What is the absolute best that the AXIS could do in North Africa .What happens after that .

It may sound funny, but the best way to have the Italians do better in Africa in WW2 is not even a military POD, it is a colonial one. Mussolini makes the Italian 5th coast an ego project. Expanding/Rebuilding the old Roman Empire. To attack settlers, Mussolini staff starts some modest infrastructure projects such as improving the port, and connecting the ports with railroads. If there are any mines or the the like, some side track is built to these locations. Few additional modest airports are built so Italians can easily fly to the 5th Coast. If these actions start in 1936-37, by the time the war rolls around, most of the logistic issues have been fixed.

From Wikipedia

Libya was considered the new "America" for the Italian emigrants in the 1930s, substituting the United States.[5]

The Italians in Libya numbered 108,419 (12.37% of the total population) at the time of the 1939 census. They were concentrated in the coast around the city of Tripoli (they constituted 37% of the city's population) and Benghazi (31%).

In 1938, Governor Balbo brought 20,000 Italian farmers to colonize Libya, and 26 new villages were founded for them, mainly in Cyrenaica.[6]

On January 9, 1939, the colony of Libya was incorporated into metropolitan Italy and thereafter considered an integral part of the Italian state. Libya, as the Fourth Shore, was to be part of the Imperial Italy, desired by the Italian irredentists.

By 1939 the Libyan Italians had built 400 km of new railroads and 4,000 km of new roads (the largest and most important was the one from Tripoli to Tobruk, on the coast) in Libya.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Italian_settlers_in_Libya
 
Hmmm... Instead of building up a long railway all the way from Tripoli to Benghazi and perhaps further, might it instead be viable to build up a large cargo port in Benghazi itself so that supplies don't need to be transported so far by land in the first place?
 

hipper

Banned
Hmmm... Instead of building up a long railway all the way from Tripoli to Benghazi and perhaps further, might it instead be viable to build up a large cargo port in Benghazi itself so that supplies don't need to be transported so far by land in the first place?

Import a workforce that will work through bombing races while you are at it.
 
an alternate plan would be to cut British Suez route with least resources possible, to simply hold Libya with least resources possible?

my understanding the use of Med Route was eliminated quickly and Libya could have been supplied thru Tunis. (a less hazardous overnight route)

... Even using the negotiated port capacity from French Tunisia would be a lot of movement cost and less stuff to use in the East.

to clarify you mean a situation in which Axis has advanced far to the east and into Egypt? vs. a less intense resupply effort needed to hold Libya? (of course Germany has to entice the Vichy regime with something to allow use of port)

in the latter case (resupply to hold Libya, an earlier version of 1943 strategy?) there would be net savings over OTL course of events with the loss of merchant ships, aircraft, and not least the cargoes. (despite as you highlighted there is further transit from Tunisia required)

THAT situation my view the best case scenario for Axis, low (lower) cost scenario that forces British to scrap Med route, turns Malta into sinkhole, and preserves Italian position.
 
To clarify you mean a situation in which Axis has advanced far to the east and into Egypt vs. a less intense re-supply effort needed to hold Libya? (Of course Germany has to entice the Vichy regime with something to allow use of port.)

In the latter case (re-supply to hold Libya, an earlier version of 1943 strategy?) there would be net savings over OTL course of events with the loss of merchant ships, aircraft, and not least the cargoes. (Despite as you highlighted there is further transit from Tunisia required.)

THAT situation my view the best case scenario for Axis, low (lower) cost scenario that forces British to scrap Med route, turns Malta into sinkhole, and preserves Italian position.
It's 775km from Tunis to Tripoli according to DistancesFrom.com.

Fortunately Tunis had a much better inland transport system than Libya including a network of metre gauge railways that terminated at Gabes "only" 364km from Tripoli. Furthermore, it's only 247km from Gabes to Zuara, where the 950mm gauge railway to Tripoli starts. Unfortunately that railway only goes as far as Tagiura 21km east of Tripoli. Then there's a gap of 949km between Tagiura and the Soluch, which was where the railway to Benghazi started.

One of the Wikipaedia articles on the Railways in Libya says that plans to extend the Tripoli to Zaura line by 60 km to the Tunisian frontier were well advanced in the summer of 1941, but the work was not carried out due to priority being given to extending the Tripoli to Tagiura line to Soluch. However, according to the same article only 21km was completed plus extending the Benghazi to Barce line by 40 km in the direction of Derna.

