What would make Britain negotiate in 1940-1?

[Devolved]

Recent reading on the subject as indicated that the British government, even Churchill, were not opposed to negotiations. I realize that it is a common thread, but I hoped to avoid the cliched answers and find someone that might be more educated on British politics and able to answer the question in a more analytical way than the usual "Well they didn't negotiate IOTL, why would they ITTL".

As usual there is a lot of nuance and most posters are caught on the propaganda-based history like 'It was their finest hour' and British solidarity, when even during Chamberlain's administration Churchill was recorded as having suggested acceptable terms. This suggests that he wasn't a serious about not negotiating as propaganda-based histories suggest and most of the answers I've gotten and ever seen given on a question like this are based.

http://www.amazon.com/1940-Myth-Reality-Clive-Ponting/dp/1566630363
Clive Ponting discusses this in less depth than I'd like, though he does source his claims. He also shows that Halifax and Churchill were of the same mind until Churchill replaced Chamberlin and decided to break off peace talk until after Sealion had failed to bargain from strength. By the time that Sealion was official canceled (1941) and the LW had been defeated in the Battle of Britain, Churchill felt that Britain could hold out because the German attacks, though painful, were little more than a nuisance and Britain could wait for either the US or the USSR to enter the war and take the offensive to the Germans, because Britain alone could survive indefinitely with German attacks as ineffective as they were.

Obviously this hinges on Churchill having the view that the German threat to Britain was not great enough to consider terms. I've never seen the question properly answered as to what would convince Churchill or his government to consider terms, so I thought I'd ask again, hoping for someone with a better answer.

Perhaps you're right that it was a newbie move to expect an educated answer beyond posters repeating the tired cliches they've seen older posters post in these types of threads, but there are very educated people on this board and I hoped that one of them might be able to post information that goes deeper into the issue and explores more than the white-washing that figures like Churchill got after the war to make them look more stoic and principled than they really were.

That would be a more insightful and thought provoking opening post than what you started with.

You started with this:


"What would it take for Britain to negotiate and accept an unfavorable peace that still left the Empire mostly intact and Britain independent from Nazi domination?

Would the failure of the Dunkirk evacuation be enough?

Would a sustained, effective blockade be enough?

Would the RAF being driven out of Southern England in the Battle of Britain be enough?

Would it have to come to a land invasion to bring Britain to the table?

This is a lot different from discussing the news that Churchill mentioned making an acceptable peace before coming Prime Minister. Perhaps you could have elaborated on what Churchill meant by acceptable and then it would have been a good start for a debate.

By making the original post you just reopened the old debates about changing the Battle of Britain tactics, different use of bombers and a more effective U boat blockade.

All that produces is the same answers as always and the thread makes a small circle.

 

[BlairWitch749]

several stage pod's that must be in place; with a POD in 1939 it's a maybe

1. BEF captured mostly intact at Dunkirk
2. Benny keeps the CVT from Spain together as one cohesive force and sends them to Libya with a modest LW cover element to advance the weak forces in Egypt
3. Spain joins the axis as France falls and with German help takes Gibraltar
4. The LW and the KM focus soley on commerce raiding/port suppression to create as much disruption to imports as possible
5. Hitler offer's generous terms; restoration of western europe (minus A-L) return of the BEF; let western govt's in exile return in return for peace/release of interned or captured German and Italian shipping and recognition of Germany's annexing of Poland
6. Someone less bellicose than Churchill who is more concerned about some of the financial rammifications of continuing the conflict coupled with Stalin's possible aggression takes reign

 

[BlairWitch749]

Number 3 there is close to ASB. The Italian forces in North Africa were in a dismal state, poorly led, poorly equipped and poorly supplied. If you want them to perform better your POD is going to have to be long before 1940.

you could do that with a POD in 1939; have the CVT which had 60k men in 4 divisions with 24+ months of combat experience (including experience with tanks and airplanes) remain together as one force and have them shipped from spain to libya to be the spearhead of an attack into egypt; due to their experience, and already decentish command structure they should be able to run the two small British divisions back to the nile if they achieve some tactical and strategic surprise

 

[SergeantHeretic]

What would make Great Britain settle for the Nazi's peace?

At a guess, I would say, HELL FREEZING OVER!

 

[Deleted member 1487]

That would be a more insightful and thought provoking opening post than what you started with.

