What were the German War Plans before the Schlieffen Plan

The problem, as I see it, is this:

With Russia engaged in civil war, and therefore not available to do France's heavy lifting, France's leaders will do ABSOLUTELY NOTHING that might antagonize Germany. And if offense is accidentally given, will backtrack to whatever extent is necessary to repair the breach. Poincare was nobody's fool.

Now, it's possible that Germany might pick a fight with France nonetheless, but why, especially as it risks war with Britain? Germany's motivation was not an absolute lust to put all Western Europe under her jackbooted heel; rather it was fear of a strong, hostile, encircling alliance. ITTL, if Germany wants to take advantage of the situation in order to free herself from such a threat being reestablished, it seems most likely that she will involve herself in the East, helping Poland and the Baltic regions throw off the Russian yoke and become "independent" buffer states. Something that Britain wouldn't be terribly sad to see happen, given the loathing many Liberals (and most of Labour) had for the Tsar's regime, and given how worried Britain remained over Russian intentions towards the Mideast and India.

I'm sorry, I hate to point out implausibilities in folks' ideas, but I think this is too big to ignore. Perhaps it can be gotten around by the right POD and prevailing circumstances.

I think you're right on all points. I made a similar argument over in @WarlordGhandi's timeline thread just now.

Wilhelm *might* be tempted by the opportunity to settle accounts with France. But he's got one hell of a fluid situation on his eastern flank now, with the opportunity to gather all sorts of fruits at low price - new independent states which will be drawn into Germany's economic and diplomatic orbit. The chance to secure a cordon sanitaire against Russia (however it ends up being governed). That will absorb a great deal of Berlin's energies for the time being.

France under Rouvier was, and will be, desperate to avoid any war with Germany that it must fight all by itself. British intervention is still unlikely, at best, and would contribute very minor land forces, at best - no substitute for having the Russian Steamroller to divert a major part of the Heer.
 

Perkeo

Banned
I will never understand why Germany does not seem to have any answer to the - IMO extremely obvious - questions:
1) What do we do if the conflict starts in the east and France takes care not give a credible casus belli before Russia has completed its mobilization?
2) Does the benefit of invading Belgium really compare to the extreme risk of British war entry?
3) France lasted seven months in the Franco-Prussian war. Does that support the assumption that you can beat them before Russia is ready?
 
I will never understand why Germany does not seem to have any answer to the - IMO extremely obvious - questions:
1) What do we do if the conflict starts in the east and France takes care not give a credible casus belli before Russia has completed its mobilization?
2) Does the benefit of invading Belgium really compare to the extreme risk of British war entry?
3) France lasted seven months in the Franco-Prussian war. Does that support the assumption that you can beat them before Russia is ready?

The answers, pre-Schliefffen, seem to have been multivalent, and more cautious. (British entry pre-Schlieffen looked extraordinarily unlikely anyway, before the 1904 Colonial Agreement.)

The answers, post-Schlieffen, seem to have been more aggressive, especially as the army expanded:

1) Take out France anyway, because they're much smaller with better transportation;
2) Yes, because the British are not likely to make any real difference in the quick campaign we have in mind;
3) No, because we now have the capability to force a collapse more quickly now.

Then again it's not always clear how widely shared those views were. There's evidence that more than a few senior officers had doubts about the ability to carry it off, but they also seem to have thought it was worth the risk. That maybe you grab enough key French territory that France is put in a serious disadvantage in the war going forward - which is, after all, what happened, to so me degree. That Russia was not a great power Germany could defeat quickly, given its vast size and poor infrastructure.
 
I will never understand why Germany does not seem to have any answer to the - IMO extremely obvious - questions:
1) What do we do if the conflict starts in the east and France takes care not give a credible casus belli before Russia has completed its mobilization?
2) Does the benefit of invading Belgium really compare to the extreme risk of British war entry?
3) France lasted seven months in the Franco-Prussian war. Does that support the assumption that you can beat them before Russia is ready?

problem is the franco Prussian war is so dated at this point its like the Italians saying well our plan worked during the roman conquests
 
Snip.
3) France lasted seven months in the Franco-Prussian war. Does that support the assumption that you can beat them before Russia is ready?

Well...

Before WW1, France was inducting and training about 85% of her young male population. That is, every able-bodied man was either in the Active Army, or the Reserves.

That was a LOT of guys. But there was literally no one behind them, other than the (much smaller than in Germany) annual contingent of male youths reaching adulthood.

Now, in theory, this meant that if you could smash up the existing Army+Reserve badly enough, the French could not rebuild their forces to a fit enough state to resume major offensive operations within, say, one to three years. Under these circumstances, France might even sue for peace.

It was different in 1870, when France's army was quite a small % of the male population. You could immediately draft a fresh 100,000 out of surplus males. Repeat as needed, plenty of excess males. But not in 1914.

