What the odds that a third strike on Pearl Harbor. . .

I could think of a method, whereby a Val drops a SAP bomb to blow the walls of an oil tank out and a follow up Val could drop an incendiary to light off the splashed fuel oil in the berm catch. It would be a difficult feat, but would result in something catastrophic like what the Indians did to the Pakistanis when they blew up Karachi's oil refinery during Operation Trident in 1971. Horrific event. It took the Pakistanis a week to bring it under control (Second attack was the killer, the fire got out of hand and they had to let it burn out.) and probably did more to wreck their naval operations during the Indo-Pakistani war than any other action the Indian navy undertook against the Pakistani navy.

Hitting a refinery that works on all sorts of petroleum products that differ in fire risk is different from hitting a tank fully storing heavy fuel oil which is much less prone to vaporozation and fire. The IJN would need intelligence on the content of different tanks and need to hit tanks containing lighter fuels.
 
It would be a difficult feat, but would result in something catastrophic like what the Indians did to the Pakistanis when they blew up Karachi's oil refinery during Operation Trident in 1971.

Yet even so, an oil refinery is not the same thing as a naval tank farm.

As Calbear noted, the tanks were separated and bermed to reduce the possibility of losing the whole farm if something happened to one.

EDIT: Barry Bull ninja'd me, and said it better than I did.
 
Pembroke was 3 medium bombers (Ju88) and 2 fighters setting off 1 tank that the lack of fire fighters meant it consumed 18 tanks. This doesn't look like it would happen this easy at PH but Darwin does show that when the IJN/IJA put their minds to it they could damage or destroy oil facilities. However, it would probably take several attacks and the smoke will obscure targets.

But Darwin was not shut down, the damage was repaired and the Allies continued to use it after the raid. This is my biggest problem with the whole third strike argument - the mythology that it could cause decisive long term damage to the facilities at the base in a way that it would require the United States to fundamentally alter its long term posture in the Pacific. That is physically impossible with just one or two extra strikes from the KB. To get that kind of damage would require a series of re-strikes over a considerable period of time, something the Japanese could not do because they could not sustain the KB off Hawaii for the weeks or months that would require and their nearest land bases were in the Marshalls. The Allied bombing campaign against Rabaul is instructive in this regard.
 
Hitting a refinery that works on all sorts of petroleum products that differ in fire risk is different from hitting a tank fully storing heavy fuel oil which is much less prone to vaporozation and fire. The IJN would need intelligence on the content of different tanks and need to hit tanks containing lighter fuels.

Quite true, but the tank the Styx missile hit during Trident contained naval fuel, hence we may assume heavy fuel oil was the ignition event. And we do know that Pearl Harbor's fuel farm contained av-gas storage as well as heavy fuel oil since the cockamamie airfield was right next to the fuel dump.

Yet even so, an oil refinery is not the same thing as a naval tank farm.

As Calbear noted, the tanks were separated and bermed to reduce the possibility of losing the whole farm if something happened to one.

EDIT: Barry Bull ninja'd me, and said it better than I did.

Same again. The attack would have to be a saturation attack or a lucky hit on an av-gas tank. The same care the Japanese used to grid the anchorage with humint assets pre-attack could be used if they planned a resource based attack.

But Darwin was not shut down, the damage was repaired and the Allies continued to use it after the raid. This is my biggest problem with the whole third strike argument - the mythology that it could cause decisive long term damage to the facilities at the base in a way that it would require the United States to fundamentally alter its long term posture in the Pacific. That is physically impossible with just one or two extra strikes from the KB. To get that kind of damage would require a series of re-strikes over a considerable period of time, something the Japanese could not do because they could not sustain the KB off Hawaii for the weeks or months that would require and their nearest land bases were in the Marshalls. The Allied bombing campaign against Rabaul is instructive in this regard.

