What would you do differently at Versailles in 1919?

"don't see" as in not noticing argument, or not agreeing with argument?
I am sorry, you're being unclear as to whom you're disagreeing with, and which point you're disagreeing with.

I disagree with phil03's dismissing the "general reduction" bit from the Treaty as a meaningless boilerplate. So I'm agreeing with your position.
 
At this point I already expected an incredibly convoluted explanation meant to convince everyone to not believe their lying eyes. I wasn't disappointed.
I disagree with phil03's dismissing the "general reduction" bit from the Treaty as a meaningless boilerplate. So I'm agreeing with your position.

The treaty essentially argue that making Germany disarm will, at some non-precise point in the future, start a process that might eventually lead to general disarment. It does not engage the allies to any concrete measure at any point and it certainly does not, unlike what Petike implied, allowed Germany to rearm because the allies didn't disarm. Neither in words nor in spirits does the treaty said that and there is no way in hell the UK of France would have agreed to that in 1919. Its not convoluted, its just plain common sense and to think otherwise is to make the treaty for more fair minded it could ever be in the circumstances.
 
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Alright, ffs.

There have been many points about Germany bring occupied, disintegrated, or otherwise. Where is the political will, the corpses, and the interest in keeping this going? Germany wanted peace, so they could get back to normalcy. Not so they could be permanently occupied.

Disintegration of Germany as an entity? Large chunks got bitten off OTL. What military enforced this in Berlin, bleeding their way there, for total disintegration? Total disintegration, not the loss of significant chunks, but literal dismemberment.

Germany conceded to Versailies because they lost, and the government was hated for it. Now, imagine terms far harsher. What do you think is the result?
 
The treaty essentially argue that making Germany disarm will, at some non-precise point in the future, start a process that might eventually lead to general disarment. It does not engage the allies to any concrete measure at any point and it certainly does not, unlike what Petike implied, allowed Germany to rearm because the allies didn't disarm. Neither in words nor in spirits does the treaty said that and there is no way in hell the UK of France would have agreed to that in 1919. Its not convoluted, its just plain common sense and to think otherwise is to make the treaty for more fair minded it could ever be in the circumstances.

If the Entente had no obligations to limit their arms, then they were idiots to try limiting their armaments. And because of efforts like those, they only have themselves to blame if the impression spread that they were making a general effort to do so.

They go unenforced, like OTL's.

Or, well, the Germans reject the peace treaty, because it's literally worse than continued hostilities. Just imagine how the boys in the trenches will feel about that, especially if they ever hear about what the terms were.
 
If the Entente had no obligations to limit their arms, then they were idiots to try limiting their armaments. And because of efforts like those, they only have themselves to blame if the impression spread that they were making a general effort to do so.

I would agree that the Briand-Kellog Pact was indeed a stupid decision (as for Geneva, I would argue that they didn't have much of a chemical arsenal in the first place and the Protocol doesn't limit conventional armements in the slightest), not because it was contradicting Versailles in the slightest or because it wasn't a worthwhile goal but because it was ridiculously premature. At the end of the day, the pact was a product of his time: a manifestation of the idea that World War I would be the war who ended all wars and allowed everyone to move on toward a peacefull world. A naive, well intented and ultamitely misguided policy, at least under the circumstances as they existed.

What the Brian-Kellow or its faillure didn't, however, was to supercede or revise the terms of Versailles in any way. They're is no legal links between the two treaties and, furthermore, they're is no indication that Germany or the Entente tought so. Ultamitely, Germany hated Versailles for what it was: the product of their defeat in a major war and the consequences of it. That include the military clauses, witch they would have wanted to get rid of independently of wheter Brian-Kellogg work or not or if the allies put a nice feel good formula at the start of the clause who limited their military. To keep Germany from rebuilding her military in contradiction with the treaty you need to be ready to do what it take to enforce the clause concerned, if you aren't Germany will rebuild her armed forces. Simple as that.
 
Or, well, the Germans reject the peace treaty, because it's literally worse than continued hostilities. Just imagine how the boys in the trenches will feel about that, especially if they ever hear about what the terms were.

