What would a Nazi-Polish vs. Soviet war in 1939 look like?

Advantage to the Soviets is that the existing line of Border fortifications, the Stalin Line is intact, and not gutted to make the new Molotov Line on the new territory gained since 1939
 
If Germany and Poland are allied, it's basically like the Germans have fast-forwarded 2-3 weeks into Barbarossa with the extra territory, as long as the Soviets aren't clued in to the date of Barbarossa.

Also, the Germans could bluff to the Soviets and act like they want to encircle Poland before invading it, citing Danzig and Slovakia as proof, while still saying they'll give the eastern half to the Soviets. Perhaps the Germans could acquire Lithuania in an alternate Molotov Ribbentrop, while giving Latvia and Estonia to the Soviets.

But the Germans never invade Poland (secretly seeking its collaboration against the Soviets), so the Soviets never invade.

While this would be cause for Soviet concern, when war starts between Germany and the Allies due to some other reason (maybe Yugoslav Slovenia), Stalin naively assumes the best about German intentions, like OTL, and thinks Germany is preparing for a war against Britain and not against the Soviet Union until 1942, despite evidence to the contrary.

Effectively Germany has Poland and Lithuania, so that completes the fast forward 2-3 weeks into Barbarossa.

After Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France fall, the Germans and Polish secretly prepare for a 1940 or 1941 war against the Soviet Union.

In the end the Germans still lose because they don't have enough fuel, tanks, or trucks.
Germans do not have Finland and Romania though. Their occupation of Baltic states will be seen in same view as was by Soviets. Stalin line is intact. German army is much less experienced too. It was wouldn't be so easy.
 
The biggest problem for the Germans is not going to be operational superiority (green troops, some housecleaning occurred post Case White), or technological issues (too many PZII, not enough PZIV). The biggest problem is going to be as it was in 1941 in that logistical failings and the immense strain of a deep penetration campaign are going to be huge as it was in OTL. In fact they will be somewhat more severe as all of those trucks that the Germans stole from Western Europe are not available.

On the plus side at least the Germans don't have to garrison Poland, and the Baltic States can be probably counted on to side with the Germans too (or accept occupation with minimal complaint or resistance).

Another interesting thing to consider is that the winter 1939-40 was one of the worst of the century in Western Europe, so it had to have been brutal, perhaps more so, than the winter of 1941-42
 
The biggest problem for the Germans is not going to be operational superiority (green troops, some housecleaning occurred post Case White), or technological issues (too many PZII, not enough PZIV). The biggest problem is going to be as it was in 1941 in that logistical failings and the immense strain of a deep penetration campaign are going to be huge as it was in OTL. In fact they will be somewhat more severe as all of those trucks that the Germans stole from Western Europe are not available.

On the plus side at least the Germans don't have to garrison Poland, and the Baltic States can be probably counted on to side with the Germans too (or accept occupation with minimal complaint or resistance).

Another interesting thing to consider is that the winter 1939-40 was one of the worst of the century in Western Europe, so it had to have been brutal, perhaps more so, than the winter of 1941-42
But would Balts really be so benevolent to Germsn occupation? Especially without prior much lower Soviet involvement in their affairs? After all I guess Lithuanians were not to happy about March 1939 German ultimatum, loss of Klapeida and huge part of their industrial production (app 1/3).
 
But would Balts really be so benevolent to Germsn occupation? Especially without prior much lower Soviet involvement in their affairs? After all I guess Lithuanians were not to happy about March 1939 German ultimatum, loss of Klapeida and huge part of their industrial production (app 1/3).

It is really hard to say. We have OTL as a model, but that was after the Soviets came in and used the NKVD to arrest, deport, imprison or execute a large percentage of the Balt population, making the Germans liberators in 1941 from the standpoint of the Balts (and doom for the Jewish population and it is notable that a lot of Balts served in SS field atrocity units and as camp guards).
 
If the balt states allow German forces in and are allied/covelligerent/friendly neutral, the German military will then have access to Baltic ports in good shape which helps the northern forces logistically. The rest will still be a mess.

Interesting scenario though, however unlikely it might be.
 
The Soviets went into high gear when France fell, for a year, so I think we have a pretty good model.

No they didn't. The Soviet mobilization after the Fall of France was not remotely "high-gear". The fact that it's official term was "creeping up to war" says everything. High gear is what the Soviet mobilization after June 22nd 1941 looked like. That mobilization also had to deal with much more severe disruption and dislocation to the Soviet economic base compared to what would be occurring IATL.
 
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No they didn't. The Soviet mobilization after the Fall of France was not remotely "high-gear". The fact that it's official term was "creeping up to war" says everything. High gear is what the Soviet mobilization after June 22nd 1941 looked like. That mobilization also had to deal with much more severe disruption and dislocation to the Soviet economic base compared to what would be occurring IATL.

