what next in Buenos Aires after 1807 British victory there?

British Buenos Aires from July 1807 - independence/protectorate or colony?


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Given that the new British government that came to power in March-April 1807 was interested even more in just economic power than military/political power for South America (decided upon by Castlereagh's Memorandum of May 1807), though perhaps it could have changed its mind with a capture of Buenos Aires by the British in July of that year, here's a major question with regard to the immediate outcome of British success in 1807:

Would Buenos Aires have gotten independence either in 1807 or certainly by 1810 with British help (in which case the Banda Oriental might - but just might - split off and become a separate British colony*), or would Buenos Aires (and thus the River Plate as a whole) have been reduced to a British colony?

*due to the relative ease of administering Montevideo compared to BA because of smaller population (despite threats in the countryside posed by such people as José Gervasio Artigas), British garrisons already being located over much of the Uruguayan coast by mid-1807, as well as the rivalry between Buenos Aires and Montevideo
 
I think the Rio de la Plata was already too developed to reduce it to a colony. Plus, independence-minded Creoles who shook off Spanish rule only three years later wouldn't want to belong to a foreign government that would grant them even less privileges.
 
I reckon you have to look at the backlash from this to the Peninsular War; yes, at that precise point Britain and Spain were enemies. In a little while, though, strategically speaking, the French will make their ill advised attempt to reduce metropolitan Spain to a protectorate.

In this time line, the Latin Americans fought off the British, the French attacked the Spanish, sides were duly changed, and the Peninsular War became the bleeding ulcer that helped bring the French Empire down.

How does that change if, prior to Cintra, Britain holds large amounts of the former Spanish colonial empire? I can't help thinking that it is going to make the Peninsula much more awkward, if nothing else- reduce the amount of cooperation, mean the regular British and guerilla Spanish are not going to support each other nearly as effectively-

well, what do the British do now that their newest colonial possession suddenly belongs to one of their allies again? Hand it back? Retain it, and risk the friction and bad blood involved?
 
How does that change if, prior to Cintra, Britain holds large amounts of the former Spanish colonial empire? I can't help thinking that it is going to make the Peninsula much more awkward, if nothing else- reduce the amount of cooperation, mean the regular British and guerilla Spanish are not going to support each other nearly as effectively-

well, what do the British do now that their newest colonial possession suddenly belongs to one of their allies again? Hand it back? Retain it, and risk the friction and bad blood involved?

If the British hand back either Buenos Aires to Montevideo back to the Spaniards, I think it would be Buenos Aires, simply because more military resources would be required for the British to set up garrison in as populated a city as Buenos Aires was already at the time. After all, it was at least partly the balance of power doctrine that led Britain, in 1763, to keep Quebec but give back Martinique (both captured from the French a few years before); that led Britain, in 1803, to keep Ceylon and give back the Cape (both captured by the Dutch several years beforehand); and that led Britain, in 1815, to keep the Cape and Guyana but give back Java, Suriname, and Curacao (all captured from the Dutch in the decade up to that). Even so, the Spanish Empire was quite weak at that time, and its mainland possessions in the Americas were just a few years away from independence anyway, so it's possible that we could talk about handing over Buenos Aires directly to ... independence forces (under British protection). One other thing to understand is that Britain gave back to France, the Netherlands, etc. those possessions which Britain didn't deem valuable enough, whereas the Plate region (or a good portion thereof) would have been too valuable for the British to completely let go.
 
As CViking said, and as I said last time you asked, Britain has a sticky situation on their hands when Spain becomes an ally within a year. Britain gives BA back, they give Montevideo back, and extort trade privileges for doing so . the colonials are probably going to rebel against British rule in the meantime, and probably rebel against Spain not too long after. I think OTL events have shown that any hopes of forming a colony/protectorate are pipe dreams.

to have a fair poll you need a wider range of options.
 
As CViking said, and as I said last time you asked, Britain has a sticky situation on their hands when Spain becomes an ally within a year. Britain gives BA back, they give Montevideo back, and extort trade privileges for doing so . the colonials are probably going to rebel against British rule in the meantime, and probably rebel against Spain not too long after. I think OTL events have shown that any hopes of forming a colony/protectorate are pipe dreams.

Ok, but how would the balance-of-power concept not apply in this case where it did apply to French and Dutch territories that the British captured, as I explained before? Is it just because BA and Montevideo were *both* in one *single* Spanish colony, the Viceroyalty of La Plata, or is it more than that?

If Britain gives BA back but keeps Montevideo, so the British extort trade privileges in BA for doing so, and Montevideo gets to be the regional administrative headquarters of the informal British empire in South America. Just like Britain obtained Hong Kong within China (another area of informal economic empires of countries like Britain), why not Montevideo/Uruguay for Latin America?! And, as you yourself said earlier, the greatest chances - relatively speaking - for a long-term British colony in southern South America would have been Uruguay. I'm sure there will be less bad blood between now-allies if one place is given back but the other is kept, than if both places are kept.

