What would be the best strategy for Napoleon in 1812?

What

Napoleon won his wars by destroying his enemies' armies. You're completely ignoring the whole concept of the strategy of annihilation, as well as Napoleon's strategic goals in the Russian campaign. You're the one who's crafting a total non-strategy for its own sake, not Napoleon. His plan was to destroy the Russian army in a massive operational envelopment and so coerce the Tsar into resuming his participation in the Continental System to bring Britain to its knees; reinstating the Polish kingdom does nothing towards that goal. Moreover, a limited two year campaign would be impossible without first destroying the Russian army; only with that achieved could Napoleon go into winter quarters around Minsk or Smolensk. Otherwise he'd have to abandon his gains in the East. When he got to Smolensk, the furthest he ever anticipated advancing, he could either retreat, or go double or nothing and continue to pursue the destruction of the Russian army.


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Napoleon's 1812 campaign could have worked if it was pursued with greater vigor by the man himself and his chief subordinates. Long delays on Napoleon's part at Vitebsk and Vilna aided the Russians in escaping, as did operational failures by Jerome, Murat, and even the Iron Marshal himself.

That said, I think it would have been better to solve the Spain and Russia problems one at a time; once the Austrians are defeated, return to Spain and destroy the Anglo-Portuguese army. Without a conventional threat forcing French to remain concentrated, they could then more effectively disperse to suppress the unconventional threat. Leave Spain and Portugal under a single military commander, then make the necessary preparations for the Russia campaign.

Sorry but you are reasoning purely theoretically. A war campaign is not a Risk game.

Fighting Russia is not fighting Austria or Prussia because Russia enjoys exceptional strategic depth.

And when you fight not just a tiny enemy but a big power, you just can’t destroy all his military potential. Especially not before the Industrial Age when your troops walk.

Just read the assessments by military experts of Napoleon’s Russian campaign. You win a war by forcing the enemy to accept ceasing hostilities.
And by the way, Napoleon did not want to destroy the Russian army. He just wanted to win a big pitched battle which he thought would drive czar Alexander I to accept to come back to negotiations. Which happened to be a total countersense.
 
Sorry but you are reasoning purely theoretically. A war campaign is not a Risk game.

Fighting Russia is not fighting Austria or Prussia because Russia enjoys exceptional strategic depth.

And when you fight not just a tiny enemy but a big power, you just can’t destroy all his military potential. Especially not before the Industrial Age when your troops walk.

Just read the assessments by military experts of Napoleon’s Russian campaign. You win a war by forcing the enemy to accept ceasing hostilities.
And by the way, Napoleon did not want to destroy the Russian army. He just wanted to win a big pitched battle which he thought would drive czar Alexander I to accept to come back to negotiations. Which happened to be a total countersense.
Frankly, you're the one playing at Risk, trying to take territory for territory's sake, completely losing sight of the broader strategic picture.

Sure, Russia has more room to retreat, but that's why Napoleon's campaign plans centered on the destruction of the Russian armies near the borders. And make no mistake, destruction was absolutely his objective; if you look at the actual plans, they're a massive concentric operational envelopment with half a million men intended to box in the Russian armies and smash them utterly. Anyone who doesn't see the strategy of annihilation in full force here is willfully blind. Once that was achieved, the Russians would be unable to meaningfully threaten the Imperial cantonments, allowing Napoleon to undertake continued campaigning next year if the Tsar refused to make peace after the annihilation of his main field armies. Moreover, you fail to see Clausewitz's distinction of the dual nature of war; Napoleon's plan was not a game of trading provinces at the negotiating table, but leaving his enemy helpless to resist the imposition of his goals by force.
 
Prussia and Austria don't count?
AFAIK Prussia and Austria didn't contribute large forces to either the Russian or Spanish theatres? My point being, if the Russians and British launch major offensives at the same time, Napoleon can't be in two places at once (and has to split his army). France doesn't have an ally that can do something like this to distract the Russians.

You described exactly what Nappy was planning to do but, as everybody knows, Russians refuse to comply and the rest is a history.
I've said before that Napoleon's initial plan wasn't bad. The main difference from OTL would be the movements of his armies such that when a major battle is fought, the Russian forces cannot easily retreat. This was ultimately what saved them at Vitebsk, at Smolensk, and at Borodino. Force the surrender, not just retreat, of a major army and the campaign is won.