Field Marshall Haig was getting worried about this. See his diary entry from 2 Jan 1918.

"I told the King that it was very desirable to tell the Army in a few unambiguous sentences, what we were fighting for. The Army iis now composed of representatives of all classes in the Nation, and many are most intelligent and think things out. They don't care whether France has Alsace and Italy Trieste; they realise that Britain entered the war to free Belgium and save France. Germany is now ready, we have been told, [1] to give all we want in these respects. So it is essential that some statement should be made which the soldier can understand and approve of. Few of us feel that the "democratising of Germany" is worth the loss of a single Englishman! I also pointed out that the removal of the Hohenzollerns from Germany is likely to result in anarchy just as was the case in Russia. This might prove a serious evil for the rest of Europe".

Haig doesn't use the M-word, but is clearly uneasy about his troops' reaction if required to continue fighting for objectives which they did not see as theirs.

[1] This report turned out to be false.
 

hipper

Banned
It was not properly implemented.

The sanctions were limited, however. They did not prohibit the provision of several vital materials, such as oil, and were not carried out by all members of the League. UK and France's ruling right-wing governments spent most of their time appeasing Italy and then Hitler.

Now, if oil and coal sanctions were imposed, combined with Suez and Gibraltar being closed, Italy would be screwed.

What you are describing is war with Italy with the League of Nations cheerleading the UK on. Strangely enough the National Goverment did not fancy it so no hard sanctions..
 
What the Brian-Kellow or its faillure didn't, however, was to supercede or revise the terms of Versailles in any way. They're is no legal links between the two treaties and, furthermore, they're is no indication that Germany or the Entente tought so. Ultamitely, Germany hated Versailles for what it was: the product of their defeat in a major war and the consequences of it. That include the military clauses, witch they would have wanted to get rid of independently of wheter Brian-Kellogg work or not or if the allies put a nice feel good formula at the start of the clause who limited their military. To keep Germany from rebuilding her military in contradiction with the treaty you need to be ready to do what it take to enforce the clause concerned, if you aren't Germany will rebuild her armed forces. Simple as that.

That is the opposite of what was being explained to you. You're no longer making a token effort to understand what was being said. Besides which, you're assuming that the Treaty was seen as just or should have been seen as just by 20's and 30's Entente governments, when the actions of future governments, British and American ones in particular, suggests that they had second thoughts afterwards. You haven't offered any suggestions to prevent the OTL Anglo-French split over the Ruhr occupation, say, without which a unified front to maintain the Versailles provisions seems impossible.
 
That is the opposite of what was being explained to you. You're no longer making a token effort to understand what was being said. Besides which, you're assuming that the Treaty was seen as just or should have been seen as just by 20's and 30's Entente governments, when the actions of future governments, British and American ones in particular, suggests that they had second thoughts afterwards. You haven't offered any suggestions to prevent the OTL Anglo-French split over the Ruhr occupation, say, without which a unified front to maintain the Versailles provisions seems impossible.

The point Petike has tried to push on this specific issue, witch started this whole thing, is an assumption that a declaration of sentiments of what might be desirable as a process that would begin at some imprecise date in the future would is somehow as important then a clause that specifically detailled what Germany can have in specifics numbers and in equipment prohibited and that because the allies Entente supposedly failed to act on its most vague of promises the Germans actually believed the treaty allowed them to rearm. As an argument this is just plain ridiculous and it isn't even making a token effort to consider any kind of imput we had on how the Germans saw things latter or the Entente power saw things then. 1919 was not the 20's and certainly not the 30's, no notion of true reciprocity in disarmement would have been accepted by France or even the UK.

The Germans where disastified with Versailles from the get go and wanted an occasion to rearm, they didn't particularly care for the terms of the treaty as they hated everything it stood for (they where at least partially justified in feeling that way, to what degree is another question). Since you intervened in that discussion with Brian-Kellog I assume you pursued a similar point then Petike: that it somehow freed Germany from her obligations on the military clause and/or make it unclear. To try to essentially find supposed loopholes inside the treaty is to actually give said treaty more credit then the Germans did themselves.