And when the colonials do rebel against British rule, I'm sure the British will beat them back a majority of the time, provided that the British have competent commanding officers.
 
As CViking said, and as I said last time you asked, Britain has a sticky situation on their hands when Spain becomes an ally within a year. Britain gives BA back, they give Montevideo back, and extort trade privileges for doing so . the colonials are probably going to rebel against British rule in the meantime, and probably rebel against Spain not too long after. I think OTL events have shown that any hopes of forming a colony/protectorate are pipe dreams.

Seems to me that in your opinion, a more proper analogy for BA/Montevideo than Quebec in 1759, the Cape in 1806, etc. would be Havana and Manila in 1762-63 or Porto Bello in 1739 (especially if both BA and Montevideo are given back to the Spanish in 1808 or so)?
 
argument against giving Buenos Aires back to the Spanish in 1808

CViking and unprincipled peter, you might be right. But on the other hand, the British Empire was so much stronger at the time than the Spanish Empire, and the Plate region would have been very important and valuable one way or another for the British (whether British-assisted independence, British colony, or a patchwork of the two, or in between). So much so as to be reluctant to give those up. The British perhaps would have been afraid, even with the Spanish becoming allies in 1808, that were they to return the captured territories to the Spanish, the weapons might end up in the hands of the French (who were now occupying Spain itself)* - cf. weapons that the US left behind in Iraq with good intentions (for the weak Iraqi army) that ultimately ended up in the hands of ISIS.

*The French were also fighting overseas at that point, as in St.-Domingue, for example, and thus the British perhaps would have been afraid that the French might end up fighting in the River Plate too.
 
the least of anyone's worries (directly) in la plata is France. they have no navy. Britain rules the seas. And Portugal is now in Brazil and their navy can easily prevent France from getting there. If France, by some miracle can get to la plata, Britain jumps for joy, because now French forces are bogged down, wasting resources there, too.

somewhat about this time, British/Portuguese forces are taking over French Guiana, in part because France couldn't give any assistance. Guiana was given back to France in the congress of Vienna. Should France somehow get to la plata, between Portugal, Britain, and the Spanish forces, they would quickly find themselves in serious trouble.

Havana/Manilla is completely different. For starters, they were exchanged for Florida (and I believe at the time of the peace treaty, Britain was unaware that Manilla had fallen). Spain was an enemy at the end, rather than an ally, and the exchange was part of the peace negotiation. BA/M would be keeping the colony of an ally.

I get that you desperately want Britain to have a colony in the region. It's not going to be easy (I think almost undoable), and there's no reason to. Britain can get a trade foothold in the area far easier, either by extorting it from Spain (most likely) or doing what they did OTL throughout south america after the war: backing the rebels. there's no strategic reason to establish a presence, as there was in south africa.
 
I get that you desperately want Britain to have a colony in the region. It's not going to be easy (I think almost undoable), and there's no reason to. Britain can get a trade foothold in the area far easier, either by extorting it from Spain (most likely) or doing what they did OTL throughout south america after the war: backing the rebels. there's no strategic reason to establish a presence, as there was in south africa.

Britain got trade footholds in India, Malaya, and parts of West Africa in the 17th and 18th centuries, and those ultimately led to British colonies in the 19th century.

As for a strategic reason, in the age of sailing ships, the River Plate was on the way to (but not from) India, and with a colonial foothold in South America, the South Atlantic would have been even more of a British pond than OTL, with its powerful Royal Navy. And abundant riches in South America, and somewhat later on incredibly fertile soils as well, never hurt either in increasing the value of all or part of the River Plate for the British.
 
I should clarify in terms of the strategic need(s) which would be reason enough for the British to at least want to hold onto what it would have grabbed in the River Plate in 1807. And after all, whatever a power such as Britain captures, it is human nature for that power to want to retain it, so long as there's at least some strategic value. Here, I think we really have to distinguish Buenos Aires (city and province) and Montevideo/Banda Oriental. Buenos Aires, at that time, would have had much more mercantile than strategic value for the British, while Montevideo would have had more strategic than even mercantile value. While the River Plate as a whole, in sailing ship terms, is located on the way to India (albeit not from India), Montevideo is located closer to the open Atlantic, a key British Empire waterway, than Buenos Aires is. Just as importantly, the British would have acquired the all-important naval base in Montevideo from the Spanish for the longer term. Moreover, the Banda Oriental was more of a frontier area than the Buenos Aires region and less colonized already; thus, the colonial elite, the Catholic Church, etc. were less entrenched in Montevideo than in Buenos Aires, let alone Lima or Mexico City. Not to mention that, as I said before, Montevideo had a much smaller population than Buenos Aires, and thus more ease of control at lower cost. All of this is ammunition for the British to keep the Banda Oriental no matter what (either as a colony or, at the very least, as a protectorate), but to dispense with Buenos Aires in the form of directly giving its citizens independence or handing it back to the Spaniards in 1808. How does that sound?