If even Borodino with its terrible losses and Napoleon's entry into Moscow did not convince Alexander, there is a little chance that the less dramatic events would.
By Borodino, the Grande Armee was falling apart and was overextended, the Tsar knew he wasn't going to lose just because Moscow burned. If he loses a battle early on that wipes out most of his army, he won't see an enemy falling apart, but an enemy who is a serious threat. A lenient peace deal at that point would look a lot better than letting Napoleon rampage through Western Russia.

- BNC
 
Frankly, you're the one playing at Risk, trying to take territory for territory's sake, completely losing sight of the broader strategic picture.

Sure, Russia has more room to retreat, but that's why Napoleon's campaign plans centered on the destruction of the Russian armies near the borders. And make no mistake, destruction was absolutely his objective; if you look at the actual plans, they're a massive concentric operational envelopment with half a million men intended to box in the Russian armies and smash them utterly. Anyone who doesn't see the strategy of annihilation in full force here is willfully blind. Once that was achieved, the Russians would be unable to meaningfully threaten the Imperial cantonments, allowing Napoleon to undertake continued campaigning next year if the Tsar refused to make peace after the annihilation of his main field armies. Moreover, you fail to see Clausewitz's distinction of the dual nature of war; Napoleon's plan was not a game of trading provinces at the negotiating table, but leaving his enemy helpless to resist the imposition of his goals by force.

Do you just know how many troops Russia had ? Not much less than the whole napoleonic coalition. The point was that half of it was on the reserve. Read for example Oleg Sokolov.

Defeating the Russian front army was not the goal, just the means to have Russia concede defeat and come back to a cooperation relationship with France against Britain.

Which by itself was contradictory and underlined Napoleon was completely wrong in 1807 and was fooled by Alexander. His strategy was : let’s aim again at the same goal that was aimed at Tilsit in 1807, that Napoleon thought he had reached but had in fact failed to reach.

The logical part of the plan was that, this time contrary to 1807, Napoleon was not going to be blindly generous. Full restoration of Poland was the price Russia would pay if it was defeated.

But, once again, this was the plan : fighting Russia in order to force her back into the continental blockade and weaken her to deter her from turning against Napoleon one more time.

Napoleon would not and anyway could not destroy the Russian army. He just though quickly and badly defeating it in a big battle would end the war. Which was a total countersense. He remained stuck to his old schedule with which he had been so successful against medium sized countries.

The Spanish quagmire should have been a warning. You can hardly force back to peace an enemy that wants to keep on fighting and that has the means to do so.
 
Do you just know how many troops Russia had ? Not much less than the whole napoleonic coalition. The point was that half of it was on the reserve. Read for example Oleg Sokolov.

Defeating the Russian front army was not the goal, just the means to have Russia concede defeat and come back to a cooperation relationship with France against Britain.

Which by itself was contradictory and underlined Napoleon was completely wrong in 1807 and was fooled by Alexander. His strategy was : let’s aim again at the same goal that was aimed at Tilsit in 1807, that Napoleon thought he had reached but had in fact failed to reach.

The logical part of the plan was that, this time contrary to 1807, Napoleon was not going to be blindly generous. Full restoration of Poland was the price Russia would pay if it was defeated.

But, once again, this was the plan : fighting Russia in order to force her back into the continental blockade and weaken her to deter her from turning against Napoleon one more time.

Napoleon would not and anyway could not destroy the Russian army. He just though quickly and badly defeating it in a big battle would end the war. Which was a total countersense. He remained stuck to his old schedule with which he had been so successful against medium sized countries.

The Spanish quagmire should have been a warning. You can hardly force back to peace an enemy that wants to keep on fighting and that has the means to do so.
Your argument has no foundation in either history or theory.

However many men the Russians had on paper, many would be unavailable for field operations as part of major armies; if they were, it just shows an astounding lack of judgement on the Russians' part that their front line forces were so paltry in comparison. They were not formed into a large enough army to defeat Napoleon's force, and would in any case be badly demoralized by the destruction of the empire's best troops in its strongest armies. The men left over after the main Russian armies were smashed in the Bug-Narew pocket would not be able to credibly threaten Napoleon's cantonments, and the campaign could renew in the Spring if the Tsar did not make peace. You have to realize that Napoleon's strategy is not simply about winning battles for the sake of it; it's about destroying the enemy's means to resist. Austria didn't sue for peace in 1805 because they lost a battle and them's the rules, it was because they no longer had the means to keep fighting after their armies were destroyed.
 
