What if USA not broke any Japanese codes during World War 2

The main reason for US victory in Midway was the breaking of the Jap codes...

If they weren't broken, other then Midway getting occupied, the US Carriers could have been destroyed and not vise versa as really happened.

No US carriers, that means that the US navy gets an even worse blow, something that might trigger more desperation among American public...

And even if all that happened, Japan was still doomed. By 1943 the USN would have made good its losses. Midway would be an outpost that Japan would eventually have to abandon, and the march toward Japan would continue. Yes, the war might last a bit longer with higher US losses, but Japan would still lose, catastrophically.
 
It isn't clear that the IJN would have been able to actually take Midway from the garrison, especially since the IJN woefully underestimated the firepower and numbers on Midway.

For that matter the USN which has not broken the IJN codes may have gone off en masse to Alaska after the diversionary force is first sighted around the Aleutians...


Rubicon, the USSR would no more be able to commit the national output of electricity to a single project in 1948 than Japan could in 1937. However, the USSR had 25% more electrical production in 1937 than Japan and substantially more electrical production than Japan after WWII...yet it still took the Soviets until 1949 and four years at peace to produce an Soviet atom bomb.

In comparison the likelihood of Japan being able to find enough electricity to do so before being crushed by the US is pretty much nil.
 
And do you know the Soviet electricity production of 1948?

Do you believe that the Soviet union would have 26,000,000,000 KwH to spare in 1948 when it's production in 1937 was 32,000,000,000 KwH?
Though of course as the Soviets were skipping the R&D work and had plans to work off they wouldn't have needed anywhere near as much electricity as the Manhattan Project used. Being able to jump straight to gas diffusion without having to run calutrons, etc in parallel should save you a massive amount of electricity compared to Manhattan.

I'm not making a comment either way on actual electricity production, just saying there is no need for any alt-nuke project to use as much electricity as OTL. Manhattan went for it's broad spectrum approach for good reasons and likely the project would have been delayed had it relied solely on gas diffusion, but the OTL power needs weren't compulsory - it could have been done with a lot less.

Start earlier (or accept a later date for the bomb) and focus just on one method and you can do it cheaper. Of course it's then possible your more 'focused' cheaper programme then loses out to a better resourced all aspects effort, but that's a different problem.
 

CalBear

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True, but it took about four years for a plane to go from the drawing board and into production during this time frame. The G10N was canceled after two years in 1944 because the war situation demanded that resources were allocated elsewhere. Since this is an alternative history board there is reason to speculate what could have happened to this design (and the G5N and G8N) if the war had developed differently in the pacific war. There could have been a need for then and it could have been allocated the resources to make it into production in 1946 when it would have been finished by using the four-year rule.

Based on the engine performance of ALL high output Japanese designs (mainly due to materal issues rather than design problems) it is probable that the Japanese would have required far more than the normal time frame common in the Western nations. This does not even begin to consider the resources necessary to actually construct a super heavy bomber.





Not this again. I told you that you were wildly off mark in regards to German electricity production, and you are wildly off marks in regards to the Japanese electricity production.
In 1937 the Japanese electricity production was 26,714,000,000 KwH, that's roughly the same as Canada, and about 6,000,000,000 short of the electricity production of the USSR that same year. USSR that managed after the most destructive war in history that swept and destroyed large parts of the lands, including vital dams for hydro-electrical production, to achieve a nuclear detonation four years after the USA.

So your statement that Japan lacked the electrical production (same as I said to you in an earlier thread about Germany) for a nuclear program is now, and was then just flat out wrong.


How much EXCESS electrical capacity did Japan have in 1944? For that matter how much excess capacity existed in 1943?

How much of Japan's capacity was degraded by U.S. strategic bombing (which was far more destructive than that over Germany)?

How much additional generating capacity did the USSR bring on line between 1937 and 1949?

Exactly where was the Japanese nuclear reactor complex to enrich Uranium?

As was the case with Germany, what they had in 1937 isn't half as important as how much the U.S. (and Canada) ADDED from 1940 onward. Just U.S. Government production doubled from 1941-45 and total generation increased by 30% (average of 7.5% each year) in the same time frame. Even using the 1937 figures you provided for the U.S., which doesn't account for several HUGE hydro projects, this mean that the U.S. added 37,000 KwH (million). Put another way the U.S. ADDED 150% of Japan's TOTAL 1937 generating capacity (or 78% of Germany's TOTAL 1937 capacity).
 
