What Terms Could The Confederacy Expect?

Let's say that, for the sake of argument, the Confederacy manages to hold on long enough for the a McClellan win. We go through the old cliche of McClellan getting elected and cutting a deal to "let out wayward brothers go". What terms could the Confederacy expect to receive at the table? Would they press for independence, or accept status quo ante, with slavery preserved? If they went for independence, what would be the size of the CSA?

Assume, for the sake of argument, that the battle lines are roughly where they were in 1863-ish.
 
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Unconditional surrender was what McClellan wanted IOTL.

No Arizona, no Kentucky, no West Virginia, and no Missouri, for sure. The north is definitely keeping those areas.

Northern Virginia also probably gets split off and stays with the union- McClellan is not going to leave the capital on the border.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
"1863-ish" means the US, presumably, holds the following:

Let's say that, for the sake of argument, the Confederacy manages to hold on long enough for the a McClellan win. We go throughold cliche of McClellan getting elected and cutting a deal to "let out wayward brothers go". What terms could the Confederacy expect to receive at the table? Would they press for independence, or accept status quo ante, with slavery preserved? If they went for independence, what would be the size of the CSA?

Assume, for the sake of argument, that the battle lines are roughly where they were in 1863-ish.


"1863-ish" means the US, presuambly, holds the following:
  • Littoral Virginia (both sides of the Chesapeake), northern Virginia, and West Virginia;
  • northeastern coastal North Carolina;
  • enclaves in coastal South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and Mississippi;
  • about a quarter of Louisiana, including the banks of the Mississippi and both New Orleans and Baton Rouge;
  • about half of Mississippi, including the banks of the river, Vicksburg, Corinth, and (presumably) Jackson;
  • the northern quarter of Alabama;
  • about a third of Arkansas, including the banks of the Mississippi, the confluence of the Mississippi and the Arkansas, and everything north of the Boston Mountains;
  • the northeastern third of the Indian Territory;
  • El Paso, Texas;
  • 95 percent of Tennessee, including Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, and (presumably) Chattanooga; and, of course,
  • the whole of Missouri and Kentucky;
The above include the only fully connected east-west railroad nets south of Maryland and the Ohio River, the only major north-south river route, and almost every port of significance but Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, and Mobile.

The rebel states have been cut in two since Vicksburg in May and June, and even before that were basically throttled; the trans-Missisippi was essentially a nation unto itself, while the rebel states east of the Mississippi are reduced to a crescent along the Gulf and southeastern coasts that function as two separate theaters, the northeast under Lee and the southwest under JE Johnston.

The first question is a) why, when the rebels are obviously on the ropes, would anyone - especially McClellan - agree to anything even approaching the status quo antebellum?

Independence is off the table.

Best,
 
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How does the Confederacy hold 1863-ish lines until late 1864?

And how does McClellan come to win? If Chickamauga has gone horribly wrong and the Vicksburg siege still occurs, even a major defeat of the Union army in the field is not likely to cause the war to shift in and of itself.

Supposing the lines are roughly where they were in mid-1863 and the Confederates win some level of victory with their northern foray at a non-Gettysburg location?

*Confederacy has claims on Delmarva side of Virginia though the Union controls it. Repeat for Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri, and the New Mexico Territory - these will be interesting points for discussion but largely not of enough bargaining power to do much with.

*Oklahoma/Sequoyah/etc. is likely to become a Confederate state, the Union is not going to want to keep a territory full of armed, hostile Native Americans whose own governments had sworn fealty to Richmond and whose one general was the last Confederate officer to surrender.

*West Virginia is likely to be put under a plebiscite given the guerilla activity there and significant Confederate presence even into late 1863 with the Battle of Bulltown. Wheeling is probably gone, but the central and southern parts of the state are likely to remain Confederate, probably reuniting with Virginia though a separate state is not out of the question. Parkersburg and Grafton would be about where I see a boundary forming in this case.

*Without a counteroffensive to take the city or an internal revolt before a final peace negotiation, New Orleans is very likely to become an open city or 'neutral' city-state a la Danzig after World War I. It is distant enough not to be an attractive lure for Union reintegration but a large enough prize to be a massive counterweight at the negotiating table. Bone Key (Now known as Key West) also wanted to join the Union and would probably be allowed to do so as an exclave, possibly taking parts of South Florida with it though as swampland it might be a smaller chip at the negotiating table itself.

*Negotiations will take time under a McClellan administration but a demoralized Union army will have little will to fight if the new guy wins on a peace platform. Fighting will likely peter out though local revolts could put parts of southern and eastern Kentucky back in Confederate hands with the chance of a split of that state being on the table. The Kentucky River and a line due south or along county lines to the Cumberland River would split the state in two and make Frankfort a border town. It would also leave much of the pro-Union population of Louisville their own state of the Union and leave the Shelby Purchase, the one area of Kentucky to send a pro-Confederate congressman to Washington in 1860 despite the boycott of voting that year by pro-Confederate residents, to Richmond.