The neutralization campaign (Cartwheel) is quite instructive. As long as the Japanese could resupply the air garrison, the place could not be suppressed, which is the old truism that only a soldier with a rifle can deny a runway's use by sitting his butt on it, but then again, if your strike potential is limited and you want to complicate things for the Americans for only a few months, the oil tank farm (between the major naval airfield and the sub pens!) is THE logical ancillary target; "IF" and that is a big if, you can blow it up. Remember that the first strike at 0750 local time, was actually 80% counterair mission oriented and was wildly far more successful with anti-ship results than any Japanese planner had any right to expect. The second strike, 70 minutes later, was much less successful as an anti-ship strike although it was balanced more half and half. A third strike may have only splashed fuel oil (very likely) or a lucky hit might have set off the av-gas, but it is an accumulative effect we seek from the Japanese point of view. It took a year of hard work to partially clear the anchorage (ARIZONA is still an obstruction to smooth port operation) and that was with POWER. Add as little as two months damage repair to the tank farm and the loss of fuel supplies on hand and it could make Pearl Harbor untenable and force an anchorage shift for that two months to repair the damage. Here are factors we are not taking into account, the US PACFlt had a tanker shortage, an escort shortage and a trained personnel shortage that they were trying to make good by March 1942. What does adding a partially damaged fuel facility add to this burden? It delays the comeback a bit further, and that might just be enough during the crucial middle and later half of 1942 to affect several other ongoing allied operations. Egypt, Iran, SLOCs to Australia, the Burma campaign, all could be badly affected if the IJN has a free hand to swing east past the collapse of ABDA and there is no Coral Sea or sniping PACFlt able to gadfly them to turn west. The US will win the Pacific War but that then is 1946-1947 and that means a much different world and a MUCH different American style Pacific war that evolves to win it.

I can no longer assume that the tank farm was not a viable option. Andrew Boyd's book (see above) has changed a lot of assumptions I had about early WW II events at sea.
 
... To get that kind of damage would require a series of re-strikes over a considerable period of time, something the Japanese could not do because they could not sustain the KB off Hawaii for the weeks or months that would require and their nearest land bases were in the Marshalls. The Allied bombing campaign against Rabaul is instructive in this regard.

For a understanding of the damage the US 5th AF did or did not do to Rabauls military installations I'd recommend 'Fortress Rabaul' by Bruce Gamble. He reviews the entire series of air attacks and results for 1942 & early 1943.
 
Same again. The attack would have to be a saturation attack or a lucky hit on an av-gas tank. The same care the Japanese used to grid the anchorage with humint assets pre-attack could be used if they planned a resource based attack.

Again, even taking out a single tank faces obstacles in achieving a more general conflagration.

The IJN could only achieve a quick raid. The Kido Butai did not have staying power. A three wave attack which prioritizes the tank farm and dry docks would have difficulty doing sufficient damage to justify the risk and likely losses, because they are difficult objects to destroy with the munitions available to the IJN in 1941.

And as has been noted before, the IJN simply did not think this way. A radical change in the culture and doctrine or the IJN officer corps is needed to even put it on the table.

It delays the comeback a bit further, and that might just be enough during the crucial middle and later half of 1942 to affect several other ongoing allied operations. Egypt, Iran, SLOCs to Australia, the Burma campaign, all could be badly affected if the IJN has a free hand to swing east past the collapse of ABDA and there is no Coral Sea or sniping PACFlt able to gadfly them to turn west.

But where can the IJN go, further East?

There were only two planned major operations past the Solomons: Operation MO, aimed chiefly at Port Moresby, and Operation FS, aimed at the New Hebrides.

Well, Port Moresby is possibly achievable if Nimitz refuses to or is unable to contest it. (Given the garrison in place there in May 1942, it would have been a close call.) But as for Operation FS? Well, that's been chewed over in threads here plenty. The garrisons in these places, save possibly on Efate, were simply too strong, and Japanese logistics too weak, to make New Cal, Fiji, or Espiritu Santu viable for Japanese conquest.
 
Again, even taking out a single tank faces obstacles in achieving a more general conflagration.

The IJN could only achieve a quick raid. The Kido Butai did not have staying power. A three wave attack which prioritizes the tank farm and dry docks would have difficulty doing sufficient damage to justify the risk and likely losses, because they are difficult objects to destroy with the munitions available to the IJN in 1941.

And as has been noted before, the IJN simply did not think this way. A radical change in the culture and doctrine or the IJN officer corps is needed to even put it on the table.

