What would a Germany which was reunified in 1952 look like?

CaliGuy

Banned
What would a Germany which was reunified in 1952 look like?

For instance, would this Germany have joined NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union (if this event won't change in this TL)? Also, what would the attitude of a neutral unified Germany be towards various European integration projects? Would it (be compelled to) reject them due to the belief that these institutions will push Germany out of its neutrality (which appears to have been Austria's position up to the end of the Cold War in our TL)?

Also, what would have been the economic policies of such a united Germany?

In addition to this, what would have been the immigration policy of such a united Germany? For instance, would it have still accepted as many immigrants as it did in our TL over the last several decades?

Also, what effect would this have had on the rest of Europe as well as on the Cold War in general?

Finally, would this Germany have been willing to try pursuing territorial revision in Europe? Indeed, memories of the post-World War II expulsions of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe would have still been fresh at the point of German reunification in this TL; thus, even if Germany was compelled to formally recognize the Oder-Neisse Line in exchange for the Soviet Union agreeing to this reunification, Germany might still try pursuing territorial revision in the future. (Indeed, the fact that Weimar Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 certainly did not prevent its subsequent attempts to engage in territorial revision.)

Anyway, any thoughts on all of this?
 
Are we talking about a Germany that reunified along the lines imagined in the Stalin Note?

It's not clear to me that Germany would have been in a position to engage in territorial revisionism. The Stalin Note did not imagine a further Soviet withdrawal from central Europe, for instance. (Indeed, I can imagine that some satellite governments in the Warsaw Pact might prefer to remain allied to the Soviet Union to deter German revanchism.) Looking westwards, meanwhile, it's not clear to me that Germany would be in a position to threaten any of those neighbours if it wanted: French intervention would surely come about.

Much depends on what the internal structure of this Germany would have been like. The East German official reaction seems to have imagined a Germany that would look quite like the GDR. Would this Germany be able to sustain a democracy?

European integration seems unlikely to occur, given this Germany's neutralism and the early start of European integration in affairs as much military as economic. Maybe if France, too, goes neutralist ... ? This Germany is likely to engage in world capitalist markets generally, but without the possibility of a Franco-German duo to drive European integration from the start I find it difficult to imagine anything with the supranational design of the EEC. EFTA may well be possible. Much depends, again, on how wider Europe evolves in this context.

Regarding immigration, if anything this Germany may see more immigration earlier. West Germany's labour shortages in the 1950s were partially met by the influx of refugees coming from East Germany. In a timeline where East Germany is an integrated part of the German state, you will see considerably less migration from East to West.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Are we talking about a Germany that reunified along the lines imagined in the Stalin Note?

Yes, we are. Indeed, that was the only way that a German reunification would have been possible back in 1952.

It's not clear to me that Germany would have been in a position to engage in territorial revisionism. The Stalin Note did not imagine a further Soviet withdrawal from central Europe, for instance. (Indeed, I can imagine that some satellite governments in the Warsaw Pact might prefer to remain allied to the Soviet Union to deter German revanchism.) Looking westwards, meanwhile, it's not clear to me that Germany would be in a position to threaten any of those neighbours if it wanted: French intervention would surely come about.

You are very much correct that Germany wouldn't be in a position to actually impose its will on anyone. However, what I'm thinking of is having Germany make a lot of noises in regards to this and perhaps using whatever (probably small) economic pressure it could to try getting neighboring countries--specifically Poland and perhaps Czechoslovakia and/or Belgium as well--to agree to territorial revisions.

I certainly agree that such German moves would bring Eastern European countries--which are already Soviet satellites--even further into the Soviet orbit, though.

Much depends on what the internal structure of this Germany would have been like. The East German official reaction seems to have imagined a Germany that would look quite like the GDR. Would this Germany be able to sustain a democracy?

Well, Austria managed to sustain a democracy in our TL; in turn, this fact combined with the fact that the Communists didn't perform that well in pre-war German elections makes me think that German democracy would survive and thrive in this TL.