*Look for the Confederate to be asked to take some of the national debt with them, though they might say 'why'? and use this as counter-leverage. Giving up a few counties in northern Virginia (and perhaps West Virginia) as a buffer to let DC be reasonably able to continue as a national capital might also give them some bargaining power. But overall I expect something about like this: Green for *might* go Confederate, gray likely to stay Confederate, blue for Union states, off blue Union states that might form a Greater California under the wrong circumstances, light blue for Union territories, and orange for Mormon country/modern Utah which might also try to seek its own independence in this case.

Confederate Win 1863-ish.png
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Here are the 1863 lines of control:

Here are the 1863 lines of control:



New Mexico Territory; the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas; much of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi; the length and breadth of the Mississippi River; essentially all of Tennessee; various important enclaves in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina; much of northeastern North Carolina; and essentially the whole of Virginia's coastline (both sides of the Chesapeake) is in US hands, along with all of West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri.

There's no way the US would give that all up.

Best,
 

jahenders

Banned
True. However, they only way for McClellan to be elected and accept peace is if the war in 1863 went considerably worse for the US, perhaps losing Gettysburg, failing to take Vicksburg, and doing poorly elsewhere (perhaps even some UK/French support for the CSA).

McClellan lost, in part, because there were several big positives for the US in 1863. If things stood as they did IOTL and he was still (somehow) elected, he would not have accepted peace because victory was essentially just a matter of time. If the US then took a series of bloody losses, perhaps he might be persuaded, but (at best) it would be a diminished CSA leaving -- losing WV, Kentucky, MO, and KS, parts of Northern VA, perhaps New Orleans, and all claim West of Texas.

Here are the 1863 lines of control:
New Mexico Territory; the Indian Territory north of the Arkansas; much of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi; the length and breadth of the Mississippi River; essentially all of Tennessee; various important enclaves in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina; much of northeastern North Carolina; and essentially the whole of Virginia's coastline (both sides of the Chesapeake) is in US hands, along with all of West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri.

There's no way the US would give that all up.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yes, but for any of that to happen requires

True. However, they only way for McClellan to be elected and accept peace is if the war in 1863 went considerably worse for the US, perhaps losing Gettysburg, failing to take Vicksburg, and doing poorly elsewhere (perhaps even some UK/French support for the CSA).

McClellan lost, in part, because there were several big positives for the US in 1863. If things stood as they did IOTL and he was still (somehow) elected, he would not have accepted peace because victory was essentially just a matter of time. If the US then took a series of bloody losses, perhaps he might be persuaded, but (at best) it would be a diminished CSA leaving -- losing WV, Kentucky, MO, and KS, parts of Northern VA, perhaps New Orleans, and all claim West of Texas.

Yes, but for any of that to happen requires someone other than Lincoln et al, and the policies the Republicans existed for, to be in place...which would seem to have some ripples of its own.;)

Best,
 
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Don't forget, the British had a lot of the US under control in 1783; they still gave it up at the peace table.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Actually, not really; other than NYC and a few coastal

Don't forget, the British had a lot of the US under control in 1783; they still gave it up at the peace table.

Actually, not really; other than NYC and a few other coastal ports (Charleston and Savannah the most important, actually), and some frontier forts and villages (in Maine and some of what became the Old Northwest), that's about it.

They had given up on New England after the retreat from Boston, they had given up on the Mid-Atlantic (outside of Manhattan, essentially) after Saratoga and the withdrawal from Philadelphia, and had given up on the south in the campaign that led to Yorktown.

In contrast, in 1862 the largest city in the rebel states, New Orleans, had fallen; that was followed the same year by Nashville, the largest "Western" city and the second-largest industrial center in the rebel states; Memphis followed the same year, and Knoxville, Vicksburg, Jackson, and Baton Rouge were all in US hands by the summer of 1863.

The trends are substantially different.

Best,
 

jahenders

Banned
I'm not sure I understand your point. I think some of the negative things (doing poorly at Gettysburg, failing to take Vicksburg, etc) could happen even with Lincoln policies in effect -- poor leadership decisions, luck, etc are all that's needed.



Yes, but for any of that to happen requires someone other than Lincoln et al, and the policies the Republicans existed for, to be in place...which would seem to have some ripples of its own.;)

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Okay, but think about those battles and campaigns:

I'm not sure I understand your point. I think some of the negative things (doing poorly at Gettysburg, failing to take Vicksburg, etc) could happen even with Lincoln policies in effect -- poor leadership decisions, luck, etc are all that's needed.

Okay, but think about those battles and campaigns:

Gettysburg - Meade was capable, had a veteran army and some excellent corps commanders, was on the defensive, had superb logistics, and outnumbered his enemy substantially. Lee was capable but extremely overconfident, had one solid corps commander, was on the offensive, had lousy logistics, and was substantially outnumbered by his enemy.

Vicksburg - All of the above, and ... Grant. (Plus the USN) And facing (God help them) Pemberton and JE Johnston.


