For those who don't know, Operation FS was a Japanese plan to take New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa in order to help cut off Australia and New Zealand from the United States. An obvious prerequisite was for the Japanese to take Port Moresby in order to secure New Guinea but the defeat at the Coral Sea obviously prevented this. Then Midway happened, and any hope for FS happening ended. However, let's say the Japanese won the battle of the Coral Sea and proceeded to win Midway or some equivalent battle. The Americans had garrisoned New Caledonia with the Americal Division and several other units approximately 20,000 altogether. For the Japanese to take New Caledonia would probably require 60,000 men. Where exactly could Japan get these troops from? They could use the forces that historically fought on Guadalcanal and in the Kokoda Track Campaign but this would obviously not be enough. If the Japanese withdrew occupation troops from their new conquests though, I can imagine some difficulties. I was hoping my fellow board members would have some interesting thoughts on the topic.
What Troops Could Japan Use For Operation FS?
- Thread starter AbeLincoln1865
- Start date
Complex question. Hope someone else has a count of the Japanese forces available. I'd have to return to home base to turn up the US OB. Memory does tell me the 1st Marine Division was in the region then, parked in defense positions in the Fiji area. The Americal Div was defending the New Calidonia area. There were assorted other US forces also sent in the spring/early summer, but I can't remember if all were sent to Australia/New Guinea. The ground combat forces are half this, or more accurately one third. The other two parts are the air combat, & then the logistics side. The US won the air campaign around Guadalcanal because they were able to feed increasing numbers of aircraft to the battlefield. Ditto for the logistics portion. Can the US do the same in this FS campaign?
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Troops could probably be skimmed off of various occupation forces to assemble a more sizeable army for this campaign. My main questions would be guaranteeing transport and then logistical support.
If battles in New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa do not become substitutes for Guadalcanal, I would imagine that come middle 1943, the Allies will design their campaigns to bypass these territories, and they could wither on the vine till 45.
If battles in New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa do not become substitutes for Guadalcanal, I would imagine that come middle 1943, the Allies will design their campaigns to bypass these territories, and they could wither on the vine till 45.
The elite 48th Division is smoking and joking on Timor. Have the Japanese scrape enough second line troops to garrison Timor because they realize the Allies are unlikely to invade Timor from Darwin.
Seriously, the activities of a battalion sized formation of light infantry on Timor into early 1943 caused the Japanese to tie down one of their best divisions for the rest of the war.
Seriously, the activities of a battalion sized formation of light infantry on Timor into early 1943 caused the Japanese to tie down one of their best divisions for the rest of the war.
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Japan needs to find good troops, not just random odds & sods. Then there is the problem of transporting them and protecting them during transport - meaning getting some carrier aviation for protection and then during the fighting. Then there is the issue of supplying them during a significant campaign against prepared troops and then once they win (if they do). Even if there is no Allied threat to the supply lines, and there will be, Japan simply does not have the capacity to devote much shipping to that area.
Here is a partial list of US ground combat units sent to the Pacific during 1942. Note there are five Army and Marine divisions present in the S Pac/Australia by May 1942. Four Army & a Marine separate regiments were also present in the S Pac by May 1942. Three more divisions were sent to the Pacific in 1942 & were available as reinforcements for the hypothetical FS campaign. Source is Stauntons 'US Army OB in WWII'. I may have missed a division or regiment & made a transcription error or two.