If the Soviets were slow to mobilize when it was clear that the Germans were dangerous after having conquered the West and Poland, why would the Soviets move any faster 1938-39? The agreement with Germany cannot have been that big a break when even Stalin seemed to think there was strong danger of war in 1942
 

Deleted member 1487

No they didn't. The Soviet mobilization after the Fall of France was not remotely "high-gear". The fact that it's official term was "creeping up to war" says everything. High gear is what the Soviet mobilization after June 22nd 1941 looked like. That mobilization also had to deal with much more severe disruption and dislocation to the Soviet economic base compared to what would be occurring IATL.
The Soviet system wasn't in position to mobilize like that without massive problems....as the mobilization during the war demonstrated. They could mobilize a lot of manpower if needed, but the combat units that resulted were barely worthy of the name; arguably THE major reason the Soviets suffered such heavy losses in 1941 after the initial surprise wore off was the lack of organization, equipment, trained leaders, etc. of the reservists slapped together and tossed in the way of enemy forces as speed bumps. It was only after a lot of experience with the flaws of such units, time to train and organize, plus then huge new production after industry started getting online after evacuation to resulted in the semi-competent formation that conducted the Winter counteroffensives.
 
I said Danzig--not the Polish Corridor. Also, AFAIK, Hitler initially only wanted a road across the Polish Corridor--not the entire Corridor.

What Hitler said he wanted and what he actually wanted were two very different things.

Assuming in this case Hitler might really content himself with what he asked and that he sincerely wanted a Polish alliance, there is his track record against him.
The track record shows him presenting demands to the Czechslovakians, then when the first demands are granted, adding new demands, then upping them, then accepting a deal that weakens irretrievably his target, then finally swallowing what remains of it.

So no, the Poles wouldn't go down that path. Even if ironically Hitler were sincere in this one case.
 
If the Soviets were slow to mobilize when it was clear that the Germans were dangerous after having conquered the West and Poland, why would the Soviets move any faster 1938-39? The agreement with Germany cannot have been that big a break when even Stalin seemed to think there was strong danger of war in 1942

Oh, I doubt that there would be much additional mobilization before the German invasion. It'll really be when the attack comes that the Soviets will go full bore. And while there will indeed be disruption, the stalling out of the German advance much further west means it won't be quite as much as OTL.

The Soviet system wasn't in position to mobilize like that without massive problems....as the mobilization during the war demonstrated.

The massive problems with mobilization during the war stemmed directly from the immense damage the Germans did upon the Soviet economic base. IATL, that damage is either greatly reduced if not outright eliminated due to German logistical weakness.
 

Deleted member 1487

The massive problems with mobilization during the war stemmed directly from the immense damage the Germans did upon the Soviet economic base. IATL, that damage is either greatly reduced if not outright eliminated due to German logistical weakness.
I'm more referring to the flawed military mobilization system able to create working units out of reservists and equipment stocks. The Soviets had more of everything as of 1941 than in 1939 and were pretty much short of everything once the border echelon was destroy in June-July 1941. So ITTL 1939 or '40 the Soviets will run out of stocks even faster, have fewer trained leaders after the purges, have little time to learn lessons, and won't have their best leader, Zhukov, on had in Moscow nor assigned to STAVKA.
 
I'm more referring to the flawed military mobilization system able to create working units out of reservists and equipment stocks. The Soviets had more of everything as of 1941 than in 1939 and were pretty much short of everything once the border echelon was destroy in June-July 1941. So ITTL 1939 or '40 the Soviets will run out of stocks even faster, have fewer trained leaders after the purges, have little time to learn lessons, and won't have their best leader, Zhukov, on had in Moscow nor assigned to STAVKA.

Without the disruption inflicted by the German occupation of their regions, Soviet industry would be able to make up the difference in short order. And besides, the Germans also have less of everything and less experienced troops, which rather evens things out. The relative gap there in '39 is really the same as it was in '41.
 

Deleted member 1487

Without the disruption inflicted by the German occupation of their regions, Soviet industry would be able to make up the difference in short order. And besides, the Germans also have less of everything and less experienced troops, which rather evens things out. The relative gap there in '39 is really the same as it was in '41.
Apparantly they were well short of their planned production goals in 1939 due to the purges and loss of qualified engineers. Differences were probably going to be harder to make up than you think and be inferior quality weapons like T-26s. That's not to say the Soviets don't have their own advantages, but things aren't as rosy as you'd think in terms of production. The Purges did really mess up the USSR.
 
Apparantly they were well short of their planned production goals in 1939 due to the purges and loss of qualified engineers. Differences were probably going to be harder to make up than you think and be inferior quality weapons like T-26s. That's not to say the Soviets don't have their own advantages, but things aren't as rosy as you'd think in terms of production. The Purges did really mess up the USSR.