One of the things worth considering is how many capable army/department/theater commanders the US produced during the war; there were (at least) six who took the absolute best the rebels could throw at them and won through:
  • Grant
  • Sherman
  • Meade
  • Thomas
  • Sheridan
  • Ord
The rebels came up with one, Lee.

Quality can hold off quantity; quantity can overcome quality.

But quality and quantity pretty much trumps everything.

Best,
 

jahenders

Banned
As far as Gettysburg, those are just decisions of the leaders. It arguably wasn't in his nature, but Lee could have decided that the Union position was just too strong and done what Longstreet suggested -- entrench on good ground between the main US force and DC. If he'd done that, Meade might have felt he had little choice but to attack. Even aside from Lee and Meade, numerous subordinate decisions could have affected things -- CSA corps moving faster or slower, US corps likewise, more US forces doing their own thing (Sykes) with disastrous results.

Vicksburg is similar. Grant might have maneuvered less effectively and his opponents more effectively. Johnston and Pemberton could have worked MUCH better together, Grant could have done a bloody assault before the US had a strong advantage etc. At the least, the fall could have been delayed months.

As far as leader, keep in mind how long it took the US to get to those and some of those are somewhat debatable. Also, I think the CSA might reasonably count at last Johnson and Jackson.

Okay, but think about those battles and campaigns:

Gettysburg - Meade was capable, had a veteran army and some excellent corps commanders, was on the defensive, had superb logistics, and outnumbered his enemy substantially. Lee was capable but extremely overconfident, had one solid corps commander, was on the offensive, had lousy logistics, and was substantially outnumbered by his enemy.

Vicksburg - All of the above, and ... Grant. (Plus the USN) And facing (God help them) Pemberton and JE Johnston.


One of the things worth considering is how many capable army/department/theater commanders the US produced during the war; there were (at least) six who took the absolute best the rebels could throw at them and won through:
  • Grant
  • Sherman
  • Meade
  • Thomas
  • Sheridan
  • Ord
The rebels came up with one, Lee.

Quality can hold off quantity; quantity can overcome quality.

But quality and quantity pretty much trumps everything.

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yes and no; in all cases, the decisions the combat commanders made

As far as Gettysburg, those are just decisions of the leaders. It arguably wasn't in his nature, but Lee could have decided that the Union position was just too strong and done what Longstreet suggested -- entrench on good ground between the main US force and DC. If he'd done that, Meade might have felt he had little choice but to attack. Even aside from Lee and Meade, numerous subordinate decisions could have affected things -- CSA corps moving faster or slower, US corps likewise, more US forces doing their own thing (Sykes) with disastrous results.

Vicksburg is similar. Grant might have maneuvered less effectively and his opponents more effectively. Johnston and Pemberton could have worked MUCH better together, Grant could have done a bloody assault before the US had a strong advantage etc. At the least, the fall could have been delayed months.

As far as leader, keep in mind how long it took the US to get to those and some of those are somewhat debatable. Also, I think the CSA might reasonably count at last Johnson and Jackson.

Yes and no; in all cases, the decisions the combat commanders made reflect their experience in the previous years of the war; Lee's overconfidence, for example, or Meade's caution. Likewise, Grant's determination vs. Pemberton's hesitancy and JE Johnston's vacillation.

The command organizations also reflect the lessons each army had drawn; in the West for the Vicksburg campaign, there was one supreme commander - Grant - for the US, who had - literally - more than two years of experience at every-increasing levels of responsibility, including working directly with his principal subordinate, and excellent cooperation with the Navy, and with a very capable staff that had developed and improved since Belmont. Likewise, Grant's forces were concentrated, well led at the corps and divisional level, and had excellent communications.

The rebels were separated under Pemberton and Johnston, neither of whom had the solid and uninterrupted service that Grant had, poor staffs and subordinates, and lousy communications - much less anything approximating a navy.

The same essentially holds true for Meade and the Army of the Potomac in comparison to Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.

As far as the 6 sucessful army commanders to 1 reference, the reality is all six of those listed did not lose a battle at the army level or above to their rebel counterparts; Jackson lost at Kernstown to NP Banks, and never held an independent command after the Valley; and it's unclear which Johnston you are referring to, but AS Johnston lost the only battle he led, and JE Johnston, although fairly capable on the defensive, also lost the only significant army-level offensive he tried to command (Seven Pines).

Even Lee, despite his undeniable brilliance, had his share of failures, on the offensive (Seven Days in the grand tactics sense, and both Antietam and Gettysburg period) and the defensive (West Virginia, Spotsylvania, and the Wilderness, ending with Petersburg and Appomattox.)

Grant never lost a battle, essentially, and certainly never lost a campaign; and the other five - Sherman, Meade, Thomas, Sheridan, and Ord - were all sucessful and (notably) still alive, effective, and in the field at the end of the war. Jackson, of course, was dead, as was AS Johnston.

The rebels really don't compare, in any way, and the huge population differential in favor of the US was reflected across the board in terms of the US war effort, from battlefield commanders to administrative experts to political leaders.

Best,
 
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