What is the absolute best that the AXIS could do in North Africa .What happens after that .

On multiple occasions in WW1, the British built RR at the rate of 1 mile per day. So 500 km per year is technically feasible. So looks like you could largely fix the Libyan logistic issues with a POD in late 1939. But I guess we would need Benny to be a better administrative and military mind.

I suppose the very limited OTL rail met the commercial needs of the colony, and the Italians were not thinking they would get in the kind of war that they would need a high capacity railway. So the earliest POD would be September 1940 when the Italians figure out that the British are not going to make peace.

By then you are talking a lot of steel to cover long distances, steel useful for other things for countries at war.

I wonder since there is a coastal decent road if something like the modern Australian road trains could be improvised here to deliver lots of supply without rail: Basically the engine of a diesel locomotive, but with road wheels pulling multiple trailers on a paved road.

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BlondieBC

Banned
I suppose the very limited OTL rail met the commercial needs of the colony, and the Italians were not thinking they would get in the kind of war that they would need a high capacity railway. So the earliest POD would be September 1940 when the Italians figure out that the British are not going to make peace.

By then you are talking a lot of steel to cover long distances, steel useful for other things for countries at war.

I wonder since there is a coastal decent road if something like the modern Australian road trains could be improvised here to deliver lots of supply without rail: Basically the engine of a diesel locomotive, but with road wheels pulling multiple trailers on a paved road.

images

I am sure the answer is yes, but I strongly suspect the railroad is cheaper when measured in terms of money or units of steel. And it does not have to be an all or nothing type decision. Start building from the main port at a about a half mile per day, and the logistics rapidly improve.

Also, I don't think need a high capacity rail, just a standard gauge, single track.
 
On multiple occasions in WW1, the British built RR at the rate of 1 mile per day. So 500 km per year is technically feasible. So looks like you could largely fix the Libyan logistic issues with a POD in late 1939. But I guess we would need Benny to be a better administrative and military mind.

Apparently when the axis tried it in 1942 the bottleneck was a shortage of rails, but I don't think that would have as big a deal in 1941. However it still might be a thing, so building the full 1000km might be impossible.
 
Also, I don't think need a high capacity rail, just a standard gauge, single track.
According to the Wikipaedia article on the Western Desert Campaign the railway that was extended from Mersa Maruth to Tobruk carried 4,200 long tons a day. Can anybody corroborate that?
 
I am sure the answer is yes, but I strongly suspect the railroad is cheaper when measured in terms of money or units of steel. And it does not have to be an all or nothing type decision. Start building from the main port at a about a half mile per day, and the logistics rapidly improve.

Also, I don't think need a high capacity rail, just a standard gauge, single track.

I agree.

Put in a few passing loops and the capacity goes way up, maybe strategic improvement here and there and decent rolling stock will also yield benefits.

Also, there is nothing particularly bad about the 950mm track gauge the Italians used in Libya. In fact with the limited resources available the narrow gauge might be an advantage, getting lines laid that wouldn't with higher quality standard gauge tracks.. Its more about other stuff than the width of the tracks, like the quality of the earthworks, slopes, passing loops and signals.
 
Van Creveld has the railroad capacity as 300 tons/day. The railway never went all the way to Tobruk. stopping 10km short of the Port.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=56&t=99035&start=30
I've seen that article when it was referred to in another thread. That's about how much the Axis was able to carry. The 4,200 long tons a day seems to be what was carried when the British were using it.

The distance from Alexandria to Tobruk is 657km according to DistancesFrom.com. In that context 10km is neither here or there.
 
The distance from Alexandria to Tobruk is 657km according to DistancesFrom.com. In that context 10km is neither here or there.

It isn't a probem for the British, since Tobruk is the railhead from their base areas, but for the Axis going east it is a pain in the arse because of the double handling.

BTW, that Axis History forum thread seems to be more about the Tobruk to Egypt railway rather than those coming from Tripoli and Benghazi, which are the ones I'm interested in.
 
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With no Barbarossa preparations? They are stopped at the Nile when a Jewish militia commander David Ben Gurion arrives with his forces from mandatory Palestine to relieve the Anglo-Egyptian defenders.
 
BTW, that Axis History forum thread seems to be more about the Tobruk to Egypt railway rather than those coming from Tripoli and Benghazi, which are the ones I'm interested in.
The reason I quoted the tonnage carried by the Western Desert Extension railway in Wikipaedia and asked if it was accurate is that if it was accurate it would be a guide to what Libyan railways could have carried with enough locomotives and rolling stock.
 
Quote from Pages 80-82 of An Illustrated History of the Navies of World War II by Anthony Preston
The invasion of Greece by Italy in October 1940 forced the British to transfer troops from Egypt to Greece, and to meet this new commitment the Royal Navy set up an advanced base at Suda Bay in Crete. The British Cabinet took on such a major commitment with little apparent thought about how thinly stretched their armed forces were. Miracles were achieved between July and December 1940, but it was surely folly to launch a major land operation in the Balkans when the naval and air forces were over-stretched. Just how stretched they were can be gauged by the fact that even allowing for the Mediterranean Fleet's depredations, the presence of a submarine flotilla at Malta and a number of strikes by land-based aircraft from Malta and Egypt, the Italians passed over 690,000 tons of shipping to North African ports, and lost under two per cent. The reason was that both aircraft and submarines were too few in numbers and unsuitable for the job; the submarines were large boats originally designed for the Pacific, and apart from their size, tended to leak oil from their external fuel tanks. Italian escorts sank ten out of 17 boats in six months. The shallow waters of the Mediterranean were dangerous for any submarine, but a gratuitous oil-slick made the enemy's job easier.
That's an average of 115,000 tons a month and 2% of 690,000 tons is 13,800 tons.
 
