What ultimately made the Japanese surrender in WWII?

What made Japan surrender? (1945 August 15)


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That's seems to be the most common view, and the one you can't vote for in the poll. The A-Bombs meant that the Japanese plans to bleed the Allied invasion forces and drain their will to fight went out the window. The Soviet DOW and invasion of Manchuria buried any hopes of using them as a diplomatic conduit, as well as taking away the last overseas territory the Japanese Empire had.

I remember reading that Japan was hoping to use the USSR to make peace with the West and Stalin was pretending to entertain the premise whilst really stalling for time for the Soviets to launch a foray into Manchukuo?
 
I remember reading that Japan was hoping to use the USSR to make peace with the West and Stalin was pretending to entertain the premise whilst really stalling for time for the Soviets to launch a foray into Manchukuo?

That's a pretty accurate summary of what Stalin was trying to do. He knew that if he rejected the ambassador outright, it would dishearten them and he worried that might lead them to surrender before he was ready to hit them, in which case the WAllies might not give him the territory they promised him. So he had Molotov play a stalling game with the Japanese ambassador. He even essentially told Truman as much at Potsdam (although Truman already knew thanks to intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic codes) and Truman replied "keep them talking".

Also, a bit of a non-sequitor, but later on MacArthur presumed that the language in the surrender documents extended his authority to Soviet forces operating in Manchuria and Korea. When he tried to order them to stop hostile operations, he got a reply from the STAVKA which (in very polite language) basically told him to fuck off and stop trying to order their forces around.
 
An interesting corollary to this is that MacArthur presumed the language in the surrender documents extended his authority to Soviet forces operating in Manchuria and Korea. When he tried to order them to stop hostile operations, he got a reply from the STAVKA which (in very polite language) basically told him to fuck off and stop trying to order them around.

Of course he did... :rolleyes: He really was a muppet...
 

jahenders

Banned
The correct answer is a qualified both, plus alot of other things. The nukes provided the better excuse for the peace faction (and Emperor) to argue, "Hey, this is just something we cannot combat." However, that combined with a Russian invasion (and more on the way), made it clear to most that there was just no way to continue.

Actually, those events taken in isolation might not have done it were it not for:
- The almost complete destruction of the Japanese merchant marine and fleet
- Almost complete blockade
- Looming starvation on a massive scale
- Months of devastating US bombardment across Japan

That is, if in 1942-43, we had nukes and the Russians attacked, the Japanese would likely NOT have surrendered.
 
Gaurentee of no prosecution of the imperial family and emperor was the reason.
had americans not offered this deal japan would have fought to the bitter end. That is the real reason.
 

Ming777

Monthly Donor
It was a national level anvil and hammer attack. The atom bomb was the hammer to the invasion of Manchuria's anvil.
 
I spent 30 years of my life in that Cold War, and the mendacities practiced that purported to call itself "history" were with us for a long time.

So your latching on to a non-sequitor because you feel it personally insults you?

If we can quite rightly decry the false histories of the Lost Causers and their sacred Dunning Thesis, then what pray tell allows the revisionist theory of the use of the Bomb to get a pass? Particularly on the nature of its origin?.
Well, firstly, because there is no one giving them a pass. What we have on this thread is people recognizing that the Soviets played a role in the Japanese to surrender when they did. Exactly how important this role is in comparison atom bomb is debatable but no serious scholar (and no-one on this thread) is going to say that the atom bomb had no impact. Just as no serious scholar (and no-one on this thread) is going to say the Soviet attack had no impact.

Secondly, because the assertion that the Soviet Union entry into the war had an impact on Japan's decision to surrender when it did can be supported by the statements and actions of the Japanese leadership at the time as recorded by those same Japanese leaders. In this, the revisionists could be said to have a point: the Soviet Union did have an impact. They get pretty much everything else wrong, though.

I promise to quit "strawmanning" just as soon as I start.:rolleyes:
Strawman: a common form of argument and is an informal fallacy based on giving the impression of refuting an opponent's argument, while actually refuting an argument which was not advanced by that opponent. The sham argument in this case being the revisionist argument, which no-one here is pushing yet which you are hyper-focusing on for some reason.
 