Your argument has no foundation in either history or theory.

However many men the Russians had on paper, many would be unavailable for field operations as part of major armies; if they were, it just shows an astounding lack of judgement on the Russians' part that their front line forces were so paltry in comparison. They were not formed into a large enough army to defeat Napoleon's force, and would in any case be badly demoralized by the destruction of the empire's best troops in its strongest armies. The men left over after the main Russian armies were smashed in the Bug-Narew pocket would not be able to credibly threaten Napoleon's cantonments, and the campaign could renew in the Spring if the Tsar did not make peace. You have to realize that Napoleon's strategy is not simply about winning battles for the sake of it; it's about destroying the enemy's means to resist. Austria didn't sue for peace in 1805 because they lost a battle and them's the rules, it was because they no longer had the means to keep fighting after their armies were destroyed.

Just read.

What Napoleon is reported of Napoleon’s sayings. What history scholars wrote.

And of course Napoleon was not an idiot. He did not think he had beaten Austria or Prussia just because he had won a battle. He also was most aware in 1807 that, after Friedland, there was a high risk the Russians would keep on fighting which would put him in a situation where he did not know how to end this war, because he wanted it short.

One of Napoleon’s weaknesses was that he was both a head of State and the commander in chief in the battlefield. He wanted to do all by himself. This put him in a very difficult situation and created a very strong incentive for him to lead short campaigns.

Once more, I must say that Napoleon did change his plan in early August 1812. The initial plan was a limited 2-year long campaign. This plan was quite clever, both strategically and geopolitically. This would force Russians to move and either to confront him or to accept the new de facto situation of a liberated Greater Poland. Such a war was much more sustainable in the long run for the napoleonic coalition than for Russia.

But the point was that Napoleon was quite out of touch in 1812. He did not understand Alexandre. He was aware of this, that he could not understand what were Alexander’s intentions and goal. And please don’t tell me this has no historic foundation. There are quotations of Napoleon saying so (not the out of touch statement, which of course Napoleon would never admit to).

He did literally screw his 1812 campaign.

He was neither defeated by winter which was later and milder than usual, nor by a genious Russian defensive strategy (the russians in fact had no coherent plan except retreating as long as they could not have a situation where they could fight a battle in a good situation.

Napoléon was defeated by himself. By his misunderstanding of Alexander’s I tentions, by his own strategic mistakes which created a logistical disaster and by the inadequacy of his new strategy of chasing the Russian armies.
 
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AFAIK Prussia and Austria didn't contribute large forces to either the Russian or Spanish theatres? My point being, if the Russians and British launch major offensives at the same time, Napoleon can't be in two places at once (and has to split his army). France doesn't have an ally that can do something like this to distract the Russians.

As I said before, the best thing for Nappy would be to evacuate Spain. This would free a lot of the experienced troops and more or less kill any danger of the British attack on the Southern France (anyway, they did not have enough troops to try something of the kind with the strong French presence on the Franco-Spanish border. Of course, as an alternative, Nappy could launch a blitz campaign on the Peninsula, like one he did earlier but left unfinished. This would require only relatively small additions to the troops he already had there but (IMO) the whole Spanish scenario was a massive waste of the resources which continued only due to Nappy's stubbornness.

An idea of a simultaneous offensive requires coordination that would go well beyond the available means of communications and, if initiative of attack is their, it is highly unlikely that the Russians would try anything prior to 1813 when their new troops are raised and trained and even then it is very unlikely because so far their experience of an aggressive war against Napoleon was strictly negative: the 1st ended at Austerlitz and 2nd at Friedland.


I've said before that Napoleon's initial plan wasn't bad.

Actually, it was because it relied too much on enemy's foolishness and incompetence and completely ignored the nationalistic/political component of this specific war.


AFAIK Prussia and Austria didn't contribute large forces to either the Russian or Spanish theatres? My point being, if the Russians and British launch major offensives at the same time, Napoleon can't be in two places at once (and has to split his army). France doesn't have an ally that can do something like this to distract the Russians.

