What would be a good peace after WWI?

In Franco-German rapprochement in the 20s Streseman played a huge role - he was its main propagator on the german side. But even he didnt give up the revision of the Versailles treaty - using force if need be. If even the more moderate germans like him couldnt accept the treaty it shows that this treaties were really unacceptable to Germany and instigate it to go to war again if needed to revise them.

The Versailles Treaty was really bad and Germany was determined to its revision. I see the Great Depression more as a catalyst that strengthened this anti versailles feelings and made them more evident. But sooner or later a conflict was bound to happen because of german revision plans even without the Great Depression.

Stresseman played a major role admittedly. But even after Stresseman died there was still continuing rapprochement, to an arguably greater extent than when he was alive - this was the time when the first stirrings of a custom union and a joint agricultural policy began to emerge for example, as well as even some considerations regarding joint foreign policy positions on the USSR and Turkey. Of course, Stresseman's death did play a role in ultimately scuttling rapprochement, and nor should it be ignored that there would be adjustments ultimately made to Versailles, as they had during the 1920s on reparations. Rapprochement did not after all, end the conflict over equality of armaments vs. French security concerns. But it was not impossible that Versailles would have provided the gateway to a lasting state of affairs, ultimately integrating Germany into the European community. Of course there was resentment against Versailles, and of course it played a role in what happened, but at the same time it was in my opinion not entirely responsible and its implementation did not necessarily mean that a group akin to the Nazis was bound to emerge.
 
Stresseman played a major role admittedly. But even after Stresseman died there was still continuing rapprochement, to an arguably greater extent than when he was alive - this was the time when the first stirrings of a custom union and a joint agricultural policy began to emerge for example, as well as even some considerations regarding joint foreign policy positions on the USSR and Turkey. Of course, Stresseman's death did play a role in ultimately scuttling rapprochement, and nor should it be ignored that there would be adjustments ultimately made to Versailles, as they had during the 1920s on reparations. Rapprochement did not after all, end the conflict over equality of armaments vs. French security concerns. But it was not impossible that Versailles would have provided the gateway to a lasting state of affairs, ultimately integrating Germany into the European community. Of course there was resentment against Versailles, and of course it played a role in what happened, but at the same time it was in my opinion not entirely responsible and its implementation did not necessarily mean that a group akin to the Nazis was bound to emerge.

I can agree with most of what you say and i never said that the Versailles Treaty was solely to blame for WWII and the nazis. But it played an important role and was very easy to exploit because most of Germany hated it. The situation it created might not be hopeless without the Great Depression but it was far from being an easy one.

What i think is that it would have been very easy to make a much better treaty. With less indemnity, maybe a few less territorial losses and a german delegate sitting at the table during the negotiations a much better situation might have been created. You could avoid things like the Ruhr occupation and the situation that lead to it. Germany taking part in the peace negotiations makes the treaty much harder to exploit for nazi like groups and much easier to accept for the german people. Rapprochement with France will be much easier.
 
I would say a Wilsonian peace. A League of Nations and self determination. aAustria and Sudetenland become part of Germsny. This eliminates on of Hitler's big issues.
 
I would say a Wilsonian peace. A League of Nations and self determination. aAustria and Sudetenland become part of Germsny. This eliminates on of Hitler's big issues.

Not to be the stereotypical AH.comer, but calling such a peace "Wilsonian" is giving the man way too much credit.

At any rate, would some sort of commitment to lowering trade barriers have helped? AIUI that would have made it easier for Germany to get some exporting done and build up gold reserves with which to pay off the reparations. That hopefully butterflies the Ruhr occupation and other unpleasantness.
 
Not to be the stereotypical AH.comer, but calling such a peace "Wilsonian" is giving the man way too much credit.

At any rate, would some sort of commitment to lowering trade barriers have helped? AIUI that would have made it easier for Germany to get some exporting done and build up gold reserves with which to pay off the reparations. That hopefully butterflies the Ruhr occupation and other unpleasantness.
I guess the whole starting point should be how to make Germany able to fulfill its reperations. And this will not work as long as it is excluded from its old markets.
 
Divide Germany into two parts, going along religious lines. Tell the Bavarians, Badenians and Wurtembergians that Prussian rule has only brought misfortune on them, and war they didn't need or want. Let them even unite with Austria. Afterwards, favoritize Southern Germans over Northern ones when dealing with things like reparations, border changes etc. to increase the divide between them.
North Germany alone should be possible to contain with French and Polish forces if needed.
 

Deleted member 1487

Divide Germany into two parts, going along religious lines. Tell the Bavarians, Badenians and Wurtembergians that Prussian rule has only brought misfortune on them, and war they didn't need or want. Let them even unite with Austria. Afterwards, favoritize Southern Germans over Northern ones when dealing with things like reparations, border changes etc. to increase the divide between them.
North Germany alone should be possible to contain with French and Polish forces if needed.

