What was the final moment that the CSA could've won the Civil War?

But the French approach was based on a theory of infantry attack which would have applied just about anywhere else but the highly dense machine-gun-equipped Western Front. (Zulu infantry with high morale got through the killing zone of the British at Isandlwhana,

And the Zulu lost that war.

Japanese troops with high morale got through the killing zone of the Russians in the Far East in 1905,

The Japanese did better than the Zulu, no question. But had the war gone on longer, they would have lost on land. The big problem for the Russians was an incredibly long logistical tail overland from Europe through Siberia. That was a bigger problem than morale.

and a 1914-style French-style charge against the Union at Gettysburg would have won the battle in an incredible hurry, as the rate of fire of a Mauser-equipped German rifleman is about thirty times that of a Union rifleman even before allowing for relative range and accuracy - and that's not counting the change between machine guns and no machine guns).

That's..... Interesting. Seriously. I don't have any response to this, positive or negative, simply because I have never conceived it in those terms. I'm sure that some of our military specialists might have an interesting discussion about that tactical approach.

I would suggest, however, that even if that approach did succeed, that it would have resulted in horrific Confederate casualties. Gettysburg would be the new byword for Pyrhic.

And the French morale collapsed completely in 1940 and didn't recover.

The French hadn't recovered at all from the demographic purge and the cultural fallout of WWI, so their morale was a pretty flimsy thing back then. They were overmatched, outflanked and overrun in every possible way in 1940.

It's hard to imagine the Union, with superior numbers, superior weapons, and the experience of long protracted battle being vulnerable to the same sort of collapse.


While it's not always the case that a defeat leads to lowered morale,

Thank you for that concession.

it's also not never the case

True. But then the big issue is that if we acknowledge things can go either way, what's the argument to say that it would go a particular way? Unless you can provide statistical evidence, or a set of applicable similar case histories, or an underlying theory to explain when defeat lowers morale and when it hardens morale, you can't really rely on the assertion. It's on the level of wishful thinking. Might happen, might not, but there's no reason to say it will.

and confidence and morale go a long way to explaining why the consistently outnumbered Army of Northern Virginia was fighting a major battle sixty miles north of Washington two years into the war.[/QUOTE

Well, it goes some way. Inept union leadership, slow mobilisation, the fact that the Confederacy recruited most of the war staff, initiative, and an astonishing string of luck all played a part.]
 

Saphroneth

Banned
True. But then the big issue is that if we acknowledge things can go either way, what's the argument to say that it would go a particular way?
That the thread is about the last moment the Confederacy could survive? It's only necessary to show the possibility, not the high likelihood.

That's..... Interesting. Seriously. I don't have any response to this, positive or negative, simply because I have never conceived it in those terms. I'm sure that some of our military specialists might have an interesting discussion about that tactical approach.

I would suggest, however, that even if that approach did succeed, that it would have resulted in horrific Confederate casualties. Gettysburg would be the new byword for Pyrhic.

You might want to consider the French-Austrian War of 1859, which was won decisively by the French on a "charge through the beaten zone" approach and which is the European war with the technology closest to the Civil War (in that both sides had rifle muskets and neither had breech loaders in any great number).

You should also consider the following statistics.

1) The hit rate for elite infantry troops - troops trained as Union troops were not at target practice - in the period was about one in sixteen. This is British regulars who obsessively practiced target shooting, from the best-trained army in the world at the task.
2) The open-fire distance at Gettysburg was about 100 yards or so.
3) At a fast walk of two metres per second - quite possible for a charge through the beaten zone - the beaten zone would be covered in about fifty seconds.
4) The reload rate of the rifle-musket was about one round every thirty seconds.

Thus, in the case that the Confederate troops keep up the charge in a French style and the Union ones reload and fire faster than average, the Union will get off three rounds over the time the Confederacy crosses the beaten zone. This will inflict roughly one casualty for every five defending troops.

This is not Phyrric. It's actually quite cheap for getting to bayonet range, breaking and defeating the enemy, especially since those casualties will not all be fatal or crippling. (Heck, it's less than the casualties the Union inflicted OTL at Gettysburg on Pickett's Charge. Charging works if you can keep up the momentum all the way to the enemy line.)
 
That the thread is about the last moment the Confederacy could survive? It's only necessary to show the possibility, not the high likelihood.

If your case is built on transcendent Confederate morale and collapsing Union morale, then I'd say that the burden is on you to support your assertion with something more profound than wishful thinking. My entire point is that your case rests on a contention which you have no meaningful support for. You're asking us to make an assumption.... because? My point is that there's no actual reason to make that assumption.

And yes, while charging headlong into the enemy allows you to engage them hand to hand... The Union outnumbered the Confederacy by 25 to 30%, or so I've been lead to believe.