As I said before, the best thing for Nappy would be to evacuate Spain. This would free a lot of the experienced troops and more or less kill any danger of the British attack on the Southern France (anyway, they did not have enough troops to try something of the kind with the strong French presence on the Franco-Spanish border. Of course, as an alternative, Nappy could launch a blitz campaign on the Peninsula, like one he did earlier but left unfinished. This would require only relatively small additions to the troops he already had there but (IMO) the whole Spanish scenario was a massive waste of the resources which continued only due to Nappy's stubbornness.

An idea of a simultaneous offensive requires coordination that would go well beyond the available means of communications and, if initiative of attack is their, it is highly unlikely that the Russians would try anything prior to 1813 when their new troops are raised and trained and even then it is very unlikely because so far their experience of an aggressive war against Napoleon was strictly negative: the 1st ended at Austerlitz and 2nd at Friedland.


The main difference from OTL would be the movements of his armies such that when a major battle is fought, the Russian forces cannot easily retreat. This was ultimately what saved them at Vitebsk, at Smolensk, and at Borodino. Force the surrender, not just retreat, of a major army and the campaign is won.

Of course, I understand that comparing to you Nappy was just a mediocre military talent and his marshals were ordinary nincompoops who did not manage to accomplish such a trivial task as achieve enemy's surrender. However, making allowances to their limited mental capacities, complete lack of a military experience, absence of the radio and aerial surveillance and unavailability of the history books describing their mistakes and giving valuable recommendations, it is safe to say that they did pretty much what they could do under the circumstances in the area with which they were not familiar (just kidding). x'D

There were couple moments when a portion of the Russian army (not the whole army) could be cut off but the questionable "credit" goes mostly to the quarrels between the Russian top commanders about which Napoleon could not know (Bagration & Co forced Barclay to stay and fight at Smolensk with a resulting difficulty of extricating themselves out the the dangerous situation). An idea of forcing Russian army to surrender at Borodino is very interesting one but I wonder how this could be achieved if the retreat route was safely behind well-protected Russian right flank.

By Borodino, the Grande Armee was falling apart and was overextended,

It was far from falling apart but the numbers, especially after the terrible losses in the battle, had been too small to force Alexander to surrender. OTOH, a much greater French force staying in Smolensk would not force Alexander to surrender either.


the Tsar knew he wasn't going to lose just because Moscow burned. If he loses a battle early on that wipes out most of his army, he won't see an enemy falling apart, but an enemy who is a serious threat.

Well, the obvious problem with that scenario is, as I said earlier, the fact that the Russian commanders did not want to indulge Napoleon with such a battle. Even if on the early stage of campaign Davout was successful in cutting off and completely defeating Bagration (which would be quite difficult because, while being inept strategist, Bagration was a brilliant tactician with an impressive record of getting out of the difficult situations), this would only strengthen Barclay's resolve not to give a battle with the inferior numbers and fighting for Smolensk would be avoided altogether.

A lenient peace deal at that point would look a lot better than letting Napoleon rampage through Western Russia.

Clausewitz was quite skeptical about that "rampaging" scenario and, anyway, "Western Russia" amounted mostly to the Poland/Lithuania/Belorussia which were only marginally valuable from the "imperial" perspective.
 
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If Wellington was already in Portugal, why would it be a good idea to retreat from Spain? The Brits would prop it up.

Because the whole invasion of Spain was a big political and strategic mistake: the Spaniards did not want King Joseph, French occupation and even reforms. Guerrilla war was going on and the French had been losing experienced soldiers to no obvious purpose. Restoring Ferdinand early in 1812 (and evacuating French troops) would make the British advance from Portugal highly unlikely: the Spaniards hated French but if they are out, they'd not invite the Brits to occupy Spain and I'm not sure that in this scenario Wellington would even try.
 
Because the whole invasion of Spain was a big political and strategic mistake: the Spaniards did not want King Joseph, French occupation and even reforms. Guerrilla war was going on and the French had been losing experienced soldiers to no obvious purpose. Restoring Ferdinand early in 1812 (and evacuating French troops) would make the British advance from Portugal highly unlikely: the Spaniards hated French but if they are out, they'd not invite the Brits to occupy Spain and I'm not sure that in this scenario Wellington would even try.
That would mean abandoning the Continental system, though, if Portugal would then be able to carry on importing British goods unmolested; if you're gonna let that happen, then why bother with Russia in the first place?
Actually, it was because it relied too much on enemy's foolishness and incompetence and completely ignored the nationalistic/political component of this specific war.