You cannot assume hindsight. You have to assess capability. The Japanese do have the tanker assets to hang around a while. They were able to mount the Indian Ocean raid with two separate task forces. That was entirely tanker supported since Singapore and the Dutch refineries were still under repair.

But where can the IJN go, further East?

After the Eastern Fleet. Wipe Somerville out and its a bad desperate situation made absolutely supremely critical from the Allied point of view.

There were only two planned major operations past the Solomons: Operation MO, aimed chiefly at Port Moresby, and Operation FS, aimed at the New Hebrides.

Coral Sea, which was the igniter, was bungled. If you want a good description of how it was Japanese bungled, read my ATL version. It assumes the same exact factors at work and presents a rosier outcome for the Allies, but the Japanese mistakes and interactions are dead RTL on. From Inoue not planning his tactical end of it, properly; to the intramurals between King Kong Hara and Braindead Takagi, it makes for an utter farce worse than Midway was later for the Americans. And at the top of the pyramid mismanaging the whole sad affair was Yamamoto, Isoruku. Incredible it is; but true, that should have been Japan's Pacific Jutland. It was their Jutland, but not the way the Japanese planned it or wanted it. I actually think it was more decisive than Midway. Lose at Coral Sea and write off Australia and the Southwest Pacific as an offensive base.
Well, Port Moresby is possibly achievable if Nimitz refuses to or is unable to contest it. (Given the garrison in place there in May 1942, it would have been a close call.) But as for Operation FS? Well, that's been chewed over in threads here plenty. The garrisons in these places, save possibly on Efate, were simply too strong, and Japanese logistics too weak, to make New Cal, Fiji, or Espiritu Santu viable for Japanese conquest.

Maybe... Given a carrier task force that can interdict sea lanes... that is a HUGE gamble. I think that if the Japanese commit as few as two Rikkos and an engineer brigade and an IJA division from their force pool as well as ALL of the First Air Fleet, it looks DICEY as far southeast as Efate. They had the means. Just depends on what objective they want first and how much time the allies are delayed in comeback. The Pacific Island war was actually in small force packets, not too much larger than what the Japanese used in Phase I. Again Coral Sea was decisive in thwarting those moves. Tully and Parschall and now Boyd, make good arguments that the Japanese scattered their forces during Mid 1942 and the Allies were very lucky to catch them scattered and were able to beat them in detail.

As I have written, I have to rethink some assumptions I had about the IJN and their RTL campaigns. I think they were "incompetent" to put it charitably.
 
For a understanding of the damage the US 5th AF did or did not do to Rabauls military installations I'd recommend 'Fortress Rabaul' by Bruce Gamble. He reviews the entire series of air attacks and results for 1942 & early 1943.

I've got all of his books they are good.

There is also the bombing campaign against Malta and the RAF's campaign against Brest. They made it hard on the residents and for awhile the Allies couldn't operate surface ships out of Malta but they facilities were never shut down.
 
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I can no longer assume that the tank farm was not a viable option. Andrew Boyd's book (see above) has changed a lot of assumptions I had about early WW II events at sea.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...relocates-to-california.452680/#post-17651217

Right at the start of the thread,
M176436613.GIF

Red Hill underground fuel tanks. Tank #1 done in September 1942
 
After the Eastern Fleet. Wipe Somerville out and its a bad desperate situation made absolutely supremely critical from the Allied point of view.

Ah - my mistake. When you said "further East," I thought you meant from the Eastern perimeter of the Empire, which at that point was Gilberts/Solomons.

But to look at the Bay of Bengal: Defeating Somerville is certainly possible. But the IJN doesn't have the lift capacity or logistics to do much beyond the Malay Barrier. Glenn, as you know, has long made the argument that a landing could have been effected on Ceylon, which is a contested point. If there is a real danger for Britain, it is that another British defeat might trigger some real uprising in India...