So your argument is that the Confederacy charges through a hale of withering fire, depleting their numbers to some degree, and then engages in close quarters combat with a numerically superior enemy, who are just as well armed, as battle hardened, better fed, etc.... And wins through the sheer awesome power of testicular fortitude?

The notion of the Confederacy winning in 1864 demands a combination of awesome luck, generalship, near superhuman confederate soldiers on the Confederate side, and apocalyptic bad luck, incompetent and craven leadership on the part of the Union which has somehow ignored or abandoned every lesson of the last four years, plus a union army of wretched malnourished cowards, and a Union population so intimidated and exhausted by war it is prepared to wallow in national humiliation, and on top of that, it requires overlooking the collapse of the Confederate economy and society, the blockade, and the industrial and population advantages of the Union. If we do all that, sure, the Confederacy could win. And Mexico could take back all its losses the every next year. At some point, unlikelihood verges into the miraculous.
 
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Had the Light Division launched its assault on Cemetery Hill in conjunction with Early's division, they would have a very good chance of taking it; from there, Rodes and Early could roll up the Union right on Cemetery Ridge while they were fixed in front by Anderson's division. Culp's Hill would no longer be a viable position, and in evacuating the position, XII Corps would be vulnerable to Johnson. Meade would have to retire from the field, and mark the army with the dishonor of having relieved a general in his first week on the job. I think bumping up day 2 losses to 15k Union and 9k Confederate would be a reasonable conjecture; assuming OTL day 1 losses, the AotP and ANV would have basically equal strength when Meade retreats; if Lee can bring about a second battle with a rearguard before Meade can get behind the Pipe Creek Line, he has a good chance of winning a slight numerical edge.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Had the Light Division launched its assault on Cemetery Hill in conjunction with Early's division, they would have a very good chance of taking it; from there, Rodes and Early could roll up the Union right on Cemetery Ridge while they were fixed in front by Anderson's division. Culp's Hill would no longer be a viable position, and in evacuating the position, XII Corps would be vulnerable to Johnson. Meade would have to retire from the field, and mark the army with the dishonor of having relieved a general in his first week on the job. I think bumping up day 2 losses to 15k Union and 9k Confederate would be a reasonable conjecture; assuming OTL day 1 losses, the AotP and ANV would have basically equal strength when Meade retreats; if Lee can bring about a second battle with a rearguard before Meade can get behind the Pipe Creek Line, he has a good chance of winning a slight numerical edge.

Confederate success against the Union left flank on the second day at Gettysburg was entirely possible. It's an AH scenario that gets little comparatively attention, what with all the chatter about taking Cemetery Hill or Culps Hill on the evening of the first day or taking Little Round Top on the second day.
 
That's..... Interesting. Seriously. I don't have any response to this, positive or negative, simply because I have never conceived it in those terms. I'm sure that some of our military specialists might have an interesting discussion about that tactical approach.

I would suggest, however, that even if that approach did succeed, that it would have resulted in horrific Confederate casualties. Gettysburg would be the new byword for Pyrhic.
You might want to consider the French-Austrian War of 1859, which was won decisively by the French on a "charge through the beaten zone" approach and which is the European war with the technology closest to the Civil War (in that both sides had rifle muskets and neither had breech loaders in any great number).
And yes, while charging headlong into the enemy allows you to engage them hand to hand... The Union outnumbered the Confederacy by 25 to 30%, or so I've been lead to believe.
While saying nothing about the overall premise of the thread, I do need to point out that at Magenta the Austrians outnumbered the French by a bigger margin (125,000 to 59,000), and the French won while taking fewer casualties than the Austrians.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
So your argument is that the Confederacy charges through a hale of withering fire, depleting their numbers to some degree, and then engages in close quarters combat with a numerically superior enemy, who are just as well armed, as battle hardened, better fed, etc.... And wins through the sheer awesome power of testicular fortitude?
As Cerebro has noted, the French could do it at a 2:1 numerical disadvantage despite their opponents being better shots than the Union.

So yes.
 
1914-style French-style charge against the Union at Gettysburg would have won the battle in an incredible hurry, as the rate of fire of a Mauser-equipped German rifleman is about thirty times that of a Union rifleman even before allowing for relative range and accuracy - and that's not counting the change between machine guns and no machine guns).

There were no reserves to exploit a breakthrough. Even if they had broken the line? What then? Well, the Union has an entire Corps in reserve that would have come rushing to the scene. The Rebs, meanwhile, would have had nothing to reinforce the hole. The initial attack was not doomed; creating a hole was possible. But the goal (to break the Union army) was fantasy. It needed additional troops to take advantage of the breakthrough, and Lee did not have them on hand. In order to get them, he would have needed significant reinforcements from elsewhere or strip other parts of his own line. The latter would have exposed him to counterattack, which Meade was willing to do if he saw an opening.
It's not the commanders who matter in this. It's the men.

