What would 19th C Russia's wet-dream scenario in the Balkans look like?

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

I mentioned before that this is just an indication of what the border might look like west of the Strymon if European Turkey were to be divided in the 1860s. The Russians would simply never accept a Greece extending to the Balkans and the Black Sea, regardless of its chances of actually keeping control over that much territory. I'd expect the region east of the river (except the Straits and possibly Adrianople), as well as some places west of it (maybe even Nis), to be assigned to Bulgaria.

Keep in mind that this is before the Bulgarian Exarchate was founded, so many in Greece would view the Bulgarians coming under their rule as simply Slavified Greeks. The later the division, the greater the Greco-Bulgarian rivalry - and the larger the Bulgarian share of Macedonia.

It was before the Bulgarian Exarchate, but the Bulgarians knew exactly what they considered Bulgarian by 1860. As I've said before, Bulgarian nationalism developed in resistance to Greek domination, not Ottoman.

The idea of Russia dominating a big Bulgaria is a pipe-dream. It would be strong enough to stand on its own and it would reject Russian control just as it did in OTL with a third the territory. The idea of it annexing it is preposterous.

And there is no chance whatsoever that Russia would ever allow Greece to have the Straits or anything near it.

The problem with these scenarios is that there's no chance of making anyone happy. Anything Bulgaria gets will be horrifically resented by Greece and Serbia, and all the various vice versas. Even if Russia picks one to be its client, that one will never feel it got everything it wanted and will resent Russian attempts to control it.

And, this all has to pretend that the all the other powers don't exist and are going to sit around while Russia dominates all of eastern Europe and the Middle East. Even if for some magical reason they're all diverted by something else, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire will have such massive consequences that it will inevitably lead to a major war.

Forget not that a huge number of our current problems are the direct result of the end of the Ottoman Empire. That's not going to be any different in 1860 - in fact it will be much worse.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

It was before the Bulgarian Exarchate, but the Bulgarians knew exactly what they considered Bulgarian by 1860. As I've said before, Bulgarian nationalism developed in resistance to Greek domination, not Ottoman.

The Greeks didn't quite get it yet.

The idea of Russia dominating a big Bulgaria is a pipe-dream. It would be strong enough to stand on its own and it would reject Russian control just as it did in OTL with a third the territory.

Given the nature of the Bulgarian independence movement, it would not be surprising if Bulgaria turned out to be a liberal, socialist or even anarchist state and a refuge for like-minded inhabitants of the Russian Empire and its sphere of influence - and therefore a threat.

The idea of it annexing it is preposterous.

I said so myself.

And there is no chance whatsoever that Russia would ever allow Greece to have the Straits or anything near it.

Again, no contradiction with what I said.

Forget not that a huge number of our current problems are the direct result of the end of the Ottoman Empire. That's not going to be any different in 1860 - in fact it will be much worse.

Actually, I think an earlier end would be less troublesome. Less nationalism and fewer rivalries and grievances.

 

[Valdemar II]

The christian community in the balkans lasted for centuries after the Ottoman conquest. The muslim communities were lucky to last for a decade when the Christians conquered the land

Bulgaria still have around a million Muslims, Greece have between 100-150 000 thousands when the new immigrant aren't counted, Serbia 150-200 000. Macedonia still have a significant Muslim community.

Beside that in Russia the Muslim communities still exist and also make up a significant part of the population.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

The Greeks didn't quite get it yet.



Given the nature of the Bulgarian independence movement, it would not be surprising if Bulgaria turned out to be a liberal, socialist or even anarchist state and a refuge for like-minded inhabitants of the Russian Empire and its sphere of influence - and therefore a threat.



I said so myself.



Again, no contradiction with what I said.



Actually, I think an earlier end would be less troublesome. Less nationalism and fewer rivalries and grievances.

I'm not debating you, I'm largely agreeing. Although I disagree with your last point.

The partition of the empire was done gradually and slowly to minimize the chances of a general war: Berlin set up autonomous regimes, granted independence to the areas that were already autonomous, arranged for spheres in Cyprus and Tunis, allowed A-H occupation of Bosnia, etc. - so Ottoman control was loosened, but not eliminated. A total and sudden breakdown would have caused a disaster, instead of the incremental extension of spheres of influence.

A total collapse would have led to chaos in the Middle East, too. What would happen to Egypt? Syria and Palestine? Mesopotamia? Anatolia?

There's just too much that could go wrong for nothing to go wrong. Even the more orderly dismemberment led to WWI.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

Bulgaria still have around a million Muslims, Greece have between 100-150 000 thousands when the new immigrant aren't counted, Serbia 150-200 000. Macedonia still have a significant Muslim community.