European integration seems unlikely to occur, given this Germany's neutralism and the early start of European integration in affairs as much military as economic. Maybe if France, too, goes neutralist ... ?

I don't think that France would have been willing to give up its good ties and economic relations to the U.S. in this TL, though; indeed, that would have been the price of going neutralist. Plus, France's politicians and population will still remember the events of 1940 very well at this point in time. Thus, they almost certainly would have been unwilling to severely anger the U.S.--especially considering that they could theoretically need U.S. assistance saving their own skins from Germany and/or the Soviet Union in the future!

This Germany is likely to engage in world capitalist markets generally, but without the possibility of a Franco-German duo to drive European integration from the start I find it difficult to imagine anything with the supranational design of the EEC. EFTA may well be possible. Much depends, again, on how wider Europe evolves in this context.

Out of curiosity--would an EFTA look similar to NAFTA?

Regarding immigration, if anything this Germany may see more immigration earlier. West Germany's labour shortages in the 1950s were partially met by the influx of refugees coming from East Germany. In a timeline where East Germany is an integrated part of the German state, you will see considerably less migration from East to West.

Where exactly did East Germany's manpower come from during this time, though? After all, wouldn't East Germany have experienced a severe labor shortage before 1961 due to the large migration from East Germany to West Germany? If so, where exactly did East Germany get the workers to compensate for this emigration in our TL?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Also, one more question--if the Cold War still ends on schedule and the Soviet Union still collapses on schedule in this TL, what exactly do you think that the post-Cold War situation in Europe would have looked like? For instance, would this Germany have then joined NATO and agreed to create an E.U.? Or would it have remained neutral like Austria did in our TL (albeit with it still joining the E.U. in 1995)?
 
You are very much correct that Germany wouldn't be in a position to actually impose its will on anyone. However, what I'm thinking of is having Germany make a lot of noises in regards to this and perhaps using whatever (probably small) economic pressure it could to try getting neighboring countries--specifically Poland and perhaps Czechoslovakia and/or Belgium as well--to agree to territorial revisions.

I certainly agree that such German moves would bring Eastern European countries--which are already Soviet satellites--even further into the Soviet orbit, though.

I simply don't see that as possible. Even if you exclude the possibility of Soviet or American intervention, France and Britain strike me as exceptionally likely to intervene against a revisionist Germany.

I don't think that France would have been willing to give up its good ties and economic relations to the U.S. in this TL, though; indeed, that would have been the price of going neutralist. Plus, France's politicians and population will still remember the events of 1940 very well at this point in time. Thus, they almost certainly would have been unwilling to severely anger the U.S.--especially considering that they could theoretically need U.S. assistance saving their own skins from Germany and/or the Soviet Union in the future!

Yeah. How the Cold War will evolve, if it will, is an open question. Decolonization might also go differently: France might still feel compelled to intervene in Algeria and Vietnam, but it might also feel compelled to keep the French Union in existence as part of a strategy to contain Germany. Who knows?

Out of curiosity--would an EFTA look similar to NAFTA?

Possibly? It might perhaps also look like Nordic integration. It might bear only a passing resemblance to the EFTA we know.

Where exactly did East Germany's manpower come from during this time, though? After all, wouldn't East Germany have experienced a severe labor shortage before 1961 due to the large migration from East Germany to West Germany? If so, where exactly did East Germany get the workers to compensate for this emigration in our TL?

East Germany certainly did experience a massive labour shortage--that's why the Berlin Wall was built in the first place, to contain East Germany's population within its borders. There was a certain amount of labour migration from other Communist countries, particularly of guest workers from Communist countries, but it was not enough to prevent the slow population decline that occurred throughout the history of East Germany.

