What would it have taken for the Schlieffen Plan to succeed?

[kham_coc]

Personally I would say it did work.
It put France in a choke hold, and let Germany deal with Russia - the failure was in not getting out of the war when Russia left it.
Then their prewar goals would have been met.

 

[Riain]

Personally I would say it did work.
It put France in a choke hold, and let Germany deal with Russia - the failure was in not getting out of the war when Russia left it.
Then their prewar goals would have been met.

This is exactly what the aim was; to knock France down with 7 armies in 6 weeks so they could finish France off with 4 armies and send 3 armies east to deal with Russia.

 

[Historyrookie]

That's a LOT of stuff to do, the French could do it, they went from 5 field Armies to I think 8 in 5 weeks, whereas it took the Germans 6 weeks to go from 8 to 9 field Armies and 3 ArmeeGruppe which were basically big, independent Corps.

yes, that's a lot to do. In any case almost being outflanked and defeated when you have a dense and good railway sistem and the germans are running away from his means something was wrong and a more conservative approach in deployment and offensive would have stopped the German army earlier.

 

[Aphrodite]

This is exactly what the aim was; to knock France down with 7 armies in 6 weeks so they could finish France off with 4 armies and send 3 armies east to deal with Russia.

Actually, the Germans are far more ambitious. what they really seek is a decisive victory in Belgium where they destroy a French army, cut off the retreat of the rest and throw them back against their own fortress line. They want to Vichy France.

Schlieffen is clear: if the French retreat to the Marne, the war will be endless. Funny, how he knows Joffre's moves ten years before Joffre does.

As for 1915, the object of war is to destroy your enemy's ability to wage war. Chasing the Russians around Poland for a year achieves nothing. The Russian armies are intact for 1916 and the British are stronger than ever.

Germany needs a quick victory. only Ottoman intervention saves them in 1915

 

[Gannt the chartist]

ts like you're trying to use details to disguise the fact that the Germans got within sight of Paris while the French didn't get near Cologne or even Strasbourg in 1914 by pointing to this or that mistake or detail. The fact of the matter is that the Germans were able to repulse French attacks on the left and centre and advance on the right and centre and take territory that put them in the best position to fight the long war that would ensue of victory wasn't achieved in a single campaign.

But its not a sightseeing trip and the German objective is to avoid a long war they believed that would lose. Launching an attack the end result of which is well we not going to lose as fast as we might have is not strategy, operations or even tactics. All you have managed to do is attack Belgium, extend your front and bring Britain into the war as an enemy. Which brings in the worlds largest merchant marine, so ALL your enemies now have access to world resources.

 

[Dorknought]

The assumptions were poor.

• Russia is weak
• Russia is slow
• Belgium wont resist
• GB is occupied with Ireland
• France will surrender in 42 days.

 

[Riain]

But its not a sightseeing trip and the German objective is to avoid a long war they believed that would lose. Launching an attack the end result of which is well we not going to lose as fast as we might have is not strategy, operations or even tactics. All you have managed to do is attack Belgium, extend your front and bring Britain into the war as an enemy. Which brings in the worlds largest merchant marine, so ALL your enemies now have access to world resources.

The assumptions were poor.

• Russia is weak
• Russia is slow
• Belgium wont resist
• GB is occupied with Ireland
• France will surrender in 42 days.

I think you're giving the Germans too much credit for having a strategy that was linked to political objectives that military operations were conducted to achieve. It took the experience of WW1 to show that an organisation to do this sort of strategic thinking and planning was required, with the British being the first to put together a group called the Imperial War council. The Germans never put one together during WW1, which is a big reason why they lost.