Beside that in Russia the Muslim communities still exist and also make up a significant part of the population.

Bulgaria used to be close to half Muslim, and Muslims were a plurality in the entire region Greece gained in the Balkan Wars. The Muslims that survived in the Balkans largely did due to treaties: The Greeks were required to leave the West Thracian Muslims alone, and in the areas you're referring to in Serbia (Kosovo), almost the whole population was Muslim, so options were limited.

In 1877 the Ottoman Balkans were 43% Muslim, and that's not counting Istanbul, and is counting the Aegean Islands. It's nothing even close to that today.

When Serbia became autonomous, the Muslim population was entirely expelled, and the Ottomans were required by international treaty to not allow any Muslims to reside there (in their own territory!)

Here are the figures - Bulgaria is understated because there was a large number of refugees in the Dobruja from the Crimea and Caucasus that were not counted:

Percentage Muslim by province:

Edirne 43.1%
Tuna 43.8%
Sofya 26.4%
Selanik 39.0%
Manastır 25.8%
Kosova 47.0%
İşkodra 62.4%
Yanya 30.1%
Bosna 49.8%
Cezayir 11.1%
Girit 42.9%

Total 42.9%

That represents about 5M Muslims in 1877. There should be at least 5 times that number today due to population growth.

 

[Cuāuhtemōc]

Could you present us the map? I remember you posting a map.

 

[Oddball]

Could you present us the map? I remember you posting a map.

https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=88367

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

I'm not debating you, I'm largely agreeing. Although I disagree with your last point.

The partition of the empire was done gradually and slowly to minimize the chances of a general war: Berlin set up autonomous regimes, granted independence to the areas that were already autonomous, arranged for spheres in Cyprus and Tunis, allowed A-H occupation of Bosnia, etc. - so Ottoman control was loosened, but not eliminated. A total and sudden breakdown would have caused a disaster, instead of the incremental extension of spheres of influence.

A total collapse would have led to chaos in the Middle East, too. What would happen to Egypt? Syria and Palestine? Mesopotamia? Anatolia?

There's just too much that could go wrong for nothing to go wrong. Even the more orderly dismemberment led to WWI.

From a Balkan perspective, a lot of the mutual bad blood had not accumulated yet half a century before WWI. From a Middle Eastern perspective, the less British and French involvement, the better. I would expect the Mashriq to be divided between Egypt, Persia, the Ottoman remnant, local dynasties (Saudis, Rashidis and others), probably some Christian and Druze statelets, possibly some Kurdish tribal confederations, and some limited European colonies on the coasts.

 

[Abdul Hadi Pasha]

From a Balkan perspective, a lot of the mutual bad blood had not accumulated yet half a century before WWI. From a Middle Eastern perspective, the less British and French involvement, the better. I would expect the Mashriq to be divided between Egypt, Persia, the Ottoman remnant, local dynasties (Saudis, Rashidis and others), probably some Christian and Druze statelets, possibly some Kurdish tribal confederations, and some limited European colonies on the coasts.

The 60s were just after a massive sectarian explosion in Syria - I don't think there was ever worse bad-blood - and that includes the creation of Israel. As for the Balkans, perhaps there was less bad blood over Macedonia, but was it really so much less than later? You know quite well how Balkan people felt about Greeks and their domination of Orthodox institutions...

But what really matters, I think, is how bad blood is produced by the question, who gets what? In OTL, spheres were more or less marked out and dissolution handled in stages. The only exception, albeit spectacular, was Macedonia.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

The 60s were just after a massive sectarian explosion in Syria - I don't think there was ever worse bad-blood - and that includes the creation of Israel.

I meant bad blood in the Balkans.

As for the Balkans, perhaps there was less bad blood over Macedonia, but was it really so much less than later? You know quite well how Balkan people felt about Greeks and their domination of Orthodox institutions...

But what really matters, I think, is how bad blood is produced by the question, who gets what? In OTL, spheres were more or less marked out and dissolution handled in stages. The only exception, albeit spectacular, was Macedonia.

A division of the Balkans in the 1860s would mean a very sudden increase in the borders of Greece, Bulgaria (which would have to be created then and there), Serbia, and Montenegro. This means 2 things. First, it means that these states would be far too busy assimilating their new and large acquisitions, presuming they even can, to actively plot making new ones at the expense of their neighbors. 2nd, it means that they'd realize how fortunate they'd been and therefore show more willingness to place their unaccomplished ambitions on the back-burner.

