What if Wildcats completely replaced Brewster Buffaloes in Oct 1941?

The Buffalo was tested in Britain and was found to have performance superior to the Hurricane in many aspects. The Hurricane in Burma and Ceylon fared poorly against the Zero. The Spitfire in Australia fared poorly against the Zero in Australia. The Dutch CW-21B fared poorly in the DEI. The Wildcat fared poorly in performance evaluation against the Aleutian A6M2. The P-40 had notable success against the Zero in China using tactics devised by Chennault, and would be a better substitute, if the tactics were adopted as well. The Buffalo would have done better if properly built, with correct engine parts, and without long range tanks.

Experiments were done on the Curtiss P-36 to streamline the engine better using a ducted cowl. It failed and they ended up fiddling with a normal cowl, formed better, with a propellor spinner designed for speed. This resulted in success, achieving 340 mph from a 311 mph airplane. This was called the XP-42. Success didn't come until 1943, after the mass production of the P&W R-2800, so success was pointless for the P-42. The lesson learned was never adopted by America's military, but was utilized by successful post-war air racers and record breakers in Corsairs and F8F Conquest II and 505 mph Rare Bear. I question how fast an F4F Wildcat would have been with a streamlined cowl/spinner combination.

I thought the issues with Spitfires and Hurricanes in SEA & the Pacific in early 1942 fell down to two separate issues:
- Range
- Tactics

The Spitfires had a fairly short range, I seem to remember that a few of the spitfires defending Darwin may have runout of fuel.

The tactics issue is that they were using the same tactics and maneuvers that they used against the Germans, which just didn't work against the Zero.
 
There's two more things to remember: tactics and squadron experience. If all that happens is that the Buffaloes replace the older aircraft, but tactics remain the same, they're easy meat for Zeroes and Oscars. And many of the RAF and RAAF pilots (and all of the NEIAF) were either novices fresh out of flight school or had no combat experience despite having been winged for about a year or so prior to Dec 41. The RAF guys in Burma did have some combat veterans, including at least one ace with 12 kills in the Battle of Britain, but when they flew against the Flying Tigers in P-40Bs, the Tigers ate them for breakfast because they flew the way Chennault taught them to, despite their own lack of combat experience.
 
Hate to rain on this parade, but something to keep in mind when it comes to giving the RAF, NEIAF, and RAAF the ex-USN/MC Buffaloes: pilot training and squadron workups. In those days, it took about two weeks to a month to get a pilot, depending on his own individual experience level, checked out on a new aircraft that he had never flown before. Then the squadron has to complete workups to be declared combat-ready, and that's another two months at best if they're transitioning from older aircraft, at least four if they're standing up from scratch (i.e. a whole new squadron formed to fly the aircraft).

Say the F2As are replaced by Wildcats Fleet- and Corps-wide in Oct-Nov 41. Then the planes have to be shipped to their new operators-and that takes at least three weeks in freighters. Earliest they can arrive is early November 41. The war starts on that side of the Date Line on 8 Dec. The units flying the initial delivery of F2As, at best, will have begun their squadron workups at least. But they won't be anywhere near combat-ready, until they have to face Zeroes and Oscars. The experience of the Buffalo squadrons in Malaysia in the early days isn't good: they were shot to pieces or blasted on the ground. The lone Buffalo Squadron in Burma did OK: but flying alongside them was one of Claire Chennault's squadrons (3rd) with P-40Bs. They took on the fighters while the Buffaloes tried going for bombers-and not always succeeding. And the P-40s sometimes were busy enough that enough Japanese fighters stayed with their bombers-and shot the Buffaloes to pieces.

A good analogy would be the AAF pilots in the Philippines: one squadron had been on P-40Bs since arrival in the Philippines, two transitioned from P-35s to P-40Es between their arrival and 8 Dec, and one squadron had just arrived that final weekend and some of their aircraft were still in the shipping crates on that fatal day of 8 Dec 41.


The first shipments to Malyasia and the DEI would be considerably before Nov 1941. It isn't like 240 planes would be replaced in one fell swoop in Oct. The first replacements would happen before then, probably by a number of months. Once the Wildcats replace the Buffaloes there is nothing better to do with them than ship them to the DEI or Australia or Singapore. So there would be a number of months for them to train the first people at least. After which they do have a core soon after or slightly before Dec 8th. If they don't have the best training they fly anyways. If the best you have are half trained pilots they still go in an emergency.
 