You started with this:


"What would it take for Britain to negotiate and accept an unfavorable peace that still left the Empire mostly intact and Britain independent from Nazi domination?

Would the failure of the Dunkirk evacuation be enough?

Would a sustained, effective blockade be enough?

Would the RAF being driven out of Southern England in the Battle of Britain be enough?

Would it have to come to a land invasion to bring Britain to the table?

This is a lot different from discussing the news that Churchill mentioned making an acceptable peace before coming Prime Minister. Perhaps you could have elaborated on what Churchill meant by acceptable and then it would have been a good start for a debate.

By making the original post you just reopened the old debates about changing the Battle of Britain tactics, different use of bombers and a more effective U boat blockade.

All that produces is the same answers as always and the thread makes a small circle.

Yeah, in retrospect I should have asked the question in a more nuanced way. I went back and expanded the OP.

I don't have the book in front of me, but IIRC it was to return the German colonies and consider the loss of Malta and Gibraltar acceptable if need be. There was a bit more to it and Churchill's opinions were changing during the 1939-1940 period, so I'm not exactly clear as to what the maximum he'd consider would be. It doesn't appear that he was concerned with Poland at all and may have recognized Vichy France in the end, but was at that point holding out for the best possible terms.

5. Hitler offer's generous terms; restoration of western europe (minus A-L) return of the BEF; let western govt's in exile return in return for peace/release of interned or captured German and Italian shipping and recognition of Germany's annexing of Poland
6. Someone less bellicose than Churchill who is more concerned about some of the financial rammifications of continuing the conflict coupled with Stalin's possible aggression takes reign

Restoring pre-Vichy France probably would not have been necessary after the Fall of France, but before the entry of the USSR and US. Norway would have been sticky, as would the Low Countries, but recognizing a peace deal that the Germans made with them while also leaving their pre-war governments intact and no German basing in those countries is pretty do-able.

Churchill wasn't as bellicose privately as he portrayed publicly. Eventually when he realized that the US could be 'brought along', the USSR was going to be brought in, and Nazis were going to lose he thought it better suffer the financial consequences than agree to an unfavorable peace when Britain could be part of the winning team, even as a junior partner. I'm thinking that if he doesn't have the hope that the war could be won the British government is not going to let Britain stand aloof from negotiations for very long and stand in a stalemate when Britain was rapidly approaching broke.

 

[Bill Garvin]

My apologies to everybody

I've just checked the original reference (Air Operations: Taiwan) and the Chinese Communists pumped 588,000 artillery rounds into Kinmen Island, not 445,000. During the six weeks of the bombardment, port capacity increased from 200 tons per day to 700 tons per day.

 

[AdA]

you could do that with a POD in 1939; have the CVT which had 60k men in 4 divisions with 24+ months of combat experience (including experience with tanks and airplanes) remain together as one force and have them shipped from spain to libya to be the spearhead of an attack into egypt; due to their experience, and already decentish command structure they should be able to run the two small British divisions back to the nile if they achieve some tactical and strategic surprise

The CVT is not the best base for a modern mechanized force. The Italians, like many people, took the wrong lessons from the Spanish Civil War.
You need to start with major military reform in the mid 30s. The Army wanted it (Balbo did, anyway) and there was a proposal to go for a smaller (20 Div) but better army with modern equipment. Mussolini was a beliver in "big battalions" and blocked it.
If we give Balbo a chance to downsize and upgrade, we can have Litorio and Ariete in Africa with better tanks (this ones: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=237522 )

 

[Devolved]

The CVT is not the best base for a modern mechanized force. The Italians, like many people, took the wrong lessons from the Spanish Civil War.
You need to start with major military reform in the mid 30s. The Army wanted it (Balbo did, anyway) and there was a proposal to go for a smaller (20 Div) but better army with modern equipment. Mussolini was a beliver in "big battalions" and blocked it.
If we give Balbo a chance to downsize and upgrade, we can have Litorio and Ariete in Africa with better tanks (this ones: https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=237522 )

Even then they need to breakthrough the Alamein bottleneck.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

My apologies to everybody

I've just checked the original reference (Air Operations: Taiwan) and the Chinese Communists pumped 588,000 artillery rounds into Kinmen Island, not 445,000. During the six weeks of the bombardment, port capacity increased from 200 tons per day to 700 tons per day.

http://www.independent.co.uk/travel...that-chairman-mao-couldnt-capture-760206.html

In 1958 Mao started shelling the 150 sq km of Kinmen and its adjacent islets in an attempt to seize them. The shelling continued for 44 days but Mao had neither the air force nor the navy to complete the capture. When the high explosives stopped, the guns continued to fire every day with shells containing propaganda. In a bizarre ritual the communist forces banged away on odd-numbered days of the month, while the Taiwanese did the same on the even days.