And if the French were dumb enough to launch their armies over the border at the beginning of the war, maybe you could smash up enough of them (especially the well-trained Active Army) that you wouldn't even need to fight your way deep into France. Maybe the French would sue for peace, but rendering them incapable of conducting large-scale offensives for a year or so would be good enough.

This seems to have been the German thinking. Now, in 1912, their 3rd Department (Intel) assessed a high likelihood that enough Frenchmen would survive the initial battles to fall back, and prolong the war. That was undoubtedly worrying, but there seemed to be no better course. Germany's best chance still appeared to lie in trying to cripple the French Army at the outset.
 
Snip.
2) Does the benefit of invading Belgium really compare to the extreme risk of British war entry?
Snip.

Here's my take on it:

The Germans (wrongly) believed that there was some nonzero chance of Belgium allowing passage to German armies. They also believed (rightly or wrongly) that even if they had to invade Belgium, there was some nonzero chance that Britain could be convinced to stay out. They reckoned that, by going through Belgium, there was some nonzero chance of effectively knocking France out of the war early.

Meanwhile, they figured that the chance of smashing France up quickly WITHOUT going through Belgium, was zero; and that the chance of winning (or even surviving) a two-front war WITHOUT smashing France up quickly, was also zero.

So, proceeding from those assumptions, the rational answer is "Yes, it's worth the risk."

Of course, if some or all of those assumptions are wrong, then it's a terrible error.
 
Athelstane,

It seems to me that, as technology progressed, and as the Franco-Russian Entente bloated its armies and seemingly grew ever more hostile, the German leaders became increasingly convinced that Germany WOULD NEVER be able to fight on one front, and COULD NOT avoid a fairly swift defeat if forced to fight on two fronts, and very well might be broken up as a nation if defeated (and indeed, they had good reason to suspect that last bit).

Which means that, in their view, a war would be an absolute, win-or-die, uncompromising Crisis.

They also firmly believed that the Franco-Russians were determine to eventually force a war. They (rather naively) thought that Britain could be made to understand all this and might be convinced to stand aside.

I think these facts explain why, as you put it, the answers got more aggressive. If you're convinced that you're going to have a "fight to the death" forced upon you, and that only one course of action holds even a chance of survival, you do it.

I think it was something very like desperation. But a desperation combined with the sort of prideful stubbornness that won't permit *admitting* to desperation.

The funny thing is that they weren't alone. Several key Entente leaders believed that *Germany* intended to force a war; that defeat meant death of the nation; that victory or defeat could be made to come swiftly; that it would be better to fight a horrble war than to sacrifice honor in trying to avoid it.

And prideful and stubborn to a fault.
 
Warlord Gandhi,

On fortress strengths.

Based on WW1 case studies (of Verdun, Osowiec, Przemysl, Liege, etc), I think there are some general rules you might use, even when you don't know the specifics of a particular fortress.

The following apply unless the fortress is known to be old and significantly outdated.

First, a fortress (any fortress) probably cannot be conquered if it is closely supported by an intact field army (although outworks might be captured).

Second, no fortress is likely to be taken by a poorly-supplied force, a distinctly low-quality force (Landwehr, for instance), or one lacking in heavy artillery.

Third, if the fortress is surrounded by flooded, marshy, or intensely muddy terrain, its capture is unlikely or will take much longer.

The big factors for capturing fortresses were: no supporting field army close by; able to be surrounded (cut off from aid); firm terrain around for deployment of big guns; attacked by a skillful for with heavy artillery and plentiful supply; fortress is under-garrisoned.

If all the above factors are present (think Liege in Aug 1914), then no matter how technically strong, it will fall anytime between one to maybe three weeks.

Examples:
Osowiec -- not particularly strong, but marshes nearby flooded when attacked by a reserve/Landwehr force underequipped with Heavy artillery. Successfully resisted siege.

Verdun -- supported by a field army, couldn't be completely cut off from supplies and replacements. Resisted a long, determined attack.

Przemysl -- had a large garrison and good defenses, but its best protection was mud. Held until relieved (the first time).

Liege -- widely regarded as among the strongest fortresses in Western Europe, but ended up lacking a big part of its garrison, no field Army support, attacked by a competent force with plenty of supplies and heavy guns. Fell in 9 days of actual siege.

Various very costly Russian fortresses in Poland -- abandoned and blown up when Russian field forces had to withdraw eastward.

Incidentally, I suspect Liege would've held out closer to a month in 1905. The defenses may have been weaker, but there was a lot less heavy artillery around.




Anybody out there with better knowledge of fortresses and sieges, please weigh in if I've gotten anything badly wrong!
 
I think these facts explain why, as you put it, the answers got more aggressive.

Sure. Good points.

I think you also have to add in the 1912-1914 expansion of the army, and the expansion of the heavy artillery - all of which began to make Schleiffen's envelopment through Belgium a viable proposition.