When you guys talk about giving the River Plate back to Spain in 1808, do you mean if the British keep the River Plate as a possession right up until then? Because if the River Plate (and especially Buenos Aires) becomes independent with British assistance in late 1807 or early 1808 (before the Napoleonic invasion of Spain), then all talk of giving the River Plate back to the Spaniards becomes moot.
 
it's shorter to Cape town from London than it is to Buenos Aires.

BA is sort of on the way to India, but by no stretch of the imagination is it strategic for getting there. anyhow, after 1808, Britain has extorted port rights for Rio de Janeiro and I believe one or two ports of Northern Brazil which are far handier for getting to India.

(edit) Montevideo is a better port than Buenos Aires, but overall, it's not really much of a port, as ports go. It's limited in size.

If Britain really wants a port/colony in that time period, they should just go a hair further south to Bahia Blanca. The port is superior, and you still have access to the fertile pampas, and the mineral riches are greater (although they wouldn't have known that at the time). The locals there are the Indians, and they're formidable, but you have limited European resistance. destroy the Indians that won't accept you, and use the others to harass the Spanish in BA territory.
 
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one more strategic item about Banda Oriental

I forgot to say one more argument in favour of the Banda Oriental (relative to BA) for the British. That is that a British colony or protectorate there would have served as a buffer between Buenos Aires/Argentina (esp. if given back to the Spaniards or if it becomes independent) and the Portuguese/Brazil, just like OTL Uruguay was set up as an independent country in 1828 as a buffer between Argentina and Brazil.
 
it's shorter to Cape town from London than it is to Buenos Aires.

Except that Africa bulges out to the west in a way that makes distances by boat from London about the same to Buenos Aires as to Cape Town. Just look at a map.

If Britain really wants a port/colony in that time period, they should just go a hair further south to Bahia Blanca. The port is superior, and you still have access to the fertile pampas, and the mineral riches are greater (although they wouldn't have known that at the time).

The agricultural (and mineral) potential of the general Bahia Blanca region was known much later than that of the River Plate.
 
I looked up sailing distances before I posted. it's shorter to Cape Town.

BA is NOT a stop off point on the way to India. It's not horribly out of the way, but it's still out of the way.

the fertility of the pampas was not known for quite a while. It was cattle country. Yes, it was known that it was good, but I don't think anyone knew at that time that is was kick ass good. Bahia blanca was dang good, too.
 
I looked up sailing distances before I posted. it's shorter to Cape Town.

According to an atlas that I have which shows shipping distances between certain places, Southampton (England) to Montevideo is 6007 miles, while Southampton to Cape Town is 5947 miles - in relative terms, almost exactly the same distance. The routes are also pretty much exactly the same until around Senegal and the Cape Verde Islands (the westernmost part of Africa - considerably to the west of England longitudinally), and only afterwards does one fork to the southeast to get to the Cape, and to the southwest to get to the Plate.
 
I should clarify in terms of the strategic need(s) which would be reason enough for the British to at least want to hold onto what it would have grabbed in the River Plate in 1807. And after all, whatever a power such as Britain captures, it is human nature for that power to want to retain it, so long as there's at least some strategic value. Here, I think we really have to distinguish Buenos Aires (city and province) and Montevideo/Banda Oriental. Buenos Aires, at that time, would have had much more mercantile than strategic value for the British, while Montevideo would have had more strategic than even mercantile value. While the River Plate as a whole, in sailing ship terms, is located on the way to India (albeit not from India), Montevideo is located closer to the open Atlantic, a key British Empire waterway, than Buenos Aires is. Just as importantly, the British would have acquired the all-important naval base in Montevideo from the Spanish for the longer term. Moreover, the Banda Oriental was more of a frontier area than the Buenos Aires region and less colonized already; thus, the colonial elite, the Catholic Church, etc. were less entrenched in Montevideo than in Buenos Aires, let alone Lima or Mexico City. Not to mention that, as I said before, Montevideo had a much smaller population than Buenos Aires, and thus more ease of control at lower cost. All of this is ammunition for the British to keep the Banda Oriental no matter what (either as a colony or, at the very least, as a protectorate), but to dispense with Buenos Aires in the form of directly giving its citizens independence or handing it back to the Spaniards in 1808.

I forgot to say one more argument in favour of the Banda Oriental (relative to BA) for the British. That is that a British colony or protectorate there would have served as a buffer between Buenos Aires/Argentina (esp. if given back to the Spaniards or if it becomes independent) and the Portuguese/Brazil, just like OTL Uruguay was set up as an independent country in 1828 as a buffer between Argentina and Brazil.

If none of those arguments regarding the Banda Oriental work by themselves, they surely might work for the British when put together.
 
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