Of course, I understand that comparing to you Nappy was just a mediocre military talent and his marshals were ordinary nincompoops who did not manage to accomplish such a trivial task as achieve enemy's surrender. However, making allowances to their limited mental capacities, complete lack of a military experience, absence of the radio and aerial surveillance and unavailability of the history books describing their mistakes and giving valuable recommendations, it is safe to say that they did pretty much what they could do under the circumstances in the area with which they were not familiar (just kidding). x'D

There were couple moments when a portion of the Russian army (not the whole army) could be cut off but the questionable "credit" goes mostly to the quarrels between the Russian top commanders about which Napoleon could not know (Bagration & Co forced Barclay to stay and fight at Smolensk with a resulting difficulty of extricating themselves out the the dangerous situation). An idea of forcing Russian army to surrender at Borodino is very interesting one but I wonder how this could be achieved if the retreat route was safely behind well-protected Russian right flank.

[...]

Well, the obvious problem with that scenario is, as I said earlier, the fact that the Russian commanders did not want to indulge Napoleon with such a battle. Even if on the early stage of campaign Davout was successful in cutting off and completely defeating Bagration (which would be quite difficult because, while being inept strategist, Bagration was a brilliant tactician with an impressive record of getting out of the difficult situations), this would only strengthen Barclay's resolve not to give a battle with the inferior numbers and fighting for Smolensk would be avoided altogether.

Clausewitz was quite skeptical about that "rampaging" scenario and, anyway, "Western Russia" amounted mostly to the Poland/Lithuania/Belorussia which were only marginally valuable from the "imperial" perspective.
Briefly,
Bagration himself attributed his escape to his enemy's underperformance, saying 'These fools have set me free!' Even if de Tolly becomes even more cautious after Bagration's destruction, he's still at risk of being cut off from his route of retreat. Moreover, even the best generals are not above critique, especially considering the outcome of the campaign. You don't have to be Alexander the Great to realize Jerome was not up to snuff as an army commander and that Napoleon shouldn't have stuck around in Vilna for eighteen days when the campaign resulted in the loss of half a million men. Like, we are allowed to point out where say Junot failed his mission, right?

Moreover, continued French presence on Russian soil into 1813 could have disastrous consequences for Alexander in the court of public opinion. There's this letter from his sister which really spells it out, saying, “the taking of Moscow has put the finishing touches on the exasperation of the people. Discontent is at its highest and your person is far from being spared. If such news reaches me, you can imagine the rest. You are openly accused of having brought disaster upon your empire, of having caused general ruin and the ruin of private individuals, lastly, of having lost the honor of the country and your own personal honor. I leave it to you to judge the state of affairs in a country whose leader is despised.”
Just read.

What Napoleon is reported of Napoleon’s sayings. What history scholars wrote.

And of course Napoleon was not an idiot. He did not think he had beaten Austria or Prussia just because he had won a battle. He also was most aware in 1807 that, after Friedland, there was a high risk the Russians would keep on fighting which would put him in a situation where he did not know how to end this war, because he wanted it short.

One of Napoleon’s weaknesses was that he was both a head of State and the commander in chief in the battlefield. He wanted to do all by himself. This put him in a very difficult situation and created a very strong incentive for him to lead short campaigns.

Once more, I must say that Napoleon did change his plan in early August 1812. The initial plan was a limited 2-year long campaign. This plan was quite clever, both strategically and geopolitically. This would force Russians to move and either to confront him or to accept the new de facto situation of a liberated Greater Poland. Such a war was much more sustainable in the long run for the napoleonic coalition than for Russia.

But the point was that Napoleon was quite out of touch in 1812. He did not understand Alexandre. He was aware of this, that he could not understand what were Alexander’s intentions and goal. And please don’t tell me this has no historic foundation. There are quotations of Napoleon saying so (not the out of touch statement, which of course Napoleon would never admit to).

He did literally screw his 1812 campaign.

He was neither defeated by winter which was later and milder than usual, nor by a genious Russian defensive strategy (the russians in fact had no coherent plan except retreating as long as they could not have a situation where they could fight a battle in a good situation.