It dropped that artillery on the whole 100 square mile island chain, not the port.
That's 98,000 per week on 100 square miles.
That's 584 shells per hour on 100 square miles.
That's 10 shells a minute on 100 square miles.

That wasn't dropped on the port as a specific target, but all over a main island and its adjacent islets.
Its not hard to imagine at all that the port capacity would improve when its wasn't the main target and the fire was being inaccurately distributed all over the island and islets.

Also observation of 3-9 miles by land is horrible. The ChiComs did not have air spotting to accurately adjust their fire. They were limited to what they could see by binoculars. Also the main port was on the Southeast side of the Island, which means it would not have been visible by land! So much for your accurate inundation of hundreds of thousands of shells on the port.

http://www.kinmen.gov.tw/Layout/sub...ID=15d53e1689d34fc7b57fa15e2ededb02&path=6457

Liaoluo Port

Liaoluo Port, which is located at the southeast corner of the Large Kinmen Island and easternmost side of Liaoluo Bay, is presently the prime port of Kinmen, with a majority of cargo and passenger ships sailing out from here.

 

[Bernard Woolley]

applauds JN1's correct analysis​

I thank you, I'm here all week.

 

[AdA]

Even then they need to breakthrough the Alamein bottleneck.

Doable if they move fast enough with good enough forces. Getting those forces is the ASBish part. But even if they did Britain could still hold as long as it had US support. Lets face, any war in wich the USA and the USSR are on the same side is pretty much won...

 

[Bill Garvin]

That wasn't dropped on the port as a specific target, but all over a main island and its adjacent islets. Its not hard to imagine at all that the port capacity would improve when its wasn't the main target and the fire was being inaccurately distributed all over the island and islets.

No. The Communist artillery fire was not distributed over the whole island. You're putting far too much meaning into the casual phraseology of a generic document intended for use by tourists. I would suggest you read Air Operations: Taiwan by Jacob Van Staaveren which is a military account of the Kinmen Islands affair and therefore much more reliable when it comes to discussing military operations. The communist intent was to establish an artillery blockade of the Kinmen Islands and force the Nationalists to withdraw due to lack of supplies. The fire was, therefore, concentrated on the port area and the artillery batteries protecting it. The 544,000 rounds were those fired at Big Kinmen; the source I gave you has seperate numbers for rounds fired at the other islands.

Also observation of 3-9 miles by land is horrible. The ChiComs did not have air spotting to accurately adjust their fire. They were limited to what they could see by binoculars. Also the main port was on the Southeast side of the Island, which means it would not have been visible by land! So much for your accurate inundation of hundreds of thousands of shells on the port.

Unfortunately, spotting at 3 - 9 miles is far from "horrible"; its a standard capability well within the expertise of the Chinese Army. By the way, Chinese artillery was and is pretty good. Equipment for doing that has been around since the First World War. Air spotting is completely unnecessary under these tactical circumstances. As the map you reproduced shows, there are multiple positions from which fire could be observed and corrected. The map you provide does not give terrain but I was able to check this from topographic maps and these show there is high ground to both the north and south that completely overlooks the port in question (the elevation of spotting ground is 1,500 feet plus while the elevation of the land between these positions and the port is less than 70 feet). The highest ground on Kinmen Island is around 300 feet plus.

I would suggest that the maps and data you provide prove the contention that the Chinese artillery in this case was in a far better position to provide an accurate bombardment of a port that Luftwaffe bombers operating at night hundreds of miles from their own bases. This is therefore a relevent example of how difficult port interdiction by bombardment is.

 

[BlondieBC]

Wiking, for you TL, do you want?

1) Germany to win
2) Germany to get UK to leave the war
3) Germany to do better
4) Germany to do different
5) Or something else.

My apologies to everybody

I've just checked the original reference (Air Operations: Taiwan) and the Chinese Communists pumped 588,000 artillery rounds into Kinmen Island, not 445,000. During the six weeks of the bombardment, port capacity increased from 200 tons per day to 700 tons per day.