In a TL where East Germany is reunified early on as part of a capitalist Germany, there may well be some lag effects stemming from post-1945 Soviet looting of the East's industry. I would still be willing to bet that the economic lag between West and East will be much smaller than OTL. This, along with the decidedly better conditions for East Germans across the board, means that any flow of East Germans to the West will be much smaller than in OTL. This reunified Germany will, if all else proceeds as OTL, start to experience significant labour shortages at an earlier date.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I simply don't see that as possible. Even if you exclude the possibility of Soviet or American intervention, France and Britain strike me as exceptionally likely to intervene against a revisionist Germany.

I'm talking about making noises and engaging in economic pressure--not actually going to war. As for Britain's and France's reaction in regards to this, their behavior during the German-Polish customs war (which appears to have been initiated by Germany in an attempt to force Poland to agree to territorial revision) might be a good guide to how they would respond to this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_customs_war

In other words, they aren't actually going to support any German territorial revisionism but they are nevertheless going to try being nice to Germany (due to their unwillingness to permanently alienate 70+ million German people). At least, that's my bet.

Yeah. How the Cold War will evolve, if it will, is an open question.

Agreed.

Decolonization might also go differently: France might still feel compelled to intervene in Algeria and Vietnam, but it might also feel compelled to keep the French Union in existence as part of a strategy to contain Germany. Who knows?

True, France could try keeping the French Union together and be more aggressive in Vietnam and/or (especially) Algeria in this TL. However, what it is ultimately going to come down to will probably be whether or not the U.S. will continue to be engaged in Europe; in our TL, the failure of Robert Taft's 1952 presidential bid killed off any chance that the U.S. would once again disengage from Europe, and frankly, I don't see this as being any different in this TL.

Ultimately, France is going to be aware that the French Empire didn't save France's skin in 1940 but that a large-scale U.S. troop presence in Europe could have done this. In turn, this might actually result in France not only remaining in the Western orbit in this TL, but also refusing to withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure in the 1960s (like it did in our TL).

Possibly? It might perhaps also look like Nordic integration. It might bear only a passing resemblance to the EFTA we know.

How does Nordic integration look like?

East Germany certainly did experience a massive labour shortage--that's why the Berlin Wall was built in the first place, to contain East Germany's population within its borders. There was a certain amount of labour migration from other Communist countries, particularly of guest workers from Communist countries, but it was not enough to prevent the slow population decline that occurred throughout the history of East Germany.

Did this population decline also hurt East Germany economically, though?

In a TL where East Germany is reunified early on as part of a capitalist Germany, there may well be some lag effects stemming from post-1945 Soviet looting of the East's industry. I would still be willing to bet that the economic lag between West and East will be much smaller than OTL. This, along with the decidedly better conditions for East Germans across the board, means that any flow of East Germans to the West will be much smaller than in OTL. This reunified Germany will, if all else proceeds as OTL, start to experience significant labour shortages at an earlier date.

Completely agreed with this.

Also, would this mean that Germany would have even more immigration in this TL than it had in our TL?

Finally, are far-right parties such as the AfD (or something similar) going to have much less support in eastern Germany in this TL? Or, alternatively, is there going to be more support for far-right parties in western Germany in this TL (as a result of Germany drifting out of the Western orbit in the 1950s and thus being somewhat less influenced by Western values and ideas in comparison to our TL*)?

*Indeed, it is worth noting that Austria is much more nationalistic than Germany is nowadays. Indeed, had Germany reunified in 1952 and been neutral like Austria, would it have followed in Austria's path in regards to greater nationalism?
 

Deleted member 97083

Denazification may not be complete ITTL despite the program's ending in 1951; the lack of occupation troops, as well as an atmosphere where Germans are playing off the WAllies and the Soviets constantly, may make it incomplete.

In 1950, a pamphlet given to Soviet/East German agitators shows that they were still trying to convince Germans that Lebensraum was unnecessary:

Question: Would we not have sufficient food if we had not lost the eastern territories?