The difference between high morale and low morale, especially in the Civil War, is the difference between experienced troops and green ones. It's morale which means that men stand under fire, it's the lack of morale which means men break under it.

And if the Army of the Potomac has fought the Army of Northern Virginia three times and has been defeated each time, if the AoNV which Harper's Weekly insists is smaller and less well equipped wins three times in a row, if the men are expecting to be beaten - then they're half beaten already. It's the same reason Virginia cavalry could break Union lines - not because they had a solution to the infantry square, but because the Union did the thing which destroys infantry squares or any infantry defence against cavalry. They expected to lose, so they panicked - and lost.
This is patently false. The reason for the AotP's defeats can be almost entirely blamed on the commanders. The AotP was no less experienced than the AoNV. Time and time again, its men proved themselves the equal of the AoNV in a standup fight (See Brawner's Farm, Antietam, early and late stages of Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, etc). The problem was that Lee and Co. consistently were up against commanders that committed significant blunders that Lee was able to take advantage of. I would also note that conventional Cavalry charges on infantry in the Civil War were exceedingly rare. The one instance in which I can think of what you described as happening was the First Battle of Bull Run-where a couple cavalrymen were mistaken for a charge by the Confederates and a panic broke out among the green troops, who naturally ran as fast as they could from the scene.
 
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Confederate success against the Union left flank on the second day at Gettysburg was entirely possible. It's an AH scenario that gets little comparatively attention, what with all the chatter about taking Cemetery Hill or Culps Hill on the evening of the first day or taking Little Round Top on the second day.

I have always wondered what would have happened if Hood had been given his way and allowed to charge on to the Round Tops instead of attacking Sickles flank. There were delays to set that attack on Sickles up, while for a brief moment there was little in front of him if Hood slipped by Sickles. At that point some of those Union reserves were simply not available yet.

However, my favorite alternate history, the Forchen/Gingrich Gettysburg trilogy does an excellent job looking at the best case situation for Lee in 1863 and I agree strongly with their conclusions (and I hate Gingrich politically but he is a good historian)

Really as long as the Union doesn't lose in the East in 1863 it is going to win in the West. The loss of the entire Mississippi River system plus ports one by one is going to do in the Confederacy even if Lee is parked in Maryland. He can't be in two places at once, and the Confederacy does not have the forces to deal with the Union offensive in the West AND come up with defend Virginia at the same time.
 
That the thread is about the last moment the Confederacy could survive? It's only necessary to show the possibility, not the high likelihood.



You might want to consider the French-Austrian War of 1859, which was won decisively by the French on a "charge through the beaten zone" approach and which is the European war with the technology closest to the Civil War (in that both sides had rifle muskets and neither had breech loaders in any great number).

You should also consider the following statistics.

1) The hit rate for elite infantry troops - troops trained as Union troops were not at target practice - in the period was about one in sixteen. This is British regulars who obsessively practiced target shooting, from the best-trained army in the world at the task.
2) The open-fire distance at Gettysburg was about 100 yards or so.
3) At a fast walk of two metres per second - quite possible for a charge through the beaten zone - the beaten zone would be covered in about fifty seconds.
4) The reload rate of the rifle-musket was about one round every thirty seconds.

)

where on earth are you getting 100 yards from? Canister and rifle fire were hitting the Confederates at 400 yards according some sources) and of course there is that fence that keeps being ignored by some posters in this forum whenever Picketts Charge comes up

"In the meantime, the Emmitsburg Road represented a substantial logistical problem, as it cut across the valley from the southwest to the northeast and was covered on both sides by sturdy fencing that needed to be climbed or broken through somehow."
http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Numbers_at_Pickett_s_Charge#start_entry

That fence is going to bring that "rush through the beaten zone" to the same kind of halt as barbed wire would do in the Great War and for the same reasons.

you can literally watch the whole thing in the movie "Gettysburg" and it alone disproves your assertion (and it is thoroughly researched and had literally thousands of amateur historians in it)

as to the magical accuracy of the British Army... who cares, even if it were true. They were notably absent except for Lt Colonel Freemantle

If the Confederates or Union for that matter practiced your recommended tactics, both of them would have, and both of them would have developed counters because they both used the exact same book of tactics well into the war.
 
As Cerebro has noted, the French could do it at a 2:1 numerical disadvantage despite their opponents being better shots than the Union.

