What would be a good peace after WWI?

Divide Germany into two parts, going along religious lines. Tell the Bavarians, Badenians and Wurtembergians that Prussian rule has only brought misfortune on them, and war they didn't need or want. Let them even unite with Austria. Afterwards, favoritize Southern Germans over Northern ones when dealing with things like reparations, border changes etc. to increase the divide between them.
North Germany alone should be possible to contain with French and Polish forces if needed.

Um...you sure they would buy into that? And I don't think that they would be able to do such a colonial-power move to "fellow white Europeans" instead of "savage dark tribals"...
 
That's the thing though only from a certain perspective could you say that Germany+Austria (in whatever form that takes) would be a hegemon; it would still have military restrictions, reparations, and territorial losses of major resource areas. Its industrial heartland would be occupied and demilitarized, surrounded by enemies willing to keep her in check, and having lost her only major ally, plus most of her trade markets; Germany would still be a basket case economically due to hyperinflation and the human losses, but now also having to deal with Austria's problems. Maybe in the far future it could recover, but for the next generation at least it is prostrate. With the Austrians its more politically divided than ever and the Catholics and Socialists are heavily strengthened with the addition of Austria.

It would only be fair to compensate Germany after its pretty serious hamstringing with Austria, but also to moderate it in the long term; its pretty superficial to claim that Germany would walk away from the ToV then as a giant, as it ignores all of the problems post-war Germany has.

Of course a greater germany of 1919 created from 2 losers wouldnt be a hegemon from the beginning. But as times go by this big Germany will recover. And do you thing that adding Austria to Germany would create more divide than lets say the poles had?

But my point is that its really hard to imagine any of the winners agreeing to this after WWI. A more lenient peace is one thing but this seems far too hard to shallow for example to France just after WWI. Maybe if France had the goal of a later rapprochement with Germany when making the peace.

Since we are talking about a peace treaty in 1918-19, obviously we are presuming Germany had already had its revolution and a government largely of Social Democrats was in charge. The Kaiser was gone (although possible retention of the monarchy in some form was still an option) and Hindenburg and Ludendorff were out of the picture. So here's my take:

1. The allies should have done all that they could to legitimize the new government in the eyes of the world and especially the German people. True or not, the Allies should have acknowledged that this regime was not the same regime at the start of the war and that it was not responsible for any of the supposed outrages of the German Empire. No "war guilt clauses" for sure, and less severe reparations as well.

2. With the exception of Alsace-Lorraine going back to France (which I think would be a political necessity in view of how this territory was taken from France in 1870) all other territorial adjustments affecting the borders of pre-War Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey needed to be presented as items up for negotiation at the conference table, not dictates. Military realities would probably put the Central Powers at a disadvantage in these negotiations, but at least they were being treated as negotiating partners and not being disrespected. Considering that the A-H Empire was already disintegrating, in the spirit of Wilson's 14 points the Allies should have been open to an Austrian-German Anschluss and a less draconian reduction of Hungary in establishing the new nations in central and eastern Europe.

3. End all economic warfare against the Central Powers (ie., the naval blockade) as soon as the peace negotiations begin, while making sure the Germans understand that the Allies reserved the right to resume it if no settlement is reached or Germany appears to negotiates in bad faith (ie treats the negotiations only as a lull while it prepares for a new offensive)

4. The Allies should have negotiated the reduction of German armed forces in the context of a broader arms-limitation treaty, while making it clear to Germany (as the party that lost the war) that it was not going to be permitted an army and navy as large as it had in 1914-18. No artificial limits on the how Germany meets the agreed upon limits in manpower, ship tonnage, etc.

5. Allow Germany, Austria (if it remains independent), Hungary, and other CP states to join any and all international organizations (especially the League of Nations) immediately upon signing the treaty and even before the terms of the treaty are fully implemented.

6. In the negotiations, the Allies should consider the extent to which the new German government reduces the power and authority of Army and Naval ministers to influence political decisions, and offer increasingly lenient terms to the extent that this occurs...and let this be publically understood as a factor in the treaty negotiations.

WW1 was called "The War to End All Wars". The Versailles Treaty was anything but.

Finally some more concret points. And you are the first one to mention the other peace deals - which were pretty bad as well but as the losers werent potential treats to world peace they tend to be ignored.

I like your points but if you are already touching how the political institutions work in some countries you could make sure they are proper democracies. Like i would like to remove the clauses of the Weimar Constitution that makes presidential government possible (article 48 i think).
 
