What was the final moment that the CSA could've won the Civil War?

That the North could accomplish either of those two actions or that that accomplishment would have given the South a real chance of winning?

I don't think either of these accomplishments would have given the South a real chance of winning. Neither of them would have really addressed the incredible mismatch of manpower and resources.

To give you an example, in the War of 1812, the British burned Washington. In the Napoleanic wars, Napolean actually took Moscow. Neither made a difference.
 
I don't think either of these accomplishments would have given the South a real chance of winning. Neither of them would have really addressed the incredible mismatch of manpower and resources.

To give you an example, in the War of 1812, the British burned Washington. In the Napoleanic wars, Napolean actually took Moscow. Neither made a difference.
Why bring 2 random examples of people taking or burning the capital down? One could bring up many more counterexamples.
 
How dependent was the federal government on getting Grant in play?

Suppose Grant just isn't in the right place at the right time in 1862, gets killed (including at Belmont), cashiered for drunkenness, or just not brought back into the mix at Shiloh?

In IOTL the CSA simply had much better officers leading its armies, corps, and divisions. This was mostly massive, almost ASB luck on their part. However, I think it helped alot that the CSA had the former Secretary of War as its President, and the former Adjutant General of the US army as its Adjutant General. They simply knew what they were doing in organizing their forces and making key appointments compared to Lincoln and Cameron. And what good generals the North had available were too infirm (Scott) or sidelined or viewed with suspicion for one reason for another (Sherman, Thomas, very arguably Fremont). In this environment, getting Grant in a key command was important.

In 1863 the USA generals got better. Whatever their faults, Hooker and Rosecrans were big improvements over what they had in the same positions in 1862, and later in the year they got Meade at the Army of the Potomac. By 1864, their generals were as good as or better than their CSA counter-parts. I don't think Grant was needed as much once Vicksburg fell, or at least after the release of Chattanooga. It would have been nice to get an upgrade over Lincoln/ Halleck, but SHerman would have done fine. But Grant, along with the US Navy at New Orleans, were the only players scoring points for the Union in the first half of the war.

Of course this is an argument that even with all its resource and manpower disadvantages, make the USA leadership abysmal enough and the CSA wins. You need almost ASB levels of bad leadership for this. But they almost got this! And this seems to have been what the Southern military commanders were thinking when they fired on Fort Sumter.
 
I don't think either of these accomplishments would have given the South a real chance of winning.
The Union taking Atlanta in September was a massive boost to Lincoln's re-election chances, and greatly discredited the Copperheads right after they had declared the War to be a failure at the Democratic Convention, to the point that McClellan had to distance himself from that section of the party once it became clear that the War was actually going the North's way. Robbing the North of such a critical victory gives the Copperheads much more credibility going into the election.
Now, to Early taking Washington. If Early had successfully taken Washington, and occupied it for any length of time, I fail to see how this would not have had massive implications for Northern morale as the year went on. This is more about what effect the capture of the city would have upon the Northern Populace than the actual military impact.
 
Why bring 2 random examples of people taking or burning the capital down? One could bring up many more counterexamples.

Both of these cases are examples of 'Saving Throws.' They were big dramatic gestures, victories that made no real difference to the war.

Suppose the Confederacy had overrun Washington. Could they hold it? Nope. Would taking it have given them any strategic or tactical advantage? No. At most, they would have looted a bit, burned some buildings, and eventually got run off by vengeful Yankees. Best case scenario, they could have put in a garrison and tried to hold on, dying on the vine as the Confederacy got crushed elsewhere.
 
The French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution started a period in military history where the key to victory was in mobilizing large numbers of men and putting guns in their hands, backed up by artillery. This lasted until the advent of the nuclear-airpower era in the 1940s.

This made victory a lock in this period for the side that had both the mobilization and the industrial product advantage. I've seen internet arguments where people say the South could have one by pointing to instances where the weaker side by these metrics did win, but the examples always come from conflicts earlier than 1790 or later than 1950! Within these dates, its all manpower and industry. Most of the leaders of the CSA didn't understand this.
 
