What's the best deal France can make and take at Versailles?

France could have gotten a better deal at Versailles, w/greater security against WWII & conquest

  • Yes

    Votes: 38 41.8%
  • No

    Votes: 9 9.9%
  • Concessions to Italy in 1919 would have improved France's later position v. Germany

    Votes: 46 50.5%
  • Concessions to Italy in 1919 wouldn't have improved France's later position v. Germany

    Votes: 9 9.9%
  • Concessions to UK in 1919 would have improved France's later position v. Germany

    Votes: 10 11.0%
  • Concessions to UK in 1919 wouldn't have improved France's later position v. Germany

    Votes: 28 30.8%
  • Concessions to US in 1919 would have improved France's later position v. Germany

    Votes: 7 7.7%
  • Concessions to US in 1919 wouldn't have improved France's later position v. Germany

    Votes: 28 30.8%
  • Reduced demands on Germany in 1919 would have made a 2nd war much less likely

    Votes: 33 36.3%
  • Reducing demands on Germany in 1919 wouldn't have made 2nd war much less likely

    Votes: 24 26.4%
  • Reducing demands on Germany in 1919 wouldn't have been politically acceptable for France in 1919

    Votes: 44 48.4%

  • Total voters
    91
This is a related follow up to my thread here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/ahc-–-france-sustains-its-post-versailles-security-order-for-44-years.516252/.

In that challenge, I asked what France could do to sustain the Versailles order for as long as possible, *after* the treaty was written out and the ink was dry.

In this challenge, I ask, what was the best, most enduringly beneficial deal France could have gotten for itself that:
a) the French legislature/public/bureaucracy would have plausibly signed on to, b) the other victorious powers would have signed onto, c) the Germans would have signed on to or been effectively powerless to oppose.

The PoD can be any time after the November 11, 1918 armistice, so the armistice still provides French and it allies the exact same amount of leverage over Germany. No earlier PoDs or alterations of the armistice terms allowed.

What is the range of greater "hardness" or "softness" the French body politic can even accept compared to OTL's Versailles treaty?

How can France can get the best, most enduring, interwar cooperation with, and commitments from its wartime allies like the US, UK, Belgium, Italy, Japan?
Or Germany?

How much of the answer could be found with concrete bilateral horse-trading with any of these other countries over French concessions towards or support for those countries specific territorial, geopolitical, or economic ambitions? And how much of the interwar/postwar behavior of France's wartime allies predetermined by their own internal politics, interpretations of the Great War experience and mood swings, not susceptible to anything France could bargain with them over?

I tend to think that a bilateral, horse-trading solution had some potential to improve France's relative position if used with Italy, and may have kept Italy friendly to France and out of any Germany alliances in later decades. If Paris had favored Italy in getting all its desires from the Treaty of London, treated her as an equal of the other Allies, and basically favored her in any territorial dispute with more minor allies like Greece or the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Italy would have been far more likely to remain a status quo power in favor of the post-Versailles territorial order.

I think the bilateral, horse-trading, approach with the United States probably didn't have any potential for France at all. The US's course of action was going to be dictated by its mood swings on the war, which meant postwar buyer's remorse about participating in the war, and the kingdom of heaven not arriving (inflated expectations not being met), so strongly that territorial or geopolitical bribes from France that America never solicited wouldn't change American behavior. What could France offer? Caribbean islands, that America didn't want or need? French Polynesia, that America didn't want or need? An alliance against Japan, that America wouldn't anticipate needing?

With Belgium, I don't know.

I suspect the UK, like the US, would be somewhat impervious to any French "bargains" to support French continental policy of things like a Rhenish Republic, or a permanent Anglo-French alliance, or extended support for the new post-Versailles states of central Europe, even if France offered Britain concessions in other regions, like conceding the British or their puppets the mandate over Syria or even Lebanon, or supporting Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy. But maybe I underestimate trade-space here.

Could any greater, more enduring cooperation have been achieved through economic angles? I'm not sure on the specifics of a French economic deal with America, but I could imagine a proposed early coal and steel community consisting of the former European Entente members, UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.

Your thoughts?
 
I mean, the sad truth is, France is never going to compete with a united Germany. Ever. They still can't, just nowadays that means slightly less favorable economics and not troops marching through Paris.
 
It appears you have made a multi-query poll and forgotten to adjust the answer limit.