You are giving a bad example. At 700 tons per day, it would take about a week to unload one standard freighter. They probably just added manpower and unload by hand. A major port will have cranes and warehouse required for efficient operation. In WW1, the UK unload 100,000 tons per day not 700. 700 is closer to one LST than a real port, in fact it is the tonnage of a Merchant submarine form WW1.

 

[Bill Garvin]

You are giving a bad example. At 700 tons per day, it would take about a week to unload one standard freighter. They probably just added manpower and unload by hand. A major port will have cranes and warehouse required for efficient operation. In WW1, the UK unload 100,000 tons per day not 700. 700 is closer to one LST than a real port, in fact it is the tonnage of a Merchant submarine form WW1.

Thank you for the additional data and I agree with the comments you make. To a large extent I also agree on the nature of the port but the point is that half a million artillery rounds (which were a lot more concentrated and accurate than bombing at night) didn't stop even a primitive port like this functioning. Back in 1958 Liaoluo Port was little more than a fishing port so it had very little flexibility to absorb damage. In contrast, the docks and so on of a major commerce port cover dozens of miles so damage in one area can be offset by using undamaged areas until the original comes back on line - which may take as little as a few hours. Most big ports also have extensive near-derelict areas that are mostly disused but can be pushed back into action in extremis.

I've been trying to find an example of a major port that was closed by artillery or airborne bombardment and I've struck out. After all, if Miss Buffy can't do it, who can?

 

[BlondieBC]

Snip

What you are looking at is only part of the puzzle. Understanding Churchill or alternative power players in the UK is important, but often making peace takes the leaders themselves by surprise, so lets look at what cause other countries to leave wars. In my analysis, it is either lack of food in the capital or impending military doom.

1) Tsar Nicholas II - Within days if not hours of abdication, he did not see it coming. The trigger was simple, St. Petersburg had simply run out of food. Food shipments had been at only 65% of needed levels per month since summer, but then it went to very near zero food for a week. Lesson here is that leaders don't see events coming and often mispredict there own actions. We are often most blind about ourselves. In an ATL, the time from Churchill realizing he will lose the PM ship to him losing it could be hours, and the time from him losing the PM ship to peace could also be just a few days.

2) Lenin - It was the impending military doom for him. There were five columns of Germans advancing into Russia, and one was near the capital. You should look up the date Lenin first decided he had to make peace. You can have a similar situation here in England. If the fuel gets so low the RAF can't take to the skies or the RN can't sail, the decision can be quick.

3) A-H - Food in capital was the main issue. Again, how long from leader understanding what would happen to making peace?

4) Ludendorff - He knew he was running out of reserves in September, made peace in November - 60 days.

5) Japan - It was only a few days from "we will fight forever" to emperor makes speech. Look at the character of the King too. He can dismiss Churchill at least technically.

IMO, the question you are looking at is good, but it is not he main question. We know all the items you listed help. We know Churchill is strong willed, and would prefer not to make peace. But the events on the ground will dictate what happens, and this should be the bulk of your TL. If London runs out of food, and I don't mean 1000 calories per day, the peace will come. Civil servants and military will be spending time finding food, and the government is literally dissolved by hunger. Or it has to look like there is no military hope which means it appears the RAF is about to be grounded or the RN has no fuel (or is otherwise unable to fight).

You seemed not to like my earlier suggestions, but I will restate this last time, then move on. Unless one of the following happens,

1) Net imports is down 50-70% for at least 3 months, and these months overlap winter

2) The UK decides Sealion is likely to succeed.

3) Sealion has capture London.

4) The RAF is unable to fly due to fuel or other reasons.

then you don't have to worry about the UK leaving before the USA enters the war. Now there are less drastic measure that would eventually bring the UK to the peace table, but these will take years, not months.

Based on this and other threads you have posted on the subject, your seem to be writing a TL where the UK is crippled and its industry collapses, but the it will be saved by the combination of USA/USSR. Germany will do much better, but these will be seen North Africa, USSR, Med Sea, and German industrial production. The war last longer and is much bloodier, but probably ends sometime in 1946.

 

[BlondieBC]

Thank you for the additional data and I agree with the comments you make. To a large extent I also agree on the nature of the port but the point is that half a million artillery rounds (which were a lot more concentrated and accurate than bombing at night) didn't stop even a primitive port like this functioning. Back in 1958 Liaoluo Port was little more than a fishing port so it had very little flexibility to absorb damage. In contrast, the docks and so on of a major commerce port cover dozens of miles so damage in one area can be offset by using undamaged areas until the original comes back on line - which may take as little as a few hours. Most big ports also have extensive near-derelict areas that are mostly disused but can be pushed back into action in extremis.

