What was the predominant reason for Sukarno's anti-Americanism - payback or temptation?

What was the predominant reason for Sukarno's rising 1960s anti-Americanism

  • Perception of American aggressiveness, lack of comparable communist aggressiveness

    Votes: 9 56.3%
  • Perception of American/western weakness, and Communist global/regional strength/determination

    Votes: 7 43.8%

  • Total voters
    16

raharris1973

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In the 1950s, unsatisfied with Sukarno's formal and loud Cold War nonalignment and neutralism. and with the regime's lack of full suppression of the Communist party (only Europeans could be allowed to have those in the 1950s) the Eisenhower administration tried to undermine, break up and overthrow his regime. He probably did not like it.

I'd always thought this was the main external driver for Sukarno's increasingly anti-American and pro-Soviet and pro-Communist Chinese and domestically leftist policies. Even though the Kennedy administration sought cooperation with Sukarno and accepted his principle of non-alignment, essentially the increased anti-American tilt in Indonesia from the late 1950s through 1965 was mainly payback for Eisenhower era offenses, to the extent the motivations were internal rather than external. Also, since the Indonesian Communists were among the people in the coalition fighting for Indonesian independence in the 1940s, and supported him later, he did not feel comparably offended by them. So, in summary 'twas payback, balancing, "equal and opposite reaction", whatever term you prefer.

However, I later read an argument that turns the above on its head, from Professor Donald Nuechterlein, arguing that Kennedy's decisions to negotiate with him [and favor him in the case of Dutch New Guinea], with North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao [at Geneva over Laos], rather than simply fighting or threatening to fight, indicated American weakness, opportunities to expand at western expense, and the preferability of siding with more determined and victorious Communist powers.
I'll quote him at length:


“President Eisenhower told Kennedy before leaving office that Laos was in danger of being overrun by local Communists, using Soviet arms and North Vietnamese advisers. If they moved to the Mekong River, he warned, they would threaten Thailand, a SEATO ally.


In March 1961, two months after taking office, Kennedy publicly warned Moscow that unless it used its influence to halt the Pathet Lao attack southward, the United States would honor its treaty commitments in the area. The new president thus staked his personal prestige on a warning to Khrushchev about potential conflict in Southeast Asia. As can be seen in retrospect, this proved to be a serious mistake. In April 1961 Kennedy was embroiled in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba and its disastrous consequences. He decided that if the U.S. government could not prevail in a country ninety miles off the U.S. coast, he would run too great a risk in seeking to solve a civil war in Laos. Kennedy’s decision to back away from confrontation in Southeast Asia and seek a negotiated settlement, which ultimately permitted the Communists to retain control of Laos’s eastern provinces, shocked Thailand’s government. His apparent (weakness?) caused other Southeast Asian leaders—including Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam and Sukarno in Indonesia—to conclude that Kennedy would not use U.S. military power to prevent communist gains in Indochina.





pp53


“Kennedy made a special effort to improve relations with India, Indonesia and several African states….”


Pp55


“While the United States was getting more deeply involved in Vietnam, the Commonwealth countries of Britain, Australia and New Zealand were already engaged in an effort to counter the expansionist policies pursued by President Sukarno of Indonesia. He had decided in 1961 to improve relations with North Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China, believing that they represented the wave of the future in Asia. He also calculated that he could increase Indonesia’s influence in Malaya and Singapore, and perhaps the Philippines, if the Kennedy administration showed an unwillingness to back up the commitments of the Manila Pact with military force—as Kennedy had seemed to signal when he failed to remain firm after threatening to intervene in Laos. In 1963 Sukarno adopted a “confrontation” policy against the newly-established federation of Malaysia and directed heavy propaganda against the presence of British bases in Singapore, then part of Malaysia. He mistakenly believed that Britain would be no more steadfast in Malaysia than the Netherlands had been a few years earlier in West Irian (New Guinea)which Sukarno had annexed after making a large show of force. However, Britain and its Commonwealth partners sent reinforcements to defend the territories, and by 1963 Sukarno had lost his bid to annex North Borneo and dominate Singapore and Malaya. Although effectively curbed, Sukarno continued to harbor ambitions of becoming the major power in the Malacca Strait area and believed he could do so in cooperation with the People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam. Sukarno began a close political association with the powerful Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which plotted to oust the army’s leadership and take over political power with Sukarno’s blessing. This effort resulted in an abortive coup on October 1, 1965, the decimation of the Communist Party, and the eventual ouster of Sukarno from power. The army under General Suharto then took control of Indonesia and reoriented its foreign policy toward the West.”

-----to sum up, Sukarno's motivations, rather than retribution or balancing , were more based on opportunities for predation, the temptation of expansion and geopolitical bandwagoning.

Which explanation makes more sense to you?
 
Why do I get the feeling that with these highly specific questions about 1960s Indonesia you are getting your shit in a pile to write a TL?

If you don't get much of an answer, I've got nothing, then you know you can gloss over some details in safety.
 
I voted B, although with a different definition of 'regional'. The impression I got from Joseph Daves' book on Indonesian military history, From Revolusi to Reformasi, was that the Eisenhower blunders undoubtedly did play a big role, a, if not the key reason was appealing to the PKI and its base. That is, it was based on internal rather than external politics.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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I voted B, although with a different definition of 'regional'. The impression I got from Joseph Daves' book on Indonesian military history, From Revolusi to Reformasi, was that the Eisenhower blunders undoubtedly did play a big role, a, if not the key reason was appealing to the PKI and its base. That is, it was based on internal rather than external politics.

What if we tweak US policy in the Truman Administration, to make it unequivocally opposed to Dutch return to the East Indies and have Washington recognize the Indonesian Republic within weeks of its self-declaration.

Would the odds end up favoring the Indonesian Communist Party becoming such a large party with such a large base of constituents still be just as great, making the Republic's leaders want to lean on their support so much in later times?

Or to put it less awkwardly, what could make it so the Indonesian Communist Party is not such a successful group by the 1960s? Could different actions by the Eisenhower or Truman Administrations help put the party on a lower trajectory in Indonesian mass politics.
 
The indonesian never fully trusted the americans as they wanted to get back business as usual with netherlands after they have to deal with the japanese so..A-
 
Or to put it less awkwardly, what could make it so the Indonesian Communist Party is not such a successful group by the 1960s? Could different actions by the Eisenhower or Truman Administrations help put the party on a lower trajectory in Indonesian mass politics.

The only way I can think of is having Sukarno post Madiun go (even) farther than OTL and be more successful in smashing and repressing them.

The demographic core is there, and the only other solution (having a unified INC-level machine that can co-opt most of them and bulldoze the rest within the system) would require a much earlier POD and drastic changes to its governance.
 
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