24th ID @ Oahu to May 43
25th ID @ Oahu to 25 Nov 42, to Guadalcanal
27th ID Departed US for Oahu Mar 42
32d ID Departed US April 42, arrived Australia May 42, -
-to New Guinea Sept-Nov 42
37th ID Departed US May 42, Fiji June 42
40th ID Departed US to Hawaii Aug 42
41st ID Departed US Mar 42, arrived Australia May 42
43d ID Departed US Oct 42, to Fiji New Caledonia
TF 6814 arrive New Caledonia March/April 42. Designated AmeriCal Div-
- May 42 wi three inf regiments To Guadalcanal Nov 42
24th Inf Reg From US to New Hebridies May 42
53rd Inf Reg From US to Alaska Jun 42
58th Inf Reg from US to Alaska May 42
102 Inf Reg from US to Bora Bora Jan 42
138 Inf Reg from US to Alaska May 42
146 Inf Reg from US to New Zealand May 42, to Fiji July 42,
147 Inf Reg from US to Fiji April 42, to Guadalcanal Nov 42
153 Inf Reg From US to Alaska April 42
1st Marine Div From US to Fiji April 42
2d Marine Div From US to Samoa Jan - Oct 1942
24th ID @ Oahu to May 43
25th ID @ Oahu to 25 Nov 42, to Guadalcanal
27th ID Departed US for Oahu Mar 42
32d ID Departed US April 42, arrived Australia May 42, -
-to New Guinea Sept-Nov 42
37th ID Departed US May 42, Fiji June 42
40th ID Departed US to Hawaii Aug 42
41st ID Departed US Mar 42, arrived Australia May 42
43d ID Departed US Oct 42, to Fiji New Caledonia
TF 6814 arrive New Caledonia March/April 42. Designated AmeriCal Div-
- May 42 wi three inf regiments To Guadalcanal Nov 42
24th Inf Reg From US to New Hebridies May 42
53rd Inf Reg From US to Alaska Jun 42
58th Inf Reg from US to Alaska May 42
102 Inf Reg from US to Bora Bora Jan 42
138 Inf Reg from US to Alaska May 42
146 Inf Reg from US to New Zealand May 42, to Fiji July 42,
147 Inf Reg from US to Fiji April 42, to Guadalcanal Nov 42
153 Inf Reg From US to Alaska April 42
1st Marine Div From US to Fiji April 42
2d Marine Div From US to Samoa Jan - Oct 1942
If something like this is attempted, maybe more of the Australian Militia (now the Army Reserve) divisions serve overseas.
In mid 1942 there was something like 7 Militia Divisions (5x Infantry + 2x Cavalry) formed and located in Australia and New Guinea. in addition to the four AIF divisions ( 3 Infantry & 1 Armoured) that were explicity formed for overseas duty. There was a fourth Infantry Division, but it was lost at Singapore.
The three Infantry Divisions were on their way back from Africa, not sure exactly when they arrived back, 1st Armoured Division was in Australia.
In mid 1942 there was something like 7 Militia Divisions (5x Infantry + 2x Cavalry) formed and located in Australia and New Guinea. in addition to the four AIF divisions ( 3 Infantry & 1 Armoured) that were explicity formed for overseas duty. There was a fourth Infantry Division, but it was lost at Singapore.
The three Infantry Divisions were on their way back from Africa, not sure exactly when they arrived back, 1st Armoured Division was in Australia.
Its clear there were plenty of ground forces to oppose the Japanese in the FS operation. The more important questions revolve around the naval and aircraft ability of each side. To win the Japanese don t need overwhelming ground forces, they need to defeat the Allies or USN in the air and on the sea. Absent a Midway defeat will the Japanese be able to dominate the air and sea int its target region, and along the LoC to it?
The question about naval/aircraft is basically what can the IJN bring, and how long it can stay. IJA aircraft require ground troops to take airfields and get them up and running. Until then its all on the IJN. If Midway has happened forget it. If not, the problem still is that the IJN has had aircrew losses and is already at the beginning of the aircrew downward spiral although not a severe pinch yet. Can Japan bring a chunk of this in support of this operation? Yes, but it puts it waaaay out on a limb and exposes it to danger (land based air, naval air, submarines, surface action) for quite some time. Just as important if this naval power is sent for this, it is not being used elsewhere, and given the distances it is off the table for some time. Lastly,this operation is going to consume a lot of petroleum products, and the conquered resources are not pouring in.
The 5th AF based in Australia, had by May had gotten its logistics tail functioning. Regular air raids on Rabaul were already underway. Kenny had taken over & in June was testing extreme low level bombing techniques, that is 'skip bombing'. The US Pacific airfares had already proven to themselves high altitude bombing did not work vs ships. From this point on their tactics improved and attrition of IJN cargo ships went up. From Rabaul eastwards the Japanese cargo fleet would be running a gauntlet of air attacks.