Therefore in a TL where the Axis does persuade Vichy to use Tunisia's ports and railways it would have been better to fill the gap between Gabes and Zaura, then convert the existing Zuara-Tripoli-Tagiura line to the French metre gauge before trying to extend the railway beyond Tagiura.

The passage from Italy to Bizerta and Tunis is considerably shorter than the ones from Italy to Libya's ports. Therefore it should be possible to send more cargo and fuel to Libya with the same amount of shipping. (Does anybody know how long it took to load and unload a ship in the early 1940s?) Furthermore as this route was safer the amount of merchant shipping available would increase over time because fewer ships were being sunk and damaged. (The shorter and safer route would also mean less "wear and tear" on the escorts. Fewer ships sunk and fewer damaged ships to repair.)

Tunisia was much more developed than Libya. For example in 1936 Tunisia had a population of 2,630,000 compared to Libya's population of 900,000 in 1936. Therefore it's very likely that the ports of Tunis and Bizerta were much bigger than Benghazi and Tripoli.

Therefore it looks as if the Axis could have sent more materiel to Tripoli using Tunisia's transport system than was possible via the direct rout by sea. The limiting factor would be the capacity of the railway line itself plus the amount of motive power and rolling stock that was available. However, then they have to get the extra supplies from Tripoli to the other end of Libya.
 
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As well as the railway from Mersa Maruth to the vicinity of Tobruk the BEC Forces in the Middle East also built the Haifa-Beirut-Tripoli Railway. (This is the Tripoli in Lebanon, not the Tripoli in Libya.)

Volume III – Tobruk and El Alamein (1st edition, 1966) from Australia in the War of 1939–1945. Series 1 – Army has an appendix about the construction of the railway.

According to that the route was selected in August 1941. Work actually began in December 1941 and was completed on 17th December 1942. The official opening was on 20th December and the first train ran on 21st December 1942. The total length of 176 miles (283 km) was completed within a year and 6 months ahead of schedule.

The South Africans built the Haifa to Beirut section (86 miles) between December 1941 and August 1942. The Australians built the Beirut to Tripoli section between early 1942 and December 1942.
 
I've come across an online copy of what appears to be the official history of the Corps of Royal New Zealand Engineers in the Middle East. This is a passage about the operation of the Western Desert Extension Railway in the last months of 1942 and the early months of 1943.
Railway Operating Group

In spite of the precautions to ensure that no information leaked out regarding the build-up for the Eighth Army attack in October 1942, the New Zealand Railway Operating Group could not help knowing that something big was afoot. For weeks they had been pushing train loads of stores forward to Burg el Arab by day and by night and they had watched the entertaining sight of army transport evacuating native families and their assorted livestock; opinions were divided as to whether this was a precaution against espionage or merely to reduce the fly nuisance.

A highlight of the period was an attempt by Italian commandos, who were landed from a submarine near Burg el Arab, to blow up the line near Hawaira. The only result was a broken rail and the loss of a few thousand gallons of Nile water, for Gurkha troops soon rounded up these rather amateur demolition experts. The Gurkhas patrolled the area for a week or so but there were no more efforts to dislocate the railway system. The operating sappers manning the stations got along very well with the little smiling men from the mountains of North India. Few could speak much English but the two races met on common ground around a draught-board. The Gurkhas won nearly every game.

It has been related that, on 5 November, 2 NZ Division was concentrated to the south of Fuka. At a minute past midnight on the same date, new railway operating instructions came into force, placing the responsibility for the running of traffic as follows:

‘OC 16 NZ Rly Op Coy—Stations from amriya to hammam. The 16 NZ Rly Op Coy will be responsible for the signalling and despatch of all trains at amriya station. Shunting duties at amriya station and depot will be carried out by 16 NZ Rly Op Coy. Two diesel shunting engines are located at amriya depot.

‘OC 17 NZ Rly Op Coy—Stations hammam to railhead. The 17 NZ Rly Op Coy will be responsible for the signalling and despatch of all trains at hammam station and West thereof. Also for shunting railhead depots.’