As its stood, the German army was limited to a 100K army with no planes, tanks or heavy artillery post treaty. France by itself has enough power to throw her weight around if Germany tried to rearm and reoccupy the Rhineland if, but only if, it does put her foot on the ground as soon as Germany try to bypass those regulations, as to not allow her to even start rebuilding. War weariness and, as you say, second toughts about the treaty prevented that from happening. As Clemenceau said: the treaty would only be worth what they would do with it and it turned out to not be much.
 
The point Petike has tried to push on this specific issue, witch started this whole thing, is an assumption that a declaration of sentiments of what might be desirable as a process that would begin at some imprecise date in the future would is somehow as important then a clause that specifically detailled what Germany can have in specifics numbers and in equipment prohibited and that because the allies Entente supposedly failed to act on its most vague of promises the Germans actually believed the treaty allowed them to rearm. As an argument this is just plain ridiculous and it isn't even making a token effort to consider any kind of imput we had on how the Germans saw things latter or the Entente power saw things then. 1919 was not the 20's and certainly not the 30's, no notion of true reciprocity in disarmement would have been accepted by France or even the UK.

It's not even about what the Germans want, though, of course they wanted to rearm. What it did was underline the sheer hypocrisy and impracticality involved in such a requirement. There were no such provisions in the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, which is just as well, seeing how just like the Germans in 1919, the French back then had to use their non-Treaty-defanged army to put down an internal revolt. In that case, they weren't forced to fatally poison their new government by cutting deals with right-wing militias to get that done.

That the Germans wouldn't like losing the ability of their state to defend itself or even, as Weimar's history shows, to fulfill the basic function of a state by having a monopoly of force inside their borders, then at least don't hand them arguments as to why they shouldn't have to abide by such restrictions. The ahistoricity, the sanctimoniousness, those didn't cause German dissatisfaction, but they made it harder to rebut.

As its stood, the German army was limited to a 100K army with no planes, tanks or heavy artillery post treaty. France by itself has enough power to throw her weight if Germany try to rearm and reoccupy the Rhineland if, but only if, it does put her foot on the ground as soon as Germany try to bypass those regulations as to not allow her to even start rebuilding. War weariness and, as you say, second toughts about the treaty prevented that from happening. As Clemenceau said: the treaty would only be worth what they would do with it and it turned out to not be much.

In which case we could try for a peace treaty that wasn't so terrible that even the victors thought it was unjust. That's the point of this thread, and personally I'm not sure the ideas floating around about dissolving Germany are headed in the right direction.
 
It's not even about what the Germans want, though, of course they wanted to rearm. What it did was underline the sheer hypocrisy and impracticality involved in such a requirement. There were no such provisions in the Treaty of Frankfurt in 1871, which is just as well, seeing how just like the Germans in 1919, the French back then had to use their non-Treaty-defanged army to put down an internal revolt. In that case, they weren't forced to fatally poison their new government by cutting deals with right-wing militias to get that done.

That the Germans wouldn't like losing the ability of their state to defend itself or even, as Weimar's history shows, to fulfill the basic function of a state by having a monopoly of force inside their borders, then at least don't hand them arguments as to why they shouldn't have to abide by such restrictions. The ahistoricity, the sanctimoniousness, those didn't cause German dissatisfaction, but they made it harder to rebut.



In which case we could try for a peace treaty that wasn't so terrible that even the victors thought it was unjust. That's the point of this thread, and personally I'm not sure the ideas floating around about dissolving Germany are headed in the right direction.

As stated before, Frankfurt is not an accurate comparaison on that level as they're was a bunch of neutral powers who would have been worried by the power inbalance created by such a clause and Bismarck didn't want to alienate them. No such things for Germany in 1919. What Petike tried to argue is that the Germans genuinelly believed that this little formula gave them the right to disarmement, and that's nonsense. Did they give them one more rethorical tool to justify it on the diplomatic stage? Perhaps, but at the end it was only that at worst: a rethorical tool. The germans would have went forward without it just the same.

I also tend to believe that a 100K was more then enough and that the issue was more of a wether the Weimar Republic could trust said army and to what degree when it was very much infiltrated by far-right movements as it was.