As for the assumptions, the Russians were slow and while not weak they were relatively beatable on the battlefield. The Belgian field army quickly retreated into the national redoubt in Antwerp, although they did conduct 2 or 3 sorties into the German rear and escaped from the siege, the most effective Belgian resistance was railway sabotage and flooding of coastal areas which weren't big army tasks. I don't believe the Germans were relying on the British being occupied with Ireland, by December 1912 the German assumption was that Britain would be an enemy combatant in the next war. Germany didn't think France would surrender in 42 days, their aim was to have done enough in France in 42 days to start transferring up to 3 field armies to the east, they still expected to have 4 field armies in France after 42 days.

 

[Dorknought]

I think you're giving the Germans too much credit for having a strategy that was linked to political objectives that military operations were conducted to achieve.

The German General Staff had a strategy that was divorced of the political consequences that military operations were able to realise.

As for the assumptions, the Russians were slow and while not weak they were relatively beatable on the battlefield.

The Russians were fast enough to invade and necessitating a shift in German forces.
Weak 1914 -> strong 1917 which was the whole driver for 'preventative war'.

I don't believe the Germans were relying on the British being occupied with Ireland, by December 1912 the German assumption was that Britain would be an enemy combatant in the next war.

Then why go to such lengths to secure British neutrality if they didn't have an obvious situation in Ireland and that the British Army had already refused orders.

Germany didn't think France would surrender in 42 days

Paris falls in 39, France capitulates in 42.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

I think you're giving the Germans too much credit for having a strategy that was linked to political objectives that military operations were conducted to achieve. It took the experience of WW1 to show that an organisation to do this sort of strategic thinking and planning was required, with the British being the first to put together a group called the Imperial War council. The Germans never put one together during WW1, which is a big reason why they lost.

As for the assumptions, the Russians were slow and while not weak they were relatively beatable on the battlefield. The Belgian field army quickly retreated into the national redoubt in Antwerp, although they did conduct 2 or 3 sorties into the German rear and escaped from the siege, the most effective Belgian resistance was railway sabotage and flooding of coastal areas which weren't big army tasks. I don't believe the Germans were relying on the British being occupied with Ireland, by December 1912 the German assumption was that Britain would be an enemy combatant in the next war. Germany didn't think France would surrender in 42 days, their aim was to have done enough in France in 42 days to start transferring up to 3 field armies to the east, they still expected to have 4 field armies in France after 42 days.

There is certainly a total disconnect between the German Military, Naval and Political thinking. Michael Neiberg has some interesting comments on the perspectives ( Dance of the Furies is the book but there are several online lectures based on the book) Herwig states that the General Staff plans were not shared with the Navy, Chancellor, Foreign Office Austrians or the Prussian, Bavarian and other armies. The General staff in peacetime commands no troops it is 650 guys trying to 'command' 5 million men whose command structure has not seen the 'plan' and the single largest element is the railway section, none of them are really evaluating weapons effects or training troops or subordinate commanders that's what the Armies are for. In May 1914 Moltke says 'We are not superior to the French' and by late August/September is writing to his wife that Germany will lose, then he as nervous breakdown.

There is a pretty good argument that in the circumstances of June and early July there is a view that noone likes political assassinations the British are concerned with Home Rule, the French with Cailloux, the Tsar really does not like Political assassinations of Royalty and maybe Austria can bully Serbia so its worth backing them for a diplomatic 'victory' but Austria arguably overplays in its demands and arguably because of a fear that the International Community will intervene and impose a settlement tries to hurry things up, Serbia folds but not totally and Russia starts to mobilise. Russia dicks around with it mobilisation ( vs Austria alone or Vs Germany) chooses or subordinate commands choose to mobilise vs both. The German response - with the Socialists voting for war credits because the cause of Socialism is not advanced by Cossacks being in Berlin, Germany mobilises but that means 7 armies invade Belgium and France ( and Luxemburg) which is an offensive war which causes the Franco Russian defensive alliance to come into play, the Austrians moving against Serbia and neither reacting to the fast mobilisation of the Russians.