Railhead for the moment was at Alamein while Railway Construction Groups worked across the battlefield towards Daba, which became the railhead on the 10th when the first stores train arrived there. The repair gangs had not only to deal with shell and bomb damage but also had to replace sleepers and rails taken from the road bed by both armies for the construction of splinter-proof shelters.

While 2 NZ Division was stacking up at the foot of Halfaya Pass at the Egyptian border (11 November) the construction train was working west of Daba, to which station Major Pearse had shifted 17 Company Headquarters, and from where the Group was operating some American main-line diesel-electric locomotives. The arrival of these was well timed as steam engines were dependent on water and the damage to the water pipelines and reservoirs had not yet been made good. Major Aickin writes:

‘These diesel locos, had been constructed and shipped in such a hurry that there was insufficient time for carrying out the customary service trials. However, although the locomotives were practically nothing more than working blue prints when they reached us, they arrived in the nick of time and served our needs admirably. The NZ engine drivers quickly learned to handle them.’

Railhead was at Matruh on the 13th, when three trains were despatched from Daba to that destination; by the 25th, after relief by 193 Railway Operating Company, RE, 17 Company had manned and was operating from its headquarters at Capuzzo the Misheifa – Capuzzo – Tobruk Road section. On the same day 16 Company, now relieved by 115 (Indian) Railway Operating Company, had settled into its old ‘possie’ at Similla and taken over the Similla–Misheifa section.

When the Company had evacuated Similla it had left behind a very old and battered built-in stove, a most prized possession of the sergeants' mess. The shed that housed the derelict was not worth destroying so it was decided to lend the amenity to the Germans as a going concern. A note was left instructing the new tenants to look after both stove and building until the return of the rightful owners in the near future. The premises were clean and tidy when the sappers retook possession, but some nasty-minded Jerry had planted a couple of booby traps that had to be removed before the cooks could resume business.

While the water reservoirs at Capuzzo, Misheifa and Similla were being repaired the whole of the running was performed with diesel engines, but a partial changeover to steam loco operation was made on the 28th and three days later (1 December) the diesel-electric locos were worked over the Capuzzo-Tobruk sector, leaving the steam locomotives to operate between Similla and Capuzzo.

The railway system had in fact been recommissioned in accordance with the timing laid down in ‘Movement Plan—Eighth Army Maintenance’. Planning a battle is not solely a matter of deploying brigades, regiments and divisions—they have to be fed, watered and munitioned, and in a desert neither food nor water are easily obtained. With the lengthening line of communications it was of supreme importance that, through the efforts of Indian, South African, Australian, British and New Zealand railway sappers, the line connecting Alexandria with Tobruk was operating within the times set down in the movement plan.

The arrival of the supply trains at Tobruk made it possible to maintain sufficient forces for the reduction of the Agheila position where the enemy was then holding. After 2 NZ Division had made its outflanking march and the enemy had withdrawn beyond Agheila the running of trains became monotonously normal; so normal that, with the interference from the air a thing of the past, a total of 374 trains ran in December conveying 14,762 wagons and 140 coaches. Apart from passenger traffic some 65,000 tons of stores were off-loaded at Tobruk in addition to many thousands of tons at other railheads.

Tripoli was occupied on 23 January 1943 and the opening of the port there took the pressure completely off the Desert Railway; on 21 February, after relief by 115 (Indian) Operating Company, 16 New Zealand Railway Operating Company was back whence it had started in October 1940—at NZ Base Camp, Maadi.

Group Headquarters and 17 Company endured another month of the desert winter with its cold and dust, the nilvisibility running and the usual track washouts. A changeover to diesel-electric locomotives was completed on 8 March when WD Locos 9332 and 9327 hauled the last steam-operated service (Train No. 5) over the Tobruk Road – Capuzzo – Misheifa section. The steam loco depot at Capuzzo closed the same day and coal, oil and wood supplies, together with depot equipment, were despatched to Misheifa. The rail loop at Tobruk docks was finished on 10 March and on the following day a 17 Company diesel crew and brakesman ran the first train over the new extension that finally linked Alexandria with Tobruk. In a way it was a pity that it was not Kiwi construction men who put the finishing touches to the Western Desert Extension.