"Rosy" outright? No, not really. We're still looking at a hefty degree of disruption and dislocation. What it it is rosier then OTL, where the extent German invasion inflicted such damage upon the Soviet economic base, including the loss of skilled personnel, that made the damage done by the purges pale in comparison. That doesn't mean, though that the Soviets won't have some desperate times where they'll be improvising and such. Everything's relative.
 
Without the disruption inflicted by the German occupation of their regions, Soviet industry would be able to make up the difference in short order. And besides, the Germans also have less of everything and less experienced troops, which rather evens things out. The relative gap there in '39 is really the same as it was in '41.

The Germans still have more of everything than they did in 1917-18 and they overran all of Belorussia and the entire Ukraine. Sure the Russians had collapsed, but from a purely logistical standpoint they can do it, and from the standpoint of operational capability they have that to.

The OTL Soviets made no efforts to reform the Red Army until AFTER the demonstrated need post OTL invasion of Poland and Finland, with even more desperate and hurried measures taken after the German conquest of the West.

Now of course the Germans had their own problems. They sacked a number of officers after Poland or moved them to less critical positions. They refined their Panzer Divisions, and added more PZ III and PZ IV tanks, plus incorporated more of the Czech tanks. They added a huge number of British, French, Belgian and Dutch trucks they captured in 1940 in time to use in 1941.

But the thing is both the Soviets and Germans are relatively weaker than they would be in 1941, but the Germans are not weaker than the Soviets in relative terms.
 
The Germans still have more of everything than they did in 1917-18 and they overran all of Belorussia and the entire Ukraine. Sure the Russians had collapsed, but from a purely logistical standpoint they can do it, and from the standpoint of operational capability they have that to.

The fact that the Russians had collapsed meant everything in those occupations. They would not have remotely been possible had the Russian armies still been offering significant resistance. The occupation in that case was literally just the German forces riding the trains out to the Ukrainian-Russian and Belorussian-Russian borders. This has always been the case: in the absence of enemy resistance, overcoming logistical problems is just a matter of marching.

The OTL Soviets made no efforts to reform the Red Army until AFTER the demonstrated need post OTL invasion of Poland and Finland, with even more desperate and hurried measures taken after the German conquest of the West.

Yes and no. There was awareness that the purges had inflicted excessive damage upon the Soviet Red Army, but the sheer extent of that damage was less clear until the Polish and Finns demonstrated it to be so.

But the thing is both the Soviets and Germans are relatively weaker than they would be in 1941, but the Germans are not weaker than the Soviets in relative terms.

You might want to read my posts more carefully: I never claimed the Germans were weaker then the Soviets in 1939 when it comes to straight up combat capability in the field. That gap is probably no different in 1939 as it was in 1941. The thing that will really strangles the German advance compared to OTL Barbarossa is their grossly weakened logistical capabilities.
 
The fact that the Russians had collapsed meant everything in those occupations. They would not have remotely been possible had the Russian armies still been offering significant resistance. The occupation in that case was literally just the German forces riding the trains out to the Ukrainian-Russian and Belorussian-Russian borders. This has always been the case: in the absence of enemy resistance, overcoming logistical problems is just a matter of marching.



Yes and no. There was awareness that the purges had inflicted excessive damage upon the Soviet Red Army, but the sheer extent of that damage was less clear until the Polish and Finns demonstrated it to be so.



You might want to read my posts more carefully: I never claimed the Germans were weaker then the Soviets in 1939 when it comes to straight up combat capability in the field. That gap is probably no different in 1939 as it was in 1941. The thing that will really strangles the German advance compared to OTL Barbarossa is their grossly weakened logistical capabilities.

In the face of determined Russian resistance and even at times some highly effective offensive action the Germans still pushed through half of Poland and were well into Belorussia and the Balts BEFORE the Russians collapsed.

As to your posts... your implication is that the Soviets will retain more territory and industrial plant in 1939 vs 1941 German offensives. Which implies that the Soviets are relatively stronger than they were in 1941.

This seems highly unlikely
 
In the face of determined Russian resistance and even at times some highly effective offensive action the Germans still pushed through half of Poland and were well into Belorussia and the Balts BEFORE the Russians collapsed.

And they were stuck there for basically the past 2 years until the Russians collapsed, which rather nicely shows they were at their limits.

As to your posts... your implication is that the Soviets will retain more territory and industrial plant in 1939 vs 1941 German offensives. Which implies that the Soviets are relatively stronger than they were in 1941.

This seems highly unlikely

And if you'd been paying attention you'd notice I was saying that is because the Germans are logistically in '39 much weaker compared to their '41 offensive. You know the saying about amateurs and professionals, tactics and logistics...
 
As to your posts... your implication is that the Soviets will retain more territory and industrial plant in 1939 vs 1941 German offensives. Which implies that the Soviets are relatively stronger than they were in 1941.

This seems highly unlikely

Not really, when you consider the German logistical weakness and the slower advance that would result. Their ability to exploit battlefield victories is lesser.
 
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