Regarding both Belgium and Britain, what first-hand accounts I have seen suggests a kind of narrative capture was at work for both Moltke and the Kaiser: Belgium would not resist (a proposition established when Leopold was still king, and stuck to their synapses even after he died), or if it did, would not resist very effectively; Britain would not intervene, or if it did, would not contribute any land forces, or if it did, these land forces would not amount to effective accretions to French defenses, or if they did, they would not arrive in time. On every count, however, they were proved to be wrong.

Perhaps we could even call it stubborn pride.
 
Warlord Gandhi,

I think the things you noted were partly due to a persistent failure to understand how other countries were likely to respond to stimuli.
Most famously, this manifested itself in the frequently very bad German diplomacy. They just didn't seem to be able to understand how other countries saw things. Sure, arrogance sometimes played a role, but I very often get the impression of earnest incomprehension.

Second, I think the fantasy-world optimistic outlook about whether Belgium would resist, or whether Britain would enter the war, was partly due to that desperation I mentioned. They NEEDED to believe these things were possible, because otherwise their bleak situation starts looking almost hopeless.

And yes, I'm confident that stubborn pride ("Of course, Belgium surely wouldn't dare resist OUR military might!") played a role.

I want to say again, though, that I don't consider Germany to be the only nation susceptible to these things. Paranoia, for example? Look at how Britain fretted ridiculously (for decades) over a totally unrealistic Russian threat to India. Et cetera. I think Germany's biggest problem was being the inexperienced but ambitious newcomer stuck between long-established Great Powers.

Of course, some would think that assessment overly-generous.

Anyway, as usual, I've gotten long-winded and philosophical. I do that a lot, sorry.
 

BooNZ

Banned
I think you also have to add in the 1912-1914 expansion of the army, and the expansion of the heavy artillery - all of which began to make Schleiffen's envelopment through Belgium a viable proposition.
Drastically improved Russian infrastructure and military readiness meant Germany was fated to fight a two front war from 1912-14. The increased liaisons between the Anglo-French militaries meant the rapid deployment of Entente forces would actually outnumber the Germans on the Western Front from 1912-14. And the overall increase in size of the respective militaries since 1905, meant more Germans and military equipment using increasingly strained infrastructure.

Aside from the lack of a decent CB, 1908 was probably a sweet spot where a wider German excursion through Belgium excursion may have worked. From that point onward, a strengthening Russia and improved Anglo-French relationship made it an increasingly flawed concept.

Regarding both Belgium and Britain, what first-hand accounts I have seen suggests a kind of narrative capture was at work for both Moltke and the Kaiser: Belgium would not resist (a proposition established when Leopold was still king, and stuck to their synapses even after he died), or if it did, would not resist very effectively; Britain would not intervene, or if it did, would not contribute any land forces, or if it did, these land forces would not amount to effective accretions to French defenses, or if they did, they would not arrive in time. On every count, however, they were proved to be wrong.

In at least one of the late and prominent war games the Germans had assumed Belgium would side with the Entente - without prompting. The truth is neither Germany nor the Entente were sure of the extent to which Belgium would defend its territory. Germany had the added fear that Belgium would quickly side with the Entente. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear Belgium was determined to take the defense of its neutrality seriously, against all comers.

In respect of Britain, even as late as 1914 the hawks in Britain were worried a German excursion through the Ardennes would not be enough to get Britain into the war. The French were still not entirely sure the German plunge through the middle of Belgium was enough to get Britain into the war. The German expectations of the British were all over the shop. With the benefit of hindsight, no-one in Britain was absolutely certain what Britain would do before the Germans went through Belgium.
 
Somebody in Germany needs to channel Bismarck.

German diplomacy should just avoid war with Russia. Its not hard. You have a German - Russian boundary that is not in dispute at all (1815 congress of Vienna). Both have their heels on the Poles so there is agreement there.

Germany should put firm clamps on Austrian designs in the Balkans. German has little to gain and lots to lose from such things as 1908 Bosnia.
 

BooNZ

Banned
German diplomacy should just avoid war with Russia. Its not hard. You have a German - Russian boundary that is not in dispute at all (1815 congress of Vienna). Both have their heels on the Poles so there is agreement there..

Wilhelm's natural instincts were often overridden by the geniuses in the German foreign office - examples: Queen Victoria's funeral 1901 and Bjorko 1904.

Germany should put firm clamps on Austrian designs in the Balkans. German has little to gain and lots to lose from such things as 1908 Bosnia

The Bosnia Herzegovina annexation merely formalized the existing administration of the state, which it had administered for decades. It was the removal of a potential point of contention at a time when Russia was not able to use the threat of force. It was an excuse for Serbian/Russian militancy, but scarcely the underlying cause.

OTL A-H military spending was proportionately the lowest of all the great powers. If Germany had any influence over A-H, it should have encouraged vastly increase military spending to reflect French-Russian-Serbian priorities.
 
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