What would have been a better alternative than Operation Steinbock?

What would have been a better alternative than Operation Steinbock for the Third Reich and the Luftwaffe?

The Luftwaffe assembled 474 bomber aircraftfor the offensive. The attacks were mainly aimed at and around the Greater London area. In Britain, it was known as the Baby Blitz due to the much smaller scale of operations compared to The Blitz, the campaign against the United Kingdom in 1940–1941.[2] The operation began in January and ended in May 1944. It achieved very little, and the German force suffered a loss of some 329 machines during the five months of operations—an average of 77 per month—before it was abandoned.

Eventually, the revenge attacks gave way to attempts to disrupt preparations for the impending Allied invasion of France, but Steinbock had worn down the offensive power of the Luftwaffe to the extent it could not mount any significant counterattacks when the invasion began on 6 June 1944.
 
What would have been a better alternative than Operation Steinbock for the Third Reich and the Luftwaffe?

To have bombed the suspected invasion ports using tip and run tactics using small numbers of aircraft at differing points at the same time to try and overwhelm the British AirDefence Network and preserve aircraft and crews.

Mine ports as well as bomb them.

The problem is always going to be that the Allies had such a superiority in airpower that they are going to be able to counter this tactic as well and still inflict heavy losses.

The other option is to do nothing and try to retain aircraft and aircrews for when the invasion comes / use them in the east
 
The other option is to do nothing and try to retain aircraft and aircrews for when the invasion comes

This would be what I'd suggest. These aircraft arent going to defeat the allied air forces but at least will make them have to fight. That could make some differences on the ground.
 
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The problem is always going to be that the Allies had such a superiority in airpower that they are going to be able to counter this tactic as well and still inflict heavy losses.

The other option is to do nothing and try to retain aircraft and aircrews for when the invasion comes / use them in the east

The first half of this rather obviates the second. Here are some numbers to get a sense of perspective on the problem. These vary with source so consider them illustrative.

On June 6th 1944. The Allies had approx 12,000 combat aircraft in the UK. Through a maximum effort they were able to run over 14,000 sorties by midnight of 6th June. Conversely the Germans had slightly under 300 aircraft in range of the invasion site. Managed to get about 250 sorties after aborts from mechanical failures. Another 500-600 operational aircraft were in the Netherlands, Belgium, & France & able to respond & sortie to the invasion site by the end of 7 June. Tho not all did. This does not include the training and defense fighter groups east of the Rhine & defending Germany itself.

For June & July the Allies were able to replace all losses in aircrew and aircraft within 2-3 days. A replacement pool had been expanded, and the replacement flow from the factories in the UK & the US was at full throttle. The Germans were also trying to maximize their replacement flow but were handicapped by declining quality of new machines, and pilot training. By this point in 1944 40% of German aircraft losses were from non combat causes, either mechanical failure or pilot error. In contrast the RAF & US AAF operational losses were falling below 30%. While the Allies kept up a daily sortie rate average of between 80 & 90 % during June & July, the Germans average sagged down towards 50%. During early July the operational German aircraft in the west, able to attack the Normandy battlefield on 24 hours notice rose up towards 2500 aircraft. Peak daily sorties in the first week or two of July was at about 1,300 nightly. By this point daylight attacks were dropped in a effort to reduce combat losses. Training deficiencies meant operational losses increased with the night missions.

In the east I understand the Soviet aviation was operating approx 8,000 aircraft, tho I don't know anything of their sortie rates. The Germans started the year with close to 5,500 operational combat aircraft on all fronts. At the end of the year there are supposed to have been 4,500 still operational, tho fuel, aircrew training, mechanical problems and parts shortages meant the effective strength was as low as half that. In addition to the roughly 20,000 Allied aircraft in operational units on the eastern front and the west there were some 5,000 combat aircraft in the Mediterranean theatre. In this context the 475 bombers used in Op STEINBOCK seem insignificant.
 