Operational responsibility for its section was relinquished to 195 Railway Operating Company, RE, by 17 Company on 14 March and by 21 March the company was also back in Maadi, to which place Group Headquarters had preceded it by a couple of days.
The 65,000 tons of stores off-loaded in Tobruk in December 1942 is an average of 2,100 tons a day (rounded up to the nearest hundred).

65,000 tons of stores divided by 374 trains is an average of 174 tons per train.

14,902 wagons and carriages divided by 374 trains is an average of 40 wagons and coaches a train.

65,000 tons of stores is the equivalent of nearly 22,000 3-ton truckloads and each trail carried the equivalent of 58 3-ton truck loads.
 
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and from where the Group was operating some American main-line diesel-electric locomotives. The arrival of these was well timed as steam engines were dependent on water and the damage to the water pipelines and reservoirs had not yet been made good.

Who caused the damage?

Given the dependency on water and coal I am surprised there was not more effort pre 1939 to make use of diesels.
 
It's 775km from Tunis to Tripoli according to DistancesFrom.com.

Fortunately Tunis had a much better inland transport system than Libya including a network of metre gauge railways that terminated at Gabes "only" 364km from Tripoli. Furthermore, it's only 247km from Gabes to Zuara, where the 950mm gauge railway to Tripoli starts. Unfortunately that railway only goes as far as Tagiura 21km east of Tripoli. Then there's a gap of 949km between Tagiura and the Soluch, which was where the railway to Benghazi started.

One of the Wikipaedia articles on the Railways in Libya says that plans to extend the Tripoli to Zaura line by 60 km to the Tunisian frontier were well advanced in the summer of 1941, but the work was not carried out due to priority being given to extending the Tripoli to Tagiura line to Soluch. However, according to the same article only 21km was completed plus extending the Benghazi to Barce line by 40 km in the direction of Derna.

Therefore in a TL where the Axis does persuade Vichy to use Tunisia's ports and railways it would have been better to fill the gap between Gabes and Zaura, then convert the existing Zuara-Tripoli-Tagiura line to the French metre gauge before trying to extend the railway beyond Tagiura.

The passage from Italy to Bizerta and Tunis is considerably shorter than the ones from Italy to Libya's ports. Therefore it should be possible to send more cargo and fuel to Libya with the same amount of shipping. (Does anybody know how long it took to load and unload a ship in the early 1940s?) Furthermore as this route was safer the amount of merchant shipping available would increase over time because fewer ships were being sunk and damaged. (The shorter and safer route would also mean less "wear and tear" on the escorts. Fewer ships sunk and fewer damaged ships to repair.)

Tunisia was much more developed than Libya. For example in 1936 Tunisia had a population of 2,630,000 compared to Libya's population of 900,000 in 1936. Therefore it's very likely that the ports of Tunis and Bizerta were much bigger than Benghazi and Tripoli.

Therefore it looks as if the Axis could have sent more materiel to Tripoli using Tunisia's transport system than was possible via the direct rout by sea. The limiting factor would be the capacity of the railway line itself plus the amount of motive power and rolling stock that was available. However, then they have to get the extra supplies from Tripoli to the other end of Libya.

Crefeld does mention German attempts to use Bizerta.

Even without an offensive, however, Rommel’s demand for a second division had already jeopardised his supplies. Together with the Italians, the Axis force now in Libya totalled seven divisions, which when air force and naval force units were added, required 70,000 tons per month. This was more than Tripoli could handle effectively, so that a crisis was bound to develop unless the French agreed to allow 20,000 tons of supplies a month to pass through their port of Bizerta. Although Rommel was usually at loggerheads with his nominal Italian superiors, they were in agreement this time, for Mussolini had long been looking for just such an opportunity to penetrate Tunisia. Hence Rommel’s request was enthusiastically seconded.

Negotiations with Vichy were accordingly initiated. Firstly, the premier, Admiral Darlan, was asked to sell the Germans French lorries stationed in Africa, to which he immediately agreed. Encouraged by this success, Hitler next summoned Darlan for a tete a tete on 11 May, in the course of which he told him that the unloading facilities of Tripoli harbour were ‘being used to capacity’ and asked for permission to use Bizerta. Darlan acceded to the request, and on 27-8 May a German-French Protocol was signed in Paris, granting the Germans rights of transit through Bizerta. It also provided for French ships to be chartered by the Axis, mentioned Toulon as a possible alternative port of embarkation in case Naples became choked. At this point, however, Vichy was alarmed by the British invasion of Syria. For reasons of their own, the Germans also came to regret the agreement, and by the end of summer not a single Axis load had passed through Bizerta.