Perkeo

Banned
The Nukes gave the Emperor the excuse he needed to surrender, with a traditional invasion the Army would have fought to as close to the last man as they could have managed.

I agree. If nukes is the true reason, it is because of the excuse issue and not due to the actual damage. America didn't need nukes to flatten cities, but Japan needed a new form of threat to justify the unconditional surrender.

Still I don't think Japan was going to fight to the last man. They were not as stupid as Nazi Germany was.
 
Gaurentee of no prosecution of the imperial family and emperor was the reason.
had americans not offered this deal japan would have fought to the bitter end. That is the real reason.

After Nagasaki, the Supreme War Council was split 3-3 on how to end the war,

The doves, wanted to guarantee position of the emperor and the imperial family
The hawks, wanted the additional 3 terms:
-no occupation of Japan by allied troops
-Japan will disarm itself
-Japan will trial its own war criminals



The Nukes gave the Emperor the excuse he needed to surrender, with a traditional invasion the Army would have fought to as close to the last man as they could have managed.
Still I don't think Japan was going to fight to the last man. They were not as stupid as Nazi Germany was.

"It is far too early to say that the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our favor, pulling victory out of defeat."
Army Minister General Anami, (war faction) after Nagasaki
 
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Absolutely nukes, people who think invasion don't understand psychology. A nuke is a devastating impact at home and fear of impending obliteration, and invasion of Manchuria is just another military defeat that's covered up by removing the Prime Minister. And the nukes, as poster 3 said, gave the Emperor a face saving way out of "saving mankind from destruction"
 
Voted Soviet DoW, but as others have said, I would prefer there to have been a 'both' option. Why do I think that one and not the bomb was the deciding factor? Well the nuke was mostly an unknown quantity at this point, even to most of the allied forces, while the Soviets were well-known to the Japanese, and I think at this point it was more a case of 'the devil we know'.

Maybe the two bombs might have been enough on their own, maybe not, but I do think an earlier deployment of leaflet AB11, and making the leaflet itself more explicit about both the effects and expected targets (pad that one a bit) would have swayed the Nagasaki bombing more effective. A little warning that more bombs would follow if the Government didn't give up would have helped too.
 
Absolutely nukes, people who think invasion don't understand psychology. A nuke is a devastating impact at home and fear of impending obliteration, and invasion of Manchuria is just another military defeat that's covered up by removing the Prime Minister. And the nukes, as poster 3 said, gave the Emperor a face saving way out of "saving mankind from destruction"
The "don't understand psychology" line seems needlessly insulting.
Also, the Soviet entry into the war was far more than "just another military defeat". It was the entry into the war of yet another hugely powerful enemy, in a nation that was already seriously over-matched by its enemies. It represented the loss of the delusional, but widespread, hope that the Soviet Union would help negotiate an end to the war. Finally, it helped shatter the last thin hope of the hardliners in the Militarists. They had been arguing that one final battle would allow Militarist Japan to gain terms by making the conquest of Japan too bloody for the Allies to continue. The very quick and decisive victories of the Red Army showed how woefully outmatched Japanese armies were, and called into serious doubt the hopes of inflicting huge casualties on the enemy on the battlefield.

I personally might even agree that the nuclear bombings had more of an impact on the decision to surrender than did the Soviet entry into the war, but looking at all the facts, I don't see how anyone could argue that it was wholly one or wholly the other. The Soviet entry into the war was a huge blow to the pro-war faction, regardless of whether or not the nuclear bombings was an even greater blow.
After Nagasaki, the Supreme War Council was split 3-3 on how to end the war,

The doves, wanted to guarantee position of the emperor and the imperial family
The hawks, wanted the additional 3 terms:
-no occupation of Japan by allied troops
-Japan will disarm itself
-Japan will trial its own war criminals


"It is far too early to say that the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our favor, pulling victory out of defeat."
Army Minister General Anami, (war faction) after Nagasaki

There were many hardliners within the Militarists who wanted to continue fighting, right up until the bitter end. But it is interesting that even Anami argued not that Japan should go down fighting to preserve its honor, but because there was still hope of inflicting such severe losses on the enemy that terms other than unconditional surrender are granted. As far as I can tell, the hardliners in Germany did not even argue that, just that Germany should keep fighting until the bitter end simply to avoid a repeat of the "dishonor" of 1918.
 
