What were the German War Plans before the Schlieffen Plan

NoMommsen

Donor
There's a book about : Therence Zuber, The Real Geman War Plan, 1904-14. Relativly cheap, esp when purchased used.

In short : Moltke the Elder and Waldersee preferred the "East First" option and let plan for that.

With Schlieffen becoming Chief of the Great General Staff ... things started to change, focussing more and more on France as the first to target. However, Schlieffen knew, and let it play through several times, that a thrust to Paris via Belgium and/or the Netherlands was not feasible, ... not enough troops, unsure logistics.

The preferred 'solution' in these war games and staff rides was :
after the first advance into the lowlands France counterattacks in Lorraine and/or north and/or south of Metz/Thionville(Diedenhofen) with the german right wing then being redeployed to Lorraine/Luxembourg or 'just' attacking the french from there, causing a BIG Cannae in Lorraine with the (hoped for) destruction of most of french forces.

The famous/infamous "Schlieffen"-plan we know, was more a 'memorandum', than an actual, on deployment to be used plan, mostly showing, that for an action as described the german forces were ... not enough.

Moltke the younger 'just' took over, not really developing something own. Partially due to the already in life-time idolization of Schlieffen and perhaps not having the guts to voice against his former 'master'.
Dunno, if he had the intellectual capacity either.
In the end he successfully narrowed any thinking of military doctrine even more down to this 'legacy' of Schlieffen.
 
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There's a book about : Therence Zuber, The Real Geman War Plan, 1904-14. Relativly cheap, esp when purchased used.

In short : Moltke the Elder and Waldersee preferred the "East First" option and let plan for that.

With Schlieffen becoming Chief of the Great General Staff ... things started to change, focussing more and more on France as the first to target. However, Schlieffen knew, and let it play through several times, that a thrust to Paris via Belgium and/or the Netherlands was not feasible, ... not enough troops, unsure logistics.

The preferred 'solution' in these war games and staff rides was :
after the first advance into the lowlands France counterattacks in Lorraine and/or north and/or south of Metz/Thionville(Diedenhofen) with the german right wing then being redeployed to Lorraine/Luxembourg or 'just' attacking the french from there, causing a BIG Cannae in Lorraine with the (hoped for) destruction of most of french forces.

The famous/infamous "Schlieffen"-plan we know, was more a 'memorandum', than an actual, on deployment to be used plan, mostly showing, that for an action as described the german forces were ... not enough.

Moltke the younger 'just' took over, not really developing something own. Partially due to the already in life-time idolization of Schlieffen and perhaps not having the guts to voice against his former 'master'.
Dunno, if he had the intellectual capacity either.
In the end he successfully narrowed any thinking of military doctrine even more down to this 'legacy' of Schlieffen.
Was there any plan for a war with solely France vs Germany?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Was there any plan for a war with solely France vs Germany?
Latest with the 'official' ratification of the franco-russian alliance in 1984, due to the IMO unnecessary non-prolongation of the german-russian reinsurance treaty in 1890, it was clear to the german military, that in case of war they would have to face a "War at Two Fronts".
 
No, the 1914 plan was unusual because it was the only plan available, previous years there were a number of plans.
Latest with the 'official' ratification of the franco-russian alliance in 1984, due to the IMO unnecessary non-prolongation of the german-russian reinsurance treaty in 1890, it was clear to the german military, that in case of war they would have to face a "War at Two Fronts".
Damn. You see, I'm trying to determine what Germany would have done if the Moroccan Crisis had resulted in a declaration of war by Germany (due to the nature of my TL, Russia is fighting a civil war and so Germany does not have to worry about the Eastern front)
 
Damn. You see, I'm trying to determine what Germany would have done if the Moroccan Crisis had resulted in a declaration of war by Germany (due to the nature of my TL, Russia is fighting a civil war and so Germany does not have to worry about the Eastern front)

In 1911 Germany would have had 3 or 4 plans, one of which would be a big attack on France. But I think at the time the plan was the strategy of the diagonal, meet the enemy offensives and conduct counter-offensives once they are defeated.
 
Damn. You see, I'm trying to determine what Germany would have done if the Moroccan Crisis had resulted in a declaration of war by Germany (due to the nature of my TL, Russia is fighting a civil war and so Germany does not have to worry about the Eastern front)

The problem, as I see it, is this:

With Russia engaged in civil war, and therefore not available to do France's heavy lifting, France's leaders will do ABSOLUTELY NOTHING that might antagonize Germany. And if offense is accidentally given, will backtrack to whatever extent is necessary to repair the breach. Poincare was nobody's fool.

Now, it's possible that Germany might pick a fight with France nonetheless, but why, especially as it risks war with Britain? Germany's motivation was not an absolute lust to put all Western Europe under her jackbooted heel; rather it was fear of a strong, hostile, encircling alliance. ITTL, if Germany wants to take advantage of the situation in order to free herself from such a threat being reestablished, it seems most likely that she will involve herself in the East, helping Poland and the Baltic regions throw off the Russian yoke and become "independent" buffer states. Something that Britain wouldn't be terribly sad to see happen, given the loathing many Liberals (and most of Labour) had for the Tsar's regime, and given how worried Britain remained over Russian intentions towards the Mideast and India.