But noone on the General staff thinks this is a winning move. Neither Schlieffen nor Moltke ever it seems thought it was a way to win a war but it was the best option. As far as they are concerned they have been screwed over by the Chancellor, the Foreign Ministry, the Navy and the Austrians ( and quite possibly by the General staff and subordinate army commands have no understanding of what the other is doing).

The Chancellor has not funded the Army to the extent they need to keep up with the potential enemy much less deliver the size of increase needed to execute the war plan such as it is ( not that anyone really knows what the war plan is and why they need that level of funding). The Foreign ministry has set them up with France and Russia both as enemies and Britain now friendly with France and Russia. Austria has been totally compromised by Russian spies and have a horribly obsolete weaponry and the navy has managed to both piss off the British and suck resources away from the army but what the hell this is going to be as good as it gets.

 

[Riain]

Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.

Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?

 

[spkaca]

The German General Staff had a strategy that was divorced of the political consequences that military operations were able to realise.

They should have read Clausewitz. What a pity for them he didn't write in German. Oh, wait...

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.

Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?

Whereas the British staff officers all went back to their regiments at the outbreak of war, determined not to miss a moment of glorious conflict, and died in their droves on the Aisne and at Ypres. No wonder British army staff work was - with some exceptions - pretty poor for the first years of the war - we'd killed all the trained ones off.

 

[Aphrodite]

Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.

Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?

The problem with plan XVII was Joffre forgot to plan for the worst case. Instead, he just assumed the Germans wouldnt commit their reserves early. Germany had twenty divisions more than e Joffre thought.

The plan was highly controversial in France and many made the correct suggestion to extend the flank.

Plan XIX is a very reasonably one given the need to draw the Germans off the French. The Russians do after all destroy Austria.

Even if unsuccessful plans can be the best available.

The Schlieffen plan is the only one that makes any sense for the Germans. It does well because of Joffre and King Albert's mistakes. Against competent opponents, the Germans would easily lose the war by the end of September

 

[Riain]

The problem with plan XVII was Joffre forgot to plan for the worst case. Instead, he just assumed the Germans wouldnt commit their reserves early. Germany had twenty divisions more than e Joffre thought.

The plan was highly controversial in France and many made the correct suggestion to extend the flank.

Plan XIX is a very reasonably one given the need to draw the Germans off the French. The Russians do after all destroy Austria.

Even if unsuccessful plans can be the best available.

The Schlieffen plan is the only one that makes any sense for the Germans. It does well because of Joffre and King Albert's mistakes. Against competent opponents, the Germans would easily lose the war by the end of September

Your assessment of plan 17 is exactly what general staffs did, you're looking at the plans tactical and operational aspects and looking to maximize them. About the only higher level thinking about plan 17 was that France wanted A-L back and had to act simultaneously with Russia. There was no thought about if A-L was a valid strategic objective and how a successful campaign would Force Germany to surrender or set France up for another campaign and if a follow-up campaign launched from A-L would be beneficial and force Germany to sue for peace. Maybe it was, but I suspect nobody gave such issues serious thought.

The same with Russia's plan 19, was invading East Prussia the best way to defeat Germany and was Russia looking to getting hold of forward ports on the Baltic because Russia needed them or something? Or was EP invaded because it was operationally possible and allowed Russia to fight while the French fought?

Germany was the same. A 'war plan' might have looked a lot like Moltkes campaign plan, but added things like making sure the French channel ports were captured and coal and ore fields were secured with minimal damage.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

Not just Germany, all of them, the Royal Navy didn't even have a staff to make plans until 1912, the plan was all in the 1st Sea Lord's head.

Was France's plan 17 a well thought concept of how to win a war against Germany in a way that served France's needs, was Plan 19 the same for Russia?

No, none of them were and almost all suffered the same issues as the German. And largely for the same reasons. Noone thought it was important to do this and everyone thought it was impossible to do this. You cannot communicate with armies in the field most of the time and they cant communicate back, largely once the armies march off from the depot that are on their own and you have to trust the subordinate commander. Worked for Napoleon, Worked for Moltke the Elder. Worked for Grant. Worked for Nelson, Worked.

