What would be needed to repel a US bombing campaign?

Status
Not open for further replies.

ObessesedNuker
A US staff officer once observed that you could have swapped the two sides equipment and the results would have been little different...


… their part, the Serbs fired around 800 missiles in turn, scoring only two (manned) aircraft kills, mostly due to this suppression effort



If the exchange rate is 800 x SA-3 SAM’s for 2 x US planes shot down, then the Soviets would run out of SAM’s long before the Americans ran out of aircraft.


The US staff officer that said swapping equipment would lead to the same result never went up against a Patriot missile battery,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot



Patriot missile batteries were involved in three friendly fire incidents, resulting in the downing of a Royal Air Force Tornado and the death of both crew members, Flight Lieutenant David Rhys Williams and Flight Lieutenant Kevin Barry Main, on March 23, 2003. On March 24, 2003, a USAF F-16CJ Fighting Falcon fired a HARM anti-radiation missile at a Patriot missile battery after the Patriot's radar had locked onto and prepared to fire at the aircraft, causing the pilot to mistake it for an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. The HARM missed its target and no one was injured and the Patriot Radar was examined and continued to operate but was replaced due to a chance that a fragment may have penetrated it and gone undetected.[48] On April 2, 2003, 2 PAC-3 missiles shot down a USN F/A-18 Hornet killing U.S. Navy Lieutenant Nathan D. White of VFA-195, Carrier Air Wing Five.[49][50]

That’s probably something like two blue on blue kills for 4 or 6 missiles fired., or a massive PK rate of 1:3, not 1:400 like the SA-3.
 

I'm inclined to generally agree with obsessed nukers assessment of a soviet style air defence system (with the added proviso that it is opposing a strategic bombing campaign from a distance rather than tactical airforces at close range) run by a state with the resources of the Soviet Union and presumably operated with the skill that the west expected the Soviet air defence staff to possess during the end of the Cold War.


The Russians themselves seem to have strongly disagreed by upgrading their SAM inventories after 1990 by way of phasing out the older electronics (SA-2, 3, 5, 6) and replacing them with steerable phased array types (SA-10, 12, 20). The reason will be that theoretical lethality doesn’t matter – what counts is lethality (hit to kill PK) under jamming and the older systems are lacking, while the newer systems can probably still function. Secondly, the newer missiles are more kinetic, (another race being the ability of the SAM to get to the plane before the HARM gets to the SAM). Another aspect is hit-to-kill anti-missile. (By deploying SA-19 and SA-22 with SA-400 batteries, the SA-400 relies on the others to shoot down incoming HARM missiles in order that the battery can engage as many targets as possible).

Not that the old systems are completely useless – the Serbians demonstrated otherwise. But they are more non-lethal harassment, causing more sorties than necessary, rather than a real defense.



 
The Russians themselves seem to have strongly disagreed by upgrading their SAM inventories after 1990 by way of phasing out the older electronics (SA-2, 3, 5, 6) and replacing them with steerable phased array types (SA-10, 12, 20). The reason will be that theoretical lethality doesn’t matter – what counts is lethality (hit to kill PK) under jamming and the older systems are lacking, while the newer systems can probably still function. Secondly, the newer missiles are more kinetic, (another race being the ability of the SAM to get to the plane before the HARM gets to the SAM). Another aspect is hit-to-kill anti-missile. (By deploying SA-19 and SA-22 with SA-400 batteries, the SA-400 relies on the others to shoot down incoming HARM missiles in order that the battery can engage as many targets as possible).

Not that the old systems are completely useless – the Serbians demonstrated otherwise. But they are more non-lethal harassment, causing more sorties than necessary, rather than a real defense.
I don't disagree that the newer SAMs were better than the old one, but I still believe the Soviet air defence system as a whole would have inflicted un sustainable losses against SAC if the U.S. had attempted to mount a sustained conventional bombing campaign during the end of the cold war against the Soviet Union outside of the range of US tactical air forces. The U.S. Strategic bomber forces were finite and I suspect the Soviet Union could have shot them down faster than the U.S. could have made new ones.
 
Last edited:

If the exchange rate is 800 x SA-3 SAM’s for 2 x US planes shot down, then the Soviets would run out of SAM’s long before the Americans ran out of aircraft.


The US staff officer that said swapping equipment would lead to the same result never went up against a Patriot missile battery,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot



Patriot missile batteries were involved in three friendly fire incidents, resulting in the downing of a Royal Air Force Tornado and the death of both crew members, Flight Lieutenant David Rhys Williams and Flight Lieutenant Kevin Barry Main, on March 23, 2003. On March 24, 2003, a USAF F-16CJ Fighting Falcon fired a HARM anti-radiation missile at a Patriot missile battery after the Patriot's radar had locked onto and prepared to fire at the aircraft, causing the pilot to mistake it for an Iraqi surface-to-air missile system. The HARM missed its target and no one was injured and the Patriot Radar was examined and continued to operate but was replaced due to a chance that a fragment may have penetrated it and gone undetected.[48] On April 2, 2003, 2 PAC-3 missiles shot down a USN F/A-18 Hornet killing U.S. Navy Lieutenant Nathan D. White of VFA-195, Carrier Air Wing Five.[49][50]

That’s probably something like two blue on blue kills for 4 or 6 missiles fired., or a massive PK rate of 1:3, not 1:400 like the SA-3.

So even facing dedicated defence suppression, fighter cover etc defenders using soviet style air defence systems managed to shoot down 1 air craft for every 400 elderly SAMs fired. I suspect the Soviet Union using newer systems against un escorted heavy bombers will do much better. Add in defending interceptors that don't have to contend with fighter escorts and this doesn't bode well for SAC.
 
