Ah - my mistake. When you said "further East," I thought you meant from the Eastern perimeter of the Empire, which at that point was Gilberts/Solomons.
But to look at the Bay of Bengal: Defeating Somerville is certainly possible. But the IJN doesn't have the lift capacity or logistics to do much beyond the Malay Barrier. Glenn, as you know, has long made the argument that a landing could have been effected on Ceylon, which is a contested point. If there is a real danger for Britain, it is that another British defeat might trigger some real uprising in India...
a. PM about point 1.
b. Troop lift may not be the point of contention we need to look, when we discuss point 2. Point 2, I believe, depends on sea lines of communication. Timing from a naval point of view could not possibly be worse for the Allies. It is a contestable theory, I grant you, but I believe that a hammer and anvil attack by the Axis on British SLOCs to the middle east in the May to August to as possibly as late October 1942 timeframe would have serious consequences for not only Britain, but for Russia and the United States just when all three powers are at their most desperate straits. A massacre or even a temporary driving of the Eastern Fleet from the Indian Ocean has to wreck plans for the Persian lend lease route, endanger critical (to the US Navy) Mideast oil shipments to the Southwest Pacific, encourage Indian separatists, render Burma and the supply line to China almost untenable and have synergistic effects all the way from the Caucasus to Midway. I can think of one specific consequence that might have serious effects: suppose it becomes too dangerous to ship that convoy loaded full of Sherman tanks to British 8th Army in September October 1942? It may not mean a defeat at Al Alamein, but it makes victory much much harder to exploit or might result in another stalemate if the British do not get better tanks to Egypt.
Bungled, unquestionably. Inoue should have been retired to a port receiving facility in the Kurils.
You mean Inoue, Braindead and that genius, Yamamoto. Hara was the only one with his head screwed on straight, on either side of that shambles.
I do wonder if you're not overrating Coral Sea, however. The chief tangible loss would have been Port Moresby. If you mean the battle itself, losing Yorktown as well would certainly hurt; but it hardly opens the door to the New Hebrides. The U.S. still has five fleet carriers, four of which were by that point in theater. It would probably butterfly away WATCHTOWER, but that is hardly a serious hindrance by itself.
You think so? I invite you to take a good hard look at the section in those Marvelous Tin Fish (Page 25 or thereabouts) where I explain Australia's geo-political and logistical position/ situation and then add what I show occurs when both sides neutralize each other's sea borne naval air power in the Pacific Ocean (About page 30, please pay attention to the 8 Bells lecture about what happens to navies when their carriers are sunk or wrecked, and suddenly RIKKOS and island airfields become very important. CARTWHEEL in 1943 not only makes sense, it becomes the only practical possible way to carry forward an offensive against Japan from the west.).
As soon as it's realized that the tank farm had been attacked, Tank#1, the one closest to completion, gets finished off for the current size and uses the completed pipeline , and even more workers are tossed at it from OTL levels
So they will make due with say 60% of Tank #1 nominal capacity of 282,000 barrels so it can be used, while other are completed, the last in September 1943 OTL
Storing Oil isn't hard, doing it with low spillage, that's the trick.
Russia and later USSR, was infamous for open pit storage, with no lining beyond whatever clay or chalk layer happened to be underneath the soil.
And their tanks suffered for it. What's a little dirt in the diesel? Klonk. We cannot reach Kursk, comrade, our engine seized up! The Russians must have gone through MOPAR Lend Lease fuel filters by the freight train load!
As for the oil tank... It isn't ready to store or pump until September 1942. That is the point. The Japanese missed their "window of opportunity" when the Americans realized they dodged a disaster by a miracle. I blame Yamamoto.^1
^1 If it sounds tongue in cheek a bit, it is, because I think these guys would have somehow still ATL screwed it up; but the Japanese sure muffed an opportunity when they had a demonstrable capability.