The Union taking Atlanta in September was a massive boost to Lincoln's re-election chances, and greatly discredited the Copperheads right after they had declared the War to be a failure at the Democratic Convention, to the point that McClellan had to distance himself from that section of the party once it became clear that the War was actually going the North's way. Robbing the North of such a critical victory gives the Copperheads much more credibility going into the election.

Even if Lincoln lost the election, he would have still remained in office long enough. By the time his successor took over, the South's position would be falling to pieces. There'd simply be no incentive and no reason not to finish the job.


Now, to Early taking Washington. If Early had successfully taken Washington, and occupied it for any length of time, I fail to see how this would not have had massive implications for Northern morale as the year went on. This is more about what effect the capture of the city would have upon the Northern Populace than the actual military impact.

What? Northerners would have concluded that the Confederacy was an unbeatable juggernaut? I don't think that people in the north thought that way. The more likely outcome would have been national fury. Washington would have taken on the mythic significance of the Alamo, and whole armies would have been marching south.
 
Before Fort Sumter, the best CSA strategy for its survival was to do nothing (OK, mobilize and build fortresses) and try hard not to give the USA an excuse to attack it.

The Constitution is silent on secession, and the standing USA army was small, so even if Lincoln was determined to conquer the CSA he needed an excuse. Once the stand-off had lasted long enough, he was more likely to give in and negotiate exit terms than to try to build an army to reconquer the South, which if the CSA wasn't doing anything was so far outside Constitutional norms that the attempt probably would have brought impeachment proceedings, even in a Republican controlled Congress. Even after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the attempt to "suppress the rebellion" brought four more states into the Confederate camp, states that had before considered and rejected secession. Yeah, they wouldn't have brought in the Upper South, but a purely Lower South CSA that dared the federal government to suppress it could have survived.

Following Fort Sumter, they were screwed. Actually, their best strategy for the resulting war was the IOTL one, with the following exceptions: 1) put a much greater priority on the defense of first Fort Donelson and then New Orleans, cancelling the Shiloh attack to keep the latter properly garrisoned 2) much better leadership of the Army of Tennessee (don't use Bragg, who seems to have had severe PTSD, in a combat command, the same applies to Hood late war, also for health reasons), 3) keep the Army of Tennessee in the Mississippi Valley to defend that, no invasion of Kentucky, and put a Vicksburg-sized garrison at Chattanooga plus cavalry to serve as a speed-bump, and 4) no cotton embargo. This sounds like a lot, but they got pretty much everything else right, and doing everything right would have kept them alive until 1866 at the latest. Organize an army, defend key points, and hope to get either really lucky or to get other countries as allies.
 
Best option for a victory, was not to fight, and send a battery of lawyers to hash it out in a sympathetic supreme court.

Second best option would be victory in the first year or two.

By 1964, it was all over but the crying. After four years, the Union had committed so much money, manpower and resources that they literally could not afford to back out. The notion of a 'saving throw' victory breaking the Union will to fight ignores human nature. The point that the Union would have walked away was long long past.
 
Even if Lincoln lost the election, he would have still remained in office long enough. By the time his successor took over, the South's position would be falling to pieces. There'd simply be no incentive and no reason not to finish the job.
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If the Copperheads get enough of a hold, it won't matter.
What? Northerners would have concluded that the Confederacy was an unbeatable juggernaut? I don't think that people in the north thought that way. The more likely outcome would have been national fury. Washington would have taken on the mythic significance of the Alamo, and whole armies would have been marching south.
These are the same people unable to grasp that Grant's investment of Petersburg had more or less sealed Lee's fate in the East, given enough time (which he would need; he didn't flush Lee until after the Inauguration). Predicting national fury is disingenuous. Losing the capital would have been gold propaganda for the Copperheads, who had taken advantage of the high casualties and apparent lack of progress during the Overland Campaign. "Oh, you say we're winning? Then how the hell did we lose the capitol?" This kind of attitude might have been enough to sway voters and turn the people towards peace.
 
I'd put the Battle/Siege of Chattanooga as the last gasp; by the time of the Atlanta campaign, I suspect that the time until the inauguration is probably long enough for the Union to present McClellan with the victory well in hand. Johnston was fundamentally fighting delaying actions, and while he might be able to delay the city's fall until after the election, it won't fall that long after (unless he uncharacteristically forts up like Lee at Petersburg, in which case he gets trapped and the Union manages to bag the surrender of another major Confederate Army, probably before McClellan's inauguration).