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It isn't clear that the IJN would have been able to actually take Midway from the garrison, especially since the IJN woefully underestimated the firepower and numbers on Midway.

For that matter the USN which has not broken the IJN codes may have gone off en masse to Alaska after the diversionary force is first sighted around the Aleutians....

Excellent points, especially regarding Alaska. I suspect that, with the US fleet not there, a Japanese invasion force could probably have taken Midway after it was pounded by the combined guns of all those battleships and cruisers, but what a waste. And without bringing the US fleet to battle, it would be another of those tactical victories that was really a strategic defeat. Japan would have to abandon the atoll almost as soon as they occupied it.
 
I suspect that, with the US fleet not there, a Japanese invasion force could probably have taken Midway after it was pounded by the combined guns of all those battleships and cruisers, but what a waste.

And the Japanese knew it, which was the strange part of this tale. I'm looking for the reference now, but at least on Japanese planner, when questioned about the basic impossibility of holding Midway once taken, could only offer, (in paraphrase) "Well if that happens we'll evacuate."
 

CalBear

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Excellent points, especially regarding Alaska. I suspect that, with the US fleet not there, a Japanese invasion force could probably have taken Midway after it was pounded by the combined guns of all those battleships and cruisers, but what a waste. And without bringing the US fleet to battle, it would be another of those tactical victories that was really a strategic defeat. Japan would have to abandon the atoll almost as soon as they occupied it.

The Japanese had NO plan to bombard the Island with their heavies. The Plan called for a brief bombardment by a Cruiser division. The IJN battleships were armed for a surface engagement, not shore bombardment, so they have very limited number of non AP shells in their magazines. AP shells are more or less useless against land targets.

Without the code information the U.S. garrison would be smaller than IOTL, but the Japanese plan was so bad (it mainly consisted of there's the island go take it) that even the smaller garrison might have been able to hold.

It is true that the Japanese would have had a tiger by the tail if they had held the Island. I'm not at all sure they would have abandoned it, even in the face of heavy U.S. counter attacks. The Japanese would probably have gotten into a battle of attrition over the base, just as they did over every other sandspit they captured.
 
Anyone who wants to read about the Japanese nuclear programs should check out this book:

The Day Man Lost: Hiroshima, 6 August 1945

It covers the US, German, and Japanese nuclear programs, as well as August 6-9 and the final days from the Japanese point of view.


The primary laboratory they were using was in the middle of Tokyo and it burned to the ground hours after a B-29 raid the day Roosevelt died.
 

Rubicon

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Based on the engine performance of ALL high output Japanese designs (mainly due to materal issues rather than design problems) it is probable that the Japanese would have required far more than the normal time frame common in the Western nations. This does not even begin to consider the resources necessary to actually construct a super heavy bomber.


I agree, the Japanese had great difficulties in particular in getting high-performance engines to work, due to to many projects at the same time, lack of co-operation between army and navy projects and lack of high-quality materials for engines.

But as I said, the war in the pacific would have to be radically different in order for the Japanese to pursue such an aeroplane. In fact I agree that in any pacific war even close to OTL the G10N (and to lesser extents the G5N and G8N) would have been a ridiculous waste of resources and personnel.

However I do believe that with time the plane could have been made operational, though likely with reduced characteristics then those given on Wikipedia, somewhere between 1946-49.


How much EXCESS electrical capacity did Japan have in 1944? For that matter how much excess capacity existed in 1943?

I don't know, do you?

How much of Japan's capacity was degraded by U.S. strategic bombing (which was far more destructive than that over Germany)?

In 1943? Much less. In 1945? No idea, I don't know to what extent the USAAF targeted Japanese electricity production. Do you?

How much additional generating capacity did the USSR bring on line between 1937 and 1949?

I don't know, do you?
However I do acknowledge that my analogy of the USSR was wrong. Particular after realizing a mistake I made in reading the table of the USSR, the numbers I took was from 1936 in regards to the USSR, the electricity production of 1937 was roughly 36,000,000,000 KwH. I apologize for that mistake.

But while on this subject, I wonder why you never have denounced any successful 'tube-alloy projects' that are used from time to time in timelines on this board, on the same reasons that you denounce German and Japanese atomic bomb projects?
Electricity production in the UK was in 1937 28,760,000,000 KwH, only 2,000,000,0000 more then Japan, and much lower then the German electricity production.