However, as Viking has mentioned there is still a lot of ground to cover from Tunisia.
 
Crefeld does mention German attempts to use Bizerta.

Even without an offensive, however, Rommel’s demand for a second division had already jeopardised his supplies. Together with the Italians, the Axis force now in Libya totalled seven divisions, which when air force and naval force units were added, required 70,000 tons per month. This was more than Tripoli could handle effectively, so that a crisis was bound to develop unless the French agreed to allow 20,000 tons of supplies a month to pass through their port of Bizerta. Although Rommel was usually at loggerheads with his nominal Italian superiors, they were in agreement this time, for Mussolini had long been looking for just such an opportunity to penetrate Tunisia. Hence Rommel’s request was enthusiastically seconded.

Negotiations with Vichy were accordingly initiated. Firstly, the premier, Admiral Darlan, was asked to sell the Germans French lorries stationed in Africa, to which he immediately agreed. Encouraged by this success, Hitler next summoned Darlan for a tete a tete on 11 May, in the course of which he told him that the unloading facilities of Tripoli harbour were ‘being used to capacity’ and asked for permission to use Bizerta. Darlan acceded to the request, and on 27-8 May a German-French Protocol was signed in Paris, granting the Germans rights of transit through Bizerta. It also provided for French ships to be chartered by the Axis, mentioned Toulon as a possible alternative port of embarkation in case Naples became choked. At this point, however, Vichy was alarmed by the British invasion of Syria. For reasons of their own, the Germans also came to regret the agreement, and by the end of summer not a single Axis load had passed through Bizerta.
This passage from Page 53 of Volume II of the British official history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East corroborates the above.
Between February and May nine German ships (31,243 tons) were sunk and nine (54,753 tons) were damaged. If North Tunisian ports could have been used instead of Tripoli the sea passage would have been far safer although the land link would have been much longer. Negotiations with the French Government dragged on for a long time. On 27th May the French agreed to make available the port of Bizerta and the coastal railway to Gabes. In return, the Germans would allow the French to move certain reinforcements to French North and West Africa. The issue then became complicated by the British action in Syria and in the long run the French contrived to avoid making any concessions of any use. This was very fortunate for the British, for if Axis ships had merely had to dart across the Narrows it is difficult to see how they could have been much interfered with. German and Italian Commanders and their staffs saw clearly how grave was the failure to secure this concession, but Hitler appeared to think that it would not do to press the French too hard. All that mattered was 'Barbarossa'—the attack on Russia; everything else would come right in the end. No wonder General Rommel was told not to embark upon ambitious projects; the fewer resources that had to be sent to him by this tiresome sea route the better.
 
This is the full passage from Pages 52 and 53
Attention had naturally been focussed upon the need to make Malta safe, and for that reason the measures for its defence have been referred to first. It is nevertheless true to say that the strategic value of the island as a base from which to strike at the enemy's shipping was never lost sight of. The means were sadly lacking for a long time, but a great deal was achieved during the early months of 1941 towards the systematic improvement of co-operation between the reconnaissance and the striking forces. The targets were ships at sea and in the ports of loading and unloading, as well as the port services. Nor were coastal vessels and the coast roads forgotten. By gun, torpedo, mine and bomb all these were attacked as far as the limited means allowed.

Until February 1941 Allied warships and aircraft had not been allowed to attack at sight any single ships, or small unescorted groups, except within thirty miles of the Libyan coast, or, if the ships were ostensibly Italian, within thirty miles of any Italian territory in the Mediterranean. Enemy ships could therefore use Tunisian territorial waters secure from attack by submarines or aircraft. In order to deprive them of this advantage the British policy for the control of merchant shipping was now amended. From 5th February our forces were given authority to attack at sight any enemy ships, whether escorted or not, south of the latitude of Malta; towards the end of February this permission was extended to include the greater part of the central basin. Moreover, at the beginning of March the Admiralty announced that British warships would enter French North African territorial waters to exercise control of shipping. French ships were warned not to be at sea in these waters between sunset and sunrise.