On the other hand, if the Army of the Tennessee is forced to surrender at Chattanooga, then (a) the Union is in no position to be threatening Atlanta anytime soon (as recapturing the place will take quite some time) and (b) Grant isn't being called East until he recaptures the town.

So basically, avoid the political quagmires that the Confederate Army of Tennessee found itself in (either by getting rid of Bragg or getting rid of the worst troublemakers among his subordinates; maybe a conveniently placed bullet/artillery shell?), and it seems doable.
 
Commentator Just a Rube puts the situation most succinctly.

The election is really overrated. McClellan in fact wanted to win the war, even with a weaker military situation there was enough time before March for the Union armies to present McClellan with a situation where he would win the war. The election wasn't particularly close by nineteenth century standards, and the Republicans were more than willing to cheat to win if they had to, they also had the electoral votes of Tennessee and Louisiana in their pocket. The one chance the Democrats had was the independent Fremont campaign, which folded after the adoption of the Copperhead plank. Without the Copperhead plank, the Democrats could win, but you remove any chance of a Democratic administration implementing the Copperhead program, which is no longer a platform plank. The whole thing is circular. At worst you might of Lincoln's depression getting the better of him, in which case he is talked into resigning after the election, and Hamlin, Stanton, and the generals produce a better military situation for the incoming President by March.

Now if the Confederates could have somehow destroyed the Army of the Tennessee after Chattanooga, the destruction of a federal army would have been a significant propaganda victory in itself, and had the other effects Just a Rube mentioned. Grant and more troops stay in the West, guaranteeing stalemate in Virginia in 1864 (even IOTL they didn't take Richmond) and Atlanta doesn't fall. It gives the CSA a narrow opening to win. But destruction of an army of that size was pretty much impossible anyway.

The South fought on after Chattanooga, but it was a case of after putting forth that much effort, how can you quit?
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Suppose the Confederacy had overrun Washington. Could they hold it? Nope. Would taking it have given them any strategic or tactical advantage? No. At most, they would have looted a bit, burned some buildings, and eventually got run off by vengeful Yankees. Best case scenario, they could have put in a garrison and tried to hold on, dying on the vine as the Confederacy got crushed elsewhere.

If Early had taken Washington, which was quite possible in July of 1864 given the foolish decision to strip its defenses to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, it would have had a shattering impact on the Union war effort in the Eastern Theater and would have had an even more devastating political impact. Militarily speaking, Washington was the key logistical hub for the Union war effort in Virginia; its warehouses would have been plundered and burned, with enormous amounts of vital Union war material being destroyed and the critical wharves being burned as well. Moreover, Grant would probably have to discontinue the Siege of Petersburg and return north with the bulk of his men to drive Early off, though leaving perhaps one or two corps to hold the position at City Point. This, in turn, might allow Lee to go on the offensive.

Politically, the Lincoln administration would appear utterly incompetent and will have suffered the worst blow to its credibility imaginable. IOTL, the simple fact that Early got so close to Washington was bad enough; ITTL, with Washington actually falling to the Confederates for a brief time, it would be incalculably worse. Combined with the perceived failures of the Overland Campaign and Sherman's drive on Atlanta, it would drive Lincoln's political fortunes down to the lowest possible point. Cue a Copperhead victory in the November elections, with all that entails.
 
Not really. A CSA victory is one of the GIGANTIC clichés of alternate history. It goes beyond cliché, it was a regular go to.

It's also massively improbable, simply considering the differential in resources. This is unpleasant to hear, but typically, any fight where one side has a three to one weight advantage over the other side.... the big guy wins, 99.9% of the time.

And yes, its true that the Confederacy was a pretty morally repugnant. That makes it harder to sing Dixie.

But the reality is simply the reality. The Confederacy can't win, unless it is impossibly lucky, and the north is impossibly incompetent.

