What would a China ruled by Zhang Xianzhong look like?

If you don't know about him, Zhang Xianzhong was a Chinese warlord who took over Sichuan during the Ming Dynasty's collapse before the Qing defeated him. He allegedly massacred large swathes of Sichuan's population and erected the infamous "Seven Kills" stele. But what if he somehow takes over China, then? What would a China ruled by him look like?
 

raharris1973

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Was he the "western King" who at least drew up grandiose plans to conquer Burma, Vietnam and the Philippines? One of the guys who was based in Sichuan set out some of those hyper aggressive, Toyotomi-style goals.
 
I dont know but i want to know as well.
Considering that according to Chinese sources, he killed over 300 courtiers because of "foul sneezes", that officers were promoted based on how many people they killed (with amputated arms being the basis for confirming said massacres), committed genocide as punishment for a rebellion in the Sichuan region, was obsessed with flaying people, and demanded all Lingchi executions be done slowly with no "cheating" (read: mercy killings) allowed with the cheaters subjected to Lingchi themselves, I dread to think what a China ruled by him would look like.
 
Was he the "western King" who at least drew up grandiose plans to conquer Burma, Vietnam and the Philippines? One of the guys who was based in Sichuan set out some of those hyper aggressive, Toyotomi-style goals.
Well, he was indeed crazy, but in a different way.
 
Isn't his brutality somewhat overstated? Like he didn't actually genocide Sichuan/cause conditions leading to mass death? I mean, he'd do some pretty brutal stuff, no doubt, but he wouldn't be ruling like a 17th century version of Mao, Stalin, and Pol Pot combined. Key word in OP's post is "allegedly", meaning no doubt the Qing Dynasty's historians exaggerated his brutality and scale of his killings.
 
Isn't his brutality somewhat overstated? Like he didn't actually genocide Sichuan/cause conditions leading to mass death? I mean, he'd do some pretty brutal stuff, no doubt, but he wouldn't be ruling like a 17th century version of Mao, Stalin, and Pol Pot combined. Key word in OP's post is "allegedly", meaning no doubt the Qing Dynasty's historians exaggerated his brutality and scale of his killings.
Fair enough.
 
Heaven brings forth innumerable things to nurture man.
Man has nothing good with which to recompense Heaven.


Where does this guy get the mass appeal to win? If he has capable, non psychotic sons then maybe. But it seems like the odds are stacked against him even if the scope of his crimes are overstated.
 
More than personality, the fundamental problem is that you don't conquer China from Sichuan. The Qing were systematically building an effective state in the beifang; luck and competence aren't an especially effective counter to that, not coming from a small patch of the nanfang. And obviously that's before Zhang Xianzhong's....quirks....enter the mix.

A guy like him could more plausibly succeed in the context the Qing had already stepped into: a declining Ming state, gripped by systemic issues and plagued by an almost incomprehensible number of simultaneous peasant revolts. In a situation of flux, a lucky warlord's following could potentially snowball much better. And if it snowballs enough....

From that perspective, what's needed is a sustained failure of the Qing system to create adequate leadership, from the moment it plunged into China proper, or even before then. A half dozen bad personalities and some worse luck might have stalled the Qing expansion after its first phase. That might be sufficient to prevent their success from distracting from their brutality and foreignness, as it did in our TL.

I don't know enough of the personalities of the early Qing to suggest specifics, but in broad strokes they were very competent. It would take a lot of mess at the top to disrupt the system once it had momentum.
 
More than personality, the fundamental problem is that you don't conquer China from Sichuan. The Qing were systematically building an effective state in the beifang; luck and competence aren't an especially effective counter to that, not coming from a small patch of the nanfang. And obviously that's before Zhang Xianzhong's....quirks....enter the mix.

A guy like him could more plausibly succeed in the context the Qing had already stepped into: a declining Ming state, gripped by systemic issues and plagued by an almost incomprehensible number of simultaneous peasant revolts. In a situation of flux, a lucky warlord's following could potentially snowball much better. And if it snowballs enough....

From that perspective, what's needed is a sustained failure of the Qing system to create adequate leadership, from the moment it plunged into China proper, or even before then. A half dozen bad personalities and some worse luck might have stalled the Qing expansion after its first phase. That might be sufficient to prevent their success from distracting from their brutality and foreignness, as it did in our TL.

I don't know enough of the personalities of the early Qing to suggest specifics, but in broad strokes they were very competent. It would take a lot of mess at the top to disrupt the system once it had momentum.
Actually,you can conquer China from Sichuan,someone has already done it.Problem about Zhang Xianzhong's bunch was that they were not able to form a working relationship with the local gentry.I suspect that's the major reason as to why he got scapegoated for the massacres in Sichuan.Sichuan at the time was basically in the midst of a three way war between Ming forces,Zhang Xianzhong's folks and that of the Manchus.It wouldn't be surprising if a lot of civilians died as a result of the utter chaos Sichuan was in.Zhang Xianzhong's adopted son Sun Kewang was able to form an effective resistance to the Qing later on by using Yongli Emperor as a source of legitimacy--much like how Cao Cao did with the Han Emperor.This force was so successful that the Qing considered abandoning a large part of the south altogether until Sun Kewang fell out with Li Dingguo(another one of Zhang Xianzhong's adopted sons).
 
