What if Wildcats completely replaced Brewster Buffaloes in Oct 1941?

You're welcome. Btw, he wasn't the Naval Attache' but the Assistant Attache for Air. The Japanese Air Forces (Naval and Army) were his specialty, along with learning as much as possible about Japan's industries. Jurika actually helped with target selection and advised aircrew to make sure they didn't crash-land in Japan, as he expected anyone who did so to be executed.

If they take the NEI 2-3 weeks later, it doesn't affect the course of the war that much: They were in Borneo, Ambon/Timor, and the Celebes in Jan-Feb, so you're expecting either Sumatra or Java to hold out longer than they did. Once Singapore falls, Sumatra is only a matter of time. Java was the last one, so if Java holds out, the Japanese simply consolidate their previous gains, maybe bring additional land-based air assets in-theater, along with Kido Butai, and mass for the final assault. They were a month ahead of schedule-the Java invasion was originally set for April '42. It would give the Dutch time to attempt to destroy oil facilities-and they did accomplish some demolition, but most were still captured intact OTL. The Sumatran fields were seized intact, by Japanese Naval Landing Force paratroopers, so you might even see additional airborne landings to go along with the actual amphibious operation. It may, however, bring Kido Butai home early-they were on their way home OTL from the IO Raid when the Doolittle Raid went in, so they'd be recalled from SEA post-haste.....but there would be by that time, ample land-based Naval Air assets (21st, 22nd, and 23rd Air Flotillas) to handle things.


That is only one side of the war. Presumably the Allies aren't playing hopscotch so what are they doing with the three weeks? I doubt they would bring in the Kido Butai unless that was part of the plan all along. They are still a week ahead of schedule so why bring in a bunch of carriers? They gulp fuel like crazy and with them fighting wildcats and buffaloes instead of buffaloes and biplanes the Japanese Navy will probably lose more planes and want to replace them, particularly if they are still ahead of schedule.
 
Like I said earlier, there's more to it than just giving the Allies in SEA new aircraft: pilots have to learn the aircraft, maintenance folks also need to be checked out on the type, and the actual squadrons need to work up before being certified as combat-ready. Even if the Buffaloes are all in-theater by Oct-Nov 41, some units won't have finished the transition from whatever else they were flying, others have just stood up and are nowhere near being combat ready (takes 3-4 months at least in those days), and they're ill-led at the top. And they're fighting some of the best Naval Aviators in the world, who are combat veterans for the most part, in what was arguably the best fighter in the Pacific until the F6F and F4U came along (or the P-38 and P-47 for the AAF guys). And the Allied pilots will make the very mistakes they did OTL: dogfighting with a Zero. That was what Claire Chennault said was a mistake, and guess what? He was right. Anyone in 1941-42 who tried dogfighting with Zeroes was lucky to live to tell the story. The Zero outclasses the Buffalo in every department. And JNAF losses will not be all that greater than they were OTL.
 
Like I said earlier, there's more to it than just giving the Allies in SEA new aircraft: pilots have to learn the aircraft, maintenance folks also need to be checked out on the type, and the actual squadrons need to work up before being certified as combat-ready. Even if the Buffaloes are all in-theater by Oct-Nov 41, some units won't have finished the transition from whatever else they were flying, others have just stood up and are nowhere near being combat ready (takes 3-4 months at least in those days), and they're ill-led at the top. And they're fighting some of the best Naval Aviators in the world, who are combat veterans for the most part, in what was arguably the best fighter in the Pacific until the F6F and F4U came along (or the P-38 and P-47 for the AAF guys). And the Allied pilots will make the very mistakes they did OTL: dogfighting with a Zero. That was what Claire Chennault said was a mistake, and guess what? He was right. Anyone in 1941-42 who tried dogfighting with Zeroes was lucky to live to tell the story. The Zero outclasses the Buffalo in every department. And JNAF losses will not be all that greater than they were OTL.


So in three weeks the Allies won't reinforce Burma or Austrailia or prepare to fight in the Marshals or anything else? Somehow I don't picture them sitting on their hands for three weeks.
 