@Carl Schwamberger, while all those numbers are true a lot of them have little to no relevance to combating TTL Steinbock over Normandy. A few thousand of them would be heavy bombers given their own tasking, and many of the rest would be tasked with various other missions in support of ground forces. So there might be 4-5000 day and night fighters, many of which would be on defensive missions and the rest would be required to maintain 24 hour CAP over Normandy.

So the 500 or whatever German combat aircraft would face a similar number of defensive fighters at any one time.
 
the planned raid(s) on Soviet hydroelectric power plants, Operation Eisenhammer, probably early '44 last chance to execute?

Operation Eisenhammer for which the force was originally intended, but Hitler diverted them based on some nonsense he dreamed up.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Eisenhammer

Assuming it succeeds how much does it damage the Soviet war effort and how long does it extend the war?

had it been carried out earlier it would have had effects on Soviets replacing their equipment losses? by 1944? (IDK) they would probably view it as something that changed the momentum? when it should be used to "emergency relocate" much further west?
 
Three times Galland tried to build up a force of fighter pilots, the plan was to hit the USAAF hard enough to at least temporarily stop the attacks and buy some time. And all three times Hitler issued contradictory orders. The first group was thrown away over Normandy trying to gain air superiority and stop the landings (wasn't going to happen). The second group was wasted trying to cover German forces in the Ardennes when the weather finally broke and Allied aircraft were finally able to take off. The third and last batch were lost during Operation Bodenplatte ('Base Plate') which was a massive attack on Allied airfields on 1/1/45. A large number of Allied aircraft were destroyed but it was less than _one day's worth_ of Allied production and since most were caught on the ground few pilots were lost. But no one notified the flak batteries about this and many German aircraft were shot down by their own flak.

At this point NOTHING Germany does is going to affect the war's outcome, and extremely unlikely to even slow it down significantly...
 

Deleted member 1487

Assuming it succeeds how much does it damage the Soviet war effort and how long does it extend the war?
assuming it worked perfectly as planned, which is a pretty big stretch, the German planning documents noted that 80% of tank engines, 50% of radio production, 60% of light tanks and motor vehicles, and 50% of howitzer/optics/etc. were served by the electrical grid in the Upper Volga area. They also mention the ball bearing production being centered on Moscow, which was a critical component to a whole slew of things, and would be pretty heavily damaged by the attacks on electrical production. Now, I don't know if these numbers are actually correct, but even if partially true and the destruction of the targeted facilities worked as planned it would paralyze production in the Moscow-Upper Volga area for at least a year due to the already stretched electrical grid in the region (there was no national grid to compensate) and in fact the entire country, plus of course the lack of ability to actually replace all that equipment in country. So they'd have to externally source it, which would take a long while to do, probably not really until after mid-1945. I've seen some random estimates without sourcing that say it would take up to 6 months for the damage to be noticed in the front lines, but given loss rates in 1944 for the Soviets, even with LL it would probably be felt a lot sooner, especially if the bombing efforts continue as planned throughout 1944 (there was a long term strategic bombing plan against the rather poorly defended Soviet industry; the PVO was mostly concentrated around Moscow and Leningrad). As it was IOTL LL was maxed out at what could really be pushed into the country according to US estimates given global shipping, port, and internal Soviet transport issues, so LL cannot compensate for the damage. I'd imagine the Soviets would attack ASAP to push the bombers out of range of vital Soviet industries, which would make the extended bombing campaign impossible, but then the damage would take effect and from Summer 1944 on the Soviets would feel it. IIRC the offensive was to start in late Spring, but there was the issue of the Soviet Leningrad offensive in 1944 overrunning the air base at Dno in February, which was where the bombers were supposed to base from. I think they could use Vitebstk or Orsha if needed though.
 
I'd imagine the Soviets would attack ASAP to push the bombers out of range of vital Soviet industries, which would make the extended bombing campaign impossible, but then the damage would take effect and from Summer 1944 on the Soviets would feel it.

any sources describe the flooding/flood control aspect of their dams? my understanding the Soviets used artificial flooding around Moscow to their advantage previously, here it works against them.
 

