What would you do differently at Versailles in 1919?

Not that it would matter much. Whatever provision was made for them would have been swept away along with the rest of the Treaty of Sevres.

BTW none of this would appear anywhere in the Treaty of Versailles, which was with Germany, not Turkey.

I know that it was Sevres. Just the thought came to mind when I was reading about everyone ensuring Kurdistan was established back at the start of the thread.
 
There is allot of peoples who went with a general settlements of WWI rather then just the questions relating to Germany here. I don't think its too out of touch since it was all discussed at the same conference aniway.

Ok so long as it's appreciated that nothing in the Turkish treaty will have any effect on what happens in Europe during the interwar years - unless possibly if Turkey gets treated so badly that she's forced into the arms of the Axis.
 
Ok so long as it's appreciated that nothing in the Turkish treaty will have any effect on what happens in Europe during the interwar years - unless possibly if Turkey gets treated so badly that she's forced into the arms of the Axis.

Disagree on that, a independent Armenia is a problem for the USSR too, witch play in its diplomacy and therefore things like the Rapalo Treaty and the kind.
 

Perkeo

Banned
To enforce the treaty you don't need to send men constantly to battle, merely to put your foot on the ground when they attempt to breake said treaty unilateraly, when you have the far more means at end threats are enough.
I've tried to explain that before and I'm trying again: This only works on three conditions that aren't met by the TOV:

a) The obligation is clearly defined.
b) The obligation can actually be fulfilled.
c) Fulfilling the obligation does avoid the sanctions.

Now look at the treaty:
a) is postponed in article 233.
b) is explicitly excluded in article232.
c) is implicitly excluded in article 234, since showing too much solvency to pay the debt leads to a raise, credibility denial of solvency leads to a lowering of the final sum.

Thus the Germans kept testing the Entente's will to enforce because that was the only logical choice, not because they were evil Nazis who wouldn't admit defeat etc. pp.
Destined is a strong word but they're is a host of reasons why fascism in Germany had far more success then in the large majority of countries, and Versailles is only one of them. If you look at the big three of fascist power in WWII you have one defeated power (Germany), one who won a Pyrhic victory (Italy) and one who made major gains for minimal costs (Japan). The correlation between the two just doesn't work.
Of course the TOV didn't directly cause the Nazis rise to power. The TOV's unavoidable failure was already almost complete by 1932 without Hitler.

But neither had any of the Axis powers an inherent evil in them. Take e.g. Japan: For centuries, all they wanted was mind their own business, until forced from the outside to radically change that.

The most important factor that I can identify is instability, specifically the failure of conservatism as a stabilizing element.
As for OTL, honestly, anything was bound to be merely a beguining in the circumstances. Reparations you can help with, both the US and Britain had more moderate aims in the area at some point, and France could be made to accept it if given other conscessions,
Germany offered to pay more than twice the sum that they finally ended up paying, and if you add that A-/B-C-Bond thing the allies did, the positions were surprisingly close. So the magnitude as such wasn't the problem. Give the Germans a definitive upper limit and they'll accept a definitive lower limit.
but actually giving Germany a seat at the table just wasn't gonna going to happen for the moment, perhaps down the road things could be revised in that direction but no way a Versailles treaty who said that directly was going to happen.
If France and Britain didn't want Germany back on the table, they didn't want a peace treaty, because setting the conditions for return to normal relations is precisely what a peace treaty does.
 
I've tried to explain that before and I'm trying again: This only works on three conditions that aren't met by the TOV:

a) The obligation is clearly defined.
b) The obligation can actually be fulfilled.
c) Fulfilling the obligation does avoid the sanctions.

Now look at the treaty:
a) is postponed in article 233.
b) is explicitly excluded in article232.
c) is implicitly excluded in article 234, since showing too much solvency to pay the debt leads to a raise, credibility denial of solvency leads to a lowering of the final sum.

Thus the Germans kept testing the Entente's will to enforce because that was the only logical choice, not because they were evil Nazis who wouldn't admit defeat etc. pp.

Of course the TOV didn't directly cause the Nazis rise to power. The TOV's unavoidable failure was already almost complete by 1932 without Hitler.

But neither had any of the Axis powers an inherent evil in them. Take e.g. Japan: For centuries, all they wanted was mind their own business, until forced from the outside to radically change that.

The most important factor that I can identify is instability, specifically the failure of conservatism as a stabilizing element.

Germany offered to pay more than twice the sum that they finally ended up paying, and if you add that A-/B-C-Bond thing the allies did, the positions were surprisingly close. So the magnitude as such wasn't the problem. Give the Germans a definitive upper limit and they'll accept a definitive lower limit.

If France and Britain didn't want Germany back on the table, they didn't want a peace treaty, because setting the conditions for return to normal relations is precisely what a peace treaty does.