To give the most relevant example, the Bulgarians, whose Balkan ambitions in 1914 were IMO even more dangerous to the regional peace than those of the Serbs (and also more justified), would be far more likely to acquiesce in their relatively limited territory after they'd just gained independence in cca 1865 then after the First (and certainly 2nd) Balkan War, when they'd been de facto independent for over 30 years, had come to view the Serbs as rivals rather than brothers, had the maps of the Exarchate and San Stefano on their mind, and had a history behind them of gradually extending their territory.

 

[Admiral Matt]

A division of the Balkans in the 1860s would mean a very sudden increase in the borders of Greece, Bulgaria (which would have to be created then and there), Serbia, and Montenegro. This means 2 things. First, it means that these states would be far too busy assimilating their new and large acquisitions, presuming they even can, to actively plot making new ones at the expense of their neighbors. 2nd, it means that they'd realize how fortunate they'd been and therefore show more willingness to place their unaccomplished ambitions on the back-burner.

But historically that's not what happened.

In OTL, the only Balkan state that achieved and held all of its historical claims was Romania. And yes, by doing so they crossed into the claims of so many neighbors that they were surrounded by enemies and pursued a much less aggressive foreign policy.

The trouble is, you can only get one or two states to their fever-dream borders. While those two may then be very interested in international peace and playing it safe, you've only increased their instability while driving their neighbors - who perforce received much less of the spoils - to target them.

If you avoid creating any Uber-Bulgarias then every state in the Balkans is left feeling cheated and looking hungrily at their neighbors. The geopolitics of the region show very little sense of proportion and reserve. I don't see why we should expect more in the above situation.

 

[Thande]

Perhaps the purpose of this thread needs clarification. When I say Russia's wet dream scenario, I mean if Russia had a chance to remake the Balkans according to its will, what would it look like?

As AHP says this means we (somewhat unrealistically) assume none of the other great powers are there to intervene.

You can also ask the question of whether 'Russia's will' means 'attempting to create a stable settlement' (i.e., using its collective head) or 'try to impose a messianic dream like Catherine's renewed Byzantine Empire mentioned above' (i.e. using its heart).

This does not assume that this is somehow a magic ASB scenario where this must last - by all means I'm allowing the possibility that when the great powers (and the Ottomans) are ready to intervene, it all gets overturned again. What I am asking is what the Russians would try to set up in the Balkans, regardless of whether it's likely to last more than a couple of years before collapsing.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

But historically that's not what happened.

I don't see why you feel the need to tell me this. I'm telling you that the result would've been different if it had unfolded differently and you tell me that it didn't unfold that way.

snip

Think of it as comparing someone who just won a fortune in a lottery and someone who was born into the same fortune. Which one of them is likely to be more ambitious about increasing that fortune?

When I say Russia's wet dream scenario, I mean if Russia had a chance to remake the Balkans according to its will, what would it look like?

Russia's dream scenario, if they can completely ignore what the Greeks and Serbs negotiated between themselves, is a large Bulgaria stretching to the Aegean and Adriatic, including Salonica, Grevena, Korce, Skopje, and Nis, under a Romanov king and with a Russian military presence on its territory. Abdul will probbaly tell me that, in spite of those guarantees, this Bulgaria will inevitably have a falling out with Russia, and he may be completely right, but the Russians don't know that.

 

[Admiral Matt]

I don't see why you feel the need to tell me this. I'm telling you that the result would've been different if it had unfolded differently and you tell me that it didn't unfold that way.

I felt the need because I believe that the same trends would repeat in this time line, and that the driving factors in OTL outweigh the different circumstances in this one. In alternate history it is standard to apply the patterns of actual history to alternate situations and discuss where, and how much, events would overlap.

I would be interested to understand how small military effort leading to dramatic gains would make Balkan powers less aggressive or how expansion taking place slightly earlier would alter their strategic perspectives. I'm not calling you out here, I just don't think you've made a very compelling argument yet.

Think of it as comparing someone who just won a fortune in a lottery and someone who was born into the same fortune. Which one of them is likely to be more ambitious about increasing that fortune?

That's fair, I suppose. Bulgaria would suddenly spring into being with a hefty territory. But Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and *Rumania were all extant and are all still in the lottery situation. The former two especially will have fairly ludicrous ideal boundaries. Also, let's not forget that Italy, for example, was thrown together in the space of a few years with foreign support and 95% of its core territories, but went on to become one of the most aggressive powers of the early twentieth century.

 

[Admiral Matt]

Perhaps the purpose of this thread needs clarification. When I say Russia's wet dream scenario, I mean if Russia had a chance to remake the Balkans according to its will, what would it look like?

As AHP says this means we (somewhat unrealistically) assume none of the other great powers are there to intervene.

