What strategical alternative did the west have in 1915-1917?

Disregarding choices at the tactical level of combat doctrine choices, did the wallie really have alternative aside from attrition battles? History and people have been pretty harsh toward high generals, calling them unfit butcher, but finding an alternative strategy is not really obvious IMO.

In 1915, there is no way to stay passive on the western front while the Russian are badly getting mauled and Joffre is kind of forced to launch his bloody offensives on Artois to relieve the pressure for its' Russian ally. Just like Haig is forced to attack at the Somme to relieve the French at Verdun. The only outright unreasonable operation would be the Nivelle + Kerensky offensive in 1917. Aside from operational considerations, at this point the American have entered the war and it’s pretty clear at this point that the Russian army and whole politico-economical system is on the verge of collapse, they just have to hold on to win the war.



In OTL, in 1915, to end this gridlock, Churchill is suggesting Gallipoli which ended in a disaster. In hindsight Lord Kitchener's plan to land in Alexandretta was the right option, but it certainly was not an obvious choice since it would only cause the fall of the Ottoman on the long run as opposed to restore connection with Russia, neutrality of Bulgaria and immediate capitulation of the Ottomans. The other major attempt to get off the western stalemate was the camp of Salonica which had mixed results as the axis was able to fix the Entente’s armies with inferior forces until 1918, that the camp absorbed considerable logistical resource, and suffered more from Malaria than actual fighting.



Personally, I can see the following options which all sound more or less terrible:

- Operation in Norway and Low Countries to accentuate the blockade, and second case attempt a pinch operation on the German, but this is a very dangerous move, not only military but politically as it could have pushed more neutral in the opposite camp and America may even stayed neutral. Certainly terrible options.

- Instead of Salonika, combined operation and landing in Adriatic to pressure Austria-Hungary, which is way weaker than Germany but also indispensable to the central empire. I am not sure of how realistic it would be.



On the political spectrum:

- Helping Russia, how much economical help did the West help them? Sending help surely would have been possible from Vladivostok (not sure about the Persian Corridor), a shell on the eastern front is surely more useful than another one among the million used in the Somme.

- Seeking help from Bulgaria instead of Greece which didn’t even share land border with the Ottomans, but there is almost nothing to promise aside from limited gain in Thracia…
 
Main focus on the western Front

No distractions on 2nd fronts etc that absorbed so many Entente troops ie Gallipoli etc

Defeat Germany and the other CPs cannot stand!
 
Main focus on the western Front

No distractions on 2nd fronts etc that absorbed so many Entente troops ie Gallipoli etc

Defeat Germany and the other CPs cannot stand!
Would the number of troops (and especially shells) at Galipoli actually do anything on the western front once it settled down?

I'm not sure that you can win the western front without far more shells, new technology (tanks etc) or even better tactics?

Why not just do Gallipoli right without sending a fleet early to warn that you are coming?
 
Land in Montenegro & Albania and link up with the Serbs.
Promise Italy & Romania whatever they want to hear in order to get them to join.
 
The middle east is likely to blow up at some point. It is likely to end up a man power drain anyway.

In my misinformed youth I always assumed the Germans turtled up while the Entente banked their heads against the trenches. Obviously that isn't the case but it would be interesting to try and get the Entente to act more defensively to give the blockade time to do its job.

If I had to pick one quick and easy change I would suggest an Entente central command much earlier.
 
Would the number of troops (and especially shells) at Galipoli actually do anything on the western front once it settled down?

I'm not sure that you can win the western front without far more shells, new technology (tanks etc) or even better tactics?

Why not just do Gallipoli right without sending a fleet early to warn that you are coming?

I basically apply the idea from Gordon Corrigans 'Mud Blood and Poppycock' where he decrys the wasteful 'other campaigns' - there were times on the Western front when British Divisions had to be reduced to cadre to provide enough troops for the rest of the army and yet there were many 100,000s of troops mincing around other parts of the world fighting in other campaigns.

Beat Germany - win the war.

For example.

Gallipoli - 489,000 troops - the majority British for most of 1915

Balkans - from 1916 there was 6 British and 6 French Divisions till the end of the war absorbing 300,000 French and 400,000 British troops

Mesopotamian campaign - went on for 4 years and at its peak had nearly half Million soldiers - mainly British Commonwealth.

As you can see - had a portion of those troops been present on the Western Front then they are very likely to have made a difference

Basically Britain and France don't spread themselves as thin as they did.

Beat Germany - win the war.
 
Hmmmm.

Or they would find another way to feed them to the machine guns.

I have really mixed feeling about concentrating on Germany. The traditional UK way of war was to finish all the peripheral campaigns before concentrating on the primary target. It provides a training ground and gives time for the UK's financial muscle to work. And those peripheral campaigns have a tendency to become major running sores unless dealt with early.

In the case of the Gallipoli/Mesopotamian campaign I don't see how it can be avoided. Even if the Turks don't join the war they are going to threaten to and have to be countered. If you don't places like Suez become targets and that isn't allowable.


The way I look at it with 100% hindsight there are certain unavoidables.
The Turks have to be shadowed.
When the western front bogs down the Germans are going to try and break it. So Verdun or something similar is unavoidable. How can the French be assisted without a Somme type response?
How the heck do you help the Russians?
 
Gallipoli (and I am not going to encourage the thread to become a 'Gallipoli' digression/take-over) was strategically sound backed up by pre WW1 examples of Ottoman climb downs when Constantinople was actually threatened. It was tactically exceedingly badly handled but the concept was sound.