For the rest they're is two issues here: 1) As much as the ''lets resurect all the little germanies'' vision of things isn't going to work in the long run the ''Compromise peace'' one is simply no gonna happen in 1919 due to the passions running high at the moment. 2) Even a generally fair peace (say confiscation of a good portion of the fleet and looses of the colonies, Alsace-Lorraine and the ethnically polish part of formerly german poland for the sake of the argument) there is still gonna be allot of peoples who itch for revenge and a more moderate peace in some respect will just give them more tools to use.

Now, what do you do with that? Well, OTL gave two clues: A) even if it was itching for revenge a large part of the Germany army was far from completely on board with some of Hitler initiative, as it didn't consider herself ready to confront even France alone with any chances of success if they're was a reaction from Paris. B) Despite the German people resentment toward Weimar and the allies the Republic and a moderate foreign policy was actually gaining support due to the economic prosperity.

So basically your best bet for having something that would work would be a treaty who spare Germany and the others economically but does everything to prevent them from regaining military means capable of going for a second round short of something silly like detaching Hannover or Saxony from Germany or asking for something they would rather fight to the death then accept, like occupying Berlin. A good life on a day to day basis, no real hopes of getting revenge and hopefully time will quietly make the germans and other former Central Empires accept the result of the war.
 
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The main problem with the ToV is that for obvious reasons it did not anticipate the Great Depression. If that had not happened or happened even 10 years later then ToV would just be a footnote. The unfortunate thing was it came before the Weimar republic was strong enough to fight off the extremist fringes. Hitler, even if the ToV had had no war guilt* and limited reparations, would have painted it as beyond the pale and whipped up the mob looking for a reason things were so bad ( that did not include "its bad for every country" ).

* war guilt only appears in the German translation , its damages in the English
 
Off the top of my head..
1: Poland gets pomrelia (excluding danzig+area), poznan, the bits of silesia it historically gt.
2: East prussia is seperated from germany, to form its own nation ruled by the hohenzollerns.
3: Danzig+area is seperated from germany, made into a free city.
4: Memel is made part of east prussia.
5: Rhineland occupation for 10 years, demillitarised for 20, otl stuff with the saar and ruhr.
6: Plebiscite for eupen-malmedy, schleswig.
7: Military restrictions, aside from article 198. Germany will be allowed to retain a small fleet of light ships (no subs/capitals) for the defense of its coast. NO PARAMILITARIES.
8: Creation of the league of nations, obviously.
9: OTL article 9 from the japanese constitution forced upon germany. However, revised the 2014 one, not the original.
10: Reparations reduced to 64 billion. Let's do something they would actually pay for, instead of an unrealistic amount that is never paid in its entirety.

Now, as for austria..
1: Austria-hungary is dissolved.
2: Less punitive taking of land from hungary. Winner-takes all referendum in transylvania, slovakia is freed as an independent state (no czechslovakia), hungary retains territories ceded to austria in the west, vojvodina is retained. Croatia and bosnia can conduct seperate referendums for independence.
3: War guilt is placed upon austria. Obviously.
4: Slovenia holds a referendum with the options to 1: Become independent. 2: Stay with austria.
5: Italian areas of tyrol given to italy, honoring of the treaty of london (aside from article 10, i suppose.)

And, as for the middle east+southern balkans, this very badly drawn map.
Ionia will be a little wider though, but I just don't know where all of the ionian greeks were. Also, the docadanese+rhodes, due to the treaty of london, goes to italy.
KMIjW0g8Tki91ZXULLIaPQ.png
 
That Jordan-Syria-Iraq state will have some significant religious tensions between Shia and Sunnis. Also, I don't think there were enough Jews to justify an Israel that big yet.
 
They promised approximately everything to everybody, another big problem where treaties are concerned.
Well, it doesn't seem right to go back on that specific promise. I just hope that in my ideal universe things don't go to shit in the middle east because 1919 me drew a map shittily.
 
Germany wanted peace, so they could get back to normalcy.
Sure, but on the other hand their perception of normalcy included, say, Posen being German.

Even supposing the territorial consesions were less severe than OTL the fundamental problem remains: How do you convince Germans that they shouldn't try to reclaim the territories they lost?
 
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