Coral Sea, which was the igniter, was bungled. If you want a good description of how it was Japanese bungled, read my ATL version. It assumes the same exact factors at work and presents a rosier outcome for the Allies, but the Japanese mistakes and interactions are dead RTL on. From Inoue not planning his tactical end of it, properly; to the intramurals between King Kong Hara and Braindead Takagi, it makes for an utter farce worse than Midway was later for the Americans. And at the top of the pyramid mismanaging the whole sad affair was Yamamoto, Isoruku. Incredible it is; but true, that should have been Japan's Pacific Jutland. It was their Jutland, but not the way the Japanese planned it or wanted it. I actually think it was more decisive than Midway. Lose at Coral Sea and write off Australia and the Southwest Pacific as an offensive base.

Bungled, unquestionably. Inoue should have been retired to a port receiving facility in the Kurils.

I do wonder if you're not overrating Coral Sea, however. The chief tangible loss would have been Port Moresby. If you mean the battle itself, losing Yorktown as well would certainly hurt; but it hardly opens the door to the New Hebrides. The U.S. still has five fleet carriers, four of which were by that point in theater. It would probably butterfly away WATCHTOWER, but that is hardly a serious hindrance by itself.
 
When was Pearl Harbor?

As soon as it's realized that the tank farm had been attacked, Tank#1, the one closest to completion, gets finished off for the current size and uses the completed pipeline , and even more workers are tossed at it from OTL levels

So they will make due with say 60% of Tank #1 nominal capacity of 282,000 barrels so it can be used, while other are completed, the last in September 1943 OTL

Storing Oil isn't hard, doing it with low spillage, that's the trick.

Russia and later USSR, was infamous for open pit storage, with no lining beyond whatever clay or chalk layer happened to be underneath the soil.
 
There is also the bombing campaign against Malta and the RAF's campaign against Brest. They made it hard on the residents and for awhile the Allies couldn't operate surface ships out of Malta but they facilities were never shut down.
Yes, it was 1000's of sorties and 1000's of tons of bombs to render both these facilities untenable for large surface units.
 
Ah - my mistake. When you said "further East," I thought you meant from the Eastern perimeter of the Empire, which at that point was Gilberts/Solomons.

But to look at the Bay of Bengal: Defeating Somerville is certainly possible. But the IJN doesn't have the lift capacity or logistics to do much beyond the Malay Barrier. Glenn, as you know, has long made the argument that a landing could have been effected on Ceylon, which is a contested point. If there is a real danger for Britain, it is that another British defeat might trigger some real uprising in India...

a. PM about point 1.
b. Troop lift may not be the point of contention we need to look, when we discuss point 2. Point 2, I believe, depends on sea lines of communication. Timing from a naval point of view could not possibly be worse for the Allies. It is a contestable theory, I grant you, but I believe that a hammer and anvil attack by the Axis on British SLOCs to the middle east in the May to August to as possibly as late October 1942 timeframe would have serious consequences for not only Britain, but for Russia and the United States just when all three powers are at their most desperate straits. A massacre or even a temporary driving of the Eastern Fleet from the Indian Ocean has to wreck plans for the Persian lend lease route, endanger critical (to the US Navy) Mideast oil shipments to the Southwest Pacific, encourage Indian separatists, render Burma and the supply line to China almost untenable and have synergistic effects all the way from the Caucasus to Midway. I can think of one specific consequence that might have serious effects: suppose it becomes too dangerous to ship that convoy loaded full of Sherman tanks to British 8th Army in September October 1942? It may not mean a defeat at Al Alamein, but it makes victory much much harder to exploit or might result in another stalemate if the British do not get better tanks to Egypt.

Bungled, unquestionably. Inoue should have been retired to a port receiving facility in the Kurils.

You mean Inoue, Braindead and that genius, Yamamoto. Hara was the only one with his head screwed on straight, on either side of that shambles.

I do wonder if you're not overrating Coral Sea, however. The chief tangible loss would have been Port Moresby. If you mean the battle itself, losing Yorktown as well would certainly hurt; but it hardly opens the door to the New Hebrides. The U.S. still has five fleet carriers, four of which were by that point in theater. It would probably butterfly away WATCHTOWER, but that is hardly a serious hindrance by itself.

You think so? I invite you to take a good hard look at the section in those Marvelous Tin Fish (Page 25 or thereabouts) where I explain Australia's geo-political and logistical position/ situation and then add what I show occurs when both sides neutralize each other's sea borne naval air power in the Pacific Ocean (About page 30, please pay attention to the 8 Bells lecture about what happens to navies when their carriers are sunk or wrecked, and suddenly RIKKOS and island airfields become very important. CARTWHEEL in 1943 not only makes sense, it becomes the only practical possible way to carry forward an offensive against Japan from the west.).