Answer: Naturally not. Let us stick to the facts here. About 65 million people live in Germany today, west of the Oder-Neiße Line. The actual loss of food production in comparison with the present population of Germany is about 10 to 12%. If we still had this at our disposal, we could increase rations by 10 to 12%. That would mean, for example, an increase of the bread ration from 400 to 440 grams a day, 11 grams of fat a day instead of 10, 28 grams of meat instead of 25.

Question: But aren’t the Poles incapable of settling the areas and farming them?

Answer: This argument is also false, and demonstrates German feelings of superiority. In the areas Germans have left, several million Poles have already settled.

It is true that in 1945/46 and 1947 some areas were still unsettled, but that was also true in Germany. The reason was the war, not the incapacity of the Poles. They had to clear about 83,241 square miles of mines. A total of 5,890,000 mines were cleared. And homes were destroyed and there were shortages of livestock, machines and equipment, not to mention floods, etc. Despite these difficulties, the Poles have done remarkable things in the past five years. Otherwise it would not have been possible to steadily increase trade between the German Democratic Republic and Poland. We are importing growing amounts of food and raw materials, e.g. black coal.

Question: The Oder-Neiße Line has brought only controversy. How can one call it a border of peace?

Answer: The controversy comes from those with no conscious and who have no interest in peace. As a result, Poland has made the question of recognition or nonrecognition of the Oder-Neiße line a question of war or peace. Only a recognition and acceptance of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements will allow friendly relations between the two peoples. Therefore we say with justice that the Oder-Neiße Line is a border of peace.
 
I'm talking about making noises and engaging in economic pressure--not actually going to war. As for Britain's and France's reaction in regards to this, their behavior during the German-Polish customs war (which appears to have been initiated by Germany in an attempt to force Poland to agree to territorial revision) might be a good guide to how they would respond to this:

In other words, they aren't actually going to support any German territorial revisionism but they are nevertheless going to try being nice to Germany (due to their unwillingness to permanently alienate 70+ million German people). At least, that's my bet.

Does this happen before or after German started another world war killed millions of people rampaged across France and bombed England and invaded the USSR? Methinks any German attempt at territorial revanchism is meet with hostility A LOT of hostility by everyone in Europe.
 
I'm talking about making noises and engaging in economic pressure--not actually going to war. As for Britain's and France's reaction in regards to this, their behavior during the German-Polish customs war (which appears to have been initiated by Germany in an attempt to force Poland to agree to territorial revision) might be a good guide to how they would respond to this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Polish_customs_war

In other words, they aren't actually going to support any German territorial revisionism but they are nevertheless going to try being nice to Germany (due to their unwillingness to permanently alienate 70+ million German people). At least, that's my bet.

The behaviour of Britain and France before the Second World War towards a revanchist Germany is just not going to be the same as the behaviour of the two countries after the Second World War. Weimar did not perpetrate Auschwitz.

True, France could try keeping the French Union together and be more aggressive in Vietnam and/or (especially) Algeria in this TL. However, what it is ultimately going to come down to will probably be whether or not the U.S. will continue to be engaged in Europe; in our TL, the failure of Robert Taft's 1952 presidential bid killed off any chance that the U.S. would once again disengage from Europe, and frankly, I don't see this as being any different in this TL.

Ultimately, France is going to be aware that the French Empire didn't save France's skin in 1940 but that a large-scale U.S. troop presence in Europe could have done this. In turn, this might actually result in France not only remaining in the Western orbit in this TL, but also refusing to withdraw from NATO's integrated military structure in the 1960s (like it did in our TL).

In this timeline, France might well opt for the American alliance and trying to make something out of its empire. There had been some French interest, at the beginning of European integration but before the end of empire, in trying to achieve a synergy between the two processes. In a timeline where there's no European integration and Germany is a potential threat, the empire might look like an attractive alternative.

How does Nordic integration look like?

Relatively deep, but without a supranational component.

Did this population decline also hurt East Germany economically, though?

Hugely. As I noted, the outflows of labour--especially skilled labour--was such that the viability of East Germany was challenged.