At this time the normal route for enemy convoys between Italy and North Africa ran round the west of Sicily and close inshore down the eastern Tunisian coast to Tripoli, and occasionally on to Benghazi. To relieve the pressure on road transport some supplies unloaded at Tripoli were moved to subsidiary harbours farther east in small coastal craft, a number of which were sunk or damaged by British submarines. From the western tip of Sicily, if the coast is hugged most of the way, the distance to Tripoli is about 400 miles. Fighter escort could not easily be provided for the middle part of this voyage, and it was usual for convoys to do this part by night. The convoys averaged four vessels each, and followed one another at intervals of two or three days. They consisted of German and Italian ships, but German troops and stores were carried principally in German ships. Surface escorts were entirely Italian, and the whole movement was under Italian naval direction.

The transport of the first German troops—the 5th Light Motorized Division—began early in February 1941. By the end of March, when General Rommel made his bound forward, fifteen convoys had reached Tripoli carrying 25,000 men, 8,500 vehicles, and 26,000 tons of stores. By the end of May the transporting of the 15th Panzer Division was complete, and Italian troops, who had been almost entirely crowded out for four months, were again able to move across.

Between February and May nine German ships (31,243 tons) were sunk and nine (54,753 tons) were damaged. If North Tunisian ports could have been used instead of Tripoli the sea passage would have been far safer although the land link would have been much longer. Negotiations with the French Government dragged on for a long time. On 27th May the French agreed to make available the port of Bizerta and the coastal railway to Gabes. In return, the Germans would allow the French to move certain reinforcements to French North and West Africa. The issue then became complicated by the British action in Syria and in the long run the French contrived to avoid making any concessions of any use. This was very fortunate for the British, for if Axis ships had merely had to dart across the Narrows it is difficult to see how they could have been much interfered with. German and Italian Commanders and their staffs saw clearly how grave was the failure to secure this concession, but Hitler appeared to think that it would not do to press the French too hard. All that mattered was 'Barbarossa'—the attack on Russia; everything else would come right in the end. No wonder General Rommel was told not to embark upon ambitious projects; the fewer resources that had to be sent to him by this tiresome sea route the better.
 
and from where the Group was operating some American main-line diesel-electric locomotives. The arrival of these was well timed as steam engines were dependent on water and the damage to the water pipelines and reservoirs had not yet been made good.

Who caused the damage?

Given the dependency on water and coal I am surprised there was not more effort pre 1939 to make use of diesels.
I don't know. However, this is a link to the book, which might tell you.

http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Engr-c6-4.html
 
If Tunisia became Italian, what effect would that have on Spain? Might it encourage Spain to make a grab for French Morocco? The Italian fleet would do better if it got back better intelligence about the results of its frogmen operations - they didn't know they had battleship superiority after the frogmen sank the British ships in Alexandria, as the ships settled on the bottom and the British employed various methods (like having bands playing on the deck) to make it look like they were still fully operational. You could have the Italians making more SM 79's instead of BR 20 bombers, and learning how to use them as torpedo bombers more quickly. You could have the initial Italian army that invaded Egypt rationalised into mobile, non-mobile, and rear area troops and use the greater number of rear area troops to build better infrastructure and to otherwise improve the supply situation. You could also have the extra rear area troops give up their weapons to the other troops and make it so that each formation is better equipped and at least has the same brand of small arms and a triangular organisational structure etc
 

hipper

Banned
If Tunisia became Italian, what effect would that have on Spain? Might it encourage Spain to make a grab for French Morocco? The Italian fleet would do better if it got back better intelligence about the results of its frogmen operations - they didn't know they had battleship superiority after the frogmen sank the British ships in Alexandria, as the ships settled on the bottom and the British employed various methods (like having bands playing on the deck) to make it look like they were still fully operational. You could have the Italians making more SM 79's instead of BR 20 bombers, and learning how to use them as torpedo bombers more quickly. You could have the initial Italian army that invaded Egypt rationalised into mobile, non-mobile, and rear area troops and use the greater number of rear area troops to build better infrastructure and to otherwise improve the supply situation. You could also have the extra rear area troops give up their weapons to the other troops and make it so that each formation is better equipped and at least has the same brand of small arms and a triangular organisational structure etc

I hate to spoil a good story but neither Vallaint or QE touched bottom.
 