Napoléon was defeated by himself. By his misunderstanding of Alexander’s I tentions, by his own strategic mistakes which created a logistical disaster and by the inadequacy of his new strategy of chasing the Russian armies.
Look, there's a fairly objective measure for the success of the campaign; if Napoleon's army can go into winter quarters in some safety and continue the campaign next year, the Russian army can be considered destroyed. On the other hand, to have a successful two year campaign like you propose, he would have to be able to accomplish this, or else abandon his gains in the east. This is something Napoleon really did achieve in previous campaigns; the Prussians were utterly obliterated in the pursuit after Jena, and so Napoleon was able to go into winter quarters on the far bank of the Vistula to deal with the Russians in the spring. Napoleon's initial plan was the same as his later plans; the destruction of the Russian army. His goal was to put it in a situation where it could no longer fight effectively, and from the beginning, his efforts were anything but limited. He sought to envelop the Russian armies with half a million men and destroy them in concentric attacks in the Bug-Narew-Pripyat pocket. It frankly boggles my mind that you can frame this as a limited effort.

It's like Clausewitz said, Napoleon's campaign failed because he didn't achieve the only means available to him, the destruction of the Russian armies; this was completely plausible for him to pull off as late as Borodino.
 
Frankly, you're the one playing at Risk, trying to take territory for territory's sake, completely losing sight of the broader strategic picture.

Sure, Russia has more room to retreat, but that's why Napoleon's campaign plans centered on the destruction of the Russian armies near the borders. And make no mistake, destruction was absolutely his objective; if you look at the actual plans, they're a massive concentric operational envelopment with half a million men intended to box in the Russian armies and smash them utterly. Anyone who doesn't see the strategy of annihilation in full force here is willfully blind. Once that was achieved, the Russians would be unable to meaningfully threaten the Imperial cantonments, allowing Napoleon to undertake continued campaigning next year if the Tsar refused to make peace after the annihilation of his main field armies. Moreover, you fail to see Clausewitz's distinction of the dual nature of war; Napoleon's plan was not a game of trading provinces at the negotiating table, but leaving his enemy helpless to resist the imposition of his goals by force.

That's all true but the sheer scope of the operation made its successful execution unlikely unless enemy is "cooperating" by staying where it is and not trying to avoid the encirclement. Communications were not the strong point of the Napoleonic army (compare this with Subotai getting information about the Battle of Legnicą within 3 days while being more than 400km away at Mochi :winkytongue:) and neither was military intelligence or even reconnaissance (at Jena/Auerstedt Napoleon went against the "wrong" Prussian army leaving Davout with a single corps to deal with their main force; in 1812 his cavalry after Russian retreat from Moscow "lost" Russian army, etc.). Moreover, most of the marshals could not be relied upon as far as the independent maneuvers had been involved which lowered number of the independent players to him and Davout (who managed to be on bad terms with most of his colleagues). As a result, he was usually too late to react on the opponent's moves and communicating orders to the marshals was taking additional time. To succeed with his plan he needed to have on the other side either somebody like Mack at Ulm (holding position until surrounded) or like Alexander at Austerlitz (rushing into an ill-conceived attack).

Actually, if the Russians stuck to the plan proposed by von Phull and chosen by Alexander over the numerous alternatives (and of which Napoleon was probably aware), Nappy's goal could be achieved with Drissa being as close to a death trap as was practically possible: the 1st Army was supposed to stay in a fortified camp to prevent Napoleon's further advance while a tiny 2nd army had to act on his communications (of course, success of that plan means that the 2nd Russian Army most probably escapes). Taking into an account size of the French army, the plan was a complete absurdity and its acceptance says volumes about Alexander's competence at that time. Fortunately, danger of the plan was too obvious to the Russian military leadership and they managed to persuade Alexander to abandon it (and to leave the army). From this point on implementation of Napoleon's plan became impossible and, at best, he could expect to destroy part of the Russian force, which would be more or less pointless as far as the goal of war was involved. Politically, he was seemingly unprepared to anything but Alexander's reasonably fast capitulation and it is not even quite clear which conditions he was ready to offer. As a result, when his initial strategic plan failed he was improvising both militarily and politically. Staying in Smolensk was not a good option: Clausewitz produced quite convincing explanation why this was a bad idea. OTOH, a headlong advance toward Moscow also proved to be a disaster.

