What was the North Korea demanding of the US in the 1990s and what did the US concede?

raharris1973

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In the 1990s in the tense period over North Korea's nuclear weapons program leading up to the Agreed Framework with the Clinton Administration, what was North Korea explicitly demanding of the U.S. (and South Korea) and what of those demands did the US concede to on the one hand and refuse to concede to on the other?
 
I was going to ask “How might the US have stopped North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the 1990’s?”, but this largely covers that. The only thing I’d add is that Sec Perry was seriously considering military strikes against Kim’s young program as early as 1994.
 

Ak-84

Banned
I was going to ask “How might the US have stopped North Korea’s nuclear weapons program in the 1990’s?”, but this largely covers that. The only thing I’d add is that Sec Perry was seriously considering military strikes against Kim’s young program as early as 1994.
In the 1990s in the tense period over North Korea's nuclear weapons program leading up to the Agreed Framework with the Clinton Administration, what was North Korea explicitly demanding of the U.S. (and South Korea) and what of those demands did the US concede to on the one hand and refuse to concede to on the other?
They wanted.

1) Food aid
2) Help with power

The US agreed to provide both, with grain shipments as well as fuel oil and two light water nuclear reactors. The US resiled on most of its commitments.
 

raharris1973

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I think they also wanted a peace treaty to end the Korean War and diplomatic normalization with the United States.

Neither of those have happened by the way. Why was the US more willing to agree to material aid like fuel and food aid than diplomatic accomodation?
 
I think they also wanted a peace treaty to end the Korean War and diplomatic normalization with the United States.

Neither of those have happened by the way. Why was the US more willing to agree to material aid like fuel and food aid than diplomatic accomodation?
North Korea went through a really nasty famine at the time, so there was some humanitarian imperative for food and fuel aid.
 

raharris1973

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North Korea went through a really nasty famine at the time, so there was some humanitarian imperative for food and fuel aid.

Good point. But why was diplomatic normalization held back, like it was a more precious commodity than food and fuel aid?

Did the North Korean definition of a peace treaty with the US have a demand for US withdrawal of troops from South Korea and an end to the US-ROK alliance baked in?
 
They asked for 2 light water reactors, those are not weapons capable, of course they didnt get them as that part of the treaty got stalled until Dubya pulled the Axis of evil out of his hat.
 

raharris1973

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I think westerners focus more on the material things the north was asking for because that's the only area where the Americans were willing to start the conversation.

But there were always metaphysical/intangible interests Pyongyang was claiming, like a nonaggression pledge, a peace treaty, diplomatic normalization, that seemed to not get discussed on the US side and were sort of excluded from the conversation. A retired US official wrote about this in the NYT op-ed pages in recent months.

I'll bold the relevant parts, but it seems to me that either his understanding is correct or it is not, and if it is correct, some movement or flexibility on the US side on some of Pyongyang's metaphysical/intangible interests could have created opportunities for different diplomatic outcomes (ie, what-ifs) in the 1990s and 2000s, very few of them catastrophic. Plus, I think Congress has a harder time sabotaging non-material concessions rather than aid programs that require congressional appropriations.

Here's the quote from his op-ed:

But I told President Obama in private that our stance on North Korea was flawed.

Our policy was never to discuss what the United States might do for the North Korean government until it first agreed to give up its nuclear ambitions. That was a dead end, I told him, and merely ensured that no progress would be made.


I had not fully appreciated the consuming siege mentality that pervades North Korea until I visited and engaged directly with senior officials there in November 2014. They work hard to perpetuate the belief that Americans are always on the brink of invading and that nuclear weapons are their only chance of survival.

Neither they nor we really know whether their weapons would work, but in many ways, it doesn’t matter. We have to assume that if they do launch an intercontinental ballistic missile, it will reach our shores and detonate. Thus, without even proving they have the capability, they’ve created nuclear deterrence.

I believe, and I told President Obama, that North Korea won’t budge on its nuclear program because they see us as an existential threat. If we’re to make a breakthrough, we need to consider capitalizing on our biggest strengths: openness and information, even if we don’t take nuclear weapons off the table.

Today, the situation in North Korea seems poised for change — whether for better or for worse remains to be seen.

In the first year of Donald Trump’s administration, while he and Kim Jong-un traded taunts, the North Koreans successfully tested increasingly powerful ballistic missiles and a thermonuclear weapon.

But then, in March, a South Korean envoy in Washington informed President Trump that Mr. Kim was willing to discuss giving up North Korea’s nuclear program. Surprising everyone, Mr. Trump accepted the invitation to talk.

I have not found myself giving Mr. Trump much in the way of public kudos on his personal or policy choices, but his decision to meet with Mr. Kim could mark a courageous step forward for the de-escalation of tensions on the peninsula. (Unfortunately, it’s far from certain the talks will happen, given North Korea’s threat last week to pull out.)

North Korea survives because it fosters isolation. Outside the ruling clique, there is great interest in the outside world, but we have limited means to satisfy North Koreans’ hunger for information.

We should set aside for a minute our demand that they disarm before any other negotiation. We should meet their demand to sign a peace treaty, and establish a physical presence in Pyongyang, an office staffed by Americans who can interact with North Korean citizens. We could model it on the “interests section” we maintained in Havana for decades.

It would not be a reward for bad behavior, but an opportunity for access, which would enhance our understanding and enable the flow of information from the rest of the world.

We would, of course, reciprocate by allowing North Korea to establish a similar mission in Washington. I don’t think this would represent a huge leap over its presence now at the United Nations in New York.

Eventually, we would hope to offer a road map to withdrawing many of our forces from the peninsula, while the North Koreans reduced the forces they have along the DMZ, including the artillery and rocketry forces that are poised to fire on Seoul. If we can figure out a way to lead North Korea’s leaders to a place where they don’t feel so threatened, we could move away from the cusp of a cataclysmic war. All of this would benefit us, whether we eliminated their nuclear capacity or not.



When I traveled to North Korea in 2014, my primary interlocutor spewed anti-American vitriol at me over several car rides and through an elaborate 13-course meal. He refused to consider anything I said and typically talked — or yelled — over me when I interjected. That was true with just one exception.

I told him, “The United States has no permanent enemies.” I cited Germany and Japan as examples of how bitter adversaries can become allies. I described a recent trip to Vietnam and pointed out that the United States has developed productive diplomatic, economic and even military relations with its government. I suggested the same could happen with North Korea.

We ate in silence for a few minutes before he remarked that I could foster that transformation by negotiating the normalization of relations.

I returned to Washington’s talking point No. 1: no negotiations until North Korea denuclearizes. And then we resumed talking past each other.

Both sides are stuck on a narrative, and only the bigger partner can change it. Unfortunately, I don’t think we’ve positioned ourselves — either philosophically or bureaucratically — to achieve that change. But I sincerely hope our president will surprise me.
 
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