What if von der Goltz of von Moltke as Chief of General Staff in 1906?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colmar_Freiherr_von_der_Goltz


I am going to handwave away exactly why Wilhelm II goes with Goltz over Moltke. Maybe Wilhelm read one of Goltz books.



Goltz was a noted military writer of the day and had some very specific ideas. Now Goltz came out of the Franco Prussian war with some ideas about the nature of future wars.


First Goltz was impressed by the ability of the French state to continue the fight for a full year after Sedan. In particular the mass armies the New Republic kept raising.

Second he was a very firm advocate of largest possible military size in peace and preparation for war.

Third Goltz was of the opinion that any future war would be a long drawn out affair.

Forth Goltz believed that the Franco German border should be heavily fortified.


Now even if he was made Chief of General Staff that doesn’t mean he would have unlimited ability to put his ideas into effect. The Defense Minister sets the army budget or rather asks the Reichstag to approve his requests, which is 5 years in length. 1907 and 1912 are the dates for the budgets except special budgets like the 1913 one in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. The German Navy had been sucking more and more of the budget for years and whatever Tirpitz’s faults he was without a doubt Wilhelm II’s most skilled minister in terms of working the Reichstag and he will fight to protect his service. Also there is Wilhelm’s worry on expanding the size of the army too much and letting in middle class shop keepers as officers. This directly clashes with what would be I suspect Goltz first objective and that is creating more formations and expanding the army.


So my question is what could a Chief of the General Staff achieve in place of Moltke with a start date of 1906? Assuming few butter flies in international relations, IE the July Crisis still occurs on schedule.


We can talk about French and Russian better flies in response to Germany but for now I am interested in nailing down what Germany could reasonable achieve.


Michael
 

NoMommsen

Donor
First : von der Goltz WAS a strong contender for the job, but ... unfortunatly at that time quite busy in the Ottoman Empire and he was rendered too valuable there with his very good relations to and understanding of the ottomans to be withdrawn from there.

He would have been also a strong contender to Tirpitz in dealing with the Reichstag, as he had much more ... diplomatic skills to play on politicians than Moltke had. That's something he 'learned' in turkey : backroom politics.
With his strong personality and reputation he would have been much better suited to wring out money from the Reichstag, playing with whoever would be War Minister.
By the way : one of the arguements Tirpitz used were economics, the 'profits' the non-noble industrialists could gain from the big ship-building programs.
Now consider what von der Goltz could have offered in that terms with a dedicated fortress- and even bigger railways-building program ...

It was not Wilhelm II, who was against expansion of the army and especially the officers corps to non-noble classes. It were a louder majority (?) of the old-standing, higher echolon officers at that time. Von der Goltz was far from such social snobbery.
Instead, he was an advocate of as thorough educating as many people of whatever class as possible - military education, ofc.


(For elaborated guesstimates on what he might have achieved by 1914 I have to look a wee bit more into the politics and budgets of that time first.
But I would think of two or three things for sure :
-the Belfort Gap would be fortified at least as strong as on the french side
-the Vogese mountain passes esp. at the Donon and the Col de Saales would be almost unsurpassable
-the railways to and at East-Prussia would be double-lined to ... 60-70 % of all lines, not only two )
 
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In the planning for a two front war, hand in hand with the concept of (at least initially) a more defensive orientation to the French would be a more offensive orientation toward a Russian campaign, with a significantly larger allocation of available resources.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
First thoughts on the 'surroundings' a CGGS(Chief of the Great General Staff) von der Goltz would meet.

War Ministers :
In 1906 this was Karl von Einem. IMO the both would have 'harmonized' quite well with Karl von Einem being the reason for the better equipment with artillery and machine-guns of the German army than any other army. They could have worked together for even more (really) heavy artillery at hands in 1914 (maybe not more Big Berthas but some more 30,5cm equivalents).
Well, Einem left the War ministry in 1909. Who would/could follow ? First it might be questionable, if von der Goltz would 'let him go' and not try to convince him to hang on. Second he could promote someone with a 'big' name : Moltke. Von der Goltz didn't think bad of moltke, quite the difference and after they would have worked a couple of years together (Moltke was General Quatermaster at the Great General Staff in 1906) there might be some 'understanding' between them, Moltke being an advocate of the increase of the armys manpower, at least in 1911 and 1912 against the then War Minister von Heeringen, who heavily opposed any expansion of the army. IMO von der Goltz would have strongly intervened against von Heeringen.
However, von der Goltz with his thinking of war and its preparation as something close to 'total war' and 'War Society in peacetime', would involve himself considerably in the political 'surrounding' of his war plans and necessary armaments - of the troops as well as of economy and sociaty.

Tirpitz and the Naval Law Amendments :
As they would heavily compete for money, I don't think the two would become very ... close.
The amendment of 1906 ... might go as OTL with von der Goltz still 'finding his place', though he would have already about 4-6 month to work against.
The amendment of 1908 would have already been heavily opposed by von der Goltz. He might have been able to funnel at least parts of the money into more fortifications - economically as 'attractive' for the industry as the ships.
The amendment of 1912 ... if there would even be one, it would be considerably smaller with lots of money already 'bound' to fortifications and railways exansions. These 'investments' could also be more 'liked' by the Reichstag, as their costs are at the firt look better plannable as the ships, whichs costs increased almost from ship to ship over their estimates.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
In the planning for a two front war, hand in hand with the concept of (at least initially) a more defensive orientation to the French would be a more offensive orientation toward a Russian campaign, with a significantly larger allocation of available resources.
IMO it would become even more defensive on the western front as time goes by.
 
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