I've been trying to find an example of a major port that was closed by artillery or airborne bombardment and I've struck out. After all, if Miss Buffy can't do it, who can?

You are presenting a false choice an all or nothing choice. The question is how much is the ports capacity reduced? The USA never shut down German airplane production or oil production, but we did have a dramatic effect.

The example of the small fishing port is irrelevant, because it has no infrastructure to destroy. You can land 700 tons per day on a beach with easy or a tropical anchorage that has never had any infrastructure. A large port is a complicated industrial site that requires infrastructure to work properly. Yes they can be repaired, but you lose unloading time during the repairs. Goods will be destroyed in warehouses and ships. Skilled labor and unskilled labor will be killed.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

No. The Communist artillery fire was not distributed over the whole island. You're putting far too much meaning into the casual phraseology of a generic document intended for use by tourists. I would suggest you read Air Operations: Taiwan by Jacob Van Staaveren which is a military account of the Kinmen Islands affair and therefore much more reliable when it comes to discussing military operations. The communist intent was to establish an artillery blockade of the Kinmen Islands and force the Nationalists to withdraw due to lack of supplies. The fire was, therefore, concentrated on the port area and the artillery batteries protecting it. The 544,000 rounds were those fired at Big Kinmen; the source I gave you has seperate numbers for rounds fired at the other islands.



Unfortunately, spotting at 3 - 9 miles is far from "horrible"; its a standard capability well within the expertise of the Chinese Army. By the way, Chinese artillery was and is pretty good. Equipment for doing that has been around since the First World War. Air spotting is completely unnecessary under these tactical circumstances. As the map you reproduced shows, there are multiple positions from which fire could be observed and corrected. The map you provide does not give terrain but I was able to check this from topographic maps and these show there is high ground to both the north and south that completely overlooks the port in question (the elevation of spotting ground is 1,500 feet plus while the elevation of the land between these positions and the port is less than 70 feet). The highest ground on Kinmen Island is around 300 feet plus.

I would suggest that the maps and data you provide prove the contention that the Chinese artillery in this case was in a far better position to provide an accurate bombardment of a port that Luftwaffe bombers operating at night hundreds of miles from their own bases. This is therefore a relevent example of how difficult port interdiction by bombardment is.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/doc11.pdf
There are only a handful of paragraphs that equal about two pages of information. The report mentions an artillery blockade of the Islands was conducted with about 10k shells on a bad day and an average of about 6,600 shells a day. It doesn't define what the blockade was; all that is mentioned is that military targets were hit, with island artillery taking the brunt of the damage and a blockade set up. It mentions shipping was a big target, which found Communist artillery focusing on it when it tried to resupply the island. And the island only required 200 tons of supplies per day, less than that required by the German 6th army at Stalingrad.

The document doesn't mention shells landing on the port or that the port was targeted. In fact the document doesn't mention the port at all and only mentions beach unloading. It also mentions airlifting of supplies to the islands and deliveries to beaches being expanded by underwater demolitions to maximize imports. The report also suggests that the shells were not directed totally at stopping shipping either, but at military targets on the islands.

Frankly the only impression I got about the artillery blockade is that shipping was the main target and the unmentioned port was less significant than the beaches on the south side of the island. Other than that, I don't see how this proves your point, because small supplies were brought in, not major war industry resources like massive amounts of oil, food, steel, and other raw materials, not to mention things like machine tools that the UK brought in to its massive port facilities at Liverpool.

This doesn't prove your point at all.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Wiking, for you TL, do you want?

1) Germany to win
2) Germany to get UK to leave the war
3) Germany to do better
4) Germany to do different
5) Or something else.

For the purposes of this thread I am just interested in what it would take to get the UK to negotiate and accept an unfavorable deal that sees them recognize German conquests and the Fascist government in Vichy, give up Malta and return the Italians colonies they've captured (if they have), potentially give up Malta, and let the Germans trade in their Empire. The British would also have to restore German property they have seized.

It would leave the UK free and their empire intact. There would be no reparations and prisoners would be exchanged.

I'm interested in what it would take to do so. I like your analysis in your latest post.

