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This question is usually trumped by the question of his degree of influence or responsibility. We need not evade the influence question entirely, but I'd rather focus on what he wanted to happen or thought would be best from a policy perspective.

I have only a limited window into his views, but perhaps together we can open that window more (this is not a school homework assignment!:cool:).

My main source on his strategic preferences comes from the writings of Edward Dreyer, specifically in his book "China at War, 1901-1949"

A few times in the book, Hirohito is pointed out as being an initial skeptic of fullscale war with China, asking "hard questions" about it early on, while not pressing hard to stop it, and later reminding military authorities of their excessively optimistic predictions of how long the China war would last.
However, Dreyer suggests that this was not just posturing for the diarists or historians but also reflected a strategic preference to avoid an open-ended war on the Asian mainland so that Japan would not detract resources from its air and naval build-up to compete with the western powers.

So, this doesn't prove that he actively favored war with the west, but it does seem to show his objections such as they were to the China war were not based on a general distaste or fear of army and navy programs but rather an objection to the Army's emphasis.

Does this track with anything else you've read? (Dreyer's work is sparsely footnoted).

Herbert Bix's biography of Hirohito, which I have not completed yet, has Hirohito most definitely favoring an intensification of Emperor-worship and having everything done in his name. Meanwhile, in the parts up the the mid-1930s I've read he's mostly reactive to military moves, but always inclined to cover up or sweep under the rug rather than confront unauthorized Army actions that he or the civilian government objected to earlier. Does that track with most of what you've seen?
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