. The Germans were unable to successfully detect the Soviet build-up because Soviet deception efforts thoroughly fooled their attempts at intelligence gathering, aerial recon included.

Also, as to your discussion about the Rhine: abandoning the west bank was eminently doable without too bad economic consequences for Germany, even though that was superfluous by 1945 anyways. The overwhelming bulk of the industry was located east of the Rhine. The loss of the west bank would hurt, but wouldn't be a death blow to the German war industry like the loss of the Ruhr or Silesia (much less both) was. Just look how the industrial-urban centers are distributed:

300px-Ruhr_area-map.png
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
This may be a dumb question, but how exactly do we feed a large Indian army in Europe?

Assuming you have the funds and Assuming you mean with a neutral USA, the sources are plentiful. Rice from Burma or USA food exports are my two most likely choices.
 
4300 in Burma actually according to "Brute Force". That included the airlift forces too, which were US.
Even with that the Wallies against the Germans in the West had something like 25k combined front line combat aircraft vs. less than a few hundred German once left by April. German transport was utterly shattered in 1945 as a result of the 'tender ministrations' of the Wallied air forces.

And IJAAF activity in Burma was by that time essentially nonexistent. Defense measures against Allied air attack almost exclusively came in the form of concealment and AAA.


That brigade wasn't airlifted behind the Japanese, it was sent in to bolster the surrounded 17th division at Meiktila, that is, flown into a pocket.

Later there was mention of an air assault involving a commando unit and a division, but the division was landed by sea, not airlifted; I misread what happened.

Yes, that was a completely different action.

As to the situation with the Philippines, it is a tough place to attack against a dug in enemy and MacArthur got greedy and arrogant...not exactly something out of his character if you remember what happened in 1950. But remember despite the Japanese disadvantages they had a lot more power than the Japanese did in Burma at the time. I mean 45k reinforcements is 2.5x as many combat troops as the Japanese had in ALL of Burma.

The point being that the way the reconquest of Leyte went down was an embarrassment that shouldn't have happened, especially considering the extremely favorable circumstances setting up the tactical-operational backdrop. Aside from achieving strategic surprise, the US had occupied Leyte for over 40 years prior to their landing and had plenty of time to study both the terrain as well as possible avenues of attack and defense. MacArthur was given 45 days, four divisions, and eight fighter and bomber groups to take the island from the Japanese, which was to be converted into a massive airbase to support the invasion of Luzon (mirroring the role Kyushu was later stated to play during Operation Downfall). Yet 9 divisions and 90 days later only a fraction of that air power was online because of terrain factors and the fact that the Japanese were still resisting. As was mentioned earlier a combined ground-parachute assault even briefly isolated 5th Air Force HQ before finally being beaten back.

Overall the 6th Army's advance was, although powerful, extremely methodical and painfully slow, "like a water buffalo." This allowed the starving Japanese, outnumbered roughly 5 to 1, to more or less ensure that every move forward was effectively going to become a frontal attack against prepared opposition. There was little operational finesse or attempt at a rapid flanking maneuver save some amphibious landings toward the end, and these were seaborne and relatively slow-going. Much of this was due to terrain: the island was swampy and heavily forested, but at least as much if not more was because of excess caution on the part of the Americans, particularly their failure to capitalize on massed armor. In the end the Japanese were able to withdraw a considerable portion of their original garrison back to Luzon as the US closed in on their final pockets of territory and the island never became the great staging ground originally envisioned.
 
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