Regardless, on the one hand, c) is a relative non-issue, given that the Germans will not want to keep their sawdust diet much longer. On the other hand, though the Entente does not exactly have a Germanophile tendency, b) would require more consideration.
Lastly for these three, a) is a non-factor in every way so long as the peace is 'hard' in kind. France after its reconquest of Lothar's patrimony is still full of the so called 'revanche', and would not particularly mind it even were Germany zapped by an extraterrestrial ship.
Similarly, excepting an extraordinarily soft peace that goes as far as refraining from any adjustments at all, any hope for cooperation between France and Germany itself was dashed the day the former aligned itself with Russia.
If you are not intent on doing that or pulling it apart entirely, Germany would be best countered by leaving the Italians content in the resulting conference, gaining the French a valuable ally that could threaten the German southern flank, the presence of Austria notwithstanding.
 
It is often said that Nato was about keeping the Americans in the Germans down and the Russians out. You need something to keep the Americans in. Even if only half way in you want America involved in enforcement. That said the Americans got a lot that they wanted in Versailles but didn't even ratify it afterwards. Never mind enforcing it. I'm not sure how you get the Americans to agree but there needs to be some way to link war reparations with loans too. If Germany doesn't pay France can't pay.

Secondly you need time frames to be more strict regarding reparations. Pick something and occupy it until reparations are done. Germany could have paid reparations much quicker than they did. Look at how quickly France cleared out reparations after the Franco Prussian war. There needs to be a definable end to reparations too (or else Germany will try not to pay). You don't want a nebulous massive reparations figure that will never fully be paid. You want an achievable target.

Thirdly like you want the Americans in you want the Italians in. Maybe I'm being too focused on history but I'd give them Austrians and Hungarian (shared with Serbia and Romania) reparations. Historically Austria and Hungary ended up getting out of reparations early as France and Britain didn't care to enforce the,. By putting Italy (and to an extent Serbia and Romania) as locals in charge of Austro Hungarian reparations they can put boots on the ground to enforce reparations. It will feel to Italy as they are the dominant power amoung Serbia/Yugoslavia and Romania in enforcing Austrian and Hungarian reparations which will appeal to their pride. At the same time it will make it less likely that Hungary and Italy could work together later.
 
Last edited:

Garrison

Donor
I corrected my oversight with the poll, and now people can provide up to 6 answers.
But you haven't got any options there for taking a tougher line with Germany. Arguably the problem with the Versailles Treaty is that it neither offered concessions that would have disarmed German resentment, nor rammed home the fact that Germany had lost the war, rather than being 'stabbed in the back'.
 
But you haven't got any options there for taking a tougher line with Germany. Arguably the problem with the Versailles Treaty is that it neither offered concessions that would have disarmed German resentment, nor rammed home the fact that Germany had lost the war, rather than being 'stabbed in the back'.
A tougher line? Not sure how that is politically possible against the OTL backdrop of Bolshevism.
 
But you haven't got any options there for taking a tougher line with Germany. Arguably the problem with the Versailles Treaty is that it neither offered concessions that would have disarmed German resentment, nor rammed home the fact that Germany had lost the war, rather than being 'stabbed in the back'.

You can verbally describe one. I never ruled out annexation of territory or a Rhenish puppet state for example.

However, you are correct that I outlawed change pre-armistice, and that can make ramming home 'you're beat fair and square' rather hard.
 
I stand by the sentiment my post - if France really wants any sort of containment to work, they need Italy to buy-in on the post-Versailles order.
Now I'll admit, the French were unlucky: they really were OK with throwing Yugoslavia under the bus for Italy (if reluctantly), but then Wilson headbutted in; then a bit later, right after committing to going forward with relatively litte care for Italian interests, Fascism happened and they suddenly found themselves bordered somebody who really had all the reasons to be antagonistic. Butterfly either, and it should prove enough; digesting Dalmatia will be hard, especially for the Fascists, while no Fascism means regular governments which will likely be far more interested in the status quo over revisionist attempts.
But of course, you're working on French deals in the 1918-1919 timeframe; which means basically nothing can be achieved, for a multitude of reasons.
France policymakers know neither the UK, nor the US will proactively defend them. They also want to punish Germany for political, economical, and geopolitical reasons; but they don't have the strength, diplomatic capital, or economic strength to do it alone. The only possible partner, for such an endeavor, is Italy; but it means a very stark change from OTL, enough that it must be intentional sought from the day the War is won, something that I do not see as possible with such a late POD.
That said, minor changes such as supporting Italy's claim on Fiume or a less outspoken critique may well prove useful down the line.
 