It wasn't the reparations or the lack of thereof who was to allow or prevent Germany to go for a second round. To keep Germany to go revanchist you need to enforce the clauses on army numbers, no Anschluss and demilitarisation of the Rhineland. Those where abundently clear and it was possible for Germany to enforce. It was also relatively easy for the allies to enforce them since they could threathen war as soon as Germany build its forces too much or do something fishy in the Rhineland and Austria as they have far more forces.

At the end, the reparations are specifically what my original post argued to change to be more lenient to Germany and I stand by that. The issue predicted by Foch is that the allies wouldn't enforce the territorial and military clauses, allowing Germany to go for a second round, in witch he was entirely correct.

No societies are inherently evil but both Germany and Japan had allot of factors in their society who layed bed way before the 30's and the 40's. (Tokugawa Japan doesn't have much to do with post-Meiji restoration Japan, lets just leave it at that). Fascism was a widespread phenomenon but some societies where more vulnerable to it then others.

As to the fact that Germany didn't get a say it was nothing more then the terms of the peace treaty being decided by the powers who had won and therefore had the means to decide what they would be, nothing different then 99% of peace treaties where a side actually won the war really, and nothing different to what Germany did at the end of the Franco-Prussian war or the Brest-Litovsk treaty earlier that year. You could tell Germany to accept the terms and it would have no choice to do so in 1919, you can't do that with France. That's why you have to care about what the latter think and not the former when you made a peace treaty.
 
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Disagree on that, a independent Armenia is a problem for the USSR too, witch play in its diplomacy and therefore things like the Rapalo Treaty and the kind.

How on earth would the existence or non-existence of Armenia have any effect on Rapallo?
 
It wasn't the reparations or the lack of thereof who was to allow or prevent Germany to go for a second round. To keep Germany to go revanchist you need to enforce the clauses on army numbers, no Anschluss and demilitarisation of the Rhineland. Those where abundently clear and it was possible for Germany to enforce. It was also relatively easy for the allies to enforce them since they could threathen war as soon as Germany build its forces too much or do something fishy in the Rhineland and Austria as they have far more forces.


IOW, Versailles would have been ok as it stood so long as the victors had the will to enforce it. But since, given the general war-weariness, that will was never likely to last very long - - -
 

Thomas1195

Banned
the failure of conservatism as a stabilizing element.
The problem with the conservatives is that they had some common interests, notably anti-Communism, with the fascists, which eventually led to appeasement politics.

The very worst thing of all regarding moderate conservative governments, however, is the way they stuck to laissez-faire economics during the Great Depression, which can be clearly observed in the UK and in Canada to some extent. If you actually want to stabilize everything, you need to follow FDR. A New Deal would butterfly away extremists.

A social democrat (Continental Europe) or (social) liberal government (Britain) would make a big difference.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
IOW, Versailles would have been ok as it stood so long as the victors had the will to enforce it. But since, given the general war-weariness, that will was never likely to last very long - - -
Well, during the 1930s, you can actually enforce economic sanctions first on Italy and then on Nazi Germany via League of Nations mandate, because the USSR was also a member. Both of them relied on world markets for natural resources and raw materials, and total economic sanction would cripple their economies.
 
Well, during the 1930s, you can actually enforce economic sanctions first on Italy and then on Nazi Germany via League of Nations mandate, because the USSR was also a member. Both of them relied on world markets for natural resources and raw materials, and total economic sanction would cripple their economies.


It was tried on Italy in 1935. We know how well that worked.
 

Perkeo

Banned
It wasn't the reparations or the lack of thereof who was to allow or prevent Germany to go for a second round. To keep Germany to go revanchist you need to enforce the clauses on army numbers, no Anschluss and demilitarisation of the Rhineland. Those where abundently clear and it was possible for Germany to enforce. It was also relatively easy for the allies to enforce them since they could threathen war as soon as Germany build its forces too much or do something fishy in the Rhineland and Austria as they have far more forces.
Nope, there was a loophole that might actually legalize all rearmament, including the Rhineland occupation, due to the failure of the Geneva conference. Read the first sentence of part V of the TOV:
In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

At the end, the reparations are specifically what my original post argued to change to be more lenient to Germany and I stand by that.
And I stand by my opinion that the problem is not so much the magnitude but the mechanism behind it.
As to the fact that Germany didn't get a say it was nothing more then the terms of the peace treaty being decided by the powers who had won and therefore had the means to decide what they would be, nothing different then 99% of peace treaties where a side actually won the war really, and nothing different to what Germany did at the end of the Franco-Prussian war or the Brest-Litovsk treaty earlier that year. You could tell Germany to accept the terms and it would have no choice to do so in 1919, you can't do that with France. That's why you have to care about what the latter think and not the former when you made a peace treaty.
  1. When you compare B-L, don't compare it to OTL TOV, compare it to what the TOV would been if the Germans had insisted on status quo ante bellum until the ceasefire expires and the fighting resumes.
  2. Both France and Russia were officially allowed to the negotiating table.
  3. Neither treaty had a war guilt clause
  4. In all other treaties, the reparations were limited to a specific sum.
  5. The German reparations per GDP were more than 10 times higher than the French and Russian ones.
  6. France wasn't stripped of any colonies
  7. Nether France nor Russia had to demilitarize to be sitting ducks in future conflicts.
 