As was the case with Germany, what they had in 1937 isn't half as important as how much the U.S. (and Canada) ADDED from 1940 onward. Just U.S. Government production doubled from 1941-45 and total generation increased by 30% (average of 7.5% each year) in the same time frame. Even using the 1937 figures you provided for the U.S., which doesn't account for several HUGE hydro projects, this mean that the U.S. added 37,000 KwH (million). Put another way the U.S. ADDED 150% of Japan's TOTAL 1937 generating capacity (or 78% of Germany's TOTAL 1937 capacity).

And you still haven't posted a single number the Manhattan projects (or for that matter the post-war Soviet, French and British projects) in an either monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, half yearly, yearly or total electricity cost.

However I do acknowledge that the USA added a tremendous amount of hydro-electric electricity generation particularly from the Tennessee Valley Authority project in particular post -42 when these dams was becoming finished.
But, the figures I gave was for Germany only. Not added Austria, Bohemia&Moravia, Poland, Norway&Denmark, BeNeLux, Yugoslavia, Greece or France, whose electricity production would also have been available for Germany to use which would add about ~47,300,000,000 KwH. Which together with the German would mean an total electricity production of ~96,200,000,000 KwH or about 80% of the total USA production.

And while the USA electricity production during the war increased, so did the German (though not that of occupied Europe).

Do you still believe that Germany could not afford an atomic bomb project on the cost of electricity?
 

CalBear

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I agree, the Japanese had great difficulties in particular in getting high-performance engines to work, due to to many projects at the same time, lack of co-operation between army and navy projects and lack of high-quality materials for engines.

But as I said, the war in the pacific would have to be radically different in order for the Japanese to pursue such an aeroplane. In fact I agree that in any pacific war even close to OTL the G10N (and to lesser extents the G5N and G8N) would have been a ridiculous waste of resources and personnel.

However I do believe that with time the plane could have been made operational, though likely with reduced characteristics then those given on Wikipedia, somewhere between 1946-49.




I don't know, do you?



In 1943? Much less. In 1945? No idea, I don't know to what extent the USAAF targeted Japanese electricity production. Do you?



I don't know, do you?
However I do acknowledge that my analogy of the USSR was wrong. Particular after realizing a mistake I made in reading the table of the USSR, the numbers I took was from 1936 in regards to the USSR, the electricity production of 1937 was roughly 36,000,000,000 KwH. I apologize for that mistake.

But while on this subject, I wonder why you never have denounced any successful 'tube-alloy projects' that are used from time to time in timelines on this board, on the same reasons that you denounce German and Japanese atomic bomb projects?
Electricity production in the UK was in 1937 28,760,000,000 KwH, only 2,000,000,0000 more then Japan, and much lower then the German electricity production.



And you still haven't posted a single number the Manhattan projects (or for that matter the post-war Soviet, French and British projects) in an either monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, half yearly, yearly or total electricity cost.

However I do acknowledge that the USA added a tremendous amount of hydro-electric electricity generation particularly from the Tennessee Valley Authority project in particular post -42 when these dams was becoming finished.
But, the figures I gave was for Germany only. Not added Austria, Bohemia&Moravia, Poland, Norway&Denmark, BeNeLux, Yugoslavia, Greece or France, whose electricity production would also have been available for Germany to use which would add about ~47,300,000,000 KwH. Which together with the German would mean an total electricity production of ~96,200,000,000 KwH or about 80% of the total USA production.

And while the USA electricity production during the war increased, so did the German (though not that of occupied Europe).

Do you still believe that Germany could not afford an atomic bomb project on the cost of electricity?

Actually it would be about 80% of the U.S. 1937 production.

To date I have not been able to turn up the U.S. generating capacity in 1940, which is actually a much more germane number. My Google-fu is failing me in this regard. I have also not found the book where I found the TVA and overall electrical usage figures (did have a couple good coughing fits from the dust stirred in the effort however).