I think you're overstating it. The Americans beat the British, the Greeks beat the Persians--stranger things have happened. The thing is, they don't have to conquer the North, they just have to make them tired. Both nations had a lot of political division during the war, and events worked out to where most of the US political divisions ended up mostly working themselves out and breaking their way. I mean, the NYC Draft Riots happened two weeks after Gettysburg and Vicksburg--the war was going pretty well, and people were still pissed. Imagine if things never really bounce back after the Seven Days. Big defeats at Second Manassas and in Maryland, the midterms go much worse for Lincoln, followed up by more defeats that winter and spring. This is not a likely scenario, but it's not an impossible one, either.

I give them a 15%-20% chance of victory. So, really small, but not impossible.
 
If Early had taken Washington, which was quite possible in July of 1864 given the foolish decision to strip its defenses to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, it would have had a shattering impact on the Union war effort in the Eastern Theater and would have had an even more devastating political impact. Militarily speaking, Washington was the key logistical hub for the Union war effort in Virginia; its warehouses would have been plundered and burned, with enormous amounts of vital Union war material being destroyed and the critical wharves being burned as well. Moreover, Grant would probably have to discontinue the Siege of Petersburg and return north with the bulk of his men to drive Early off, though leaving perhaps one or two corps to hold the position at City Point. This, in turn, might allow Lee to go on the offensive.

Politically, the Lincoln administration would appear utterly incompetent and will have suffered the worst blow to its credibility imaginable. IOTL, the simple fact that Early got so close to Washington was bad enough; ITTL, with Washington actually falling to the Confederates for a brief time, it would be incalculably worse. Combined with the perceived failures of the Overland Campaign and Sherman's drive on Atlanta, it would drive Lincoln's political fortunes down to the lowest possible point. Cue a Copperhead victory in the November elections, with all that entails.
Thanks; you said it much better than I did.
 
My thought is that if the CSA won in 1864, it would not be around for long. Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas were beginning to have some issues with the Confederate government itself, with Georgia even wanting to secede from the CSA at one point because it wasn't fortifying Georgia enough. With those states seeing how incompetent the Confederate government really was, they could potentially countersecede fro the CSA, and try to strike it out n their own, cloistering up and making the states not be easy targets to attack, thus more or less dissuading any kind of invasion. Then more states would secede, and eventually you'd have a jumble of little independent states that would quickly end up leaving Slavery behind at the risk of perennial slave uprisings, and overall becoming US client states.
 

CalBear

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Sharpsburg.

There was never much of a chance that Britain or France would recognize the Confederacy, but the minute Lincoln published the Emancipation Proclamation, and made the War expressly about slavery as much as "preserving the Union" the chance that any European Power would intervene was gone. After that is was a matter of finding a couple General Officers who could count.
 
I don't think the Union wins without Lincoln and Grant (and Sherman right behind him), and there are enough battles where luck intruded that the campaigns can unfold very differently. Forts Henry and Donnelson (and the negligence of the TN governor in fortifying Nashville) gave the Union the strategic offensive-tactical defensive combination around Nashville, Shiloh delivered the key rail hub of Corinth, Vicksburg cut the CSA off from Mexico, and thus that corridor of unimpeded international trade, bagged 30,000 prisoners, and cut off the Western confederacy simultaneously with Lee's retreat from Gettysburg. Chattanooga captured another major rail hub, and left Atlanta unshielded.

Even with this unimpeded avalanche of catastrophe for the Confederates, it still took them four years to lose the war, and it seems to me that at least some of those key battles in the west were theoretically winnable for the Confederates. I definitely think Lee could have gone three in a row in the Eastern theatre, and after that, getting a fourth win in a row with his momentum would be that much easier, then a fifth, sixth, seventh. Either the Union would have to lift pressure in the west (where they won the war OTL, thus inevitably delaying Union victory just to stay on the board in the East) or submit to Lee rampaging through PA and MD, which would horribly undermine the Republicans' political position, especially if Lee bagged Harrisburg or Baltimore.

Now, it's true that McClellan wanted to continue the war, but if we assume that the peace sentiment that brought him into office translates into a Democrat congress, they're going to be passing measures that make it difficult to continue the war even if he wanted to. Scaling back taxation, conscription, military emancipation, lighter application of the laws of war; the money for the war was already getting scarce in 1865, and expiring enlistments, it would be very difficult to continue the war if the Union was still basically where it started. Even if Confederate manpower is largely tapped out, the public might not care if the only results are a bloodbath in northern Virginia and Tennessee-Kentucky.
 
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