What would happen if Napoleon did manage to completely destroy BOTH the 1st and 2nd Armies near the border (highly unlikely but let it be)? There were 44—49K in the 3rd Army in Ukraine, 59K on the Danube, 31K in Finland, 42K on the Caucasus, 18K at Riga, and 4 more corps (50 - 60K) in the rear. Then there were 117K of the irregular cavalry out of which only 20 - 25K had been already deployed on the front line. If Napoleon stops in Smolensk for winter, it means that the Grand Army is actually stretched on a very wide front from Baltic coast to Ukraine because otherwise it is going to be starving and freezing (simply not enough accommodations in Smolensk even if it is captured absolutely intact). Basically, the same thing that Clausewitz wrote applies: there are gaps between the French units into which the Russian irregular troops could penetrate with impunity cutting off the supply lines and exterminating the small French parties looking for the supplies locally. At any point each of these isolated units could be attacked by an overwhelming Russian force forcing Napoleon and his marshals to march here and there, reshuffling and exhausting their troops. All the problems with the winter clothes, horse shoes, etc. are the same as in OTL and by the spring time the French are in a very bad shape with most of their horses dead, the troops starving, big losses from the frostbites and no supplies accumulated for the continued campaign. During the winter months Russians would be able to raise more troops and Napoleon is pretty much in the same situation he was in OTL after Smolensk except that his forces are thinly spread over the big space.

Would Alexander be tempted to make a peace? Most probably, not. The economic and political base of his empire is pretty much intact, the enthusiasm and wish of a revenge is still there and the British subsidies and supplies keep coming to partially compensate the costs and to help with production of the new weapons (Russian military industry was producing 1200—1300 guns and 43,000 - 96,000 muskets annually).
 
That would mean abandoning the Continental system, though, if Portugal would then be able to carry on importing British goods unmolested; if you're gonna let that happen, then why bother with Russia in the first place?

"Bothering" with Russia was only partially due to the Continental System. Alexander assumed rather aggressive stance demanding withdrawal of the French troops from a big part of Germany, etc. The System never really worked. Not only Napoleon himself was bypassing it allowing the British goods to be carried by the neutral ships (argument which Caulaincourt had been using trying to persuade Napoleon not to attack Russia) but there was a whole system allowing to bypass the restrictions due to the fake privateering (Marbout, IIRC, "credited" Bernadotte with its invention). So with Russia it was a challenge to his authority as a supreme ruler of Europe. Neither Portugal nor Spain represented such a challenge.



Briefly,
Bagration himself attributed his escape to his enemy's underperformance, saying 'These fools have set me free!' Even if de Tolly becomes even more cautious after Bagration's destruction, he's still at risk of being cut off from his route of retreat.

Very unlikely. Bagration was, indeed, in a tight spot for a while and after both armies got together he, as a leading member of the "Russian Party" became the major endangering factor insisting on the pitched battle and bragging about his ability to defeat Napoleon with 30,000 troops. Then again, Barclay had more than one potential route of retreat and cut him off completely (like Mack at Ulm) was almost impossible.

Moreover, even the best generals are not above critique, especially considering the outcome of the campaign. You don't have to be Alexander the Great to realize Jerome was not up to snuff as an army commander and that Napoleon shouldn't have stuck around in Vilna for eighteen days when the campaign resulted in the loss of half a million men. Like, we are allowed to point out where say Junot failed his mission, right?

Yes, but what's the point?

His "master plan" required a perfect execution on the French side and almost complete incompetence on the Russian. None of these requirements had been fulfilled.

Moreover, continued French presence on Russian soil into 1813 could have disastrous consequences for Alexander in the court of public opinion. There's this letter from his sister which really spells it out, saying, “the taking of Moscow has put the finishing touches on the exasperation of the people. Discontent is at its highest and your person is far from being spared. If such news reaches me, you can imagine the rest. You are openly accused of having brought disaster upon your empire, of having caused general ruin and the ruin of private individuals, lastly, of having lost the honor of the country and your own personal honor. I leave it to you to judge the state of affairs in a country whose leader is despised.”

Maria Pavlovna was easily excitable. Of course loss of Moscow was a hit to the morale on the "top" (with whom else did she communicate?) but it also was a triggering event for raising cry for a revenge. And as far as pushing the buck, Kutuzov was not relieved of his command and the things kept running their normal course. Nappy staying on Smolensk line in 1813 would be unpleasant thing but not a disaster, especially if the Russian armies manage to deliver even the limited successes.

Look, there's a fairly objective measure for the success of the campaign; if Napoleon's army can go into winter quarters in some safety and continue the campaign next year, the Russian army can be considered destroyed.