I'm sorry, I hate to point out implausibilities in folks' ideas, but I think this is too big to ignore. Perhaps it can be gotten around by the right POD and prevailing circumstances.
 
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Actually, in 1910/11 there indeed WAS a German plan for a West-only war.

It was Aufmarsch I West, and sent 77 of Germany's 79 divisions westward against France.

As nearly as I can make out, (AK = Army Corps, RK = Reserve Corps)

1st Army - 4 AKs, 2 RKs
2nd Army - 4 AKs, 2 RKs (to take Liege by coup de main)
3rd Army - 3 AK, 2 RK
4th Army - 5 AK, 3 RK
5th Army - 4 AK, 2 RK
6th Army - 3 AK, 1 RK
7th Army - 3 AK
And IX RK will stay up north covering the coast.

Map to follow. All taken from Zuber, The Real German War Plan.
 
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upload_2017-5-2_11-30-28.jpeg
 
As of the 1908-09 plan, Dutch neutrality was to be violated if 2nd Army couldn't capture Liege in a swift coup de main. I suspect this would've still been the case in 1910-11. It was only in 1913-14 that Germany possessed the mobile, super-heavy siege guns required to quickly demolish the Liege defenses even if the coup de main attempt failed (which it did OTL).

I'll shut up now! :)
 

NoMommsen

Donor
It was only in 1913-14 that Germany possessed the mobile, super-heavy siege guns required to quickly demolish the Liege defenses even if the coup de main attempt failed (which it did OTL).
But only 2 ... of the mobile type (M-Gerät).
They had additional 5 of the very immobile typ (150 metric tons, 10 railway-cars, needed a LOT of building prior to fire).

But they had also had some 30,5 cm very mobile (comparative) siege howitzers in 'commision' from Austro-Hungary, which also participated in the Liege action IOTL.
Unfortunatly I couldn't find yet, out how many they had ... leased.

Does anybody here (hopefully) know ??


I'll shut up now! :)
Please don't !
Your comments and contributions are highly appreciated (at least by me).
 
But only 2 ... of the mobile type (M-Gerät).
They had additional 5 of the very immobile typ (150 metric tons, 10 railway-cars, needed a LOT of building prior to fire).

But they had also had some 30,5 cm very mobile (comparative) siege howitzers in 'commision' from Austro-Hungary, which also participated in the Liege action IOTL.
Unfortunatly I couldn't find yet, out how many they had ... leased.

Does anybody here (hopefully) know ??


Please don't !
Your comments and contributions are highly appreciated (at least by me).

NoMommsen,
Wikipedia says that the Germans used 8 of the Skodas at Liege (I don't vouch for the accuracy of this information, of course).

But the Wikipedia article on the Skoda says that development and testing of the 30.5 guns extended into 1911. Given construction time, I'm not sure they'd have been available in an Agadir-inspired war in the same year.

What I suspect is that, if the coup de main failed, the siege of Liege would take considerably longer than in OTL 1914, and a hook through the Netherlands would be likely.

Unless the French, moving into Belgium early to support the Belgian Army, are either defeated pretty convincingly there, or else accidentally weaken their center/south too much and the Germans break through.
 
But only 2 ... of the mobile type (M-Gerät).
They had additional 5 of the very immobile typ (150 metric tons, 10 railway-cars, needed a LOT of building prior to fire).

But they had also had some 30,5 cm very mobile (comparative) siege howitzers in 'commision' from Austro-Hungary, which also participated in the Liege action IOTL.
Unfortunatly I couldn't find yet, out how many they had ... leased.

Does anybody here (hopefully) know ??.

NoMommsen,
Wikipedia says that the Germans used 8 of the Skodas at Liege (I don't vouch for the accuracy of this information, of course).

But the Wikipedia article on the Skoda says that development and testing of the 30.5 guns extended into 1911. Given construction time, I'm not sure they'd have been available in an Agadir-inspired war in the same year.

What I suspect is that, if the coup de main failed, the siege of Liege would take considerably longer than in OTL 1914, and a hook through the Netherlands would be likely.

Unless the French, moving into Belgium early to support the Belgian Army, are either defeated pretty convincingly there, or else accidentally weaken their center/south too much and the Germans break through.

The book the wiki article references doesn't seem to be available online, unfortunately. However, I found a site that seems to be reputable and talks in some depth about the 305mm gun. here's the link: http://www.landships.info/landships/artillery_articles/30_5cm_morser_m11.html

Anyway, according to that site, the gun's develoment started in 1905 and the design work was completed in 1908, with the construction of the first prototype in 1909. The prototype was tested over the summer of 1911, and the Austrian military was pleased enough to place an order for 24 guns in December 1911. So, I think we can work with the understanding that there would not be any 305mm guns available in 1911 for an "Agadir War".
 