You've still got half-trained pilots, even if they're old hands, going up in unfamiliar aircraft against combat veterans who know what they're doing, and are aces themselves. New planes+old tactics+unfamiliar aircraft=slaughter. Saburo Sakai, who flew in the Philippines and NEI in those early months, admired the Americans, British, Dutch, and Australians for their bravery, but they were no match for Zeroes, no matter what they flew. The only guys who did OK were the AAF pilots in the 17th Pursuit Squadron (provisional) who were Philippine escapees who had hoped to lead reinforcements back to the Philippines, but had to fly from Java to delay the Japanese because the ferry route had been cut by the Japanese advance. (at least two more AAF P-40 and two P-39 squadrons, and the A-24s of the 27th BG had arrived in Australia after the war started, and the original plan was to fly them via the NEI to the Philippines-half of the A-24 pilots in the 27th had been evac'd to Australia from Manila to fly their A-24s-which were Army versions of the Navy SBD Dauntless-back to the Philippines) But even the 17th could only do so much, and half of them were killed in action and the rest flew out on 3 Mar 42 in a B-17, having put their surviving P-40s to the torch.
 
You've still got half-trained pilots, even if they're old hands, going up in unfamiliar aircraft against combat veterans who know what they're doing, and are aces themselves. New planes+old tactics+unfamiliar aircraft=slaughter. Saburo Sakai, who flew in the Philippines and NEI in those early months, admired the Americans, British, Dutch, and Australians for their bravery, but they were no match for Zeroes, no matter what they flew. The only guys who did OK were the AAF pilots in the 17th Pursuit Squadron (provisional) who were Philippine escapees who had hoped to lead reinforcements back to the Philippines, but had to fly from Java to delay the Japanese because the ferry route had been cut by the Japanese advance. (at least two more AAF P-40 and two P-39 squadrons, and the A-24s of the 27th BG had arrived in Australia after the war started, and the original plan was to fly them via the NEI to the Philippines-half of the A-24 pilots in the 27th had been evac'd to Australia from Manila to fly their A-24s-which were Army versions of the Navy SBD Dauntless-back to the Philippines) But even the 17th could only do so much, and half of them were killed in action and the rest flew out on 3 Mar 42 in a B-17, having put their surviving P-40s to the torch.

Nobody said they wouldn't get slaughtered, just that they would take more down with them than OTL.
 
To repeat myself a third time, are there enough pilots on Singapore to utilise additional Buffalos?

The easiest way to get more airpower in theatre is for someone to convince Churchill to send Complete Hurricane or Spitfire units from the UK.

Preferably veteran units.

Oh, and can they bring more combat experienced flag officers for the Army and Airforces stationed in theatre?
 
Not much of a difference: a few more Zeroes and Oscars shot down won't save the NEI and Malaya. The guys in the 17th PS had flown against Zeroes in the Philippines and had learned the right way: hit and run and no dogfighting. That learning cost a number of P-40 pilots on 8 and 10 Dec.....(those who weren't caught on the ground)
 
To repeat myself a third time, are there enough pilots on Singapore to utilise additional Buffalos?

The easiest way to get more airpower in theatre is for someone to convince Churchill to send Complete Hurricane or Spitfire units from the UK.

Preferably veteran units.

Oh, and can they bring more combat experienced flag officers for the Army and Airforces stationed in theatre?

There were at least 6 or 7 squadrons of planes in Singapore so yes they had the pilots as they wouldn't be getting all the planes. There is no reason for Churchill to send any more units than in OTL. Forget the UK the fighters simply won't be sent. This is NOT about saving Singapore it is about what effect new Wildcat squadrons would have.
 
Not much of a difference: a few more Zeroes and Oscars shot down won't save the NEI and Malaya. The guys in the 17th PS had flown against Zeroes in the Philippines and had learned the right way: hit and run and no dogfighting. That learning cost a number of P-40 pilots on 8 and 10 Dec.....(those who weren't caught on the ground)


It won't save them but it could slow the Japanese down. TIme is NOT on Japan's side and every day that goes by hurts them. Every week that goes by means more troops and planes in areas Japan attacks later.
 