Deleted member 1487

any sources describe the flooding/flood control aspect of their dams? my understanding the Soviets used artificial flooding around Moscow to their advantage previously, here it works against them.
Not in the documents I've seen. Also the plans were mostly for attacks against traditional coal powered facilities outside of Moscow (in the wider oblast) and in Gorki-Yaroslavl. There were only two turbines installed in the dam around Moscow by 1944 and the bigger benefit would have been probably breaking the dam to flood the region rather than taking out the turbines; apparently though the German bouncing bomb based on a captured British version did not work because they didn't know about the importance of the back spin the British developed with their version.
 
Not in the documents I've seen. Also the plans were mostly for attacks against traditional coal powered facilities outside of Moscow (in the wider oblast) and in Gorki-Yaroslavl. There were only two turbines installed in the dam around Moscow by 1944 and the bigger benefit would have been probably breaking the dam to flood the region rather than taking out the turbines; apparently though the German bouncing bomb based on a captured British version did not work because they didn't know about the importance of the back spin the British developed with their version.

have a book on Mistels and the originator of the Eisenhammer idea, Steinmann was promoting destruction of Rybinsk-Uglich as having merit outside of eliminating the power plants (i.e. flooding) but no real information on their expectations.
 

Deleted member 1487

have a book on Mistels and the originator of the Eisenhammer idea, Steinmann was promoting destruction of Rybinsk-Uglich as having merit outside of eliminating the power plants (i.e. flooding) but no real information on their expectations.
I guess the question is whether they could launch the bombing before Dno airfield is overrun (it was apparently bombed by the Soviets in 1943 and was still repairing the damage by February 1944) or whether they could get by using fields in Belarus instead.
 
@Carl Schwamberger, while all those numbers are true a lot of them have little to no relevance to combating TTL Steinbock over Normandy. A few thousand of them would be heavy bombers given their own tasking, and many of the rest would be tasked with various other missions in support of ground forces. So there might be 4-5000 day and night fighters, many of which would be on defensive missions and the rest would be required to maintain 24 hour CAP over Normandy.

So the 500 or whatever German combat aircraft would face a similar number of defensive fighters at any one time.

A couple assumptions there. One is that the CAP over Normandy was static in deployment of numbers. Actually that depended on German activity. Tho there were some attempts at improvements the Luftwaffes signals security was poor right to the end. Between excessive aircraft transmissions, sloppy use of tactical codes or security measures, traffic analysis of tactical transmissions, and longer term information from Enigma decrypts (the Luftwaffe was still using many older three rotor models from 1939-41), the Allied fighter command were able to anticipate on short notice the enemy air activity. Then there was observation by the French and Belgian underground of the forward airfields, near constant Allied air observation, and long range radar observation. I am more familiar how this played on in the Med in 1943, but as early as March 43 the air defense cmd in Tunisia were able to identify the oncoming air activity and counter surge fighter groups. Warning orders went out the the stand by fighter groups, often before the Axis groups were formed over the Italian airfields. By the time the Axis bomber or transport groups approached Arica the squadron size CAP units had been reinforced to multi group intercept formations, arrayed to intercept from multiple directions and altitudes.

This overwhelming intercept capability is why the Germans ceased any significant efforts at daylight bombing over Britain, and over Normandy in June 1944. From mid June night attacks became the norm for the Lufwaffe in attacking the lodgment and fleet. That reduced the combat losses significantly, but ran the operating losses up due to lack of training for night ops,. It also cut the effectiveness of the bomber attacks for the same reason, few veteran air crew remained, and the rookies training for night navigation and bombing was grossly insufficient.

A related problem was the Allied naives were authorized to use the VT type proximity fuzes. The optimal altitude of night attacks with the Luftwaffes equipment and training put the aircraft well within the maximum effectiveness zone for the naval AA ammunition with the VT fuzes. Between the radar direction of the ships batteries, and the proximity fuzes the bombers may as well have been attacking in daylight. I am unsure when the AA Artillery ashore were authorized the VT fuzes. They did have a fair amount of radar directed weapons, and sufficient ammunition. Attacking the lodgementfrom mid June, even at night was still at a noticeable combat loss of machines and air crew.
 