So, if Russia was engrossed in a civil war, would Germany invade through central Belgium (north of the Meuse) at all?

After all, the need to beat France before Russia could intervene effectively, was the main reason for invading through Belgium in the first place.

Edit: I'm thinking they might settle for just going through Belgium south of the Meuse. That avoids the Liege problem and reduces friction with GB, while still broadening the front to a useful extent.
 
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So, if Russia was engrossed in a civil war, would Germany invade through central Belgium (north of the Meuse) at all?

After all, the need to beat France before Russia could intervene effectively, was the main reason for invading through Belgium in the first place.

Edit: I'm thinking they might settle for just going through Belgium south of the Meuse. That avoids the Liege problem and reduces friction with GB, while still broadening the front to a useful extent.
I can't speak to the German side, as I'm not particularly familiar with it, but I think they would still have to move through Belgium to some extent. France had fairly substantial fortifications and the terrain advantage on the Franco-German border in Lorraine. If the Germans attack through their wouldn't they run into essentially the same issue the French did going the other direction in 1914? Plus, German military theory was heavily reliant on the idea of envelopment. To me, that seems to motivate for a swing through Belgium to envelope the French armies like they did in 1914. However, in 1911 the French were still using Plan XVI, not XVII, which was much more defensive in nature. It also gave more weight to a German advance through Belgium and allocated, IIRC, 7 corps to the Belgian border to counter a German advance. I don't believe Plan XVI envisioned an offensive into Lorraine at this point, as that concept emerged only in Joffre's later rewrites of the plan.

As a fun sidebar, ITTL if/when the French shift to a less visible uniform it won't be OTL's horizon blue ones, but the "Resada" style that they trialled in 1911 and 1912 but abandoned when there was an outcry against abandoning the red pants... So the French would be wearing green and brown, not blue!
 

NoMommsen

Donor
The problem, as I see it, is this:

With Russia engaged in civil war, and therefore not available to do France's heavy lifting, France's leaders will do ABSOLUTELY NOTHING that might antagonize Germany. And if offense is accidentally given, will backtrack to whatever extent is necessary to repair the breach. Poincare was nobody's fool.

Now, it's possible that Germany might pick a fight with France nonetheless, but why, especially as it risks war with Britain? ...
Maybe not Poincare but ... for sake of TTL ... maybe let a french Gabriele D'Annunzio type, trying to copy Leon Gambetta pop up [was there any figure, that with some butterfly-PoD-power could become that ?).

If such a guy trys to pull something alike D'Annunzio did with Fiume only with Mulhouse in Alsac ... or his 'fly ovwer Vienna' but only over Cologne (Berlin's too far away from France for the planes of that time) during the high tide of the Morocco crisis ?

Might well become a 'casus belli' for the germans.
 
The French planning for 1911/12



French Intelligence estimate, 1911:


upload_2017-5-2_15-57-52.jpeg

The French considered four possible German deployments. Above is the map of Case II, which the French considered most likely, based largely on what they thought they knew about German railway construction. Note that they expected the Germans to come through Belgium, but only well south of Liege. Further, they credited the Germans with having 84 divisions instead of the 79 the Germans actually had (evidently they didn't realize that the Reichstag was unwilling to expand the German Army, even though the French and Russians were greatly expanding their own!). But the French expected that the Germans would leave 24 divisions in the East to face Russia, and therefore invade with 60. They did not expect the German Reserve divisions to be employed in the front lines. They also expected the Germans to be able to complete their deployment by the fifteenth day of mobilization, and able to attack by the 13th day (about five days faster than the Germans could actually manage). Finally, the French thought that the Germans were building railways down south that would permit a major attack against the French right flank south of Belfort (with was not the case).


The French plan XVI, Variant I:

upload_2017-5-2_16-6-20.jpeg

Above is Plan XVI, Variant I. Note particularly that the Sixth French Army of four army corps ("CA" for Corps d' Armee) is located between Rheims and St. Menehold, prepared to counter an expected German thrust developing through southern Belgium. This, of course, is only a plan of deployment, it does not specify a particular course of action after deployment completion. From around Mezieres in the north, down to just south of Verdun, lie the 3rd, 5th and 6th French Armies, with 11 corps plus some reserve divisions. This just outnumbers the expected German force headed for this area, which is 10 corps. In the center, 7 French corps (from east of St. Dizier down to Epinal) would presumably have to handle the 11 German corps in Metz-Diedenhofen. Down south, 4 French corps of 4th Army would face up to 10 German corps!

Now, this doesn't look good at all, with 31 German corps vs only 22 French corps! But remember that the German numbers include reserve corps, which the French assume will be used only in second-line roles. So they expected the real balance of forces to be 18 German active-duty corps vs 22 French active-duty corps.

Source: Zuber, "The Real German War Plan"
 

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