What is your understanding of Hirohito's strategic & political preferences pre-1945?

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Monthly Donor
This question is usually trumped by the question of his degree of influence or responsibility. We need not evade the influence question entirely, but I'd rather focus on what he wanted to happen or thought would be best from a policy perspective.

I have only a limited window into his views, but perhaps together we can open that window more (this is not a school homework assignment!:cool:).

My main source on his strategic preferences comes from the writings of Edward Dreyer, specifically in his book "China at War, 1901-1949"

A few times in the book, Hirohito is pointed out as being an initial skeptic of fullscale war with China, asking "hard questions" about it early on, while not pressing hard to stop it, and later reminding military authorities of their excessively optimistic predictions of how long the China war would last.
However, Dreyer suggests that this was not just posturing for the diarists or historians but also reflected a strategic preference to avoid an open-ended war on the Asian mainland so that Japan would not detract resources from its air and naval build-up to compete with the western powers.

So, this doesn't prove that he actively favored war with the west, but it does seem to show his objections such as they were to the China war were not based on a general distaste or fear of army and navy programs but rather an objection to the Army's emphasis.

Does this track with anything else you've read? (Dreyer's work is sparsely footnoted).

Herbert Bix's biography of Hirohito, which I have not completed yet, has Hirohito most definitely favoring an intensification of Emperor-worship and having everything done in his name. Meanwhile, in the parts up the the mid-1930s I've read he's mostly reactive to military moves, but always inclined to cover up or sweep under the rug rather than confront unauthorized Army actions that he or the civilian government objected to earlier. Does that track with most of what you've seen?
 

B-29_Bomber

Banned
The Japanese Emperor pre-1945 was as much a figurehead as he is now, except he had the added benefit of being considered a God, which is nice.

What he wanted was largely irrelevant in the grand scheme of things.
 
He did have more influence then just a mere figurehead, but there were limits. His priorities, however, were clearly oriented towards self-preservation, preservation of his title, and the preservation of Japan (in that order). He also had a front row seat to the destruction of dynasties throughout Eurasia and the infighting that characterized the rise of militarists during the late-20s and early-30s. Had he tried to move against the militarists in the 30s or tried to surrender any earlier then he did OTL he probably would have been couped or assassinated (like he almost was during the Kyujo incident anyways) and he knew it.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
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Monthly Donor
He did have more influence then just a mere figurehead,

See that's the thing- He seems to have felt it contrary to his own self-interest to say, "let's not have a war in China" or "let's limit spending on the Army and Navy"

But, despite all the alleged Army domination of decisionmaking, it was safe for many army, navy and civilian leaders to raise questions about the length and goals of the war in China, and do something other than advocating pursuit of the Chinese to the Himalayas. Although the idea of ultimate victory could not be denied, and nobody in Japan could countenance a pull out from China and a war ending on Chinese terms, many army, navy and civilian leaders seemed to express the view that China was becoming a quagmire in some way and the solution was not to go "all-in". The Navy was not so weak that it could not stake major claims to Japan's heavy industrial output, at the expense of armor and heavy artillery.

I wonder if the Emperor was influential in that type of strategic debate, and if so, how much.

A stereotypical Army response to the China war would have been to just conquer south and southwest China, and cut off foreign supplies from the Chinese side of the border. But that's not what Tokyo didin OTL. They just occupied alot of China (albeit the best parts) and sat there, relying on the navy to blockade the rest and started wars with other countries to grab resources and cut off supplies to the Chinese.
 
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