Absolutely nukes, people who think invasion don't understand psychology. A nuke is a devastating impact at home and fear of impending obliteration, and invasion of Manchuria is just another military defeat that's covered up by removing the Prime Minister. And the nukes, as poster 3 said, gave the Emperor a face saving way out of "saving mankind from destruction"

Much like the strategic bombing campaign was. Yet, when Tokyo went up in smokes in March 1945, Japan did not surrender under that pretext. Invasion may not be as psychologically devastating as a nuclear bomb to the civilian population; but it would have been, perhaps even more so, to the Japanese command who could actually make the decision to continue or end the war.

The militarist and the peace advocates were both banking on Soviet neutrality. The militarist, so that the Kwantung Army could be used to fend off a US invasion of the homeland; and the peace advocates, as a neutral mediator to allow for a better peace agreement.

The Soviet declaration of war and its annihilation of the Kwantung Army shattered both these hopes. Additionally, there was a real fear of an invasion by the Red Army against the homelands of Japan as there was a fear of an invasion from the US Army. A major difference between these two armies however is that the Red Army was willing to fight to the last man, much like the Japanese. The US and the Western Allies on the other hand much more valued the lives of their soldiers. Thus, when the SU joined the war, it was clear to Japan that there would be no negotiated peace. It was surrender or annihilation, both by the atomic bombs and Russian bodies.

Whilst I do agree that both the nuclear bomb and the Soviet DoW were important to the surrender of Japan, I'd personally argue that the Soviet DoW was much more influential.
 
Much like the strategic bombing campaign was. Yet, when Tokyo went up in smokes in March 1945, Japan did not surrender under that pretext.

Bombing of Tokyo or any other city by a thousand bomber raid was still something one could actually comprehend and process. One bomb devastating an entire city was not.

The militarist and the peace advocates were both banking on Soviet neutrality. The militarist, so that the Kwantung Army could be used to fend off a US invasion of the homeland; and the peace advocates, as a neutral mediator to allow for a better peace agreement.

The Soviet declaration of war and its annihilation of the Kwantung Army shattered both these hopes.

If the militarists were banking on that so much, the Kwantung Army would have be brought back. It was in fact weakened, IIRC. Diplomats knew it would be war since April when neutrality pact was annulled by the Soviets.

Additionally, there was a real fear of an invasion by the Red Army against the homelands of Japan as there was a fear of an invasion from the US Army. A major difference between these two armies however is that the Red Army was willing to fight to the last man, much like the Japanese. The US and the Western Allies on the other hand much more valued the lives of their soldiers. Thus, when the SU joined the war, it was clear to Japan that there would be no negotiated peace.

The Americans have already proven that they too were willing to do what must be done and to bear any sacrifice necessary. And they were no less fierce than the Japanese in fighting the war. Both powers invading Japan, would lead to destruction of Kokutai, so the Japanese were not really preferring either more than the other.
 
The "don't understand psychology" line seems needlessly insulting.
Also, the Soviet entry into the war was far more than "just another military defeat". It was the entry into the war of yet another hugely powerful enemy, in a nation that was already seriously over-matched by its enemies. It represented the loss of the delusional, but widespread, hope that the Soviet Union would help negotiate an end to the war. Finally, it helped shatter the last thin hope of the hardliners in the Militarists. They had been arguing that one final battle would allow Militarist Japan to gain terms by making the conquest of Japan too bloody for the Allies to continue. The very quick and decisive victories of the Red Army showed how woefully outmatched Japanese armies were, and called into serious doubt the hopes of inflicting huge casualties on the enemy on the battlefield.

I personally might even agree that the nuclear bombings had more of an impact on the decision to surrender than did the Soviet entry into the war, but looking at all the facts, I don't see how anyone could argue that it was wholly one or wholly the other. The Soviet entry into the war was a huge blow to the pro-war faction, regardless of whether or not the nuclear bombings was an even greater blow.


There were many hardliners within the Militarists who wanted to continue fighting, right up until the bitter end. But it is interesting that even Anami argued not that Japan should go down fighting to preserve its honor, but because there was still hope of inflicting such severe losses on the enemy that terms other than unconditional surrender are granted. As far as I can tell, the hardliners in Germany did not even argue that, just that Germany should keep fighting until the bitter end simply to avoid a repeat of the "dishonor" of 1918.