So yes.

so what.. the French are notably absent in the American Civil War. Those tactics didn't do them much good against the Prussians it should be noted, or the Bavarians or the other German troops for that matter.

There is no magical "European Way" for the South or North to win the ACW. They both used the same manuals, had the same doctrine (at least until late war) and both had the same issues of raising citizen armies from scratch.
 
Minor point, but the French were typically on the tactical defensive in the Franco-Prussian War; it's the Germans who launch direct infantry assaults against rifle fire, not the French as you imply. If infantry has three capabilities (long range fire, bayonet assault, and volume fire), and you can do two, and your opponent can only do one, you're going to have a huge advantage every infantry fight.

The best case scenario for Lee in 1863 is to 1) Clear the Shenandoah, 2) Capture Harrisburg, 3) Inflict a defeat that leaves the remnants of the army of the Potomac confined to Washington, 4) Capture Baltimore (like Harrisburg, mostly for prestige) and 5), transfer men and generals west to shore up the Army of Tennessee, while keeping sufficient forces to observe Washington. The end state would leave the Confederacy with Chattanooga as a shield for the Deep South, while ensuring the Army of the Potomac would be weak enough to drive from the field in the 1864 summer campaign season.
 
Minor point, but the French were typically on the tactical defensive in the Franco-Prussian War; it's the Germans who launch direct infantry assaults against rifle fire, not the French as you imply. If infantry has three capabilities (long range fire, bayonet assault, and volume fire), and you can do two, and your opponent can only do one, you're going to have a huge advantage every infantry fight.

The best case scenario for Lee in 1863 is to 1) Clear the Shenandoah, 2) Capture Harrisburg, 3) Inflict a defeat that leaves the remnants of the army of the Potomac confined to Washington, 4) Capture Baltimore (like Harrisburg, mostly for prestige) and 5), transfer men and generals west to shore up the Army of Tennessee, while keeping sufficient forces to observe Washington. The end state would leave the Confederacy with Chattanooga as a shield for the Deep South, while ensuring the Army of the Potomac would be weak enough to drive from the field in the 1864 summer campaign season.

although that defensive had more to do with the fact that they were forced into that situation by better German operations and strategy


That #3 was the hard part
 
No doubt. However, the battle saw several moments of terrible luck and lower level mismanagement for the Confederates -JEB Stuart failing to properly screen the army, two of their best division commanders badly wounded, failures to attack when it mattered, delays getting the men into the fight, people to this day not knowing where AP Hill was- such that I think a smashing victory was a distinct possibility.
 
As a sidenote, the idea of a massed charge a la France would not have been news to either side. It was used with considerable success by the AotP during the Mine Run, Overland, and Petersburg Campaigns. However, Lee would not have a good opportunity to use it, for reasons already mentioned.
 
No doubt. However, the battle saw several moments of terrible luck and lower level mismanagement for the Confederates -JEB Stuart failing to properly screen the army, two of their best division commanders badly wounded, failures to attack when it mattered, delays getting the men into the fight, people to this day not knowing where AP Hill was- such that I think a smashing victory was a distinct possibility.

it could also have gone better for the Union...If Reynolds is not killed (or even wounded) his direction probably would have made a serious difference with the deployment of Howards corps. He was essentially commanding 3 corps at that point as Meades designated commander on the scene.

Sickles obeying orders on day 2 and staying were he was supposed to stay (making Devils Den even more of a nightmare)

Not sure how much worse Picketts Charge could have been, although Tsouras in his book on Gettysburg makes a reasonable case for that worst case for the Confederate side
 
As a sidenote, the idea of a massed charge a la France would not have been news to either side. It was used with considerable success by the AotP during the Mine Run, Overland, and Petersburg Campaigns. However, Lee would not have a good opportunity to use it, for reasons already mentioned.

and with ultimate success at Five Forks and for that matter Lookout Mountain (where the troops themselves decided to carry it out)
 
Eh, probably a stretch to call the Union attack on Lookout a massed charge. It was more of a firefight where better concentration and coordination won the day.

oops, meant Missionary Ridge, although part of the reason for the failure of the Confederate defeat was a fatally flawed deployment on the geographical crest instead of the military crest. But the troops rushed right on up that hill in probably the most successful charge (uphill no less) of the Civil War in terms of result.. at least in my opinion.
 
oops, meant Missionary Ridge, although part of the reason for the failure of the Confederate defeat was a fatally flawed deployment on the geographical crest instead of the military crest. But the troops rushed right on up that hill in probably the most successful charge (uphill no less) of the Civil War in terms of result.. at least in my opinion.
No disagreement there. I still prefer the breakthrough at Third Petersburg. The moment where the AotP put Bobby Lee in full flight all the way to Appomattox.
 
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