And to some extent the politicians trust and can trust the Staffs to mobilise and then they can give orders based on the current situation, after all the end point of mobilisation is your armies are concentrated still with telegraph communications and there are several days during the mobilisation when you can issue orders. Unless the mobilisation is also actually an order to attack Belgium France and Luxemburg on the afternoon of the first day and you only find out about this when its too late to do anything. The Austrians do have that debate and are happy with the idea of attacking Serbia.

Same issue most of the time for navies. Once you go to sea you are out of comms most of the time. The overall strategy and concepts may be laid down and for the Navies this is really a function of build strategy.

WW2 allied practice is misleading. The Theatre commanders are having to make a case to the Combined Chiefs for resources ( everyone is competing for landing craft) and there is a whole interallied debate going on with US, British and Dominion forces responsible to their home governments who need to give approval for at least an element of strategy, which means you have to articulate strategy.

Joffre expresses his general intentions the first of which is to attack the German Armies. The second is specific regions for the attack - the main one of which is in the Ardennes not Alsace Loraine and while they are unsuccessful and bloody there is then a reaction to the events on the ground. Largely the planning is for Russia and France to attack on the Xth day of Mobilisation and for the French the political order not to Invade Belgium.

 

[Aphrodite]

Your assessment of plan 17 is exactly what general staffs did, you're looking at the plans tactical and operational aspects and looking to maximize them. About the only higher level thinking about plan 17 was that France wanted A-L back and had to act simultaneously witht they didn Russia. There was no thought about if A-L was a valid strategic objective and how a successful campaign would Force Germany to surrender or set France up for another campaign and if a follow-up campaign launched from A-L would be beneficial and force Germany to sue for peace. Maybe it was, but I suspect nobody gave such issues serious thought.

This is completely wrong. The French want to destroy the German army and win the war. The territory comes later.

The French failure is that they thought Moltke wouldn't deploy his reserves in the front line- that there were two less German armies than existed.

It is a logical plan for the war Joffre thought he was fighting. The French attacks into AL are meant to force Moltke to deploy troops from the north not capture land.

Joffre is delighted when he sees the wide German sweep through Belgium because that would mean his center is weak.

The main French blow was to be the Ardennes. Here Joffre expected weak German forces that could easily be brushed aside. Then the French could drive north, cut off the German right, bag three German Armies and win the war.

once Joffre realizes his mistake, he retreats to the Marne like Schlieffen feared. Strategy is easy. Discerning your enemies intentions is hard.

The same with Russia's plan 19, was invading East Prussia the best way to defeat Germany and was Russia looking to getting hold of forward ports on the Baltic because Russia needed them or something? Or was EP invaded because it was operationally possible and allowed Russia to fight while the French fought?

Plan 19 is strategically sound. So was Alexeseyev's Southern strategy. While the Russians failed in the execution, its hard to suggest a better idea given the need to draw forces from the French front. Sure, the Russians should have stressed the need to delay on the French but if Rennemkampf punches through the German cavalry screen, the German 8th army is destroyed and the war practically won

Germany was the same. A 'war plan' might have looked a lot like Moltkes campaign plan, but added things like making sure the French channel ports were captured and coal and ore fields were secured with minimal damage.

This is pure hindsightium. A long war strategy can only work if the Ottomans join which is highly doubtful in August. It makes no sense to divert forces from the main effort to pursue secondary objectives of dubious value. Dont forget how close the Germans come to defeat at the Marne

 

[WeissRaben]

From the public Italian statements since 1912, it should have been obvious that Italy was not a happy camper in the Alliance, and unlikely to assist in defensive operations, let alone offensive.

I mean, why should Italy have gone out of their way to help Austria shit on the alliance terms for the eightyfourth time in the past ten years?