This is NOT about saving Singapore it is about what effect new Wildcat squadrons would have.

Well, then, you probably have your answer. Most likely, reorganization and retraining would take too long for the transferred Buffaloes to have a positive effect on Singapore or the DEI, even if only a significant delay. The Americans would do better perhaps, but they don't really have much time to retrain either, given a point of October 1941.
 
Well, then, you probably have your answer. Most likely, reorganization and retraining would take too long for the transferred Buffaloes to have a positive effect on Singapore or the DEI, even if only a significant delay. The Americans would do better perhaps, but they don't really have much time to retrain either, given a point of October 1941.

I think you are underestimating the training time as Oct is when the LAST of the Buffalo squadrons would be conveted to Wildcats not the first. Many of the squadrons would have at least 3 or 4 months training not one or two.
 
I think you are underestimating the training time as Oct is when the LAST of the Buffalo squadrons would be conveted to Wildcats not the first. Many of the squadrons would have at least 3 or 4 months training not one or two.


In that case, you should probably edit the OP. Take a starting date of, say, June 1941 to start; stipulate adequate training, facilities and logistics along the way. Then you might have something that could slow the Japanese long enough to make them miss some objective elsewhere.

But.... but.... They're still friggin' Buffaloes man. :)
 
Seconded. Even if the RAF, RAAF, and NEIAF make the transition to the Buffalo, it still won't make much of a difference. Even units with combat veterans rotated out to the Far East for "a rest" are going to have a very tough time at the very least, and those squadrons that have stood up from scratch are going to fare the worst of all. You're still sending many pilots who are fresh out of flight school at the very least, and at most, have a few weeks or a couple of months in type, facing combat veterans with experience in China in both the JNAF and JAAF. Look at Saburo Sakai's unit, the Tainan Air Group, as an example: his unit had a high percentage of vets with at least a year of combat time, some as many as three years, in their logbooks, and a couple of aces in his unit prior to 8 Dec 41. You could say the same for the other Zero groups and the JAAF in Oscars as well. Not to mention that the British at least were pretty contempous of the Japanese prior to 8 Dec 41, not considering them "a worthy enemy" and rating them worse than the Italians. A few days' pounding after 8 Dec certainly changed that attitude.

It also doesn't change the fact that the Zero outgunned, outmanuvered, outclimbed, and outran the Buffalo.
 
There was so much more wrong with Singapore than poor quality fighter aircraft. Equipping the Buffaloes with poorly-rebuilt airliner engines with incorrect fuel pumps meant that you had to operate the wobble pump by hand while battling the enemy. No oxygen equipment meant that you couldn't bounce the enemy from high altitude. Failure to establish an early warning network of radar and observers meant that you were taking off under fire. Having Imperial British officers command squadrons of colonials created great friction. Relations with Indian colonials was worse. Churchill considered Singapore a fortress, capable of being defended by a garrison of malcontents. Many sent there were malcontents, many with good reason. Mutiny was an option. Marginally better equipment wouldn't have much effect under the circumstances. CBI remained a cesspool for the remainder of the war, and only received what consideration seemed surplus to other needs at the time.
 
I thought the issues with Spitfires and Hurricanes in SEA & the Pacific in early 1942 fell down to two separate issues:
- Range
- Tactics

The Spitfires had a fairly short range, I seem to remember that a few of the spitfires defending Darwin may have runout of fuel.

The tactics issue is that they were using the same tactics and maneuvers that they used against the Germans, which just didn't work against the Zero.


And the "tropics kit" on the spitfire caused performane issues.
 
It also doesn't change the fact that the Zero outgunned, outmanuvered, outclimbed, and outran the Buffalo.

Well, it was out maneuvered, out climbed, outran (kind of, by 8 mph not exactly a barn burner). And the out gunned is arguable 4x .50 cal. vs 2x7.7mm and 2x20mm is fairly close.

Also note that the Buffalo was a lot tougher than the Zero, and a lot better than what the Dutch were using OTL. The fact that a Buffalo could take some damage and MAYBE make it back to base where the pilot MAYBE could fly again another day makes a big difference in the skill level of the Dutch air force in the DEI.

The other thing to note is that the Buffalo has over twice the range of the Bu-131 which lets the DEI them provide air cover for Allied ships much better than they could OTL.

