Nope, there was a loophole that might actually legalize all rearmament, including the Rhineland occupation, due to the failure of the Geneva conference. Read the first sentence of part V of the TOV:
In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.
And I stand by my opinion that the problem is not so much the magnitude but the mechanism behind it.
- When you compare B-L, don't compare it to OTL TOV, compare it to what the TOV would been if the Germans had insisted on status quo ante bellum until the ceasefire expires and the fighting resumes.
- Both France and Russia were officially allowed to the negotiating table.
- Neither treaty had a war guilt clause
- In all other treaties, the reparations were limited to a specific sum.
- The German reparations per GDP were more than 10 times higher than the French and Russian ones.
- France wasn't stripped of any colonies
- Nether France nor Russia had to demilitarize to be sitting ducks in future conflicts.
Any lawyer even remotely worth their salt will tell you that it isn't much of a loophole but rather an expression of optimistic wishes for the future (it doesn't even say the allies will disarm in the future but that the clauses on disarmement will favor that happening one day, maybe). Basically, on this one you are contradicting yourself: you are giving grief to Versailles for his lack of precision but you are essentially saying a very vague expression of what would be desirable for the future to a precise clause that say exactly what Germany need to limit herself too now!
As for the rest:
1. Germany wasn't even remotely in position for insisting on that. By that point her army in the western front was routing, she was facing revolutions at home, she had run out of food and ressources and thanks to the crumbling of her allies you have 2 millions more allied soldiers who would have eventually made it to Bavaria (1,5 millions Italians and 0,5 others) and she had absolutely nothing to stop them. As she tried that Foch would have refused and resumed the offensives until total victory, simple as that.
2. Both France and Russia where brought there and told to sign the treaty made by germans and they did because they had no choice, just like Germany.
3. The importance of the war guilt clause is grosly overstated. Versailles was far less rough the Brest-Litovsk in the great scheme of things despite the latter not counting one. It was bad for Germany self-esteem but ultamitely of little consequences compare to more practical clauses. In any case, making France pay indemnities when they're wasn't a piece of germany who saw combats is pretty much tantamount to force them to accept responsibility
4. See point 5.
5. That's patently false, the french reparations in peaked in 1873 at 11,1%, while Germans one made only 2,5 of their GDP in average. Even counting for the differences between peak and average and what Germany paid compared to what she was supposed to pay it doesn't add even remotely to what you pretend. In fact, I'd argue that the reality of french reparations where rougher, fix sum or no fix sum.
6. Because a) none of those where occupied and b) Germany had no fleet to speak off and wasn't interested in those aniway. Unlike WWI where the Allies had fleets and had occupied them. Realism for you.
7. In Russia case it would have refused to sign a treaty, even with the inevitable consequences, since without their forces they would have been dead in the civil war to come (and I would argue that sheer harsheness of the territorial clauses was more then enough to compensate for the absence of army limits at Brest-Litovsk. In France case they're was a bunch of neutral powers left who would have seen this as tilting the balance too much in Germany favor, no one with some semblance of power left had similar feelings for Germany in 1919. Again, circumstances and realism for you.