The main problem with the above is that it could not "go into winter quarters in some safety" (see Clausewitz on the subject).

It's like Clausewitz said, Napoleon's campaign failed because he didn't achieve the only means available to him, the destruction of the Russian armies; this was completely plausible for him to pull off as late as Borodino.

I'm afraid that you are misinterpreting what Clausewitz was saying. IIRC, his point was that even before Borodino the French army shrunk down to the size which stopped making it intimidating enough for enforcing the peace and that after Borodino it was simply hopeless. So, unless you somehow manage to come with scenario under which Napoleon is at the gates of Moscow with 250 - 300K troops, situation is quite different. But how would he manage to do so with his OTL army?

As for the battle itself, Kutuzov made practically all possible mistakes and demonstrated something close to a complete ineptitude as a leader (it seems that even a big part of the Russian reserve artillery never had been engaged) but Nappy did not manage to achieve the destruction of Russian army. So if he could not do this in pretty much best case scenario why do you think that it was "completely plausible" for him?
 
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What about advancing to the Dniepr-Düna line, which some smarter German generals suggested to Hitler in WW2 (and were blown off, of course)?
 
What about advancing to the Dniepr-Düna line, which some smarter German generals suggested to Hitler in WW2 (and were blown off, of course)?

Basically, this was what Napoleon more or less did on the 1st stage of campaign. Of course the French did not reach Riga but they came reasonably close.

However, an idea of Smolensk (on Dnieper) being an ultimate goal of the 1st campaign (with the French left flank stretching to Daugava) was discussed by Clausewitz with a conclusion that it was impractical. Stretching the line even further South along the Dnieper would create even more problems.

What strategic and political goals could be achieved by staying on that line if the Russian armies managed to escape the planned encirclement? Pretty much none. What would be supply & accommodation situation if the French remained on that line during the winter? Not very good one. Smolensk was burned almost to the ground with only few stone buildings surviving. The area around was not densely settled so the French would have to break into the small group to be able to stay in the villages. Was the area around proposed line be able to support 500 - 600,000 soldiers and corresponding number of horses during the winter? Highly unlikely: as I said, the area was not densely populated and, to put it mildly, not "the bread basket" of Russia. So the big part of supplies would have to be brought from Lithuania and Poland putting the further stress on the local peasants (and nobles).

russia_1812_map.jpg



Now, what the line would mean in the practical terms? To provide at least a minimal security, it would have to stretch all the way from Riga (or at least Riga area if the city is not taken; in OTL Marshal Jacques MacDonald tried and failed with 30,000 troops) all the way to Smolensk (more than 300 miles) and then further to Bryansk, another 150 miles, to cover possibility of the Russian counter-offensive from Orel direction. Strictly speaking, it should stretch even further at least to Gomel (another 150 miles) to protect from a possible attack of the armies of Tormasov and Tchichagov (90 - 100K with 370 guns) from the South. So you already have to cover a front of between 450 and 600 miles leaving opponent with a complete freedom of action against each of its sectors. And, unless you are ready to extend it even further all the way to Kiev and somehow manage to force Schwarzenberg to get out of his usual comatose condition and advance against Tormasov with an ultimate purpose to control the road Warsaw - Kiev, you'll have to supply your right flank by the same route Wilna - Minsk - Borisov - Orsha - Smolensk as your center.
 
What about Ukraine? In the 20th century, it was THE breadbasket of Russia / the Soviet Union.

Part of it was in Austrian hands and if you look at the map Nappy could not conveniently get to Ukraine by advancing from Poland: there are huge Pripiet Marshes right on the way and he has to go either to the South of them (Warsaw - Brest - Kiev) or to the North, which he did in OTL. Besides, his goal was to force Russia to capitulate and from this perspective occupation of Ukraine was pretty much pointless: plenty of grain had been produced in European Russia, no vital communications would be cut off (Odessa was only going to grow into a major port) and nothing politically important there (Nappy was misinformed and overestimated "spiritual" role of Moscow but did not have illusions about Kiev). Then again, the issue would be not as much what's growing in the area but rather your ability to grab it. With the offensive starting in the early summer the crop is not ripe, yet and will not be until the fall so it does not really matter for few next months how good the harvest is: you still have to fed your troops and horses.

Plus, no chance to cut off and destroy the main Russian armies and a clear possibility for them to attack unprotected Duchy of Warsaw.
 
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