An equally significant factor was the realization that industry could not cope with the new demands at such short notice. An investigation carried out by the NKVD during the war games disclosed that the master plan for the construction of railways had fallen far behind. Nor had the emergency plans ordered by the Red Army's Chief of Staff been fulfilled: no co-ordinated plan existed for the administration of the railways during the first months of the war. The handling of the mobilization plans in this context had not even been discussed, and the railways leading to the front line could not handle more than 30 per cent of the traffic anticipated. In the central sector of Minsk, for instance, no more than 16.7 per cent of the budget allocated for the improvement of the railways had been used. On average less than 12 per cent of the plans for the expansion of the railways had been accomplished. Heavy tanks had to be transferred to the front on 60-ton platforms; only 387 such platforms were available, and not a single one had been constructed in 1940. Only about 50 per cent of supplies indispensable for the construction of an adequate transport system to the front, such as rails, telegraph posts and railway sleepers, were available. Finally, the alarm was sounded that work on the Baltic mobilization system had 'not even started'. Intensive measures were indeed taken by the SNK to give a boost to the 'production of defensive materials' throughout 1941, placing great emphasis on the construction of the new industrial complexes which could cater for the new demands.
Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia by Gabriel Gorodetsky