It's not an insult not to understand psychology, or any subject.

I can't find one great power that surrendered because a powerful enemy entered the war. It might be part Soviet attack part nuke, but it's definitely not 60 40 but 99-1 for the nuke. When Prussia, Sweden, France (many times), Poland, Germany, even Turkey were attacked from all sides by powerful enemies, they fought on because people delude themselves into thinking they can win. Some of them, like the French up to a point, the Venetians and the Prussians, actually did. All it takes is a charismatic leader and a propaganda machine to convince people to keep fighting. Even in 1943, most Germans thought they could beat the world.

Much like the strategic bombing campaign was. Yet, when Tokyo went up in smokes in March 1945, Japan did not surrender under that pretext. Invasion may not be as psychologically devastating as a nuclear bomb to the civilian population; but it would have been, perhaps even more so, to the Japanese command who could actually make the decision to continue or end the war.

The militarist and the peace advocates were both banking on Soviet neutrality. The militarist, so that the Kwantung Army could be used to fend off a US invasion of the homeland; and the peace advocates, as a neutral mediator to allow for a better peace agreement.

The Soviet declaration of war and its annihilation of the Kwantung Army shattered both these hopes. Additionally, there was a real fear of an invasion by the Red Army against the homelands of Japan as there was a fear of an invasion from the US Army. A major difference between these two armies however is that the Red Army was willing to fight to the last man, much like the Japanese. The US and the Western Allies on the other hand much more valued the lives of their soldiers. Thus, when the SU joined the war, it was clear to Japan that there would be no negotiated peace. It was surrender or annihilation, both by the atomic bombs and Russian bodies.

Whilst I do agree that both the nuclear bomb and the Soviet DoW were important to the surrender of Japan, I'd personally argue that the Soviet DoW was much more influential.

Good point but the bombing was expected, a well drilled propaganda routine, and there were still cities standing. Life in Japan sucked, but life in Sweden during the Great Northern War or Germany in the first world war sucked too. It takes many years for people to crumble from sheer attrition. I don't think the Japanese feared invasion as much as their elite was excited about it. They deluded themselves into divine winds and samurai myths, and to give them credit, it would have been their best battle sequence since the early string of victories in 41. Japan predicted the allied plan 100%, which isn't an accomplishment since there was only one way they could go, but it would have been bloody.

As for the bomb, it was a shock, unexpected, seemingly godly power, and a complete jaw dropping moral blow.

For the mentality of the USSR, people in war don't think that deep that the Soviets were okay with losing men and the Western allies weren't. There were legitimate Japanese hopes of winning a negotiated peace with the US, but I don't think they all believed the Soviets were tough and hardcore to where if the US got tired the Soviets would still think it was worth it to conquer Japan. Why? To make it communist? If Stalin was willing to trade lives for more land, he would have had Churchill and Roosevelt go with the British plan to invade Yugoslavia: today, most scholars think he would have made it to France.

Even if the Soviets were tough, a Japanese officer part of the fight to the last man faction is thinking "this is our home, these are our beaches, and we will kill them all". Russians were tough when they invaded Prussia, but the Prussians (ironically with good results) deluded themselves into the same thinking. Now if a magic hurricane cast by the Tsarina swept away Berlin? That would convince them to surrender.
 
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jahenders

Banned
Any sane observer would conclude (apparently, as the emperor did) that to refuse to surrender until the Hawk's demands were met, would mean they never surrender. The allies would NEVER agree to those terms (certainly not after 1944 or so when they were grinding the Japanese down).

After Nagasaki, the Supreme War Council was split 3-3 on how to end the war,

The doves, wanted to guarantee position of the emperor and the imperial family
The hawks, wanted the additional 3 terms:
-no occupation of Japan by allied troops
-Japan will disarm itself
-Japan will trial its own war criminals






"It is far too early to say that the war is lost. That we will inflict severe losses on the enemy when he invades Japan is certain, and it is by no means impossible that we may be able to reverse the situation in our favor, pulling victory out of defeat."
Army Minister General Anami, (war faction) after Nagasaki
 
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