What was actually threatened by the Ottomans? Egypt certainly but otherwise was there any real threat other than to the Russians? Surely the Ottomans could be contained by support to the Russians and a stout Egyptian defence?
 

I don't think anyone is arguing Salonika, Galipoli, Palestine and Mesopotamia couldn't have been handled much, much better.

However, it's not like those men weren't doing anything. For instance, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian pressure on the Russians would have increased dramatically without them.

When Serbia was overrun, the Allies lost 225k men, as well as the 60k/year reinforcements they were getting as young Serbs reached the age of conscription. Given that Austria-Hungary was in a 3-front war at this time, managing to keep Serbia from falling would have had a much bigger impact on the war than throwing an extra 100k men into the Somme meatgrinder
 
Not to be a naive hippy but maybe somebody could have tried negotiating peace?
:extremelyhappy: But on what terms would both sides actually be willing to agree?

Simply a return to pre war borders is massively advantageous to the entente as they get back large parts of Northern France and Belgium, what's going to make Germany give up its main advantage it holds so far?
 
:extremelyhappy: But on what terms would both sides actually be willing to agree?

Simply a return to pre war borders is massively advantageous to the entente as they get back large parts of Northern France and Belgium, what's going to make Germany give up its main advantage it holds so far?
Not fighting a war.
 
I basically apply the idea from Gordon Corrigans 'Mud Blood and Poppycock' where he decrys the wasteful 'other campaigns' - there were times on the Western front when British Divisions had to be reduced to cadre to provide enough troops for the rest of the army and yet there were many 100,000s of troops mincing around other parts of the world fighting in other campaigns.

Beat Germany - win the war.

For example.

Gallipoli - 489,000 troops - the majority British for most of 1915

Balkans - from 1916 there was 6 British and 6 French Divisions till the end of the war absorbing 300,000 French and 400,000 British troops

Mesopotamian campaign - went on for 4 years and at its peak had nearly half Million soldiers - mainly British Commonwealth.

As you can see - had a portion of those troops been present on the Western Front then they are very likely to have made a difference

Basically Britain and France don't spread themselves as thin as they did.

Beat Germany - win the war.

Sure but how do you beat Germany? Can't just bash through the trenches with more men. Land in Hamburg or something?
 
Basically Britain and France don't spread themselves as thin as they did.

Beat Germany - win the war.

Problem is that if you are gonna put the extra men on the western front you need to put the extra equipment there too. A lot of the campaigns you reference are campaigns of the Indian army which didnt have the same artillery as the British army. A light division is acceptable in the middle East but not in the western front.

The logic in British decision making was distract someone from attacking the Russians free the Russians up as they are facing the Germans the Austrians and the Ottomans. Eventually Russia collapsed. Would they have collapsed a year earlier if Greece and Romania never entered the war or the Ottomans could focus on them fully.

Greece and Romania wouldn't have entered the war if there wasnt British and French forces in the balkans.

I strongly suspect if there was more troops on the western front they would have been thrown away in a Somme (or similar) that lasts another couple of days.

They spread themselves thinly for a reason. Trench warfare was an easy way to throw lives away for no benefit. They couldn't just turtle up and defend without leaving Russia exposed.
Land in Hamburg or something?
Minefields mean a near peer opponent can defend.
 
So what can be done to help Russia? I mean there is the usual beef up Murmansk or some such, but by the time a delivered rifle gets from the port to the front line the poor soldier is lucky to get a slightly used stock for firewood.
 
So what can be done to help Russia? I mean there is the usual beef up Murmansk or some such, but by the time a delivered rifle gets from the port to the front line the poor soldier is lucky to get a slightly used stock for firewood.
Imo any real help that's not combat related has to be a prewar investment in rail from Murmansk or the transiberian. Doing it during the war is too late.

Combat related you have to distract the enemy so you commit troops. Whether that's a constant offensive on the western front attacks in the balkans or mesopotania is upto you. We saw both historically at different times and neither was a massive success.

The other option is of course a diplomatic success (earlier Greek entry, earlier Romanian entry, earlier Italian entry, later Ottoman entry) etc.

Ive been looking at the Balkan wars recently and Ive been wondering if the Entente could have lucked out in some way there. Perhaps the Balkan powers could have kept together as a league and joined the allied side enmasse or an early ceasefire to the balkan portion of second balkan war could have seen an extension to the Ottoman vs Bulgarian portion of the conflict. Obviously Ottoman and Bulgarian troops killing each other would in hindsight be a massive entente win.
 

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Would it be possible to land some form of Allied Expeditionary Force in Russia? Rather than sending troops to Salonica, Gallipoli or the Middle East, having better trained and equipped soldiers on the eastern front as a reliable core to build around may be more useful in the long run. It might have the advantage of stopping some of the rot in the Russian Army as well as to help keep the pressure on the Germans better.
 
WRT trying to force the Dardanelles - I was under the impression there were whole lot of Russian merchant ships filled with goods that they could not export because they were stuck in the Black Sea. Is this true and would the economic benefits to Russia from forcing the Dardanelles be enough to alleviate the pressure that was on the regime to the point where the perhaps the downfall of Imperial Russia is avoided? I've heard this argument put forward but I do not know if there is serious analysis behind it or if it just sounds nice.

However, if this is true, then that campaign was worthwhile from a standpoint of strategy and it's a crying shame it did not work out.
 
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