What Napoleon could do

I was thinking more from a political and logistical dimension, as since the rifle resources are limited and need a better underlying logistics system I'd imagine there would be cautious minds pushing them towards the more stable/secure units. As for how they'd be used, I can't say I'm sure.

It seems that a general pattern of the continental armies (at least Russian, Austrian and Prussian after reform) was to have a minimal number of rifles distributed to the Jager-style units (but even then not to the whole units; not sure about the Prussian case but in 1808 they had only 2 jager battalions). As far as I could dig out, Nappy did not use them even to this degree but @dandan_noodles wrote that some of the existing ones had been retained (I asked him for a source).

In other words, they did not play any significant role and just had been more expensive than the muskets while not providing any serious advantage. So why would Nappy bother?
 
It seems that a general pattern of the continental armies (at least Russian, Austrian and Prussian after reform) was to have a minimal number of rifles distributed to the Jager-style units (but even then not to the whole units; not sure about the Prussian case but in 1808 they had only 2 jager battalions). As far as I could dig out, Nappy did not use them even to this degree but @dandan_noodles wrote that some of the existing ones had been retained (I asked him for a source).

In other words, they did not play any significant role and just had been more expensive than the muskets while not providing any serious advantage. So why would Nappy bother?

I agree he probably wouldn't. But I was responding to a post talking about who would get the rifles if they did happen to be adopted, in which case I assert they'd probably be granted as status/intimidation symbols to his most Elite units.
 
I agree he probably wouldn't. But I was responding to a post talking about who would get the rifles if they did happen to be adopted, in which case I assert they'd probably be granted as status/intimidation symbols to his most Elite units.

I see your logic but usually they were given to the jager units (the whole or to the best shooters) because they were expected to do most of the aimed shooting.
 
I see your logic but usually they were given to the jager units (the whole or to the best shooters) because they were expected to do most of the aimed shooting.

I can certainly see that, and in retrospect you're probably right. I was trying to extrapolate the general Napoleonic disemphasis on the role of skimishers relative to concentration of fire/forces and marching speed (The whole central position doctrine) outwards, but it occurs to me that if France actually did have reliable production of longer range rifles that might result in "Light" troops getting a more prominent role
 
I can certainly see that, and in retrospect you're probably right. I was trying to extrapolate the general Napoleonic disemphasis on the role of skimishers relative to concentration of fire/forces and marching speed (The whole central position doctrine) outwards, but it occurs to me that if France actually did have reliable production of longer range rifles that might result in "Light" troops getting a more prominent role

That's quite possible but no matter what the muzzle-loaded rifle had a lower rate of fire than conventional musket and the lack of precision was presumably compensated by a general volume of fire in which artillery fire was a very important component especially taking into an account Napoleon's ability to organize concentration of artillery in the critical points. Anyway, the rest of the continental armies of his time, even the Austrians, did not have too much in the terms of the rifle-armed light troops.
 
That's quite possible but no matter what the muzzle-loaded rifle had a lower rate of fire than conventional musket and the lack of precision was presumably compensated by a general volume of fire in which artillery fire was a very important component especially taking into an account Napoleon's ability to organize concentration of artillery in the critical points. Anyway, the rest of the continental armies of his time, even the Austrians, did not have too much in the terms of the rifle-armed light troops.

Yah, to be fair it makes alot of sense. Loosely formed troops are highly vulnerable to cavalry attacks, especially since we're in an era where the Pike has been essentially phased out, meaning your infantry's best defense was tight formations where they could support each other with bayonets (and moral support to keep from breaking) and the sheer mass could bog down the force of a charge. One of the reasons why getting concentration of fire and especially artillery was so effective: packed troops make for much easier targets.

One thing Napoleon could have done, on that account, was try to find some way to up the contingents of artillery. If he could find some way to get a more steady supply of bronze, cannonballs aren't that difficult to produce and crews can be trained and compitent officers can probably be trained up with minimal fuss. As they get dripped in while the general quality of the infantry starts dropping (in terms of training and marching speed), it'd help keep up a firepower advantage and feed into the establishment of a better logistics system rather than the impromptu depot setup that would, over time, ease up the rate of attrition and spending of 30,000 lives a month that something actually sustainable. The trick is laying down a solid foundation of specialized production facilities and locating suitabily ballistics-inclined candidate for officers. Perhaps tapping into some of the shorelined naval officers?
 
Better boots. Better tested cold weather clothing. Increased field ration infrastructure. Safer water. Wider wheels on the wagons. More mules. Rifled flintlock muskets shooting Minie (sp) Balls Adjustable sights on the rifled muskets. And of course more artillery.
 