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Thomas1195

Banned
It was tried on Italy in 1935. We know how well that worked.
It was not properly implemented.

The sanctions were limited, however. They did not prohibit the provision of several vital materials, such as oil, and were not carried out by all members of the League. UK and France's ruling right-wing governments spent most of their time appeasing Italy and then Hitler.

Now, if oil and coal sanctions were imposed, combined with Suez and Gibraltar being closed, Italy would be screwed.
 
Nope, there was a loophole that might actually legalize all rearmament, including the Rhineland occupation, due to the failure of the Geneva conference. Read the first sentence of part V of the TOV:
In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.


And I stand by my opinion that the problem is not so much the magnitude but the mechanism behind it.

  1. When you compare B-L, don't compare it to OTL TOV, compare it to what the TOV would been if the Germans had insisted on status quo ante bellum until the ceasefire expires and the fighting resumes.
  2. Both France and Russia were officially allowed to the negotiating table.
  3. Neither treaty had a war guilt clause
  4. In all other treaties, the reparations were limited to a specific sum.
  5. The German reparations per GDP were more than 10 times higher than the French and Russian ones.
  6. France wasn't stripped of any colonies
  7. Nether France nor Russia had to demilitarize to be sitting ducks in future conflicts.

Any lawyer even remotely worth their salt will tell you that it isn't much of a loophole but rather an expression of optimistic wishes for the future (it doesn't even say the allies will disarm in the future but that the clauses on disarmement will favor that happening one day, maybe). Basically, on this one you are contradicting yourself: you are giving grief to Versailles for his lack of precision but you are essentially saying a very vague expression of what would be desirable for the future to a precise clause that say exactly what Germany need to limit herself too now!

As for the rest:

1. Germany wasn't even remotely in position for insisting on that. By that point her army in the western front was routing, she was facing revolutions at home, she had run out of food and ressources and thanks to the crumbling of her allies you have 2 millions more allied soldiers who would have eventually made it to Bavaria (1,5 millions Italians and 0,5 others) and she had absolutely nothing to stop them. As she tried that Foch would have refused and resumed the offensives until total victory, simple as that.
2. Both France and Russia where brought there and told to sign the treaty made by germans and they did because they had no choice, just like Germany.
3. The importance of the war guilt clause is grosly overstated. Versailles was far less rough the Brest-Litovsk in the great scheme of things despite the latter not counting one. It was bad for Germany self-esteem but ultamitely of little consequences compare to more practical clauses. In any case, making France pay indemnities when they're wasn't a piece of germany who saw combats is pretty much tantamount to force them to accept responsibility
4. See point 5.
5. That's patently false, the french reparations in peaked in 1873 at 11,1%, while Germans one made only 2,5 of their GDP in average. Even counting for the differences between peak and average and what Germany paid compared to what she was supposed to pay it doesn't add even remotely to what you pretend. In fact, I'd argue that the reality of french reparations where rougher, fix sum or no fix sum.
6. Because a) none of those where occupied and b) Germany had no fleet to speak off and wasn't interested in those aniway. Unlike WWI where the Allies had fleets and had occupied them. Realism for you.
7. In Russia case it would have refused to sign a treaty, even with the inevitable consequences, since without their forces they would have been dead in the civil war to come (and I would argue that sheer harsheness of the territorial clauses was more then enough to compensate for the absence of army limits at Brest-Litovsk. In France case they're was a bunch of neutral powers left who would have seen this as tilting the balance too much in Germany favor, no one with some semblance of power left had similar feelings for Germany in 1919. Again, circumstances and realism for you.
 
It was not properly implemented.

The sanctions were limited, however. They did not prohibit the provision of several vital materials, such as oil, and were not carried out by all members of the League. UK and France's ruling right-wing governments spent most of their time appeasing Italy and then Hitler.

Now, if oil and coal sanctions were imposed, combined with Suez and Gibraltar being closed, Italy would be screwed.


Which only conforms my original observation. The problem was not the peace settlement but the lack of will to enforce.
 
At this point I already expected an incredibly convoluted explanation meant to convince everyone to not believe their lying eyes. I wasn't disappointed.

You don't need to just trust the text - there were arms reduction treaties in the 1920's, but a lot of them failed or eventually lapsed. There was a general reduction, until there wasn't. I don't see the argument for pretending those weren't being referred to.
 
I don't see the argument for pretending those weren't being referred to.
"don't see" as in not noticing argument, or not agreeing with argument?
I am sorry, you're being unclear as to whom you're disagreeing with, and which point you're disagreeing with.
 
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