Finally, are far-right parties such as the AfD (or something similar) going to have much less support in eastern Germany in this TL? Or, alternatively, is there going to be more support for far-right parties in western Germany in this TL (as a result of Germany drifting out of the Western orbit in the 1950s and thus being somewhat less influenced by Western values and ideas in comparison to our TL*)?

I would bet on the latter.
 

Deleted member 97083

Due to the Korean War creating a global shortage of goods, the Wirtschaftswunder and demand for German goods really started picking up in 1950-1953. The politicians and administration of reunited Germany from 1952 on will likely play up this factor and take credit for all the economic growth in Germany.

Also, reunited Germany from 1952 will have to pay reparations to both the WAllies and the Soviets at the same time--there will likely be significant resentment in this regard. The Marshall Plan in Germany will likely be minimized because Germany is neutral and not pro-Western, which is another factor to consider. Still it will probably not stop Germany's economic recovery, only slow it. (Alternatively, maybe both the Marshall Plan and a Soviet version will happen, as they both try to curry favor from Germany and take the whole thing. Probably not, though.)

With access to East German resources and markets, German corporations such as Volkswagen will expand faster.
 
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CaliGuy

Banned
The behaviour of Britain and France before the Second World War towards a revanchist Germany is just not going to be the same as the behaviour of the two countries after the Second World War. Weimar did not perpetrate Auschwitz.

True, but neither did the post-World War II German government.

In this timeline, France might well opt for the American alliance and trying to make something out of its empire. There had been some French interest, at the beginning of European integration but before the end of empire, in trying to achieve a synergy between the two processes. In a timeline where there's no European integration and Germany is a potential threat, the empire might look like an attractive alternative.

Agreed with this. Indeed, France will focus on both its empire and on ensuring that it continues to receive a security umbrella from the U.S.

Relatively deep, but without a supranational component.

OK.

Hugely. As I noted, the outflows of labour--especially skilled labour--was such that the viability of East Germany was challenged.

OK; understood. Indeed, this is just what I expected.

I would bet on the latter.

Agreed.

Also, though, with larger anti-immigrant and nativist sentiment in Germany in this TL, could we see large-scale opposition to mass immigration to Germany? If so, couldn't this eventually result in immigration restrictions in Germany and thus in German economic growth slowing down due to a lack of labor?
 

Deleted member 97083

Also, though, with larger anti-immigrant and nativist sentiment in Germany in this TL, could we see large-scale opposition to mass immigration to Germany? If so, couldn't this eventually result in immigration restrictions in Germany and thus in German economic growth slowing down due to a lack of labor?
They might accept immigration from other European countries, excluding those behind Iron Curtain.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
They might accept immigration from other European countries, excluding those behind Iron Curtain.
Yeah, but would there be many takers? After all, the economies of various Western European countries were significantly growing and improving during this time.
 

Deleted member 97083

Yeah, but would there be many takers? After all, the economies of various Western European countries were significantly growing and improving during this time.
There was Italian and Greek immigration to Austria at this time, and I believe Western Europeans were still immigrating to the US, Australia, Canada, etc. at this time, just in smaller numbers than before.

Actually, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Romanians may immigrate to neutral Germany as well, though there will be fear of communism.

Germany in 1952 might start off with excess labor, due to high unemployment in Eastern Germany after the Soviets scavenged the industrial zones.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Due to the Korean War creating a global shortage of goods, the Wirtschaftswunder and demand for German goods really started picking up in 1950-1953. The politicians and administration of reunited Germany from 1952 on will likely play up this factor and take credit for all the economic growth in Germany.

Agreed.

Also, reunited Germany from 1952 will have to pay reparations to both the WAllies and the Soviets at the same time--there will likely be significant resentment in this regard.

The Stalin Note didn't address this issue?

The Marshall Plan in Germany will likely be minimized because Germany is neutral and not pro-Western, which is another factor to consider. Still it will probably not stop Germany's economic recovery, only slow it. (Alternatively, maybe both the Marshall Plan and a Soviet version will happen, as they both try to curry favor from Germany and take the whole thing. Probably not, though.)

