Yes, I meant Munich, sorry unwittingly slipped in native language for a while.
Interestingly, Göring proposed several times to Colonel Beck, the Polish foreign minister, for Germany and Poland to ally against Russia - in return for settling Germany's irridentist claims in the west, Poland was supposed to be compensated with territory in the Baltics and in Soviet Ukraine (naturally one can assume that the Nazis had no real intention to honour their part of the bargain).
Hitler also briefly encouraged such notions, having signed a treaty of non-aggression with Poland in January 1934, especially after France and the USSR signed an accord in 1935 together with the Czechs (Poland also participated in the carving up of what was left of Czechia in 1939, though admittedly they did not gain much territory).
Yes, now this is yet another alternative and possibly fruitful strategy for Germany to deal with the Poland problem successfully, to enrol them in their vassal states squad for their own anti-Soviet posse. This too was made uneffectual by the conquest of Prague.
Now, I'm not entirely persuaded that it would have worked, since it's not sure that Poland would have got the foresightedness that in order to survive the coming clash between the two great powers on their borders, they desperately needed to side with one against the other, and claim a livable place in their sphere of influence. Of course, doing so would have required giving up a sizable part of the territories they had grabbed from their new ally of choice in 1919. The boundaries of 1939 Poland were made only possible by the once in a blue moon circumstance of both Germany and Russia being powerless in 1919, and geopolitically they were living on borrowed time. Stubbornly grabbing on to everything and the illusion of being a middle power able to resist both with the help of France and UK only risked a new partition, which eventually happened.
Nonetheless, Hitler's cause was doomed by the fact that he did not quested for the politically reasonable objective of fulfilling irredentist 1914 German claims on POland and turn the rest into a satellite. He wanted to make Poland the first testing stage of his grand racial realignment scheme.
Nonetheless, had he acknowledged that Germany's long-term expansionst/imperialist benefit was better served by the latter strategy, he could have pursued it to success. Of course, it required giving up naked military conquest of both Czechia and Poland. But had he done it, he would have succeeded. Even if Poland hadn not listened, the British would have. The UK asked but a decent excuse to repeat the Munich strategy, and POland was the last obstacle before Germany and USSR were free to get at each other's throats.
Naturally the whole arrangement came to nothing, especially after the Wehrmacht occupied remnant Czechia,
Yep, this is the turning point that made Hitler's expansionist strategy in Central and Eastern Europe, so successful up to then, a crash course to general war. Had he been more insightful, he could have waited until German-Soviet war had been unleashed, in the confusion few would have really cared about the independence or rump Bohemia and Moravia.
That is true. Under certain circumstances they might hope that both the Germans and the Soviets are decimated in a war, leaving both of them weakened, without Britain being forced to intervene in order to preserve the balance of power.
Or alternatively, they could have judged that a USSR pushed halfway back towards Moscow, and a severe blow given to the prestige of Communism, would have been worth the price of a Germany claiming an extensive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, which would likely absorbed German energies for the next generation. Of course, few took seriously the Mein Kampf rants about lebensraum. All thought Nazi Germany was after a repeat of the Brest-Litovsk settlement, with fascist headmen instead of Hohenzollern or Hapsburg little kings in Eastern Europe.
The problem is, of course, that German foreign policy gradually became more belligerent. Hitler was quite disappointed that the Sudeten Crisis was not resolved through the use of force, which in his eyes would have enabled him to conquer Czechia.
The man was nuts.

He could have gained it all with little risk or international outrage if he had been content with a philo-Nazi government in Prague for a couple years, then in the midst of the war with the Soviets, quite possibly the UK a friendly neutral or even maneouvred to fight on Germany's side (say Stalin is tricked into attacking Finland or Romania), he would have made a little "police action" in a satellite of his.
So in order to the scenario you described to take place we need to find a plausible reason for why Hitler behaves more cautiously than he did historically.
A little temporary internal trouble in Germany ? Russia being more aggressive ? British being more overt in their attempts to struck a deal with Germany and partition the spoils of Russia ? Hitler being just a little more insightful ?