Oh, they would've tried: actual reinforcements OTL included RAF Hurricanes and AAF P-40s as fighters, and A-24 Banshee dive bombers (AAF versions of the SBD). However, the experience of the pilots sent to Java as reinforcements left a lot to be desired. One squadron that was shot up at Darwin on its way to Java (33rd PS with P-40s) had pilots with as few as 12 hours in type. Other reinforcing units had similar issues: pilots fresh out of flight school, or experienced hands with little time on new aircraft. The results will be as they were OTL: squadrons being shot to pieces, and survivors either fleeing to Australia aboard PBYs or C-47s, or becoming POWs.
 
Oh, they would've tried: actual reinforcements OTL included RAF Hurricanes and AAF P-40s as fighters, and A-24 Banshee dive bombers (AAF versions of the SBD). However, the experience of the pilots sent to Java as reinforcements left a lot to be desired. One squadron that was shot up at Darwin on its way to Java (33rd PS with P-40s) had pilots with as few as 12 hours in type. Other reinforcing units had similar issues: pilots fresh out of flight school, or experienced hands with little time on new aircraft. The results will be as they were OTL: squadrons being shot to pieces, and survivors either fleeing to Australia aboard PBYs or C-47s, or becoming POWs.

1) They are still going to shoot down Japanese planes before they go down. They aren't all going down without shooting down a single one.
2)There are other types of reinforcements outside of planes. Burma could use infantry, tanks, AAA and artilary and air superiority will do little to stop it.
3) The Japanese can't be everywhere at once.
4) The Japanese do not have resources to burn unlike the US
 
Burma sucked in a British armored brigade: in terrain that was poorly suited to tanks. They lost all of their armor and wound up walking to India-to give one example. The Brits even sent an entire division to Singapore (18th ID) on 8 Feb 42: the day the Japanese landed on the island-literally coming off the troopships under a hail of Japanese bombs, in time to surrender a week later.

Malaya was third in priority for the British in terms of personnel reinforcment: behind the U.K. and the Middle East. 4th in terms of equipment: behind the U.K, Middle East, and supply to Russia.

Japanese losses won't be all that greater than they were OTL. Faulty leadership, obsolete or obsolescent aircraft, outdated tactics, lack of experience on the part of the Allies, and the result will be the same.
 
Okay a 3 week delay from OTL probably delays the Japanese invasion of Rabaul which does not help the Australians at all since they didn't have any troops to reinforce with. It probably delays the invasion of New Guinea which does help the Allies since that gives more time to train the troops that are going to be fighting there and the troops that were originally deployed were desperately short on training, any more training would help. It doesn't help Wake, Guam or the original Philippines invasion since they were separate commands that shouldn't depend on DEI or Singapore going as OTL. The second phase of the Philippines may be impacted because the troops from the original invasion were pulled off to assist with DEI in OTL so with the delay they may just steam roller over Bataan without stopping, or they may get pulled early if things are going slow enough in DEI that the Japanese Army feels the need for more troops (which I doubt - this POD is mostly going to impact air and sea, more air cover means the Allied ships last enough longer to delay landings just a little, more air cover means bombers last enough longer to sink or damage a few more ships or cause a bit more delay in landings. A few more bombers means a few more patrols which means more Japanese convoys spotted which means the Allied subs and patrol boats do just a bit better sinking or damaging a few more ships. All of this adds up to a few hours or days delay each causing more friction for the Japanese, which add up to a few weeks delay over OTL over the entire campaign).

And yes Matt these fighters are not going to make a huge difference mostly delay the inevitable. The Japanese timetable was so tight that any delay is going to cause a cascade of delays that will have a disproportionate impact from the actual size of the original delay. I actually think the larger impact on the war will be in 1942 when the USN/USMC start fighting the Japanese with F4Fs rather than F2As. Having a fighter that is at least almost competitive will make a huge difference.

Tom.
 
They were ahead of schedule: the Java operation wasn't planned to go until early April '42. (the fact that Manila fell earlier than expected meant the 48th Division was now available-which the histories of the Philippines campaign point out that if Homma had not had to give up that division, the Bataan campaign may have been shorter, and that Singapore fell earlier than anticipated-the Japanese expected the Philippines to fall before Singapore, not the other way around)
 
Top