I don't disagree that the newer SAMs were better than the old one, but I still believe the Soviet air defence system as a whole would have inflicted un sustainable losses against SAC if the U.S. had attempted to mount a sustained conventional bombing campaign during the end of the cold war against the Soviet Union outside of the range of US tactical air forces. The U.S. Strategic bomber forces were finite and I suspect the Soviet Union could have shot them down faster than the U.S. could have made new ones.

For example, assuming a large number of aircraft were in range, an S-400 battery might be able to shoot down, say 50 aircraft in one engagement through jamming using maybe 100 or 150 missiles. An SA-3 battery might take 5 years of combat and 20,000 missiles to do what an S-400 might do in 20 minutes. That to me suggests the S-400 is something like 100 times more effective than the SA-3.

On the Patriot friendly fire incidents, note that by accident the modern SAM scored in 3 engagements 2 of the 12 shoot downs by radar guided SAM's of Coalition aircraft - given that thousands of Iraqi missiles must have been fired for the other ten, that would make the Patriot again something like a hundred or hundreds of times more effective than the older single digit Russian SAM types.
 
Last edited:
So even facing dedicated defence suppression, fighter cover etc defenders using soviet style air defence systems managed to shoot down 1 air craft for every 400 elderly SAMs fired. I suspect the Soviet Union using newer systems against un escorted heavy bombers will do much better. Add in defending interceptors that don't have to contend with fighter escorts and this doesn't bode well for SAC.

But when the Serbians have, say, 2,000 heavy SAM missiles in their entire inventory and the Americans have 8,000 aircraft, I doubt the shooting down of five planes with 2,000 missiles is slowing down the other 7,995 aircraft that much.
 
But when the Serbians have, say, 2,000 heavy SAM missiles in their entire inventory and the Americans have 8,000 aircraft, I doubt the shooting down of five planes with 2,000 missiles is slowing down the other 7,995 aircraft that much.
I basically agree except SAC has a much smaller fleet of aircraft in this time period that were likely to have been useable in a conventional air campaign against the Soviet Union.

To recap my point is that I believe the Soviet Union could have stopped a sustained SAC conventional bomber offensive without US Tac air support during the late Cold War period.
 
I agree except SAC only has a few 100 aircraft in this time period that were likely to have been useable in a conventional air campaign against the Soviet Union.

To recap my point is that I believe the Soviet Union could have stopped a sustained SAC conventional bomber offensive without US Tac air support during the late Cold War period.

If you're indicating that B-52 bombers were a fish out of water during Linebacker II, then yes. But in terms of the lethality of older Russian SAM's against USAF tactical air power, the only one that performed to the extent of dominating the battlefield for at least some time might have been SA-6 during Yom Kippur.
 
If you're indicating that B-52 bombers were a fish out of water during Linebacker II, then yes. But in terms of the lethality of older Russian SAM's against USAF tactical air power, the only one that performed to the extent of dominating the battlefield for at least some time might have been SA-6 during Yom Kippur.
I seem to recall B52 losses during the linebacker raids were considered fairly heavy at time but I don't recall the specifics.

That being said I suspect if the Cold War had gone hot in the late 1980's or early 1990's NATO might have received a similar un pleasant surprise to the one the Israelis had in 1973. I'm not sure it would have necessairly been decisive though.

I recall reading how the USN attributed certain air craft losses (or perhaps a single loss ??) over Lebanon in the 1980's to a Soviet sensor change (that presumably their countermeasures couldn't effectively deal with.) I suspect the Soviets had other surprises in store for the west.
 
Last edited:
Yes that could present issues for the U.S. That being said the early 1990's US had a large number of comabat air craft, air craft carriers, air tankers etc to use to grind down an opponent if they were sufficently motivated.

B1 (edit I'm not sure if the B1's had a viable conventional capability in the early 1990's ?) and B52 strikes from the CONUS with fighter cover and SAM suppression from say 6 (or more) USN Carrier battle groups would be hard for any nation other than the Soviet Union to stop with conventional means.
True, but a ATL unified Vietnam that shoots down enough B52s might create a change in strategy that satisfies the OP, though I agree, once Vietnam runs out of MIGs or enough air defense installations are destroyed, the bombing resumes.
 
True, but a ATL unified Vietnam that shoots down enough B52s might create a change in strategy that satisfies the OP, though I agree, once Vietnam runs out of MIGs or enough air defense installations are destroyed, the bombing resumes.
Yep. Arguably sinking one or more carriers could have more infulence on the U.S. than shooting down aircraft.

The U.S. tolerance for losses is going to depend on the context. In the long run I would expect a mobilized and suitably motivated US could replace losses faster than any entity other than the Soviet Union (or a similar ATL entity) could inflict them in this type of scenario.

I'll try and stop commenting further in this thread unless something new comes up.

Best
 

Ak-84

Banned
Just a couple of things. The Patriot kills versus Allied Aircraft should not be equated with the actual likely performance against enemy planes. This is the equivalent of stabbing your own guys in the back by mistake, they don't expect to be hit. Even 1991 era Iraqi aircraft would have had a better chance. Iraqi AF was surprisingly good at avoiding AAM shots in OTL.

Secondly, Linebacker II loss rates were considered unsustainable. About 2% S-75 launched hit their targets and 15 BUFF's were lost.

Either way the best chance is as someone said upthread, a nation with sufficient offensive air and missile capability to seriously threaten USAF bases. Meaning either NATO bigwigs like UK or France. Or Russia and China, in which case you are looking at global thermonuclear war and everyone involved has more pressing concern. India and Pakistan also have such capability now (not so much in 1991). But both are nuclear powers and an Iraq 1991/2003 or even Kosovo 1999 type war is probably way past their nuclear threshold.

So to stop the USAF, you need either Allies, peer/near-peer adversaries or nuclear powers. In short, not happening.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Top