I mean, I could certainly see both the U.S. and the Soviet Union courting a unified Germany to some extent. However, given that Germany would be unable (due to its previous promise) to join either Western institutions or Soviets ones, the scale of such aid to Germany would probably be limited.

With access to East German resources and markets, German corporations such as Volkswagen will expand faster.

Agreed.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
There was Italian and Greek immigration to Austria at this time, and I believe Western Europeans were still immigrating to the US, Australia, Canada, etc. at this time, just in smaller numbers than before.

Very interesting!

Actually, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Romanians may immigrate to neutral Germany as well, though there will be fear of communism.

Didn't these countries tightly control emigration, though?

Germany in 1952 might start off with excess labor, due to high unemployment in Eastern Germany after the Soviets scavenged the industrial zones.

Agreed. However, this might change very quickly.
 

Deleted member 97083

The Stalin Note didn't address this issue?
As far as I know, it didn't mention the war reparations.

It was pretty much a bluff though, pretty unlikely to be accepted. But if it was accepted Stalin would have to go through with it to not embarrass himself.

Didn't these countries tightly control emigration, though?
Yeah, but after the 1956 revolution in Hungary things may change.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
As far as I know, it didn't mention the war reparations.

OK.

It was pretty much a bluff though, pretty unlikely to be accepted. But if it was accepted Stalin would have to go through with it to not embarrass himself.

TBH, I'm unsure that it was actually a bluff. After all, giving up 1/4ths of Germany while the West gives up 3/4th of Germany would have still been a net win for Stalin since he gave up much less than the West did!

Yeah, but after the 1956 revolution in Hungary things may change.

To my knowledge, though, the Hungarian revolution produced a large wave of emigration and that was it. Thus, Germany would only receive one quick infusion of Hungarian labor and then wouldn't be able to get any more of it.
 
1952. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin put forth a proposal for a reunification and neutralization of Germany, as "free, neutral, and demilitarized Germany"
with no conditions on economic policies and with guarantees for "the rights of man and basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, religious persuasion, political conviction, and assembly" and free activity of democratic parties and organizations.

External would it's acceptable proposal to use Neutral Germany and Austria as buffer state between USA and USSR forces
But on long therm it bring hell of problem
Reorientation of NATO and Warsaw Pact with GDR and BRD united, the US and Red Army have to move there Bases to Neighbor nation like Poland, Belgium, Netherlands and France.
Poland would be in an awkward predicament, having Soviet troops on there soil and there Government under rigid control from Moscow.

The biggest problem has Germany how to reunite two different Nation under one Government ?
in 1989 it was easy the run down GDR simply imploded and BRD took over the bankrupt's estate
In 1952 you got two young and flourishing States: one Democratic and one Stalinist ruled.
Here beginn the difficulty who rules the new Germany: Conrad Adenauer or Walter Ulbrich ?
next problem Economics what for one ?
A Government guided free Economy of west Germany (still doing fine)
Or planned economy runs by communist Ideologist of East Germany (let to downfall of GDR)

What happen to State Security organizations like Verfassungsschutz and Ministry for State Security (STASI)
would Erich Mielke head of STASI step down from his office and face Trail for murder he commit in 1933 on policemen in Berlin ?
would the members of Verfassungsschutz step down from there office and face Trail for there warcrimes as SS officers ?

Nazi is also a Hell of problem in neutral Germany, they could try regain power (in 1952 were allot of them still alive)
In worst case scenario they could regain power and start rearming Germany for World War III
This could be prevented by encroachments by secret services like Mossad or the KGB.
 

Deleted member 97083

Nazi is also a Hell of problem in neutral Germany, they could try regain power (in 1952 were allot of them still alive)
In worst case scenario they could regain power and start rearming Germany for World War III
Not to mention Operation Gladio.
 
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