 

[Bill Garvin]

You are presenting a false choice an all or nothing choice. The question is how much is the ports capacity reduced? The USA never shut down German airplane production or oil production, but we did have a dramatic effect.

I'd rephrase the question differently; how much can port capacity be reduced in ways that cannot be compensated by making alternative arrangements. In this case, alternative arrangements would mean using other ports, repairing damage etc. My point is that I can't think of a single case where a port's operations have been inhibited by direct assault via air or artillery. Murmansk, for example, was under fire for an extended period in World War Two yet operations through it were never seriously inhibited.

The example of the small fishing port is irrelevant, because it has no infrastructure to destroy. You can land 700 tons per day on a beach with easy or a tropical anchorage that has never had any infrastructure. A large port is a complicated industrial site that requires infrastructure to work properly. Yes they can be repaired, but you lose unloading time during the repairs. Goods will be destroyed in warehouses and ships. Skilled labor and unskilled labor will be killed.

The point was that it was a massive amount of projectiles thrown at a relatively small target and it didn't stop the port operating Even small ports like that do have infrastructure; its called people. What is significant is that the artillery fire didn't stop them working. So, how much less effective will scattered, sporadic night bombing be?

I agree with you on the infrastructure question but things like cranes and derricks are very difficult to destroy. Studying aerial photographs of bombed ports (See RF-101C Operations In South East Asia by Greenhalgh) its interesting to note that the cranes and derricks are still intact while buildings are not. The metal lattice framework of a crane is inherently blast-resistant. There's another point here; the bombing will be at night only. The collective description of a Heinkel He-111 crew that tries to fly to Tyneside in daylight is "the late lamented". That means all the daylight hours, the port will be running at fall capacity. if the bombing is too bad, the ships simply don't come in at night.

The bombing will also be sporadic. Assuming German bomber crews flew two missions a week (which seems to be about right) and there are three primary target areas, that means one gets visited every ten days or so. That's not going to kill the port; they're too easy to repair for that. Yes, there'll be goods lost in warehouses and so on but here's another thought. Without the Battle of Britain drinking fuel and other supplies, demand will be reduced as well.

I agree there is a graduated scale here and that if the Luftwaffe did make a concerted, sustained effort to pound the ports, it will have some effect. However, I believe that effect will fall far short of being critical and a combination of dispersal, repair and defense will compensate for much of the losses. In short, a nuisance in seriousness ranging from ephemeral to irritating but a long, long way from a war-winner,

As I said, if Miss Buffy can't close a port, who can?

 

[Bill Garvin]

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb249/doc11.pdf
There are only a handful of paragraphs that equal about two pages of information. The report mentions an artillery blockade of the Islands was conducted with about 10k shells on a bad day and an average of about 6,600 shells a day. It doesn't define what the blockade was; all that is mentioned is that military targets were hit, with island artillery taking the brunt of the damage and a blockade set up. It mentions shipping was a big target, which found Communist artillery focusing on it when it tried to resupply the island. And the island only required 200 tons of supplies per day, less than that required by the German 6th army at Stalingrad.

The document doesn't mention shells landing on the port or that the port was targeted. In fact the document doesn't mention the port at all and only mentions beach unloading. It also mentions airlifting of supplies to the islands and deliveries to beaches being expanded by underwater demolitions to maximize imports. The report also suggests that the shells were not directed totally at stopping shipping either, but at military targets on the islands.

Frankly the only impression I got about the artillery blockade is that shipping was the main target and the unmentioned port was less significant than the beaches on the south side of the island. Other than that, I don't see how this proves your point, because small supplies were brought in, not major war industry resources like massive amounts of oil, food, steel, and other raw materials, not to mention things like machine tools that the UK brought in to its massive port facilities at Liverpool.

This doesn't prove your point at all.

I think you'll find it does; the point is that despite that massive concentration of artillery fire, the port kept working and materials kept flowing in. It doesn't prove the point on its own but as one point on the graph (down in the corner, tiny facility, massive bombardment) and taken into context of all the other examples of ports that have not been closed by bombing, its part of a valid overall picture. I've given you plenty of other examples of attempts to close ports by bombing that failed despite a much greater effort and capability than anything the Luftwaffe could achieve. Haiphong kept working and it was importing all the things you list (or it did until we mined it which is another matter entirely).

The onus is now on you to prove that a port can be permanently by bombing and you haven't done that yet.