Not quite correct picture. The tendency did start during the Revolutionary Wars just because the bulk of the French armies were ill-trained volunteers. By the Napoleonic times the bulk of the foot was line infantry acting in the battalion formations (not forming a single line as in XVIII). When closing with the enemy the battalions would either attack in a column or spread into a linear formation, usually 3 ranks deep. In Prussia and Austria the 3rd rankers were extensivelly used as skirmishers and often were detached from their companies. Until 1807 in Russia all jager regiments were formed on 2 ranks. In October 1813, to compensate for the heavy losses, Napoleon issued an order " ... Emperor orders the entire infantry of the army to form up in 2 ranks instead of 3, in that his Majesty regarded that the fire and the bayonet of the 3rd rank useless." Needless to say that the linear infantry was firing by the salvos.
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As for Nappy and the rifles see, for example, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Napoleonic_weaponry_and_warfare#Firearms I did not find any reference to the rifles being used in his army but would be interested to see a link or quotation confirming what you wrote. However, even within framework of what you are saying, the rifles (if existed) were too few to play any significant role in his warfare. This pattern was not unique:
In Russia between 1803 and 1812 the factories in Toula (Tula) issued 20,000 rifles but in June 1808 the rifle was withdrawn and used only by NCOs and 12 marksmen in each jager company.
In Austria the jägers in the 1st and 2nd rank were armed with short muskets, while those in 3rd rank with rifles. The NCOs also carried rifles.
In Prussia (after reform) the jager battalions (2 or 3 of them) had rifles including the hunting rifles.

BTW, I was asking about Napoleon within the OTL/close to OTL framework, not in a seriously different history but even in OTL he was not fighting the major wars without an interruption so his rejection of the rifles was not done out of a desperation.

Quoth John Elting in Swords Around A Throne,
"The French Army was full of good soldiers who were too short to gain elite status as grenadiers, however much they might deserve it. It is quite possible that in his youth their Emperor had experienced some of the routine railleries tossed at short soldiers. His specifications for voltigeurs called for strong, active men, able to march at the trot and to vault up behind a cavalryman. No enlisted man was to be taller than 4 feet, 11 inches (French); officers could have an inch more. They were to be especially trained to shoot rapidly and very accurately, and their companies were to be kept constantly at war strength. Their distinction was a chamois-colored collar, and they would rank next after the grenadiers. Their officers and NCOs were issued special rifled carbines [...] it was decided that the 3d Company of each infantry battalion would become its voltigeur company."
So yes, there were a good many rifles in the French army, with every infantry battalion having a few.

Moreover, the French were very good at delivering well aimed fire even with smoothbores; "But at Albuera in 1811, French snipers picked off the British field officers; there was no cover, but they crawled forward and fired from a prone position, using their shakos as rests for their muskets."

"Once the fire fight began, most French generals preferred to let their front line take open order and fight as a heavy skirmish line, using all available cover and firing at will rather than keep them standing in stiff ranks."

In the Second Coalition, Berthier's instructions prioritized aimed fire over rapidity, saying that new recruits should "fire a few rounds so that they would know which eye to use in aiming, and how to load their muskets."

Aimed fire was central to the French tactical system; in 1792, when troops quality was the worst it had been in decades, all soldiers were taught to take aim as a matter of routine training. Target practice was a constant feature of French training. Seasoned commanders taught men even correct trigger technique. Victor and Augereau in 1812 demanded 50 cartridges per man for adequate practice, and even during the desperation of the Hundred Days Davout was able to get 20 rounds per man so they could be taught aimed fire. Their man sized targets were between 100 and 400 yards, with prizes being awarded to the winners. Men even used up their campaign load of powder and shot practicing against improvised targets, such as fountains while in bivouac.
 
Yah, to be fair it makes alot of sense. Loosely formed troops are highly vulnerable to cavalry attacks, especially since we're in an era where the Pike has been essentially phased out, meaning your infantry's best defense was tight formations where they could support each other with bayonets (and moral support to keep from breaking) and the sheer mass could bog down the force of a charge. One of the reasons why getting concentration of fire and especially artillery was so effective: packed troops make for much easier targets.

One thing Napoleon could have done, on that account, was try to find some way to up the contingents of artillery. If he could find some way to get a more steady supply of bronze, cannonballs aren't that difficult to produce and crews can be trained and compitent officers can probably be trained up with minimal fuss. As they get dripped in while the general quality of the infantry starts dropping (in terms of training and marching speed), it'd help keep up a firepower advantage and feed into the establishment of a better logistics system rather than the impromptu depot setup that would, over time, ease up the rate of attrition and spending of 30,000 lives a month that something actually sustainable. The trick is laying down a solid foundation of specialized production facilities and locating suitabily ballistics-inclined candidate for officers. Perhaps tapping into some of the shorelined naval officers?
As I said something like his nephew’s 12 pounder field howitzer (basically universal gun) would be quite handy.
 
Better boots. Better tested cold weather clothing. Increased field ration infrastructure. Safer water. Wider wheels on the wagons. More mules. Rifled flintlock muskets shooting Minie (sp) Balls Adjustable sights on the rifled muskets. And of course more artillery.
Better shoes are good. Less cumbersome uniforms would be good as well and a warmer winter clothing too. I’d say that the whole supply/logistic/medical system could be noticeably improved.

Rifles were expensive to produce and slower to reload.
 
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