You can also ask the question of whether 'Russia's will' means 'attempting to create a stable settlement' (i.e., using its collective head) or 'try to impose a messianic dream like Catherine's renewed Byzantine Empire mentioned above' (i.e. using its heart).

This does not assume that this is somehow a magic ASB scenario where this must last - by all means I'm allowing the possibility that when the great powers (and the Ottomans) are ready to intervene, it all gets overturned again. What I am asking is what the Russians would try to set up in the Balkans, regardless of whether it's likely to last more than a couple of years before collapsing.

San Stefano is probably our best guide. Maybe just exaggerate it a bit.

A massive Bulgaria dominates the Balkans. Russia probably has at least the right to move troops through, but that may not last more than a few years. Most of the rest is divided between Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia. Russia directly annexes Dobruja and the mouth of the Danube, Eastern Thrace, Istanbul and the Straights, and probably something in Anatolia - maybe the Armenian claims.

Once the powers get back on their feet, there will need to be a new treaty. Everyone will want to push back at the Russian gains, although if Bulgaria is acting independent it might be accepted. To the extent the Russian efforts will survive it will be by horse-trading - a whole lot of Asia, Africa, and Europe has lost a clear owner. Some powers may be interested in getting some for themselves. If anyone (besides the Russians) starts, then it becomes a question of who gets how much - the British for example wouldn't especially want more colonies, but might take them to keep the French out.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

That's fair, I suppose. Bulgaria would suddenly spring into being with a hefty territory. But Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and *Rumania were all extant and are all still in the lottery situation. The former two especially will have fairly ludicrous ideal boundaries. Also, let's not forget that Italy, for example, was thrown together in the space of a few years with foreign support and 95% of its core territories, but went on to become one of the most aggressive powers of the early twentieth century.

Well in Italy's case knocking down the local regimes was easier and less risky than it would've been for the Balkan states to fight each other. What really mattered was strategy WRT Austria, where there are parallels to San Stefano (the quick peace of 1859, which left the Austrians with Venetia). The new Italian state's policy towards acquiring Rome, meanwhile, was very cautious, almost giving the impression that they didn't want it. After Venetia (and Mantua, people tend to forget that) and Rome were absorbed it took some time until irredentism became a major factor in foreign policy.

Still, I have to concede that your example does point to serious flaws in that argument, as I fail to account for popular pressure and medium-term effects.

The other argument is that a large and sudden increase in territory (for Bulgaria the increase would consist of its entire territory) would render these states ill-equipped for new expansionist adventures. Looking at 1913, this appears to have held for Greece (where the new territories exacerbated a domestic political conflict, IIRC) but not Serbia (maybe the increase wasn't large enough to throw them off). These states were less stable, less developed and less experienced with governing themselves in 1861 than in 1913.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

Here's a map of what I would consider the Russian wet dream. The borders of Bulgaria are in blue, with the purple marking the extent of that territory which the Russians may take for themselves instead (the Dobruja with Silistra, Adrianople and Athos).

 

[Ofaloaf]

Here's a map of what I would consider the Russian wet dream. The borders of Bulgaria are in blue, with the purple marking the extent of that territory which the Russians may take for themselves instead (the Dobruja with Silistra, Adrianople and Athos).

Bulgaria's western border there looks like it's piss the Serbs right off, and if Salonika also answers to Sofia, then Greece is also going to be hostile to Russo-Bulgarian interests.

 

[Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy]

Bulgaria's western border there looks like it's piss the Serbs right off, and if Salonika also answers to Sofia, then Greece is also going to be hostile to Russo-Bulgarian interests.

Russia would assume that Bulgaria is more trustworthy than Greece or Serbia. Also, when you're that large you can afford to piss others off.

 

[Ofaloaf]

Russia would assume that Bulgaria is more trustworthy than Greece or Serbia. Also, when you're that large you can afford to piss others off.

What's the point in securing Constantinople if the Black Sea fleet can't pass through the Aegean? A Greece opposed to Russia would fall into either/both German or/and British spheres of influence, which would in turn not mesh with the goal of a Russian fleet in the Mediterranean. And snubbing Serbia by giving most of its southern aspirations to Bulgaria (even if Belgrade is given Bosnia)? Serbia would probably further enter the Austro-Hungarian sphere.

A Greater Bulgaria scheme would sour Russo-Bulgarian relations with all the neighboring Balkan states, greatly inhibiting further Russian expansion in the peninsula, while at the same time giving their European adversaries eager satellites in close proximity to Russian interests. A treaty which more equally distributes former Ottoman territories amongst the Balkan states will weaken the ability of other Great Powers to draw disaffected countries into their thrall.