The only way this in enforceable is via total occupation for generations, which no one was willing to do. The US got the hell out as soon as they could and didn't even agree with how harsh the peace was IOTL. This is simply not going to happen ever given OTL WW1.
 
The only way this in enforceable is via total occupation for generations, which no one was willing to do. The US got the hell out as soon as they could and didn't even agree with how harsh the peace was IOTL. This is simply not going to happen ever given OTL WW1.
True! And it totaly fails the OP about a good peace, not a worse one.
 

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True! And it totaly fails the OP about a good peace, not a worse one.

I don't necessarily think its a bad peace deal to have the culturally similar Bavaria and Austria (with Sudetenland and German South Tyrol) linked and separate from Germany, but its not viable given the identity politics and nationalism of the period. Plus the south and north would link up at some point; my opinion is pretty clear that if you cannot get a harsh peace deal through and enforce it forever you have to do with a lenient, Talleyrand style peace deal that will mollify the Germans and recognize the fact that Germany is too important and powerful to hold down forever so you just have to accept that and work to bring her peacefully into the power structure for mutual profit. Unfortunately things were way to emotional in Europe after such a brutal war for democratic nations to allow that and we got OTL; in a perfect world my scenario would be the best peace that would prevent war or at least the Nazis from coming back and have the best chance for a proto-EC situation without WW2.
 
True! And it totaly fails the OP about a good peace, not a worse one.

How does it necessarily make it a bad peace? The OP didn't say that it needed to be a nice peace, only that it had to be a good peace. If dividing Germany into two parts prevents Hitler's people from being able to rise or at least from being able to kill off as many people as they did and conquer so much of Europe, then it is a "good" peace compared to the baseline. Now, I don't think that dividing Germany into two sections like that is necessary to prevent WW2, and could entirely be counterproductive, but a "good peace" does not necessarily have to be a softer one. Most people will refer to the peace (or more precisely the treatment of Germany, since there wasn't an official peace treaty) following WW2 as a "good peace" after all, but it is manifestly harsher than that following WW1, which is commonly termed as a "bad peace".

Of course this is leaving aside the impracticalities of its formation.
 

Deleted member 1487

How does it necessarily make it a bad peace? The OP didn't say that it needed to be a nice peace, only that it had to be a good peace. If dividing Germany into two parts prevents Hitler's people from being able to rise or at least from being able to kill off as many people as they did and conquer so much of Europe, then it is a "good" peace compared to the baseline. Now, I don't think that dividing Germany into two sections like that is necessary to prevent WW2, and could entirely be counterproductive, but a "good peace" does not necessarily have to be a softer one. Most people will refer to the peace (or more precisely the treatment of Germany, since there wasn't an official peace treaty) following WW2 as a "good peace" after all, but it is manifestly harsher than that following WW1, which is commonly termed as a "bad peace".

Of course this is leaving aside the impracticalities of its formation.

Because its not enforceable. Its hard to be a good peace if it falls apart before its even in place.
 

Deleted member 1487

I was interpreting it principally along moral rather than practical lines, should have been more clear.

In that case how is it moral to deny the wishes of the people living in Germany for national self determination? They wanted to be one country, not split into two nations.
 
In that case how is it moral to deny the wishes of the people living in Germany for national self determination? They wanted to be one country, not split into two nations.

It wasn't an intent to say that the peace itself had to be morally better, only that a peace doesn't have to necessarily be "nicer" to achieve superior results.
 

Deleted member 1487

It wasn't an intent to say that the peace itself had to be morally better, only that a peace doesn't have to necessarily be "nicer" to achieve superior results.

Yes it fact it did if the 'superior' results hinge on an unenforceable terms.
 
It wasn't an intent to say that the peace itself had to be morally better, only that a peace doesn't have to necessarily be "nicer" to achieve superior results.

While a peace treaty need not be *nice* to achieve it's objective, it's important that the peace treaty be *enforceable*. This means that you have to be willing to pay whatever price enforcing means. Taking land implies you need to spend *effort* on controlling said land, for example. Enforcing a division requires *effort* to be spent on maintaining that division, as every teacher can attest to. *Effort* is not *Free*. Every person I place in the land of X requires food, stuff, and more stuff. Unless I was going to loot the land of X at the same time, which would require even more *effort* (Due to resistance, etc, etc) to do. If you could afford paying for all that *effort*, you're golden. Otherwise.. No. You eventually give up. Varsailles* is a classic of that - They demanded excessive amounts and was unable to enforce their taking of said amounts. The result is known my many around the world.

*This is a simplified commentary.
 
When i said good or better peace i thought of a peace that produces better results in the long run. So the much harsher peace is an option as well but i dont think that - as many said before - was a viable option in 1919 as there was nobody to enforce it. That being said i prefer a more lenient peace that leads to rapprochement.