I have noted in dicussions regarding the production of the Bomb that it was quite impossible for the UK to have managed it, although I have mainly looked at the sheer dollar (or pound) cost of the program. One of the more interesting things that I read in looking for the Manhattan data is that between the initial S-1 discussions in mid-1941 and the Quebec Agreement in later summer of 1943 the U.S. had managed to put $1 billion (1943 dollars) into Manhattan while the British had spent $500K on Tube Alloys. One of the main drivers for the Quebec Agreement was that the British saw that they were going to be flat out left standing in the station if they didn't get on board Manhattan before their input became, at best, marginal (BTW: I think that was a rather pessimistic assessment since the UK contributed considerably to the Project). The same is also true for the Reich or Imperial Japan. The Bomb project cost better than $20 billion (2005 dollars) and the B-29 project was virtually the same cost. (BTW: this is another mark against the Japanese super heavy project, although not the biggest one since the B-29 was possibly more plane than was needed for the mission, lack of funding).

I will state categorically that no nation on Earth could have afforded the overall research and production costs of Manhattan, while also producing everything else needed to actually fight the war except the United States. This includes the availability of excess electrical generation (and here even the U.S. was absorbing a fair share of Canada's Generation, especially from Quebec and BC). This is perhaps best illustrated that it took the USSR, even with much of the research available to them, including designs for the various separation methods, four years of a peacetime Hero Project to duplicate just the Bomb and a few substandard copies of the B-29.
 

Rubicon

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I will state categorically that no nation on Earth could have afforded the overall research and production costs of Manhattan, while also producing everything else needed to actually fight the war except the United States.
That, I do agree with.
 
I will state categorically that no nation on Earth could have afforded the overall research and production costs of Manhattan, while also producing everything else needed to actually fight the war except the United States. This includes the availability of excess electrical generation (and here even the U.S. was absorbing a fair share of Canada's Generation, especially from Quebec and BC). This is perhaps best illustrated that it took the USSR, even with much of the research available to them, including designs for the various separation methods, four years of a peacetime Hero Project to duplicate just the Bomb and a few substandard copies of the B-29.

To be fair, at least a part of that for other nations was how the war itself wound up. The UK was going bankrupt early on in the war and so would never have afforded it on its own no matter what, the USSR lost a great deal of its best industrial territory and had enough on its plate ensuring its simple survival first to worry about going further with its Bomb project. The USA could afford it at all because it was never, bar the direct intervention of Alien Space Bats, going to have enemy armies marching and shooting over its territory, the other belligerents, bar Japan, never had that luxury and Japan was bombed and starved without that being necessary as it was.
 
Actually it would be about 80% of the U.S. 1937 production.

To date I have not been able to turn up the U.S. generating capacity in 1940, which is actually a much more germane number. My Google-fu is failing me in this regard. I have also not found the book where I found the TVA and overall electrical usage figures (did have a couple good coughing fits from the dust stirred in the effort however).

I'm not sure the electrical generating capacity is really all that significant. You can use natural uranium in a heavy water or graphite reactor; you don't need to enrich it - the US didn't. And the Japanese did have a heavy water plant in Manchuria, although I don't know if it was making enough to support a pile.

Doesn't really matter anyway; they can't afford the project even if they have the juice. Also, I'm pretty sure they didn't have access to enough uranium ore, although I'm not positive about that.
 

CalBear

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I'm not sure the electrical generating capacity is really all that significant. You can use natural uranium in a heavy water or graphite reactor; you don't need to enrich it - the US didn't. And the Japanese did have a heavy water plant in Manchuria, although I don't know if it was making enough to support a pile.

Doesn't really matter anyway; they can't afford the project even if they have the juice. Also, I'm pretty sure they didn't have access to enough uranium ore, although I'm not positive about that.

Actually, electrical availabilty was a huge requirement (even though I am still vexed by having carefully saving the reference book so well I can't find the bloody thing). The need to operate massive number of various kinds of separation systems was critical to the process, even in enriched uranium. Using the natural ore you need (I actually looked up my post were I had calculated the amount this time) 112,676,000 TONS of ore to get 15 pounds of fissionable material, which, according to open sources, is what you need to create one gun-type "Little Boy" weapon.

The U.S. did enrich their uranium as soon as the capacity was available. They used the same reactors as those used to produce the early plutionium supply.
 
Actually, electrical availabilty was a huge requirement (even though I am still vexed by having carefully saving the reference book so well I can't find the bloody thing). The need to operate massive number of various kinds of separation systems was critical to the process, even in enriched uranium.

Okay, I'm really confused here. Are you talking about processing the ore or enriching the uranium? By which I mean, the process of taking ore and separating out elements other than uranium to produce uranium metal, or the process of then taking that uranium metal and removing the U-238 isotope to produce material with a higher percentage of U-235?

