That's my question, though. Did Singapore and the DEI have those pilots available?
Thats what I wanted to know! Especially in Singapore!
That's my question, though. Did Singapore and the DEI have those pilots available?
The Buffalo was tested in Britain and was found to have performance superior to the Hurricane in many aspects. The Hurricane in Burma and Ceylon fared poorly against the Zero. The Spitfire in Australia fared poorly against the Zero in Australia. The Dutch CW-21B fared poorly in the DEI. The Wildcat fared poorly in performance evaluation against the Aleutian A6M2. The P-40 had notable success against the Zero in China using tactics devised by Chennault, and would be a better substitute, if the tactics were adopted as well. The Buffalo would have done better if properly built, with correct engine parts, and without long range tanks.
Experiments were done on the Curtiss P-36 to streamline the engine better using a ducted cowl. It failed and they ended up fiddling with a normal cowl, formed better, with a propellor spinner designed for speed. This resulted in success, achieving 340 mph from a 311 mph airplane. This was called the XP-42. Success didn't come until 1943, after the mass production of the P&W R-2800, so success was pointless for the P-42. The lesson learned was never adopted by America's military, but was utilized by successful post-war air racers and record breakers in Corsairs and F8F Conquest II and 505 mph Rare Bear. I question how fast an F4F Wildcat would have been with a streamlined cowl/spinner combination.
Hate to rain on this parade, but something to keep in mind when it comes to giving the RAF, NEIAF, and RAAF the ex-USN/MC Buffaloes: pilot training and squadron workups. In those days, it took about two weeks to a month to get a pilot, depending on his own individual experience level, checked out on a new aircraft that he had never flown before. Then the squadron has to complete workups to be declared combat-ready, and that's another two months at best if they're transitioning from older aircraft, at least four if they're standing up from scratch (i.e. a whole new squadron formed to fly the aircraft).
Say the F2As are replaced by Wildcats Fleet- and Corps-wide in Oct-Nov 41. Then the planes have to be shipped to their new operators-and that takes at least three weeks in freighters. Earliest they can arrive is early November 41. The war starts on that side of the Date Line on 8 Dec. The units flying the initial delivery of F2As, at best, will have begun their squadron workups at least. But they won't be anywhere near combat-ready, until they have to face Zeroes and Oscars. The experience of the Buffalo squadrons in Malaysia in the early days isn't good: they were shot to pieces or blasted on the ground. The lone Buffalo Squadron in Burma did OK: but flying alongside them was one of Claire Chennault's squadrons (3rd) with P-40Bs. They took on the fighters while the Buffaloes tried going for bombers-and not always succeeding. And the P-40s sometimes were busy enough that enough Japanese fighters stayed with their bombers-and shot the Buffaloes to pieces.
A good analogy would be the AAF pilots in the Philippines: one squadron had been on P-40Bs since arrival in the Philippines, two transitioned from P-35s to P-40Es between their arrival and 8 Dec, and one squadron had just arrived that final weekend and some of their aircraft were still in the shipping crates on that fatal day of 8 Dec 41.
You've still got half-trained pilots, even if they're old hands, going up in unfamiliar aircraft against combat veterans who know what they're doing, and are aces themselves. New planes+old tactics+unfamiliar aircraft=slaughter. Saburo Sakai, who flew in the Philippines and NEI in those early months, admired the Americans, British, Dutch, and Australians for their bravery, but they were no match for Zeroes, no matter what they flew. The only guys who did OK were the AAF pilots in the 17th Pursuit Squadron (provisional) who were Philippine escapees who had hoped to lead reinforcements back to the Philippines, but had to fly from Java to delay the Japanese because the ferry route had been cut by the Japanese advance. (at least two more AAF P-40 and two P-39 squadrons, and the A-24s of the 27th BG had arrived in Australia after the war started, and the original plan was to fly them via the NEI to the Philippines-half of the A-24 pilots in the 27th had been evac'd to Australia from Manila to fly their A-24s-which were Army versions of the Navy SBD Dauntless-back to the Philippines) But even the 17th could only do so much, and half of them were killed in action and the rest flew out on 3 Mar 42 in a B-17, having put their surviving P-40s to the torch.
To repeat myself a third time, are there enough pilots on Singapore to utilise additional Buffalos?
The easiest way to get more airpower in theatre is for someone to convince Churchill to send Complete Hurricane or Spitfire units from the UK.
Preferably veteran units.
Oh, and can they bring more combat experienced flag officers for the Army and Airforces stationed in theatre?
Not much of a difference: a few more Zeroes and Oscars shot down won't save the NEI and Malaya. The guys in the 17th PS had flown against Zeroes in the Philippines and had learned the right way: hit and run and no dogfighting. That learning cost a number of P-40 pilots on 8 and 10 Dec.....(those who weren't caught on the ground)
This is NOT about saving Singapore it is about what effect new Wildcat squadrons would have.
Well, then, you probably have your answer. Most likely, reorganization and retraining would take too long for the transferred Buffaloes to have a positive effect on Singapore or the DEI, even if only a significant delay. The Americans would do better perhaps, but they don't really have much time to retrain either, given a point of October 1941.
I think you are underestimating the training time as Oct is when the LAST of the Buffalo squadrons would be conveted to Wildcats not the first. Many of the squadrons would have at least 3 or 4 months training not one or two.
I thought the issues with Spitfires and Hurricanes in SEA & the Pacific in early 1942 fell down to two separate issues:
- Range
- Tactics
The Spitfires had a fairly short range, I seem to remember that a few of the spitfires defending Darwin may have runout of fuel.
The tactics issue is that they were using the same tactics and maneuvers that they used against the Germans, which just didn't work against the Zero.
It also doesn't change the fact that the Zero outgunned, outmanuvered, outclimbed, and outran the Buffalo.
The other thing to note is that the Buffalo has over twice the range of the Bu-131 which lets the DEI them provide air cover for Allied ships much better than they could OTL.
Tom.
What Bu-131? The Dutch did operate the CW-21B, which was supposed to be a good colonial fighter. The squadrons were not worked up on type, and they were not particularly durable. They also had no early warning system. They were destroyed on the ground and in the air. The AVG was supposed to get a couple, but they got bad gas on the way, and crashed.
Although the CW-21 was not commissioned by the U.S. military, it was test flown at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio. The Army Air Corps immediately rejected the aircraft, with one officer commenting that it took a genius to land it.
Well, it was out maneuvered, out climbed, outran (kind of, by 8 mph not exactly a barn burner). And the out gunned is arguable 4x .50 cal. vs 2x7.7mm and 2x20mm is fairly close.
Also note that the Buffalo was a lot tougher than the Zero, and a lot better than what the Dutch were using OTL. The fact that a Buffalo could take some damage and MAYBE make it back to base where the pilot MAYBE could fly again another day makes a big difference in the skill level of the Dutch air force in the DEI.
The other thing to note is that the Buffalo has over twice the range of the Bu-131 which lets the DEI them provide air cover for Allied ships much better than they could OTL.
No this is not a win for the Dutch or Singapore, but it in my opinion it slows things down for the Japanese slightly. Maybe a few more ship losses due to Allied ships being covered from the air and not being sunk by unsupported Japanese bombers. Some Japanese unsupported bombers getting shot down - the Japanese sent many unescorted bombing missions because the DEI were so weakly defended, with this they have to send fighters now. Both of these change the flow of the war around the DEI and change the tempo of battle. I would have to think more about the actual impact but my gut feeling is a slight delay for the Japanese, but if this has any long term impact on the war - probably not.
Tom.