About Austria joining Germany: i would be all for it as im on the opinion that if they wanted to join their country to Germany it should be their right. But reality is that it wasnt. Especially not after WWI. Can you really imagine a peace where the loser Germany comes out bigger territorially, with likely more population that is much more homogen than before WWI? What have you fought for as a winner? I admit it would make franco-german rapprochement really easy on the german side but it wasnt a real option in 1919.

I have to point out that France didnt have rapprochement as its goal before the end of the Ruhr occupation. Till that point France tried to enforce the peace.
 

Deleted member 1487

When i said good or better peace i thought of a peace that produces better results in the long run. So the much harsher peace is an option as well but i dont think that - as many said before - was a viable option in 1919 as there was nobody to enforce it. That being said i prefer a more lenient peace that leads to rapprochement.

About Austria joining Germany: i would be all for it as im on the opinion that if they wanted to join their country to Germany it should be their right. But reality is that it wasnt. Especially not after WWI. Can you really imagine a peace where the loser Germany comes out bigger territorially, with likely more population that is much more homogen than before WWI? What have you fought for as a winner? I admit it would make franco-german rapprochement really easy on the german side but it wasnt a real option in 1919.

I have to point out that France didnt have rapprochement as its goal before the end of the Ruhr occupation. Till that point France tried to enforce the peace.

That's the thing though only from a certain perspective could you say that Germany+Austria (in whatever form that takes) would be a hegemon; it would still have military restrictions, reparations, and territorial losses of major resource areas. Its industrial heartland would be occupied and demilitarized, surrounded by enemies willing to keep her in check, and having lost her only major ally, plus most of her trade markets; Germany would still be a basket case economically due to hyperinflation and the human losses, but now also having to deal with Austria's problems. Maybe in the far future it could recover, but for the next generation at least it is prostrate. With the Austrians its more politically divided than ever and the Catholics and Socialists are heavily strengthened with the addition of Austria.

It would only be fair to compensate Germany after its pretty serious hamstringing with Austria, but also to moderate it in the long term; its pretty superficial to claim that Germany would walk away from the ToV then as a giant, as it ignores all of the problems post-war Germany has.
 
It would only be fair to compensate Germany after its pretty serious hamstringing with Austria, but also to moderate it in the long term; its pretty superficial to claim that Germany would walk away from the ToV then as a giant, as it ignores all of the problems post-war Germany has.

Of course, the kind of Europe that still saw prestige colonies as a good thing would be very susceptible to that kind of superficiality.
 
Since we are talking about a peace treaty in 1918-19, obviously we are presuming Germany had already had its revolution and a government largely of Social Democrats was in charge. The Kaiser was gone (although possible retention of the monarchy in some form was still an option) and Hindenburg and Ludendorff were out of the picture. So here's my take:

1. The allies should have done all that they could to legitimize the new government in the eyes of the world and especially the German people. True or not, the Allies should have acknowledged that this regime was not the same regime at the start of the war and that it was not responsible for any of the supposed outrages of the German Empire. No "war guilt clauses" for sure, and less severe reparations as well.

2. With the exception of Alsace-Lorraine going back to France (which I think would be a political necessity in view of how this territory was taken from France in 1870) all other territorial adjustments affecting the borders of pre-War Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey needed to be presented as items up for negotiation at the conference table, not dictates. Military realities would probably put the Central Powers at a disadvantage in these negotiations, but at least they were being treated as negotiating partners and not being disrespected. Considering that the A-H Empire was already disintegrating, in the spirit of Wilson's 14 points the Allies should have been open to an Austrian-German Anschluss and a less draconian reduction of Hungary in establishing the new nations in central and eastern Europe.

3. End all economic warfare against the Central Powers (ie., the naval blockade) as soon as the peace negotiations begin, while making sure the Germans understand that the Allies reserved the right to resume it if no settlement is reached or Germany appears to negotiates in bad faith (ie treats the negotiations only as a lull while it prepares for a new offensive)

4. The Allies should have negotiated the reduction of German armed forces in the context of a broader arms-limitation treaty, while making it clear to Germany (as the party that lost the war) that it was not going to be permitted an army and navy as large as it had in 1914-18. No artificial limits on the how Germany meets the agreed upon limits in manpower, ship tonnage, etc.

5. Allow Germany, Austria (if it remains independent), Hungary, and other CP states to join any and all international organizations (especially the League of Nations) immediately upon signing the treaty and even before the terms of the treaty are fully implemented.

6. In the negotiations, the Allies should consider the extent to which the new German government reduces the power and authority of Army and Naval ministers to influence political decisions, and offer increasingly lenient terms to the extent that this occurs...and let this be publically understood as a factor in the treaty negotiations.

WW1 was called "The War to End All Wars". The Versailles Treaty was anything but.
 
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