As soon as it's realized that the tank farm had been attacked, Tank#1, the one closest to completion, gets finished off for the current size and uses the completed pipeline , and even more workers are tossed at it from OTL levels

So they will make due with say 60% of Tank #1 nominal capacity of 282,000 barrels so it can be used, while other are completed, the last in September 1943 OTL

Storing Oil isn't hard, doing it with low spillage, that's the trick.

Russia and later USSR, was infamous for open pit storage, with no lining beyond whatever clay or chalk layer happened to be underneath the soil.

And their tanks suffered for it. What's a little dirt in the diesel? Klonk. We cannot reach Kursk, comrade, our engine seized up! The Russians must have gone through MOPAR Lend Lease fuel filters by the freight train load!

As for the oil tank... It isn't ready to store or pump until September 1942. That is the point. The Japanese missed their "window of opportunity" when the Americans realized they dodged a disaster by a miracle. I blame Yamamoto.^1

^1 If it sounds tongue in cheek a bit, it is, because I think these guys would have somehow still ATL screwed it up; but the Japanese sure muffed an opportunity when they had a demonstrable capability.
 
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Having read through this thread my belief that the only way for the Japanese to win this war was to never start it has been strongly reinforced. Even that though is prime ASB. They were driven by a cultural and social morality that made disengagement from China impossible. The loss of face in that scenario was way too much for them to even remotely consider it. Yet it was the only way that the sanctions were going to be lifted. The sanctions were hurting their dreams of Asian hegemony badly so they had to find a way around them - war. That was the line of thought that doomed them on 07 December 41.

Obviously the Japanese were certainly not stupid and all but the most fanatic fully understood that poking the sleeping giant of the USA and Great Britain was a dicey proposition at best. The industrial and economic statistics that historian John Parshall so ably put forth were well known even to the Japanese. So instead of an honest self-assessment that would have clearly shown that war was deeply, deeply ill-advised, they lapsed into a culture wide self-delusion that war with the decadent and unmotivated western allies was going to be short and sweet. It was the only way that they could choke down the storm that many knew was coming, by convincing themselves that it was going to taste good and be quick to digest.

I believe that deep down inside at the core of their being, at the cultural and social level, the Japanese did not yet understand the modern world of 1941. Think about it... in 1853 when Matthew Perry finally "opened" Japan they were existing in a feudal, medieval world roughly equivalent to the 13th or 14th century Europe. They were 500 years behind the west! Just 88 years later, literally in the space of one person's lifetime they had advanced to the point of being able to consider world domination. In the Navy we call this "drinking from a fire hose". It was too much too fast and they had not yet adapted. I want to be perfectly clear in what I am saying... they were not stupid or incapable of learning. Indeed the amount of progress in so short a time is nothing short of remarkable. They just hadn't had enough time to adapt to cultural and social mores that to people in Europe and America were already commonplace. Thus, the rigid adherence to cultural pride and the lapse into a self-delusionment on a scale so grand it staggers the imagination.

The folly of their ill-timed and ill-advised ambition is amply demonstrated by the deaths of nearly three million Japanese citizens, the compete destruction of their military, and the utter devastation of virtually every urban center in the land. If they had waited just 25 more years they could have achieved all of their goals peacefully and without all of the darkness and despair. Amazing, simply amazing.
 
Having read through this thread my belief that the only way for the Japanese to win this war was to never start it has been strongly reinforced.

Calbear said it best; "Japan lost the second the first bomb hit Pearl Harbor."

Obviously the Japanese were certainly not stupid and all but the most fanatic fully understood that poking the sleeping giant of the USA and Great Britain was a dicey proposition at best.

Yamamoto had spent time in the US as a Naval Attache and knew of America's economic and industrial potential. But he couldn't convince others of this fact. The same for Germany; Ernest Udet had been to the US but most high-ranking Nazi's hadn't and he couldn't convince them of the difficulties Germany would be facing if they fought the US...
 
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