I am not an expert on this, but my understanding is that the initial ore processing is primarily chemical, and does not require vast amounts of electricity (at least compared to any other metallurgical process). The enrichment, however, does require titanic quantities of electricity - but you don't need enrichment if you're planning to use the plutonium implosion approach, since you can use unenriched uranium in a graphite- or heavy water-moderated reactor.

Using the natural ore you need (I actually looked up my post were I had calculated the amount this time) 112,676,000 TONS of ore to get 15 pounds of fissionable material, which, according to open sources, is what you need to create one gun-type "Little Boy" weapon.

Grades of uranium ore differ widely, but according to the IAEA (warning: pdf), as of 1979, uranium mills were consuming 65,000,000 tons of feedstock to produce 38,000 tons of metallic uranium. That gives an average concentration of 0.058%. About 0.7% of natural uranium is U-235. Therefore, to produce 1 kg of pure U-235 would require 244,360 kg = 244 tons of feedstock. Little Boy contained 140 lbs. = 64 kg of highly-enriched uranium, which works out to about 15,616 tons of feedstock.

The U.S. did enrich their uranium as soon as the capacity was available. They used the same reactors as those used to produce the early plutionium supply.

I don't understand what you mean here. You don't use a reactor to enrich uranium, you use a reactor to convert U-238 into plutonium. The US pursued uranium enrichment from the start, as well as reactors, but either one is good enough for a bomb.
 
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Actually, electrical availabilty was a huge requirement (even though I am still vexed by having carefully saving the reference book so well I can't find the bloody thing). The need to operate massive number of various kinds of separation systems was critical to the process, even in enriched uranium. Using the natural ore you need (I actually looked up my post were I had calculated the amount this time) 112,676,000 TONS of ore to get 15 pounds of fissionable material, which, according to open sources, is what you need to create one gun-type "Little Boy" weapon.

The U.S. did enrich their uranium as soon as the capacity was available. They used the same reactors as those used to produce the early plutionium supply.

:confused:Candu plants until very recently all used natural (i.e. un-enriched) Uranium, and the tech was good enough that India used her Canadian built 'experimental' reactor to produce her first bomb.

So, actually, IF you can figure out a heavy water reactor fast enough, and then run it long enough, you don't need a WHOLE lot of electricity.

IIRC the initial Soviet reactors used graphite and unenriched Uranium, and AFAIK that was enough for (?several of?) their early bombs.
 

CalBear

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Okay, I'm really confused here. Are you talking about processing the ore or enriching the uranium? By which I mean, the process of taking ore and separating out elements other than uranium to produce uranium metal, or the process of then taking that uranium metal and removing the U-238 isotope to produce material with a higher percentage of U-235?

I am not an expert on this, but my understanding is that the initial ore processing is primarily chemical, and does not require vast amounts of electricity (at least compared to any other metallurgical process). The enrichment, however, does require titanic quantities of electricity - but you don't need enrichment if you're planning to use the plutonium implosion approach, since you can use unenriched uranium in a graphite- or heavy water-moderated reactor.



Grades of uranium ore differ widely, but according to the IAEA (warning: pdf), as of 1979, uranium mills were consuming 65,000,000 tons of feedstock to produce 38,000 tons of metallic uranium. That gives an average concentration of 0.058%. About 0.7% of natural uranium is U-235. Therefore, to produce 1 kg of pure U-235 would require 244,360 kg = 244 tons of feedstock. Little Boy contained 140 lbs. = 64 kg of highly-enriched uranium, which works out to about 15,616 tons of feedstock.



I don't understand what you mean here. You don't use a reactor to enrich uranium, you use a reactor to convert U-238 into plutonium. The US pursued uranium enrichment from the start, as well as reactors, but either one is good enough for a bomb.

I made a rather significant error when I typed my original message (putting me in the same situation as Heisenberg, albeit with far less reason) which frankly is inexcusable on my part. As such my data is pretty much worthless.

One note:

The average for all uranium ore is actually 0.25% of metal for any given amount of ore from the sandstone deposits which are generally found in Europe and Kazakstan (as well as most U.S. deposits) wich ranges fron 0.05% to 0.4%. A concentration of 0.38% is considered to be medium grade and is at the top of the quality that was available to Germany, which was the subject of my original post. A consistant 0.711% of refined metal is U-235.

I will be over in the corner licking my wounds if anyone needs me.
 
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