I mean, the sad truth is, France is never going to compete with a united Germany. Ever. They still can't, just nowadays that means slightly less favorable economics and not troops marching through Paris.
That’s primarily a demographic issue. France used to have Europe’s largest population. When they did, they dominated. If France has a population comparable to or larger than Germany, they’d definitely be able to compete.

To answer the OP, they have to be either really tough or really soft on Germany. If France had invaded early on during the German rearmament, they’d have been much better off. America was going back into isolation. I’m not sure what France could have given on to get stronger British support. Concessions to Italy might prevent the rise of fascism, but that isn’t going to change much between Germany and a France overall.
 
Last edited:
I mean, the sad truth is, France is never going to compete with a united Germany. Ever. They still can't, just nowadays that means slightly less favorable economics and not troops marching through Paris.

"Ever" is a strong world. France fell behind because they spent a century not having kids, while the germans did. Such things are hardly unchangable natural laws. Have this reverse for 50 years, even after world war 1, and germany is the lesser power.

Hardly something a government on either side could activly influence though, thats true.
 
"Ever" is a strong world. France fell behind because they spent a century not having kids, while the germans did. Such things are hardly unchangable natural laws. Have this reverse for 50 years, even after world war 1, and germany is the lesser power.

Hardly something a government on either side could activly influence though, thats true.
I think government policies can play a role in increasing birth rates. It’s debatable how much though. Beyond that, it’s a cultural issue. Germany dominates Europe primarily, because of its demographics.
 
It is often said that Nato was about keeping the Americans in the Germans down and the Russians out. You need something to keep the Americans in. Even if only half way in you want America involved in enforcement. That said the Americans got a lot that they wanted in Versailles but didn't even ratify it afterwards. Never mind enforcing it. I'm not sure how you get the Americans to agree but there needs to be some way to link war reparations with loans too. If Germany doesn't pay France can't pay.
Clever idea. I see how it is elegant, and "equitable" from an Entente point of view. But I have trouble seeing the Americans consent to be pinned down this way. There’s little legal/financial precedent, incentive, compulsion, or leverage to get the Americans to agree. No matter what, the Americans can say, "No Pierre, No Nigel, No Luigi, it's not just Fritz's creditworthiness on the line, it is yours!" and "Fritz isn't paying, that sounds like your problem".

Secondly you need time frames to be more strict regarding reparations. Pick something and occupy it until reparations are done. Germany could have paid reparations much quicker than they did. Look at how quickly France cleared out reparations after the Franco Prussian war. There needs to be a definable end to reparations too (or else Germany will try not to pay). You don't want a nebulous massive reparations figure that will never fully be paid. You want an achievable target.
This is an interesting challenge. How much reconstruction value could the French extract by basically holding on to their CP PoWs as unpaid labor, and largely unsupported and supplied labor, working on reconstruction tasks in France, Belgium, Luxembourg, maybe even some dealing with unprepared bomb damage in Britain, or damage in other Entente countries. Their feeding and fueling costs to be paid for by in-kind contributions from Germany. If the German government wants a PoW back or one of them is too ill to work, Germany has to send a substitute for an individual to come home, before the reconstruction/reparation contract is over.

Thirdly like you want the Americans in you want the Italians in. Maybe I'm being too focused on history but I'd give them Austrians and Hungarian (shared with Serbia and Romania) reparations. Historically Austria and Hungary ended up getting out of reparations early as France and Britain didn't care to enforce the,. By putting Italy (and to an extent Serbia and Romania) as locals in charge of Austro Hungarian reparations they can put boots on the ground to enforce reparations. It will feel to Italy as they are the dominant power amoung Serbia/Yugoslavia and Romania in enforcing Austrian and Hungarian reparations which will appeal to their pride. At the same time it will make it less likely that Hungary and Italy could work together later.
This is an interesting idea. One thing you won't see later though, you won't see any future period where Austria is a willing puppet state for Italy, relying on its protection against Germany, like you had for the years 1934-1938. The Austro-Italian bitterness will be far too great based on the reparations bill over the top of the territorial amputations. Austria may simply become unable to exist apart from Germany by a few years into the 1920s because of its poverty, unless an Army comes in to both hold it down, and feed it.
 
To keep Germany contained, France needs either an alliance with the United States or an alliance with Russia. It would be helpful if Britain joined either alliance, but an alliance with Britain alone proved not to be enough in 1940.

Alternative, rapproachment with Germany is both doable and effective, as was proved after World War II. In the eighteenth century, France had an alliance with Austria that was unpopular, but probably helped with the war with Britain in 1778-82.