Some other points of ToV

Sorry, coming into this a bit late but I'd like to raise a few other points about the ToV that really shaped the feelings about it ... at least in Germany. The key item (I believe) is the contrast between 1814-5 Congress of Vienna and the ToV --

1. Following the armistice the British kept the blockade in place and required foreign ship bottoms to carry food to Germany ... and Germany had to pay IN GOLD for any foreign transactions ... this requirement following a war that ravaged the treasuries of all belligerent countries. In fact the French and British had lived the last 1 1/2 years of the war on UNSECURED American loans. Up until 1917 the US had required the British to provide collateral for US credit.

2. German diplomats were not allowed to attend the discussions that led up to the final ToV and its individual points ... unlike 1814 when Talleyrand (the French Foreign Minister) was a "force majure" in the entire process. The German side did not see a copy of the document until just before it was to be signed ... e.g. sign it "as is" or let your people starve in the coming winter (see item 1. above). It is interesting to speculate on the outcome if the Wiemar diplomats had demurred and simply walked out.

3. The concept of a "Wilsonian Peace" was cynically used by the Entente on a very ad Hoc basis... only when the results of a plebiscite fitted the intended actions were they used and implemented. If there was a chance of it not "Coming out correctly" then it was quashed or simply not allowed to go froward - (A-L, "Polish Corridor", Ober Schlesien, Danzig, Marburg an der Drau, Sued Tyrol, Oestreich und Sudetenland, Saarland, et al .

4. Both the British and French owed so much money to the US that they were almost totally dependent on reparations payment from Germany to pay their own debts.

5. The Polish corridor rationale for a "Seaport" can be contrasted to the commercial trading situation of Chezcoslovakia in the inter war years and even to this very date.

6. Finally a lot of this could perhaps be endured by the new democratic republican Weimar Germany, but the final "coup de grace" was the war responsibility clause ... the facts can be argued, but by signing the ToV the Wiemar Republic (I believe ... with total hindsight of 100 years) signed their own death warrant.

7. I have purposely avoided discussion of the military limitations ... they were similarly fashioned in a way to ensure a peace the Entente were unwilling to actively enforce with "boots on the ground". The best quote is from the French General / Marshal Foch ... "This is not a peace. It is an armistice for twenty years". Largely because he understood that without returning "Germany" to an agricultural hodge podge of mini states, a surviving Germany would repudiate the treaty and given the economic clout of the combined country (even after so devastating a conflict) would be in a position to threaten France again.

At least my two cents ...
 
I like your points but if you are already touching how the political institutions work in some countries you could make sure they are proper democracies. Like i would like to remove the clauses of the Weimar Constitution that makes presidential government possible (article 48 i think).

If the purpose of the Treaty was to minimize the potential for another general European War, I actually don't think "proper democracies" in nations with no real democratic traditions are necessarily a good thing. Democracy can easily degenerate into to majoritarian or populist tyranny as to some extent what happened in Nazi Germany. The problem wasn't the strong presidency established in the Weimar constitution, it was the fact that the office's independence (and Hindenburg's) became compromised in the latter stages of the Weimar collapse. I'd argue that, in Germany's case at least, a intervention of a strong authoritarian hand from the more moderate right might have been the only thing that could stop Hitler by 1932-33.
 
Yes it fact it did if the 'superior' results hinge on an unenforceable terms.

Which I purposefully was not commenting on the actual practical effects, only on the fact that a peace treaty does not necessarily have to be pleasant to still achieve better results. I have not made the claim that an unenforceable peace treaty is a good thing, only that if capabilities for enforcement exist, a treaty does not need to be nice to fulfill better outcomes.

That's the thing though only from a certain perspective could you say that Germany+Austria (in whatever form that takes) would be a hegemon; it would still have military restrictions, reparations, and territorial losses of major resource areas. Its industrial heartland would be occupied and demilitarized, surrounded by enemies willing to keep her in check, and having lost her only major ally, plus most of her trade markets; Germany would still be a basket case economically due to hyperinflation and the human losses, but now also having to deal with Austria's problems. Maybe in the far future it could recover, but for the next generation at least it is prostrate. With the Austrians its more politically divided than ever and the Catholics and Socialists are heavily strengthened with the addition of Austria.

It would only be fair to compensate Germany after its pretty serious hamstringing with Austria, but also to moderate it in the long term; its pretty superficial to claim that Germany would walk away from the ToV then as a giant, as it ignores all of the problems post-war Germany has.

