Actually the biggest difference would be the damage to the Yamamoto Myth.
Yamamoto wasn't half as clever as is assumed by many folks with only a surface understanding of the Pacific War. His entire reputation is built off a single well executed raid on the day the war began. Killer rep built on a single action that lasted about 6 hours, and failed in its real goal, the elimination of the Pacific Fleet as a threat.
After Pearl Harbor the IJN under Yamamoto's control primarily wasted time and effort. The raid on Darwin accomplished almost nothing in either a tactical or strategic sense. The IO Raid managed to sink a CVL, a couple CA, and some light forces none of which mattered in the Japanese plans prior to 1943 (although it did, admittedly, scare the crap out of Whitehall) while putting the Kido Butai 1,500 miles out of position when the U.S. sailed to carrier to within 700 miles of TOKYO launch an admittedly pure propaganda raid and get away clean. Then there was the Keystone Kops Midway/Aleutians operations with the IJN spread across 300,000 square miles of Ocean in the hope of getting the U.S. to jump in different directions in a blind panic and sail happily into an ambush (never mind the code breakers, if there was one man in the USN not prone to panic it was Chester Nimitz). That cost the IJN four decks that it could never hope to replace in a building race with the U.S. He then let the IJN get drawn into the one thing it absolutely could not survive, a battle of attrition with the USN in the Solomons (a decision that wound up getting him killed).
Had he survived the inspection trip to the Solomons the only question is if his gambling nature would overcome his natural conservative beliefs regarding the Decisive Battle. If it did the IJN battle line might have been wiped out earlier, perhaps trying to defend the Marianas.
The one serious change his survival might create is the introduction of the Kamikaze. That sort of foolish waste of personnel in penny packets wasn't Yamamoto's style. That change wouldn't alter the war strategically, although the tactical impacts (especially in the KIA/WIA figures for the USN in the war's final year) would be substantial, and, assuming no Bomb/Soviet entry might have made the invasion of the Home Islands more palatable.