No this is not a win for the Dutch or Singapore, but it in my opinion it slows things down for the Japanese slightly. Maybe a few more ship losses due to Allied ships being covered from the air and not being sunk by unsupported Japanese bombers. Some Japanese unsupported bombers getting shot down - the Japanese sent many unescorted bombing missions because the DEI were so weakly defended, with this they have to send fighters now. Both of these change the flow of the war around the DEI and change the tempo of battle. I would have to think more about the actual impact but my gut feeling is a slight delay for the Japanese, but if this has any long term impact on the war - probably not.

Tom.
 
The other thing to note is that the Buffalo has over twice the range of the Bu-131 which lets the DEI them provide air cover for Allied ships much better than they could OTL.


Tom.

What Bu-131? The Dutch did operate the CW-21B, which was supposed to be a good colonial fighter. The squadrons were not worked up on type, and they were not particularly durable. They also had no early warning system. They were destroyed on the ground and in the air. The AVG was supposed to get a couple, but they got bad gas on the way, and crashed.
 
What Bu-131? The Dutch did operate the CW-21B, which was supposed to be a good colonial fighter. The squadrons were not worked up on type, and they were not particularly durable. They also had no early warning system. They were destroyed on the ground and in the air. The AVG was supposed to get a couple, but they got bad gas on the way, and crashed.

I did some searches on what the Dutch were flying at the start of WWII and came up with the BU-131. As I dig a bit deeper it seems they only had two squadrons of these and one was a training squadron. So Not a major Aircraft that they flew. Yes the CW-21B was their main Aircraft, which does not change my actual argument which was the Buffalo had more range F2A: 965mi vs CW-21B: 630mi vs Bu-131: 628mi

There were several problems with the CW-21B compared to the Buffalo, first the durability issue. Basically the CW-21B was unarmored and didn't have self sealing tanks so it had all of the protection of a Zero without the maneuverability. It was very hard to land, which caused losses among partly trained pilots:
Although the CW-21 was not commissioned by the U.S. military, it was test flown at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio. The Army Air Corps immediately rejected the aircraft, with one officer commenting that it took a genius to land it.

It did have a better rate of climb than the Buffalo - or the Zero for that matter - at low altitudes, but its performance fell off quickly above about 12k. Basically if they could have had both the CW-21B and the Buffalo in enough numbers things would have been better, having just one or the other they want the tougher aircraft that maybe lets pilots come home with a damaged plane.

Edit: Okay I feel really strange about this, I am not a Brewster Buffalo fan. It was a okay aircraft that should never have been chosen over the Wildcat in the first place. But I find myself in the strange position of defending the beast because I do think it was better than the choices that the Dutch or Australians had in 1941. Just thought I would clarify this so people don't think I am a F2A Fanatic!

Tom.
 
Well, it was out maneuvered, out climbed, outran (kind of, by 8 mph not exactly a barn burner). And the out gunned is arguable 4x .50 cal. vs 2x7.7mm and 2x20mm is fairly close.

Also note that the Buffalo was a lot tougher than the Zero, and a lot better than what the Dutch were using OTL. The fact that a Buffalo could take some damage and MAYBE make it back to base where the pilot MAYBE could fly again another day makes a big difference in the skill level of the Dutch air force in the DEI.

The other thing to note is that the Buffalo has over twice the range of the Bu-131 which lets the DEI them provide air cover for Allied ships much better than they could OTL.

No this is not a win for the Dutch or Singapore, but it in my opinion it slows things down for the Japanese slightly. Maybe a few more ship losses due to Allied ships being covered from the air and not being sunk by unsupported Japanese bombers. Some Japanese unsupported bombers getting shot down - the Japanese sent many unescorted bombing missions because the DEI were so weakly defended, with this they have to send fighters now. Both of these change the flow of the war around the DEI and change the tempo of battle. I would have to think more about the actual impact but my gut feeling is a slight delay for the Japanese, but if this has any long term impact on the war - probably not.

Tom.


This I think is accurate as I don't think upgrading that many fighters will have no impact. We are talking about 10-20 squadrons not 10-20 planes and the Buffalo as bad as it was was considerably better than the crap the DEI had. No it won't stop the Japanese but it could well cost them a few islands IMO.
 
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