You can apply almost all of this to the historical Germany, except for internal political changes and Austrian problems - which I doubt would be as much as you conjugate. Austria is 6.4 m people. And Germany did end up in the situation of a hegemony, however briefly. There was historically elements of support for the Nazis, and there was a government that was fascist. I think you're overestimating how much opposition this is going to generate to somebody like the Nazis, and how effective that is going to be. Also a lot of Austria's problems of economic and political are going to be solved by inclusion with Germany, diminishing the troubles of their integration.

Furthermore, where are you coming up with the idea that the surrounding powers are going to be capable of restraining it? There are two serious powers in Europe - Britain isn't really serious about European affairs over the long run - France and Italy. France was historically unable to constrain Germany, which is pretty natural concerning France's much smaller population and dramatically inferior industrial might - not to mention higher proportional Great War casualties and larger external debts. Italy is even more starkly inferior in terms of industry and similar population wise to France, and furthermore has greater trouble projecting power given the terrain they have to advance over i.e.. the Alps. Both Italy and France had rivalry during the period, so them working together isn't automatic. Given that historically they failed to constrain a weaker Germany, I do not see why they're now going to constrain Germany. Also now there are even more states in Central Europe that are vulnerable to the Germans, and German strength is again proportionally increased.
 

JJohnson

Banned
How about this?

-Schleswig must have a plebiscite to determine whether it goes to Denmark or Germany
-Alsace-Lorraine has a Kreis-by-Kreis plebescite to determine which parts go to France or Germany.
-Austria is permitted to merge with Germany with its claimed 'German Austria' territory (Teschen Silesia, Sudetenland, German Bohemia, etc)
-Germany's navy must be limited to 2/3 the tonnage of the British Navy; the army limited to 1/2 the size of that of the British army for 20 years.
-Poland has port rights to any Baltic ports of Germany without duties for 40 years, and the right to enter Germany freely to sell their goods
-Polish-speakers shall have minority rights within Germany to use their language and keep their culture but Posen, West Prussia, and Silesia shall remain with Germany. This avoids any revanchism against Poland.
-Germany shall agree not to impose tariffs on any Polish goods for 25 years.
-Germany shall pay reparations, along with Austria and Hungary, to the allies, in proportion to the war debts of the allies, in the form of food, gold, reduced tariffs, etc., once a new government is formed in Berlin, not to exceed 15% of German GDP in amount, but shall continue until completely paid off. This should avoid crippling the economy and hyperinflation.
-Germany's existing government shall abdicate and the current Kaiser alone shall accept responsibility for the war, but the country itself and her people shall not be held responsible in any way; and a new monarch placed on the throne, limited constitutionally in power, with firm protections of the rights of German citizens (speech, religion, press, search and seizure, bear arms, etc) without any right to abrogate those rights in any emergency (avoiding some problems of the 30s). Voting shall be expanded to all Germans over 21, regardless of property rights (and the allies/Germans shall stamp out extremist parties to maintain order)
-Germany's new government shall be a constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is chosen by the upper house of the legislature; the legislature is bicameral, with the lower house popularly elected and the upper house chosen by the states, with 2 members per state; Prussia is broken up into states based on its provinces, and smaller states may merge with the larger states if by plebiscite they choose to do so.
-Germany shall pledge to maintain neutrality in international relations for 25 years, except if attacked first; it shall also join the League of Nations.
-Germany shall yield all its colonies to the League of Nations mandates except German Samoa, Bougainville, Nauru, and the Caroline Islands.
 
Last edited:
-Germany's existing government shall abdicate and accept responsibility for the war,...

That opens again the can of worms that is the War Guild question. Only in this case it is the politicans and not Germany. Imo a meaningless differentiation because it again blames Germany in some form for WWI.
 

JJohnson

Banned
I made a mild edit so that it's only the Kaiser who is made responsible, alone. I don't know if that'll mollify the Allies, or if it'll cause even more problems in Germany down the line though.
 
German Navy 2/3rds the size of the British Navy - completely unacceptable to Britain as the Growth of the German navy was one of the key issues that pushed Britain towards friendship with Frane.

German Army limited to 1/2 the size of the British Army:D. Completely unacceptable to Germany - this is worse than Versailles.
 