With a POD of June 1941: A no Barbarossa scenario

a) A significant chunk of German air force is committed to the med (the rest stays in France). This is flying top cover for convoys, suppressing Malta, raiding Tobruk.
b) Malta and Tobruk falls in 1941
b) The Germans and Italian make a significant effort to expand the Italian light rail out of Benghazi torward Tobruk.
c) The Germans expand their light craft in the med significantly (MFPs and Seibel ferries, EBoats etc.) These are used to bring supplies closer to the front.
d) Italian navy gets a larger allotment of fuel.

Without the eastern front, by the beginning of 1942, the Germans have the ability to supply forward an extra panzer division, and an extra Italian motorized division (vs OTL 1942). This with extra air power available is able to take the Delta in 1942. Most of the British navy is moved to the red sea.

However the Axis don't have any hope at all of reaching the Persian Gulf or the Sudan, although they can dominate the eastern med.

This is a lovely scenario. However it has two problems:

1. Germany does not have enough oil. In June 1941, remember they only have enough oil stockpiled to continue the war for three months.

2. The Axis cannot supply in north Africa due to superiority of the Royal Navy
 
Interesting question. The big picture. Germany never invades Russia. England either surrenders or cuts a deal with Hitler. The Med becomes an AXIS Lake. Then .... assuming since England is out of it, Japan sweeps the Indian Ocean and a Japanese battle fleet sails up through the Suez Canal and links up with the Germans and Italians. Not a good alternative history at all. Changes everything.
 
The reason I quoted the tonnage carried by the Western Desert Extension railway in Wikipaedia and asked if it was accurate is that if it was accurate it would be a guide to what Libyan railways could have carried with enough locomotives and rolling stock.

I don't doubt the accuracy of those figures, and for perspective, 300t over ~150km is a day's work for about 100 3t trucks, but I don't know how relevant they are for the Benghazi-Barce/Derna railway. The main difference in my mind is the apparent completeness of the British railway network in Egypt (and presumably to Tobruk) as a standard gauge that was being worked on and improved all the way up to the outbreak of war, compared to the narrow gauge (usually chosen because it's cheap) railways in Libya that received little to no now construction after the 20s. I have a feeling that means that the railways were built to a low standard due to cost, and lack things like numerous passing loops, good signals and even strong enough rails and earthworks/ballasting to allow heavy trains to move at a reasonable speed.

The Axis cannot supply in north Africa due to superiority of the Royal Navy

IOTL the Axis managed to get sufficient supplies past the RN most months of the Desert War, particularly the early years when the fighting was in Cyrenacia. Their big problem was the 1000km between Tripoli and Benghazi, and the further 500km+ to the actual front, this soaked up a huge amount of the supplies sent to Nth Africa; trucks and fuel etc for these trucks that could have been following the Panzer divisions directly were instead chugging along the via Balbia for days bringing supplies forward from the ports.

Opel_Blitz_Afrika_Korps_Via_Balbia.jpg
 
I don't doubt the accuracy of those figures, and for perspective, 300t over ~150km is a day's work for about 100 3t trucks, but I don't know how relevant they are for the Benghazi-Barce/Derna railway. The main difference in my mind is the apparent completeness of the British railway network in Egypt (and presumably to Tobruk) as a standard gauge that was being worked on and improved all the way up to the outbreak of war, compared to the narrow gauge (usually chosen because it's cheap) railways in Libya that received little to no now construction after the 20s. I have a feeling that means that the railways were built to a low standard due to cost, and lack things like numerous passing loops, good signals and even strong enough rails and earthworks/ballasting to allow heavy trains to move at a reasonable speed.
To clarify I wasn't talking about the accuracy 300 tons a day when the Axis were using it (quoted by @hipper), I meant the 4,200 tons a day by the British as claimed by Wikipaedia.

I take your points about the track gauge, lack of passing loops, signalling, earthworks/ballasting and especially the strength of the rails. AFAIK the strength of the rails is the most important factor of all.
 
Malta is overrated, the real problem is transport within Libya, particularly the lack of railways for efficient bulk transport and the Axis never bothered to do anything abouot this drastic shortage until early 1942 when they extended the Benghazi railway some 40km to Barce.

For a much better performance the Axis need to have a railway construction unit in place as soon as Rommel goes to Libya. If they had extended their rail lines from Tripoli and Benghazi westward from early 1941, even in fits and starts they would have been mitigating their worst supply problem and perhaps have reached Cairo and the Canal. If they do that they chase the British south into the Red Sea and then control the eastern Med.

Yeah, this. The real bottleneck in North Africa was the lack of port capacity, with inland capacity being a second one. It doesn’t matter if more Axis supply ships get to port if they can’t be unloaded because the port is at capacity.

No difference, Afrika Korps still gets stomped.
 
Yeah, this. The real bottleneck in North Africa was the lack of port capacity, with inland capacity being a second one. It doesn’t matter if more Axis supply ships get to port if they can’t be unloaded because the port is at capacity.

No difference, Afrika Korps still gets stomped.
What were the limiting factors on the capacity of the ports and IOTL did the Axis take any steps to increase their capacity?
 
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