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Liu Bang.

There's always another corner of history to discover. Till just now I had never seen a map of the Chu-Han struggle. Here is been assuming the kingdom of Han shared territory with the old Han state.

Thanks for that! Now I'm trying to figure out why anyone would name the state I'm looking at "Western Chu"....

Problem about Zhang Xianzhong's bunch was that they were not able to form a working relationship with the local gentry.I suspect that's the major reason as to why he got scapegoated for the massacres in Sichuan.Sichuan at the time was basically in the midst of a three way war between Ming forces,Zhang Xianzhong's folks and that of the Manchus.It wouldn't be surprising if a lot of civilians died as a result of the utter chaos Sichuan was in.Zhang Xianzhong's adopted son Sun Kewang was able to form an effective resistance to the Qing later on by using Yongli Emperor as a source of legitimacy--much like how Cao Cao did with the Han Emperor.This force was so successful that the Qing considered abandoning a large part of the south altogether until Sun Kewang fell out with Li Dingguo(another one of Zhang Xianzhong's adopted sons).

Coopting a Ming claimant would obviously resolve some of those challenges. That said, I remain skeptical it would significantly alter the balance between the mostly-unified Qing north and the mostly-divided pro-Ming south. The Qing already had momentum, a healthy and growing military system, and control of the Chinese heartland. And, again, relative unity of command.

The pro-Ming forces were on the back foot. Even if we can go out on a limb and assume other "loyalist" states recognized the Ming claimant in Sichuan and tacitly accepted Zhang's leadership, I'd argue that stalemate is the best of all likely scenarios. Sichuan is naturally defensible. Successfully holding it against the Qing is a far cry from successfully invading the central plains.

Unless the Qing lose their stride. If they start having more substantial failures, that opens up possibilities. For that, the easiest POD I am aware of is an extended period of poor leadership.
 
There's always another corner of history to discover. Till just now I had never seen a map of the Chu-Han struggle. Here is been assuming the kingdom of Han shared territory with the old Han state.
The Han Empire IIRC is named after the region of Hanzhong (汉中), near Liu bang's Hàn (汉) state and shares zero relation to the Hán (韩) state.
 
There's always another corner of history to discover. Till just now I had never seen a map of the Chu-Han struggle. Here is been assuming the kingdom of Han shared territory with the old Han state.

Thanks for that! Now I'm trying to figure out why anyone would name the state I'm looking at "Western Chu"....
That's because Jiangdong is called eastern Chu,and Xiangyu's capital is west of that region.


Coopting a Ming claimant would obviously resolve some of those challenges. That said, I remain skeptical it would significantly alter the balance between the mostly-unified Qing north and the mostly-divided pro-Ming south. The Qing already had momentum, a healthy and growing military system, and control of the Chinese heartland. And, again, relative unity of command.

The pro-Ming forces were on the back foot. Even if we can go out on a limb and assume other "loyalist" states recognized the Ming claimant in Sichuan and tacitly accepted Zhang's leadership, I'd argue that stalemate is the best of all likely scenarios. Sichuan is naturally defensible. Successfully holding it against the Qing is a far cry from successfully invading the central plains.

Unless the Qing lose their stride. If they start having more substantial failures, that opens up possibilities. For that, the easiest POD I am aware of is an extended period of poor leadership.
I think stability of Manchu rule's overstated.Zheng Chenggong's 1658-1659 offensive and Wu Sangui's rebellion shows that as soon as the Manchu shows signs of failure,people will eagerly defect back to Ming or whatever Han regime.Another thing is that by the 17th century,the Chinese heartland wasn't actually the Central Plains--it was Jiangdong.IIRC,the region south of the Yangtze holds as much as 2/3s of the population.The key to Qing success was cavalry,and fighting in the south is actually favorable to infantry.If Han forces are able to take the south,then the Qing are quite screwed--since they will then have difficulty paying their bannerman and Han defectors.These Han defectors don't really hold any loyalty to anyone--they are more or less folk fighting for themselves.
 
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Heaven brings forth innumerable things to nurture man.
Man has nothing good with which to recompense Heaven.


Where does this guy get the mass appeal to win? If he has capable, non psychotic sons then maybe. But it seems like the odds are stacked against him even if the scope of his crimes are overstated.

http://images.library.yale.edu/divinitycontent/dayrep/9866641_1938_040-007-008_eng.pdf

The actual stele likely said "Heaven gives everything to men; men give nothing back to heaven. The gods are not without intelligence; examine yourselves and repent!"
 
Logically Zhang could not have killed nearly as many people as the sources say, simply because he didn't control the majority of Sichuan and he didn't rule even the portion he did control for a very long time.

The depopulation was caused by the incessant and brutal fighting between bandits and warlords, Ming loyalists, and Qing troops that began in the 1640s and lasted into the 1670s.
 
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