Which I purposefully was not commenting on the actual practical effects, only on the fact that a peace treaty does not necessarily have to be pleasant to still achieve better results. I have not made the claim that an unenforceable peace treaty is a good thing, only that if capabilities for enforcement exist, a treaty does not need to be nice to fulfill better outcomes.



You can apply almost all of this to the historical Germany, except for internal political changes and Austrian problems - which I doubt would be as much as you conjugate. Austria is 6.4 m people. And Germany did end up in the situation of a hegemony, however briefly. There was historically elements of support for the Nazis, and there was a government that was fascist. I think you're overestimating how much opposition this is going to generate to somebody like the Nazis, and how effective that is going to be. Also a lot of Austria's problems of economic and political are going to be solved by inclusion with Germany, diminishing the troubles of their integration.

Furthermore, where are you coming up with the idea that the surrounding powers are going to be capable of restraining it? There are two serious powers in Europe - Britain isn't really serious about European affairs over the long run - France and Italy. France was historically unable to constrain Germany, which is pretty natural concerning France's much smaller population and dramatically inferior industrial might - not to mention higher proportional Great War casualties and larger external debts. Italy is even more starkly inferior in terms of industry and similar population wise to France, and furthermore has greater trouble projecting power given the terrain they have to advance over i.e.. the Alps. Both Italy and France had rivalry during the period, so them working together isn't automatic. Given that historically they failed to constrain a weaker Germany, I do not see why they're now going to constrain Germany. Also now there are even more states in Central Europe that are vulnerable to the Germans, and German strength is again proportionally increased.

You would be right except that a peace treaty were Germany is allowed to unite with Austria is most likely a much more lenient peace treaty in other points as well. This would make this Germany much less resentful and rapprochement with France would be faster and probably they would get much farther down this road before the Great Depression. this might be enough to butterfly away the nazis coming to power - it could be a close thing.

The other parts i agree with.

And i still have a hard time imagining the allies letting Austria join Germany. I like the idea but i cant really see it happening.

How about this?

-Schleswig must have a plebiscite to determine whether it goes to Denmark or Germany
-Alsace-Lorraine has a Kreis-by-Kreis plebescite to determine which parts go to France or Germany.
-Austria is permitted to merge with Germany with its claimed 'German Austria' territory (Teschen Silesia, Sudetenland, German Bohemia, etc)
-Germany's navy must be limited to 2/3 the tonnage of the British Navy; the army limited to 1/2 the size of that of the British army for 20 years.
-Poland has port rights to any Baltic ports of Germany without duties for 40 years, and the right to enter Germany freely to sell their goods
-Polish-speakers shall have minority rights within Germany to use their language and keep their culture but Posen, West Prussia, and Silesia shall remain with Germany. This avoids any revanchism against Poland.
-Germany shall agree not to impose tariffs on any Polish goods for 25 years.
-Germany shall pay reparations, along with Austria and Hungary, to the allies, in proportion to the war debts of the allies, in the form of food, gold, reduced tariffs, etc., once a new government is formed in Berlin, not to exceed 15% of German GDP in amount, but shall continue until completely paid off. This should avoid crippling the economy and hyperinflation.
-Germany's existing government shall abdicate and accept responsibility for the war, but the country itself and her people shall not be held responsible in any way; and a new monarch placed on the throne, limited constitutionally in power, with firm protections of the rights of German citizens (speech, religion, press, search and seizure, bear arms, etc) without any right to abrogate those rights in any emergency (avoiding some problems of the 30s). Voting shall be expanded to all Germans over 21, regardless of property rights (and the allies/Germans shall stamp out extremist parties to maintain order)
-Germany's new government shall be a constitutional monarchy, where the monarch is chosen by the upper house of the legislature; the legislature is bicameral, with the lower house popularly elected and the upper house chosen by the states, with 2 members per state; Prussia is broken up into states based on its provinces, and smaller states may merge with the larger states if by plebiscite they choose to do so.
-Germany shall pledge to maintain neutrality in international relations for 25 years, except if attacked first; it shall also join the League of Nations.

Interesting. i like the idea of breaking up Prussia - it was far too big. A constituntional monarchy might be handy as well. But your polish ideas i cant agree with. I think that poland must get Posen at least - there wouldnt be too much revanchism about this in Germany either. Let them have a plebistice and it will be even easier to accept for Germany. I like plebistices - im for them in any possible case. But i dont think France would agree to one in Alsace. The army and navy part are already said.
 