France was boxed in to some extent by Wilson's approach to international relations, since he was set on the League of Nations as a security guarantee instead of a direct alliance. A direct alliance with France might have been palatable to the Republicans at the time, but not the League of Nations. But maybe France could make an approach to the Harding administration for a security deal after Wilson left office.

With Russia, an imaginative French policy would have been to push for the inclusion of the Bolsheviks at the Paris peace talks, and to recognize the USSR as early as possible. Note that this would have meant screwing Poland. However, no French politician in power at the time wanted to go there.

The rapproachment with German option runs into French domestic politics, but maybe you push to allow the German government to send negotiators to Paris (the agreement was presented as a take it or leave it ultimatum), and open a channel with them in view of improving relations later on when things cool down. They definitely needed to stop undermining the German Republic at every opportunity. Historically, after World War 2, rapproachment with Germany turned out to be the winning move.

Telling the Czech nationalists the Czechosolovakia was off the table, and pushing for a country consisting of Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, and Slovenia, possibly including Croatia, some German territory, and some of the territory that went to Italy, would have been a good approach, since it would have created a counter-weight to Germany without actually recreating Austria-Hungary.

I don't see how friendly relations or an alliance with Italy improves anything. The Kingdom of Italy was just not that strong a power. They arguably hurt France more than helped in World War I, since the French had to send substantial military assistance to Italy in 1917. During World War 2, Italy was neutral until after the fall of France was a done deal, and given the state of the Italian armed forces, its hard to see how they could have helped if some some reason they allied with France in 1939-40. After the fall of France, Germany would have had to campaign to drive the Italian government off the peninsula, but this in effect would have just replaced their having to bail the Italians out in the Balkans and Africa, and at least would have been over with earlier.
 
I mean, the sad truth is, France is never going to compete with a united Germany. Ever. They still can't, just nowadays that means slightly less favorable economics and not troops marching through Paris.
Well, actually being able to take notable territory from them to actually weaken them would probably help (alsace-lorraine doesn't count, it was a reconquest, and germany had thrashed them without it.) But then we get into questions of how much france can absorb and how much germany can lose while still being "united."
 
Perhaps France could have reconcilled with the Weimar Republic. Weimar Germany was more interested in expanding east and recovering lost land from Poland. A Weimar Germany that reconcilled with France might have survived and not be replaced by Nazi Germany if it was allowed some success in foreign policy to secure its legitimacy.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Locarno_Treaties
 
Last edited:
I don't think there any deal that could plausibly pass French and British public opinion that wouldn't leave a sizeable fraction of German public opinion a.) buying into the stabbed in the back myth b.) up for round two.

So my first step as the French lead negotiator is to write of the Americans and try and isolate them, which is easier said than done considering how much money France owes them.

Secondly there aren't many concession France can directly make to Britain that would enhance the post war order. Indulging Lloyd George on Greek policy isn't going to make Britain sign up to a permanent alliance. However the concessions to Britain might be necessary in order to get the next element over the line:

France needs to be harsher on Germany and much more supportive of Italy and ideally Belgium who are much more useful allies than Yugoslavia. For Belgium there isn't much you can give them in Europe itself but maybe Gabon could be handed over to them in return for a permanent alliance. As for Italy give them whatever you can at the expense of Austria-Hungary and the Serbs, as much as the littoral as you can get away with, especially Dalmatia. Not just because it will make Italy more favourable but it weakens the vittoria mutilata element of Italian post war politics and weakens Mussolini.
For Germany give up on the Saar, it isn't going to work, ditto long term demilitarisation of the Rhineland, the British won't enforce it. Instead ramp up the economic element as much as possible. But not just a long term cash indemnity that the Germans will wriggle out of. Instead goods up front. The Rhineland has a lot of industrial tools, barges, locomotives, railways that would be very useful for rebuilding the North-East of France. With the German Army collapsing send the French Army in under the terms of the treaty to take what you are owed. Keep the cash element by all means but recognise that you're not going to get all of it.

As for Eastern Europe anything you can do to aid Czechia and Poland is good but you don't remember the balance of power. Bluntly they are going to ally with you against a revanchist Germany and the Soviet threat no matter what. You've got the upper hand, use it.

A France with a rapidly rebuilt North-East, a firm alliance with Belgium including a Belgian Maginot Line, a strong alliance with a democratic Italy and good relations with the United Kingdom is a very difficult problem for a revanchist Germany.
 

El_Fodedor

Banned
The best deal I could think of was something like creating the Kingdom of Rhineland in the West.

This would be central.
 
Top