Is it possible to rate the value of tripoli, benghazi and tobruk?

For mine while Tripoli can handle the most cargo throughput and is the most secure from enemy action its massive distance from the front and complete lack of railway transport to haul this bulk cargo drastically reduces its value.

In contrast I think that Tobruk is extremely valuable because of its proximity to the front, despite its low capacity and being a magnet for enemy action. In terms of of what amount of supply from Tobruk reached the pointy end I don't think it would have been drastically less than Tripoli.

Benghazi is somewhere in between, its distance from the front and limited capacity partly mitigated by the 110-150km railway line heading east. Again, terms of what the troops actually got it probably wasn't drastically less than Tripoli.

Or is that all bullshit and I'm delusional?
 
Really the basic MFP, which they already had in numbers, were used OTL to land supplies in Matruh in 1942 were good for use in the med.

In a no Barbarossa scenerio, more would have been available as a bunch were on Lake Ladoga, more were ferrying supplies at Kerch etc. (you can break them up and ship by rail easy enough to Med ports). With guns removed, the Turks allowed them to go through the straits.

You can land supplies and equipment right on the beach as close as you want to risk.

http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/landingcrafts/mfp/index.html
 
You could have the Italians making more SM 79's instead of BR 20 bombers, and learning how to use them as torpedo bombers more quickly.
I'm all for more S.M.79s but not necessarily at the expense of fewer B.R.20 and Z.1007 bombers. These are the combat aircraft on had on 10th June 1940 exclusive of Italian East Africa.

Regia Aeronautica Aircraft June 1940.png


The Cant.Z.506 was a tri-motor seaplane in the same class as the Heinkel He115. It was an excellent aircraft of its type, but the Italians would have been better off building more S.M.79s instead. However, that would require a POD in the middle of the 1930s, which I think is beyond the scope of this thread.

The Cant.Z.501 was a single-engine flying boat in the same class as the Dornier Do 18, but with even worse performance. (IIRC even Blackburn Rocs and Avro Ansons could shoot down Do 18s.) Again the Italians would have been better off buying a maritime reconnaissance version of the S.M.79, but again that requires a POD in the middle 1930s, which I think is beyond the scope of this thread.

The Regia Aeronautica (excluding the A.O.I.) had 101 bomber squadrons (16 B.R.20, 52 S.M.79, 16 S.M.81, 2 S.M.85 (an unsuccessful dive-bomber), 7 Z.506 and 8 Z.1007) which was 19 short of the 120 planned in Programa R. There were also 10 assalto and combattimento (4 Ba.65/Ca.310 and 6 Ba.88) 2 short of the 12 planned in Programa R. The number of maritime reconnaissance units exceeded the 15 squadrons and 5 flights in Programa R because there were 21 squadrons (18 Z.501 and 3 Z.506) and 4 flights (all Z.501) which seems to have been done by converting 3 Z.506 bomber squadrons to the GR role and expanding one of the flights into a squadron.

Therefore the raw material for a formidable torpedo-bomber force existed but fortunately the Regia Aeronautica didn't start to organise one until after Italy entered the war.
 
they had wild concept of fast transport http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/landingcrafts/vs8/index.html

if that had been tried with standard or enlarged S-boat, starting much earlier, it might have worked?

Really the basic MFP, which they already had in numbers, were used OTL to land supplies in Matruh in 1942 were good for use in the med.

In a no Barbarossa scenerio, more would have been available as a bunch were on Lake Ladoga, more were ferrying supplies at Kerch etc. (you can break them up and ship by rail easy enough to Med ports). With guns removed, the Turks allowed them to go through the straits.

You can land supplies and equipment right on the beach as close as you want to risk.

http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/landingcrafts/mfp/index.html

think the MFPs/AFPs were a workhorse but a little slow to rely on to N. Africa coast? (if they had become the mainstay rather than isolated cases)

maybe the bow and engines could have been enhanced, if as you note, this is a scenario of No Barbarossa.

the immediate post-war Jaguar-class was enhanced S-boat, approx. 50% larger and could deploy a couple dozen mines. so a speculative transport might be feasible, and still be used for minelayer? (albeit not the hydrofoil concept mooted)
 
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