JJohnson

Banned
I guess I can agree to that. Hold a Posen plebescite, but I would agree with a prior post that would leave West Prussia intact. Perhaps yield Posen in its entirety, except for the Kreise immediately bordering another German state (where the German-speaking population is highest); in this compromise, Rawitsch would be German, but Krotoschin, Adelnau, Schildberg, and Kempen become Polish; perhaps a new state "Mark Posen" is created out of the remnant Kreise, with a capital at Bromberg. This is my alternate map to illustrate my point.

As for the other Central Power, Turkey:
-yield Aegean coast provinces to Greece, including Constantinople, and Cyprus.
-population transfer of Greeks and Turks between the two countries
-yield to Armenia a portion of their demands for a state, which must include a Black Sea coastline.

I'm not too familiar with army sizes so my numbers are likely to have been off in that respect.
 
I guess I can agree to that. Hold a Posen plebescite, but I would agree with a prior post that would leave West Prussia intact. Perhaps yield Posen in its entirety, except for the Kreise immediately bordering another German state (where the German-speaking population is highest); in this compromise, Rawitsch would be German, but Krotoschin, Adelnau, Schildberg, and Kempen become Polish; perhaps a new state "Mark Posen" is created out of the remnant Kreise, with a capital at Bromberg. This is my alternate map to illustrate my point.

As for the other Central Power, Turkey:
-yield Aegean coast provinces to Greece, including Constantinople, and Cyprus.
-population transfer of Greeks and Turks between the two countries
-yield to Armenia a portion of their demands for a state, which must include a Black Sea coastline.

I'm not too familiar with army sizes so my numbers are likely to have been off in that respect.

Have you seen what borders Greece got after WWI originally? And do you know how that ended? If you want to avoid a pointless war you are better off not giving those territories to Greece. And forget about Armenia. You cant take more from Turkey than they did OTL without the Allies deciding they are willing to fight more to enforce those ideas - and i dont think either France or Brittain would be ready to fight on so Greece gets more of Turkey or to help the armenians.
 
Even only blaming the Kaiser is Imo essentialy the same as blaming Germany for WWI. Not that the Germans were blameless, but all European Great Powers were more or less responsible for the clusterf**k that started it all.
 
Personally I've always thought that preserving the German monarchy would probably have been one of the Entente's better options. For one thing it would have allowed for a continuity of government, given a symbol for people to rally around besides the revolutionaries and attempted (and sadly successful) strongmen post-war.

If the Entente had made the Kaiser's abdication one of their goals if might have given the military some wiggle room in dealing with the German Revolution and doing a better job of restoring order if there had been a more legitimate government in place save for the chaotic alliances of convenience in November 1918 which lead to the Weimar Republic. Would have done wonders for German stability post-war.
 
Personally I've always thought that preserving the German monarchy would probably have been one of the Entente's better options. For one thing it would have allowed for a continuity of government, given a symbol for people to rally around besides the revolutionaries and attempted (and sadly successful) strongmen post-war.

If the Entente had made the Kaiser's abdication one of their goals if might have given the military some wiggle room in dealing with the German Revolution and doing a better job of restoring order if there had been a more legitimate government in place save for the chaotic alliances of convenience in November 1918 which lead to the Weimar Republic. Would have done wonders for German stability post-war.

Add that in the monarchy you have a legally unmovable head of state. That creats a more interesting situation if a nazi like or at least not democratic party comes to power.
 
Democracy can easily degenerate into to majoritarian or populist tyranny as to some extent what happened in Nazi Germany. The problem wasn't the strong presidency established in the Weimar constitution, it was the fact that the office's independence (and Hindenburg's) became compromised in the latter stages of the Weimar collapse. I'd argue that, in Germany's case at least, a intervention of a strong authoritarian hand from the more moderate right might have been the only thing that could stop Hitler by 1932-33.

That's seems like a skewed perspective. The problem of the Weimar republic wasn't a populist tyranny, the problem was that right from the start of the republic powerful elites, including the later president Hindenburg, were against the republic in principle. It was the conservative "moderate" authoritarian right that supported the Nazis in order to have the republic done away with. Hindenburg was a weak president, but he was also an anti-republican president. Making the authoritarian right, including Hindenburg, stronger won't help, because it's not like they disagreed with the Nazis on matters of principle - they just didn't like the upstart Hitler and feared (with good cause) that the old elites would loose power. Let's not forget that when he did have the power and was independent, Hindenburg used it to create a military dictatorship.
 
Top