I guess the question is whether they could launch the bombing before Dno airfield is overrun (it was apparently bombed by the Soviets in 1943 and was still repairing the damage by February 1944) or whether they could get by using fields in Belarus instead.

in the latter efforts (using the Mistels) they were to fly from Bornholm, Denmark, returning in the upper (fighter) component to Courland Pocket. requiring a "belly" fuel tank.
 
Three times Galland tried to build up a force of fighter pilots, the plan was to hit the USAAF hard enough to at least temporarily stop the attacks and buy some time. And all three times Hitler issued contradictory orders. The first group was thrown away over Normandy trying to gain air superiority and stop the landings (wasn't going to happen). The second group was wasted trying to cover German forces in the Ardennes when the weather finally broke and Allied aircraft were finally able to take off. The third and last batch were lost during Operation Bodenplatte ('Base Plate') which was a massive attack on Allied airfields on 1/1/45. A large number of Allied aircraft were destroyed but it was less than _one day's worth_ of Allied production and since most were caught on the ground few pilots were lost. But no one notified the flak batteries about this and many German aircraft were shot down by their own flak.

At this point NOTHING Germany does is going to affect the war's outcome, and extremely unlikely to even slow it down significantly...

Three times in the Mediterranean in 1943 the Axis or German AF tried to build up and defeat the Allied air forces. They fought a fair defense in the winter, with the advantage of owning the bulk of the airfields in Tunisia, and all the all weather airfields. By late March Allied construction efforts gained parity in forward airfields & then superiority. From then on increasing Allied numbers, not just in aircraft but in radar, repair tools, spare parts, ammunition, skilled mechanics, ground transport, & aircrew training put the attrition numbers heavily in favor of the Allies. Three times in 1943 the Axis AF tried to lean forward and defend the air over the ground battle. Over Tunisia, Sicilly, and southern Italy they were shot out of the sky and forced to break off support of the ground battle lest they be entirely destroyed. Depending on who is counting the Axis strength peaked a couple times in the Med at between 2500 & 3000 operational aircraft. Allied strength started in 1943 at well over 3000 and rapidly ran up to over 4000 in late spring. Unlike the Axis Allied replacements arrived fast enough the average weekly strength seldom fell below 80% of the nominal maximum operating strength. Conversely the Italian and German AF average fell to as low as 1400 operating aircraft at time during the January-October campaigns.

A similar thing was happening over NW Europe & Germany. One example would be the return of fighter groups from the Eastern Front to Germany in the autumn of 1943. Some 600 additional fighters (800) by one count) were placed under Gallands command by Octiober. The extra weight had something to do with the severe losses of the 8th AF autumn raids. Barely 90 days later the 8th AF was able to return in greater fighter strength, with more new model machines, better trained replacement pilots, and new tactics. The Big Week & all that slaughtered the remaining reinforcements from the east, leaving Gallands forces worse off than before.

By late 1944 it was not longer possible for the Lufwaffe to break off and withdraw beyond Allied fighter range to rebuild strength. Stratigic depth was gone and a combination of Allied tactical bombers and long range fighters piled into Germany on every clear day searching out the airfields and residual German air strength..
 

CalBear

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Realistically almost anything would have been better than pissing away better than half of the "strategic" assets left in the West, especially since they, by that time, were clearly incapable of inflicting maximum damage over a robustly defended Britain either day or night.

The best use for many of the aircraft would have been as night fighter conversions. At least in that role they would have provided some level of defense to the Reich. Second best would have been to use them in a tactical role in the East once the Red Army 1944 Summer Offensives (i.e. Bagration) were detected.

The really ballsy use would have been to hide the aircraft in rarely attacked rural and even forested areas of the Reich and thrown them forward against the departure ports and landing beaches once the WAllies committed. Losses would have been God Awful, but the losses were God Awful IOTL, and even a few troops transports sunk would have more useful impact than all the bombs dropped on Britain in the first half of 1944.
 
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